The Internal Administration of Lord Elgin in India, 1894-1898. by Malhotra, Piarea Lal
TH E INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF 
LORD ELGIN IN INDIA, 1894 - 1898
Thesis submitted Tor the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
University of London 
by
PIAREA LAL MALHOTRA
School of Oriental and African Studies February 1966
ProQuest Number: 11010320
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010320
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
ABSTRACT
This Thesis is a study of some aspects of the internal 
administration of Lord Elgin as Viceroy of India from 1894 to 1898.
The problems faced by the administration were mainly financial 
and economic. In 1893 the currency system of India was changed in 
order to give financial stability to the Indian exchequer and to 
introduce a gold standard in India. This, however, did not immediately 
improve the financial situation. The Indian Government had to 
impose import duties, including those on cotton goods, to meet the 
financial deficit. In order to safeguard the Manchester cotton 
interests the Government of India imposed countervailing excise 
duties on Indian cotton goods. This gave rise to a serious 
controversy. The outbreak of famine and plague added to the difficulties 
of the administration. The plague measures excited the social and 
religious prejudices of the ppople and resulted in riots and murders.
The Government was disposed to regard educated Indians and the press 
with suspicion and as being largely responsible for creating political 
troubles. In order to deal with them effectively the Government 
changed the sedition laws and armed itself with immense judicial 
powers. Though it was primarily a period of administrative difficulties, 
Elgin found time to introduce some reforms in the fields of railway 
administration and formulated a policy of planning and its rapid 
expansion.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study of some aspects of Lord Elgin's
administration in India. So far no history of Elgin's administration
1
in India has been written, nor has Elgin found a biographer.
Fortunately, some interest in this period has been shown by recent 
scholars. L. Harris, in an unpublished Ph.D. thesis of London 
University, I960, entitled British Policy on the North-Western Frontier 
1889-1901* has devoted a good deal of attention to the British 
activities on the North-Westem Frontier, the Chitral expedition 
of 1895 and the Tribal rising of 1897• Therefore, the above features
of Elgin's administration have been deliberately left out in this 
study. In this work attention has been given to the internal 
administration of Lord Elgin. In order to evaluate the real importance 
of the subject, I have endeavoured to concentrate on the most important 
problems and policies of the period. Although some other scholars 
like J.R. Me lane in his unpublished Ph.D. thesis of London University, 
1961, entitled The Development of Nationalist Ideas and Tactics and 
the Policies of the Government of India 1897-1905; H.L. Singh,
Problems and Policies of the British in India, 1885-1898; and S. Go pal, 
British Policy in India 1898-1905 have made a study of certain aspects
1 A short contemporary survey of the main activities of the period 
is to be found in 'India under Lord Elgin', in Quarterly Review, 
London, 18991 vol. 189, PP* 313-36.
2 Chapters 4, 5» 6 and 7i PP* 108-270.
of the period, a systematic and interpretative study of Elgin's 
viceroyalty has not so far been attempted. This work is a modest 
attempt in that direction.
A study of Elgin's internal administration necessarily 
leads to a thorough examination of some of the problems which Elgin 
had to face almost immediately on arrival and others which cropped 
up later during his viceroyalty.
The most pressing problem was financial. The Government budget 
had been showing continuous deficit since 1892. The gold liabilities 
of the Government, like 'Home' charges, had been increasing since 
l870's because of the fall in the value of the rupee. For example, 
in 1871 the exchange value of the rupee was 2s. and in 1892, it had 
been moved down to l4d. The fall in the gold value also discouraged 
the foreign capitalists to invest in the country for want of certainty 
in the exchange rate. It equally caused inconveniences to the foreign 
import trade. To remove the aberrations the Government decided in 
June 1893 to change the monetary system of India and abandoned the 
silver automatic standard. To achieve the necessary financial 
benefit the Government fixed the artificial ratio of exchange to 
Is. 4d, which was much above the existing market ratio. It was 
decided when the ratio of Is. 4d would be achieved after contracting 
the currency, India would be given the gold standard. Such a 
revolutionary change was hound to have a significant effect on the 
economic life of the people.
As expected the value of the rupee was bound to rise when in
course of time the number of rupees became scarce in comparison 
with the requirements of the people. The growth of population and 
trade generally necessitates an increase in the volume of currency 
and when the supply of the currency is stopped the business and 
trade starve. A sound currency is always the nerve-centre of any 
country. Over circulation of currency in the market is as bad as 
its relative shortage. Similarly the currency must serve the 
requirements of internal trade and economic interests as well as 
foreign trade. Did the Government consider all these questions 
while announcing the change or was the Government motivated by the 
consideration of improving just its own financial condition? Vas 
the closure of mints and the fixing of so high a ratio the only 
means left to the Government to employ? Did the Government materialise 
the object in view and how did it react to the impact of new changes? 
These are some questions which would obviously arise in dealing 
with a complicated problem like currency. As the impact and the 
influence of the change were entirely felt by Elgin's administration, 
the circumstances and the time of the change of India's currency 
system have been treated as essential parts of this work.
The significance of the change at the time was still more 
because Elgin on his arrival found himself face to face with an 
experimental and controversial currency system and a considerable 
financial deficit. Throughout the period of Elgin, the Indian 
Government was involved in some form of financial and currency 
crisis. This period also witnessed a great deal of debate and
clash with the Home Government on the question of introducing gold 
standard and the desire of the Indian Government to terminate the 
transitory period at its earliest*
To begin with the financial situation did not improve* There 
was a deficit of 35 million rupees in 1894-5* The only possible 
avenue of raising the revenue was through the imposition of import 
duties including those on the cotton goods which formed nearly half 
of the total import trade. The question arose as to whether the 
imposition of duty would be against the principles of free Trade?
If the financial situation was serious and imposition of duty on 
the cotton goods was essential, what possible steps could be taken 
to safeguard the Manchester interests? Would the imposition be 
against the imperial tariff policy which came to be inaugurated 
during Salisbury-Lytton period? Was there any real economic danger 
to the British from the growing Indian textile industry? Could 
the imposition of countervailing excise on the Indian cloth satisfy 
the Home interest? And would the imposition of excise on Indian 
made goods be justified taking in view the general economic and 
political attitude of the British towards India? Such were the 
questions involved in the cotton duty controversy which had profound 
effect on the Indian administration in general and on Elgin in 
particular.
In 1896 a very widespread famine broke out in India. The 
Government was called upon to put into practice the famine policy
of providing effective relief to the millions which was formulated
10 ^ ^
by 1880. It also fell to the lot of the Government to decide 
the best means of meeting the food demands of the public* Should 
Government intervene and regulate the supply of food or leave it 
in the hands of the private trade? What should ^the general 
strategy be to meet the challenge of famine?
Simultaneously the plague broke out and aroused public 
concern and compelled the Government to take certain strict measures 
which had political repercussions. The Government, in fact, 
responded to the public criticism in a negative way and amended 
the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code to restrict 
ndangerous and seditious" utterances of the public and the press. 
Disasters like famine and plague made the period difficult and 
exciting.
Thus Elgin was confronted with one problem after another and 
had no time to initiate reforms, except in the field of railways 
towards which he devoted particular attention both in the formulation 
of policy and railway organisation. Elgin realised that for the 
economic development of the country it was most essential to open 
up as much of the interior as possible. But on account of the 
falling exchange the Government had failed to attract the investors.
They demanded firm guarantees. Elgin recognised the need of guarantee 
and in a realistic way* In addition he reorganized and reformed the 
railway administration in such a way that would lead to rapid 
expansion.
Thus these were the main economic, social and political problems
11
which absorbed the attention of Lord Elgin. In an attempt to
study all these issues of the period, a great attention has been
devoted to the attitude of the Home Government and the various
points of conflicts between it and the Government of India.
For a fuller understanding of Elgin*s policy and attitude
towards the Indian problems, it may seem worthwhile to glance at
tiis life up to 1894.
Victor Alexander Bruce, the ninth earl of Elgin and thirteenth
Earl of Kincardine was the eldest son of James Bruce, the eighth
Earl, by his second wife, Lady Mary Louisa Lambton. He was bora on
16 May 1849 at Monklands near Montreal, when his father was the
Governor General of Canada. Alexander Bruce was only fourteen years
old when his father, who then was the Viceroy of India, died in
October 1863 at Dharam Sala.* This was a grievous loss to young
Elgin who was profoundly shocked by his father's death. After being
educated at Eton and Balliol, he proceeded to take an active interest
in the liberal politics of Scotland. By 1886 he became the chairman
3
of the Scottish Liberal Party. As a supporter of Gladstone at the
1 There are two excellent biographies of the Eighth Earl of Elgin: 
Theodore Valrond, Life of Earl of Elgin, London, 1872; and
J.L. Morrison, The Eighth Earl of Elgin, London, 1928.
2 There are several veiy personal letters in the family collections 
which reflect the immense loss to the family at Lord Elgin's death.
3 See James G. Kellas. 'The Liberal Party in Scotland 1876-1895*, 
Scottish Historical Review, vol. XLIV, No. 137, April 1965,
pp. 1-17.
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time of the Home Rale split, he served in the short-lived Liberal 
Government of 1886, first as the Treasurer of the Household and 
then as the First Commissioner of Works*
Vhen Gladstone formed his fourth Cabinet in 1892, he had to 
take the decision of appointing a new Viceroj of India as Lord 
Lansdowne was due to retire by the end of 1893• The first choice 
of the Cabinet fell on Lord Spencer, who was then the First Lord
of the Admiralty and Lord Herschell, the Lord Chancellor* Both
2refused to prefer anything to the Cabinet post* On 9 August 1893
the name of Sir Henry Norman, who was at one time a Member of the
Viceroy's Executive Council from 1870-7 and then the Governor of
Queensland, was proposed* His candidature was strongly supported
by Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India
3and other members of the India Council* Another name suggested was 
that of Lord Elgin by Campbell-Bannerman, the Secretary of State for
4
War in Gladstone's Cabinet, and Lord Rosebery* Gladstone and 
Kimberley showed preference for Lord Elgin* But Queen Victoria did
1 Dictionary of National Biography, 1912-1921, London, 1927, P* 72.
2 Kimberley to Gladstone, 2 August 1893* Gladstone Papers, Add*
MSS. 44229, Fol. 142*
3 Kimberley to Gladstone, 9 August 1893, Fol. 142* Also ibid* «
10 August 1893 * Fol. l48ff.
4 Kimberley to Gladstone, 11 August 1893, Fol. 152ff. Also Rosebery 
to Gladstone, 10 August 1893, Gladstone Papers, Add*MSS* 44290, 
Fol. 171.
(A
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not think Elgin to be well-suited for this important post. She
thought he was too reserved and lacked experience. Unfortunately
both Norman and Elgin declined; the former on the ground of his
2health and the latter due to his wife's delicate health. In the
meantime, Kimberley decided to ask Lansdowne to continue for
another six months or so. By September the invitation was again
revived to both Norman and Elgin. The majority of the Cabinet
preferred to send a non-military man and thus the choice fell on 
3
Elgin. Lord Rosebery personally persuaded Elgin to accept the 
call of duty. On October 1893 Rosebery informed Gladstone about 
Elgin's acceptance.
There appeared to be some misunderstanding regarding Elgin's
1 Queen Victoria to Gladstone, 12 August 1893* George Earl 
Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1891*1895. vol. 11, 
London, 1931) P* 300.
2 Algernon Vest, Private Diaries, London, 1922, entry of 28 August 
1893, P. 192.
3 Kimberley to Gladstone, 21 September 1893, Add.MSS. 44229, Fol. 
159ff» Also Kimberley to Gladstone, 26 September 1893, ibid. f 
Fol. 165.
4 Rosebery to Gladstone, 2 October 1893, Gladstone Papers, Add. 
MSS. 44290, Fol. 190.
Also Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 3 October 1893, Letters of 
Queen Victoria, p. 318.
Elgin to Gladstone, 7 October 1893, Gladstone Papers, Add.MSS. 
44517, Fol. 265.
See also, Rosebery to Elgin, 26 September 1893; 30 September
and 3 October 1893, Family Papers.
Actually on 7 October 1893, Sir Henry Norman had also accepted. 
Telegram Governor Queensland to Colonial Secretary, 7 October 
1893, Gladstone Papers, Add.MSS. 44229, Fol. 181.
initial refusal and his subsequent acceptance. He did not refuse,
as is alleged by some, on account of his own modest estimate of
himself. Nor was he offered the viceroyalty merely because his
1
father once occupied that coveted office. He refused it for the
first time on account of two reasons. First, he was more keen to
remain in England and had set his heart on the Secretaryship for
Scotland. His desire for that office was understandable because
since the l880's he had been taking a keen interest in the Scottish
2Liberal Party. Rosebery knew about Elgin's preference, but it was 
not possible at that time to offer the post to Elgin because the 
post was already occupied. Secondly, his wife was not keeping good
1 S. Gopal, British Policy in India, p. 180.
2 Rosebery to Elgin, 19 August and 21 September 1893,
Family Papers. ;jaws
James Robert Rhodes^in his book Rosebery. London, 1963* P* 290n, 
quotes Rosebery's letter to the Queen out of context, 
in which he maligns Elgin as unfit and unaspiring man.
Actually, the letter in question, written by Rosebery to the 
Queen makes no reference to Elgin and reads as follows:
"Lord Rosebery knows nothing of the new Viceroy £~Sir Henry 
NormanJ7 who is obviously too old to undertake the post ••••
It seems positively sad to Lord Rosebery that more fit and 
aspiring men should not be found for this splendid position.* 
Rosebery to Queen Victoria, 4 September 1893• Letters of 
Queen Victoria, p. 309*
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1
health and he was also concerned about education of his ten
2
children. His mother too was sick and ageing. It was only 
after a good deal of persuasion by Rosebery that he finally accepted 
the Viceroyalty.
Elgin had no experience in practical politics but had acquired 
some positive experience in the field of administration through
3
extra official agencies. His love for railways was also derived
from his earlier experience of the railway activities of Scotland.
He had been for a long time Chairman of North British Hailway Company
4
and the Director of the Royal Bank of Scotland.
5
In his political thinking Elgin was a Whig and not a radical.
1 Earlier, in 1892, Elgin had refused the Governorship of New 
South Vales offered to him by Ripon on account of his wife's 
indifferent health.. Ripon to Gladstone, 16 August 1893i Gladstone 
Papers, Add.MSS. 43326, Fol. 161.
2 Elgin's attachment and concern about his mother is lucidly 
expressed in this letter of Elgin to his mother dated 9 October 
1893* "Need I say that in the step, if we must take it, I
see plainly enough that the call on you is the most severe 
of all. But once again you know me by your example howo duty 
is to be faced - bravely, without a murmur or thought of self - 
and nothing could bring back to me remembrance (if that were 
needful) the example of my father's life more forcibly than 
the way in which you are sending me forth - encouraging me 
to believe that you consider me to be following the course he 
would have chosen. ** Family Papers.
3 Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 16 August 1893« Letters of Queen 
Victoria, p. 304.
4 Family Papers contain many papers regarding Lord Elgin's 
railway activities.
5 James G. Kell as, 'Liberal In Scotland, 1876-1895’ i
Scottish Historical ReviewrHP* 7-
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In his approach to Indian problems he was more of a moderate and 
cantious Whig. In his economic thinking he was a firm believer 
in free trade and private enterprise. He was guided by these 
principles in formulation of major policies.
Elgin's appointment though not well received in the British 
Press, was acclaimed in India, primarily because he was a representative 
of Gladstone.^ After receving the brief from the India Office,
Elgin left London after Christmas and reached Bombay on 21 January 
1894. Thus began his Viceroyalty in India.
1 See Hindu Patriot, Bombay Gazette, Morning Post, Pioneer, Lahore 
Civil and Military Gazette, 13 October 1893> Times of India,
14 October; Bengalee, 21 October 1893> E.P., vol. 74 Newspaper 
cuttings^.
See also Bombay Samachar, 13 October, Kalser-e-Hind, 15 October; 
Mahratha, 15 October, Rost Goftar, 15 October, Indian Spectator,
15 October, Indu Prakash, 16 October, Bomb. H.N.R., 1893* 
Gujarati, 21 January, Native Opinion, 21 January 1894, ibid. 
Sanjivani, 30 December 1893; Dainik-o-Samachar Chandrika,
25 January 1894^
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Chapter I
THE CURRENCY QUESTION
With a view to introduce gold standard in India the administration
of Lord Lansdowne closed on 26 June 1893» the Indian mints to the
free coinage of silver* This measure of the Government inaugurated
a radical change in the currency policy of India* It also initiated
a controversy the brunt of which was endured by the administration of
Lord Elgin* There was hardly any branch of administration which was
not affected by the new change in the currency system of India. In
order to appreciate the question fully, it is essential to study the
background and reasons which induced the Government to abandon the
free and automatic standard.
It was the East India Company which attempted to introduce both
gold and silver coins with a definite legal ratio, weight and fineness*
Before the Company rule, there existed in India 994 coins of varying
1
weight and fineness* Yet the real currency policy of British India
  2
was not laid down till 1835* The Act XVII of 1835 declared one uniform 
silver rupee as the standard coin for the whole of British India.
During the period of open mints, between 1835-931 the value of the 
rupee was natural and not artificial, and was determined by the market 
price of silver. The value of the rupee, therefore, against gold or
1 H*D. Macleod, Indian Currency, London, 1898, p. 13*
2 In 1870, this legislation on the coinage was consolidated, 
amended and passed into law as the Indian Coinage Act No. XXIII 
of 1870.
18
commodites was equal to the value of the silver contained in the 
1
rupee. The expansion and the contraction of the rupee circulation 
was perfectly automatic and was regulated by the conditions of trade 
and commerce, internal as well as external.
In 18731 a new change took place in relationship between the
two metals - silver and gold. The gold price of silver, which had
2
till then remained stationary began to fall. The rupee-sterling 
exchange, or what was the same thing, the exchange relationship of 
India with gold standard countries naturally followed the market price 
of silver in terms of gold. The rupee which was freely mintable in 
exchange for silver, began to depreciate in relation to the currency 
of Great Britain. Vhile in 1880 the Indian rupee was worth 20fd, 
it exchanged for l4jd in 1892.^
The rapid exchange fluctuations came under serious attack from 
several sources. The most affected by these changes was the Government 
of India, which had the largest amount of sterling liabilities in terms 
of 'Home Charges'. The position was all the more embarrassing because 
the Government collected its revenue in silver. Therefore, with the 
decline of the gold value of silver the obligations of the Indian
1 In other words the rupee value was equal to the silver value which 
was equal to the gold price of silver.
2 The Royal Commission on Gold and Silver in 1888 reported that in 
last 200 years, gold and silver had not varied more than 3 per cent 
on either side of a ratio of l$i of silver to 1 of gold. Final 
Report of the Royal Con— ission on Gold and Silver, 1888, Pari.
Papers, vol. 45, £C.5512_7, p.2.
3 Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 1893, Pari. Papers, vol. 6 5, 
Z “C.7060.II_7, Appendix ii, pp. 252-4.
The average price of silver which in 1872-3 80 5/l6d per oz.
went down in 1892-3 to 39 1/16 d. H.L. Chablani, Studies in Indian 
Currency and Exchange, London, 1931* PP* 13-14.
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Government increased. For example in 1894-5, the sterling value
of the bills was £15,770,533* The rupee equivalent actually paid by
the Indian Government was Rupees 28.9 crores, while at the rate
prevailing in 1872-3, it would have paid Rupees 16.6 crores. The
difference thus amounted to Rupees 12.3 crores, which was more than
1
half the amount of the net land revenue. The total loss on account
of exchange between 1875*98 came to about Rupees 154 crores - an
_ , 2 
average of Rupees 6.4 crores per year. Besides the loss to the
Government, the vagaries of exchange had made it almost impossible
to estimate the budget. Commenting on these uncertainties David
Barbour, the Finance Member in the Lansdowne's Government, aptly stated
that a fall in exchange of a penny might increase the deficit by more
than Rupees 3 crores and a rise of a penny might produce a surplus.
3
Indian budget had become a * gamble in exchange" •
The dislocated exchange was also causing great inconvenience 
to foreign trade. Those who were engaged in trade between India and 
the United Kingdom or other gold-standard countries, complained that 
fluctuations in exchange were replacing the legitimate trade with sheer
1 Imperial Gazetteer of India, Oxford, 1907, vol. iv, p. 195*
See also Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 1893, op* cit. , 
Para 3*
See also John Strachey, India: Its Administration and Progress,
London, 1911, ed*, P* 197*
2 C.N. Vakil and S.K. Muranjan, Currency and Prices in India,
Bombay, 1927, P* 40.
3 Financial Statement, 1893-4, paras. 28 and 30-1.
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speculation and gambling.^ Hie mercantile classes,particularly the 
importers argued that the falling exchange depressed the import trade, 
inasmuch as it increased the price in rupees of goods imported from 
the gold standard countries* They further emphasised that it conferred 
an unfair advantage on the exporter from India inasmuch as it enabled
2
him to receive a higher silver price in respect of the same gold price* 
The English officials were the next to protest against the 
falling exchange* They asserted that every fall in sterling exchange 
imposed a greater burden on them because their incomes were in silver 
and a part of their expenditure was in gold* They registered their
protest by officially submitting a statement underlining their
3
grievances*
It was also pointed out that the fall in the exchange value
of the rupee and the unstable exchange between England and India would
check and retard the investment of British capital in India* India
would stand to lose because she would have to pay a higher price for
the capital required, and the capitalists would lose because India
would not at this high rate take as much capital as she otherwise 
4
would* This check, it was maintained, was hindering the development
1 H.L* Chablani, Studies in Indian Currency and Exchange, p. 2*
2 Bengal Chamber of Commerce to Indian Govt*, 10 February 1892, Enc* 
to L.No* 68 of 23 March 1893, Financial Enclosures Received from 
India, vol. 174* ^ H ereaf*er as F.B.I._7
3 A Statement Submitted by Civil and Military Services of India, 
undated, India Fin. and Com. (Fin and Ac) Proc* , vol. 4392, No*
57, February 1893*
4 D. Barbour, Theory of Bimetallism, London, 1885, P* 70*
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of railway- extension in India. Lord Lansdowne was firmly of the
opinion that the only way to financial solvency of the Government
1
lay in closing the mints.
The Indian Government was supported in its main contention by 
the newly founded Indian Currency Association, led by J.L. Mackay 
plater Lord Inchcape_7, a leading commercial figure of India. ^ In
addition, the whole of European official community, obviously because 
of their own self interest, supported the new move. The Indian 
Government and the mercantile group were first interested in attaining 
some international agreement to check fluctuations of exchange on 
the basis of a fixed ratio between gold and silver. In case,the 
Government failed to secure an international agreement, they then
4
recommended the adoption of gold standard in India.
In 1892, the British Government accepted at the initiative of 
the Indian Government the invitation of the United States'. Government
1 Lansdownefs Speeches in India, vol. ii, p. 621.
2 Actually many Indians, notably, Rai Bahdur Danpat Singh, Sir
5.B. Bharucha and Jay Govind Lew, who were all leading importers 
supported the cause of the Indian Currency Association for the 
closure of the mints and the adoption of gold standard. Papers 
Relating to Changes in Indian Currency System, Simla, 1893»
pp. 60-4 and 84-90.
3 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 October 1892, Lansdowne ; Papers, MSS. 
Eur. D. 558/ix, vol. iv.^Hereafter cited as L. *-_7
4 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 68 (fin.), 23 March 1892, Paras 3, 5 ,
6 , Financial Letters Received from India, vol. 173* ^""Hereafter 
cited as F.L.I._7
See Petition Indian Currency Association to Indian Govt. , 13 
June 1892, Enc. to L.No. 183 of 1892, F.E.I., vol. 173*
See Bombay Chamber of Commerce to Indian Govt., 15 September 1892, 
Ehc. to L.No. 271 of 1892, F.E.I., vol. 175*
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to attend the International Monetary Conference to be held in
Brussels.* The purpose of the Conference was to secure the introduction
2
of a system of international bimetallism. But the failure of the
Conference seemed inevitable from the very beginning; because
England, the largest trading country, refused to adopt the system of
double legal tender, which in a way would have suited her varied
imperial interests. In September 1892, the actual blow to bimetallism
was given by Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, who
categorically stated that it was a mistake on the part of the last
Conservative Government to have agreed to participate in such a 
4Conference.
1 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 98 (Fin.), 2 June I892, 
Financial Despatches to India, vol. 39* /"Hereafter cited as 
F.D.I._7.
2 Bimetallism is that system of currency under which gold and silver 
circulate as currency and mints are open to free coinage of both 
metals. Both of them are declared legal tender for all amounts 
and they circulate at a legally fixed ratio. There are no 
restrictions on the free export and import of either metal. 
Bimetallists claim that in absence of a permanent cause operating 
to bring about a deviation between the market and the mint ratio, 
automatic forces again tend to establish the equilibrium. The 
demand for the over-valued metal for currency purposes increases, 
and its market value tends to rise. Vhereas demand for the 
under-valued metal for currency purposes tends to fall and its 
value also tends to fall. Thus there is a tendency towards an 
equilibrium between the market ratio and the mint ratio. This 
tendency is known as the compensatory action of the double 
standard.
See D. Barbour, Theory of Bimetallism, pp. 33-4.
3 D. Barbour, The CurrentyQuestion from the Indian Point of View, 
London, 1894, p. 11.
4 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 16 September and 13 October 1892, L.P.; ix 
vol. iv.
Anticipating the failure of the Brussels Conference, Lansdowne 
asked David Barbour, the Finance Member to the Government of India, 
to prepare a scheme for the introduction of gold standard in India* 1 
It was clear to Lansdowne that none of the political parties in 
Britain would readily agree to award gold standard to India, because
o
of the guarded opposition of the 'Lombard Street' to any such scheme* 
The gold interests in England were fearful of losing their gold in 
India* They believed that if the Indian mints were closed and the 
gold standard introduced in India, their gold would be attracted 
and accumulated in India* The result of which could be an **appreciation 
in the value of gold" and hence a lowering of prices in England.
Already the English producer was suffering from low prices*^
But Lansdowne desperately argued that the Government was grjowing 
bankrupt, the Indian commerce was intolerably disturbed and that 
there was no other means of raising further taxation without arousing
1 Lansdowne to Cross, 7 and 14 June 1892, ibid*
2 Lombard Street symbolises the gold assets of Ehgland*
3 Cross to Lansdowne, 1 July 1892, L.P., ix/vol. iv.
Also Kimberley to Lansdowne, 17 March 1893, ibid*, vol* v*
It would not be out of place to mention here that between 1860-74 
various attempts were made to introduce gold standard with a 
gold currency in India* All Finance Members of the Viceroy's 
executive council, except Wilson, supported the move* Then even 
the British Government refused, for fear of appreciating the 
price of gold which would act as a deterrent to the gold using 
countries*
See G*F. Shirras, Indian Finance and Banking, London, 1919, 
pp. 104-18.
See also J*C* Coyajee, The Indian Currency System, 1835-1925, 
Madras, 1930, pp. 21-48.
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public indignation, except by closing the mints, contracting the
1
currency and ultimately introducing gold standard in India. In
suggesting this the Viceroy claimed the popular support of the
2
public and complete unanimity in his executive council. It was 
professed that if the gold standard was good and successful for 
England and Europe why could it not be so for India?
The scheme of the Indian Government was laid down by David 
Barbour in his famous Minute of 21 June 1892. He recommended that 
as a preliminary to the introduction of the gold standard, mints 
must be closed to the free coinage of silver, rupee currency must be 
reduced and curtailed and gold coins made legal tender at a fixed \
4
ratio. On 30 September, Kimberley agreed to appoint a Committee
j
under the Chairmanship of Lord Herschell, the Lord Chancellor in !
5
Gladstone's Cabinet to investigate into the Indian Currency question.
The Herschell Committee accepted in principle the main plea
I
of the Indian Government with a few modifications. As part of the 
modification the Committee suggested that the closure of the mints 
should be accompanied by an announcement that "though closed to the 
public, they will be used by the Government for the coinage of rupees
1 Lansdowne to Cross, 26 July 1892,, L.P., ix/vol. iv.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 160 (Fin.), Confidential, 21 June 
1892, Para 7, F.L.I., vol. 173.
3 Enc. to L. No. 160 (Fin.) of 21 June 1892, F.E.I., vol. 175*
4 Paras. 1, 6-8 , and 12, ibid.
5 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 30 September 1892, L.P. ,vol.W
!   __     J
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in exchange for gold at a ratio to be then fixed, say Is* 4d.
per rupee; and that at the Government treasuries gold will be received
in satisfaction of public dues at the same ratio1*•
The decisive recommendation of the Herschell Committee was the 
abolition of the silver standard to a private account and instead 
introduced the system of Government monopoly in the supply of the 
currency* The value of the rupee was to be completely divorced from 
that of the silver in the rupee and the gold value of the rupee was to 
be enhanced'by reducing the quantity of money in circulation* The rupee 
was to lose the natural value and acquire an artificial value* The
purchasing power of the rupee would increase and prices would fall.
. _ 2 
On 26 June 1893i the Act was passed as an emergency measure*
Three separate Notifications were also issued to the effect that gold
coins and gold bullion were to be received at the mints in exchange
for rupees at the rate of 7*53344 grains troy of fine gold for one
rupee; and that sovereigns and half sovereigns were to be received
in payments of *|niblic dues” at Rupees 15 and Rupees 7/8 respectively*
The notifications also provided for the issue of currency notes in
exchange for gold coins or bullion at the same rate till "further
notice".^
1 Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 1893» op* cit*, Para 156.
2 A Bill to amend the Indian Coinage Act, 1870 CXXlll) and Indian 
Paper Currency Act, 1882 (XX), was introduced and passed on the 
same day in the Legislative Assembly* India Fin* and Com*
(Fin and Ac) Proc., vol. 4392, No* 401, July 1893*
3 India Fin. and Com. (Fin and Ac) Proc*, ibid*, Nos* 405-71 
July 1893*
CJ
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To fUlly realise the true implications of the currency change 
and its impact on the administration, it is necessary to examine 
certain factors which then were not publicly discussed.
One of the factors related to the decline in the price of silver. 
Though the silver standard was given up, it was nowhere asserted that the 
price of silver had fallen more than the price of the gold had risen. On 
the contrary, in all Government despatches and private correspondence, 
the word 'decline in the price of silver' was conspicuously absent.* On 
examining the Herschell Committee report thoroughly, one is struck with 
the careful avoidance of the term - 'depreciation of silver'. This 
reference occurs only once in paragraph 134. In a separate note, L.
Courtney £ one of the memembers of 1893 Currency Committee^, points out 
that the Commissioners had not examined the preliminary question whether 
there was a rise in gold or fall in silver. But he was himself of the 
opinion that the divergence between gold and silver had been nto a large 
extent due to an appreciation of gold. Yet the Herschell Committee tacitly
1 In the two major policy despatches of the Indian Government, Nos.
68 and 160 (Fin.), dated 23 March and 21 June 1892, Paras 6 and 3 
respectively; Op. cit., the words used were "decline in tie gold 
value of the rupee".
2 L. Courtney's Minute, Report of Indian Currency Committee, 1893« 
op. cit., p. 39*
See also Farrer and Velby's Minute, ibid. t p. 42.
Taking Sauerbeck's index, we get actual instructive figures.
Gold prices fell from an average of 100 in 1867-77 to 68 in 1892, 
a fall of 32 per cent. The price of silver fell from 58d in 1867-77 
to 39jd in 1892, a fall of 31J per cent. The price of silver, 
therefore, fell almost exactly with the average price of commodities. 
In other words, silver remained perfectly stable in value up to 
1892 and yet in that year Indian Government began to vehemently 
agitate for the overthrow of "this most perfect standard of value". 
E.F. Marriot, The Indian Currency Question, London, 1899?
Appendix B, p. 28.
2 *3 
(
assumed that a fall existed and thereby adopted a scheme of
contraction of the Currency. 1 It may, therefore, be assumed that
the silver standard was given up, not because it had failed to
serve as a standard of value, or was redundant or stringent, but
because the inconveniences it caused to the Government and the
importers. Commenting upon the Indian Government scheme, Kimberley
aptly remarked:
Every interest must be affected more or less, and, apart 
from hardship of the civil servants, and embarrassment 
caused to your finances, it is not shown that population 
as a whole is injured by the fall in the silver • • •. I 
quite admit the force of your argument that stability 
would be a great gain, but this does not cover the whole 
ground. 2
Another factor relates to the exchange ratio. By suggesting
Is. 4d. as an exchange ratio, the Herschell Committee decisively
enlarged the gap between the silver bullion and the rupee. If the
purpose of the Commission was to check the fluctuations of exchange
then it was not essential to put the ratio above the existing market 
3rate. From the private correspondence of Lansdowne we can infer 
the difference between what the Government intended and what it 
actually accomplished. Lansdowne had said, nIf we were to close the
1 Even ardent supporter of Government policy, like G.F. Shirras 
wrote that period between 1874-93 had been sometimes known as 
"the period of depreciation in the price of silver although this 
is open to objection, since it contains the suggestion that it 
was silver that had changed while gold had not." Indian Finance 
and Banking, p. 116.
See alBO Vera Anstey, Economic Development in Modem India, 
London, 1952, ed., p. 409*
2 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 16 September 1892, L.P., ix/vol. iv.
3 The prevalent exchange rate was l4d.
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Mints to the free coinage of silver, and to endeavour to fix the
value of the rupee in terms of gold, we should, 1 have no doubt,
have to fix it somewhere near its present gold value**; and he had
added, **If it would be steadied, even at a low rate we should know
where we were, and be able to get along, while capitalists would
not be discouraged, as they now are, from investing their money in
1
Indian enterprises*9. In another letter, Lansdowne sounded more
positive and stated that he was not in favour of raising the gold
value of the rupee. He said that **••• the rate adopted should in
the first instance, approximate to that obtaining at the time of the
change. It has always seemed to me, that what we suffered from was,
2
not a low rate of exchange, but an uncertain rate. • • 99 Kimberley 
was also of the same opinion and he stated that he was personally 
inclined to agree with Currie's observations, who was a member of the 
Currency Committee, that mints should have been closed and the ratio
3
fixed sometime in the future. Even the Manchester Chamber of Commerce
4
considered Is. 4d. to be too high a rate.
1 Lansdowne to Cross, 26 July 1892, L.P. , ix/vol. iv.
2 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 23 August 1892, and 3 October 1892, ibid.
3 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 23 June 1893* L.P., ix/vol. v.
See B.V. Currie's Minute, Report of Indian Currency Committee, 18931 
op. cit., p. 42.
4 Monthly Records of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 18931
vol. iv, pp. 138-9*
Thirdly, the currency changes were undertaken primarily to
avoid any reference to the increase in direct or indirect taxation;
although the whole purpose of the scheme was to evolve a system of
raising taxation without letting it to be so known. More than once,
reference to this fact was made in the private correspondence of
Lansdowne. He repeatedly threatened that if the mints were not
1
closed, recourse to additional taxation would have to be taken ; 
implying thereby that a closure of the mints and the raising of the 
artificial value of the rupee would supplement the increase in 
taxation. When the ratio of is. 4d. was announced, lansdowne remarked
that this would save the Government from taking resort to additional
2
taxation. A little later on, the Indian Government in their despatch 
alluded to this very point and statedthat Is. 4d. ratio was selected
because "it was considered that a lower rate would not relieve the
3
Government from its financial difficultiesn. As early as August 1892,
1 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 October 1892, and 6 February 18931 L.P. , 
i^/vols. iv and v respectively.
2 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 20 June 1893» L.P., ix/vol. v.
L. Courtney, Member of Parliament and once a member of the 
Herschell Committee stated before Fowler Commission on Currency 
that the "raising of the rupee above its intrinsic value is a 
tax not merely on production ... it is an additional tax on the 
agriculturists and the rent payers". Report of the Indian Currency 
Commission, 1899, Pari. Papers, vol. 331 Minutes of Evidence II, 
/"t.9222_7, p. 261, Q. 13, 117.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 328 (Fin.) 4 November 1896, Para 18, 
Finance Departmental Papers of the Council of India, F 5952/1896, 
vol. 1384 ^ Hereafter cited as Fin. Papers_7.
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Kimberley had written to Lansdowne that the proposal of fixing so
high a ratio might reduce the burden of home charges and could be
a source of benefit to the persons who remitted money from India
to discharge their gold obligations and debts, but the ^amount of
charge so avoided will have to be borne by some other persons £ the
mass of the Indian people^1*.1
Not many Indians understood the intricacies of the currency
problems and the Indian Government was not keen to examine its
real significance in the light of the socio-economic habits of the 
2
people. Both Cross and Kimberley had repeatedly asked the Indian
Government about the impact of their scheme on the Indians. But this
3
particular aspect was discreetly avoided for a long time. At last
at the insistence of Kimberley, Lansdowne yielded and wrote a very
revealing letter stating:
Native mind is always a somewhat obscure factor in any 
circulation. I should be inclined to answer that in all 
probability the great mass of the Natives will know very 
little, or, at all events, care very little, about the
1 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 92 (Fin.), 25 August 1892, 
Para 3i F.D.I., vol. 3k (original).
2 It is a long standing custom of the Indians to convert most of 
their savings in form of ornaments. In the time of need or 
any economic emergency like famine, the ornaments were put to 
use. For details, see below pp.
3 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 24 July 1892, L.P., xi/vol. iv*
See also Cross to Lansdowne, 1 July 1892; Kimberley to 
Lansdowne, 8 and 18 September, and 30 November 1892, L.P., 
ix/vol. iv.
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change. It would probably never occur to the owners 
of the uncoined silver in the shape of ornaments, etc. 
that their bangles and necklaces had become less 
valuable than they were •••• The owners of the coined 
silver will of course, if anything, gain by the change, 
should it lead to a fall in prices^s: for ^ ifthe producers 
of the commodities and earners of wages, they ought no 
doubt, if the question is regarded from a strictly 
economical standpoint, to be losers, because a rise in 
gold value of the rupee ought, properly speaking, to 
diminish their receipt.1
To rationalise his point, Lansdowne further added that wthe people
of this country ^ /"india^ are so used to fluctuations of prices,
that it will be impossible for them to distinguish between a fall
of prices due to alteration in the standard of value, and a fall of
2
prices, due to an abundant harvest, or to diminished exportation*.
It is quite clear that Government intended and took advantage of 
the ignorance and the illiteracy of the people.
Yet on the other hand the Government of Lansdowne under the 
pressure of military and civil officials committed themselves to 
increase the expenditure far beyond their resources. They agreed to 
increase the military expenditure for the year 1893-4 and granted 
Exchange Compensation Allowance to the Civil and Military Officials, 
at a privilege rate of Is. 6d. to a rupee. The objections to such 
policies were raised both within Viceroy's executive council and 
outside. David Barbour, in his confidential Minute very forcefully 
protested against the allocation of RX 14,810,000 tothe military budget
1 Lansdowne to Kimberley, 5 October 1892, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Lt.Gen. Brackenbury's Confidential Minute on the Military Estimate 
for 1893-4, 8 March 1893» India Fin. and Com. (Fin and Ac), Proc., 
vol. 4392, No. 120, March 1893.
which was RX 545)000 more than that of last year* He was equally
assertive against the grant of RX 1,100,000 as compensation to the
officers and to the increase in the already existing deficit from
1
RX 1,600,000 to RX 2,700,000. David Barbour frankly admitted that 
the immediate cause for the financial difficulties might be a fall 
in the exchange of the rupee, "but there are contributory causes - 
increased military expenditure of all kinds, the annexation of Upper 
Burma, a decline in the revenue of opium, and additional expenditure 
in connection with the North Western and Eastern frontierw* He
insisted that the military expenditure must be reduced and concessions
2
to the European officials must be postponed* Strangely, the 
Herschell Committee had avoided discussing this question* So the 
financial difficulties of the Government were not due to the currency 
problem only but due to certain extravagant expenditure as well*
It was, therefore, not unnatural that the Act of 1893 was not
3
well received by the Indian National Congress. Dada Bhai Naoroji
condemned it as "dishonourable",^ R.HT. Dtrtt very strongly depreciated
5the idea of "artificial currency"; D.E. Wacha, who was the most
1 13 March 1893, Para 1, Enc. to Indian Govt. L. No. 99 (Fin.) 
Confidential, of 1893» F.E.I., vol. 177*
See also C. Pritchard’s Confidential Minute, 13 March 1893, ibid.
2 Barbour’s Minute, paras 3 and 5, op. cit.
3 Report of Indian National Congress, 1893, Resblution No. xiv, 
p. 127.
4 Poverty and UnBritish Rule in India, London, 1901, p. 532.
5 India, 11 November 1893*
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ardent speaker of the Congress on currency problems vigorously 
criticised it as nindirect taxation of burdensome and indefinite 
character"; which according to him meant that the Government 
officials and usurers would "fatten" at the expense of the poor 
peasants. He characteristically defined the Herschell Committee
1
report as a "paraphrase" of D. Barbour’s Minute of 21 June 1892.
The India Press was almost as unanimous in protesting against
it as the Indian National Congress. It asserted that currency
legislation would act as deterrent to both the agriculturists and
the manufacturers.^ The Mahratha of 2 July 1893» wrote: "He ^ "the
peasant_7 will get few rupees for the produce of his field, while
3
he will have to pay the same number of rupees for assessment". The
4Act was variously condemned as "mischievous", "hasty", and likely
1 Report of the Indian National Congress, 1893J, PP- 127-30.
2 Bombay Samachar, 27 June 1893; 3 July and 4 July 18931 Bombay 
Native Newspaper Report, 1893 • ^Hereafter cited as Bomb. N.N.R._^. 
Also Bengalee, 1 July 1893*
3 Bomb. N.N.B. .1893•
4 Kaiser-i-Hind, 2, 9 and 20 July 1893? ibid.
D. Barbour, speaking in ’Drapers1 Hall' London, shortly 
after executing the Act^nat he was not in favour of moving 
quite as fast as the majority of the members of the Indian 
Government• The Currency Question from an Indian Point 
of View, p. 13.
1
to breed discontent. On his arrival, Elgin found for himself
that the Indian public opinion was opposed to the policy of currency
2
"with a reasonable unanimity”. He confessed to the new Secretary
of State, Fowler, that his main interest was completely ^swallowed
up in the matters of finance”.
The immediate impact of the change was a sudden rise in the
exchange. On 27 June 1893» it touched Is. 4d. This sudden rise
completely paralysed the export trade for some time. The importers
made rapid gains. The imports into India rose by 18 percent, and
the export of cotton yarns declined by 23 percent. The revenue from
opium fell by 13*2 percent. J.E* 0'Conor, the Director General of
Statistics and Trade to the Indian Government, attributed the decline
4
of the export trade to the closure of the mints. The rise being 
as meteoric as speculative^ did not continue for long and soon there 
was a setback. By December 1893» the exchange rate fell to 15$d and
1 Indu Prakash, 10 July 1893? Gujrati, 9 July 1893? Gujrat Parpan,
20 July and 12 October 1893? Bomb. N.N.R., 1893*
Hitavadi, 29 June and 6 July 1893; Bangavasi, 8 July 1893; 
Painik-o-Samachar Chendrika, 2 and 5 July 1893; Bengal N.N.R.,
1893.
Kerala Patrika, 8 July 1893; Vrittanta Patrika, 7 September 18931 
Madras N.N.R., 1893.
Himalah, 14 July 1893; Koh-i-Nur, 12 August 1893; Punjab N.N.R., 
1893.
2 Elgin to Queen Victoria, 21 March 1894, Elgin Papers, MSS.Eur.F.84, 
vol. i. £  Hereafter cited as/B.P._7
3 Elgin to Fowler, 7 March 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
4 Trade Statement of British India for 1893-4, Pari. Papers, 1895* 
vol. 73, ^ “C.7604_7, pp. 6-7.
See also Statistics from the Monthly Records of Manchester Chamber 
of Commerce, 1894, vol. v, p. 60.
by April 1894 it ftirther declined to 13d. * In January 1895 it 
slammed down to 12 13/32d only.
In this period of renewed uncertainties, two factors by inter­
acting against each other, played a significant role. Firstly, in 
order to raise the level of exchange the Indian Government asked the 
Secretary of State never to sell his council bills below the minimnm 
rate of l6d to a rupee. It was through the sale of council bills 
that the surplus of exports was transferred into credit for India.
When some importer in Europe wanted rupee to be paid for his imports 
for India, he paid sterling to the Secretary of State in London for 
council bills. These bills were presented at Government treasury in 
India where the holder received rupees out of the Indian revenue in
exchange for the bills. It was through this method that the Secretary
2
of State obtained most of his money to pay the home charges. By 
suspending the sale of bills below l6d, the Government hoped to check 
the downward market rate of exchange. In other words, the stoppage 
of bills was to act as a source of contraction in the supply of money. 
The Secretary of State was advised to borrow money in sterling to 
meet his demands. In August 1893» he actually borrowed £5 million
3
because he could not sell the bills at such a high rate.
1 Fowler to Elgin, 27 April 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 J.M. Keynes, Indian Currency and Finance, London, 1924, pp. 102-3.
3 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 23 August 1893» India Fin. and Com.
(Fin and Ac) Proc., vol. 4392, No. 8 5 1, March 1893-
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The : fixation of the minimum for the sale of council bills
was adversely affected by another unexpected development. Along
with the closure of the mints, a large scale import* of silver bullion
took place. In the eight months, between July 1893 to February 1894
the import of silver was 4l million standard ounces, as against 28
million ounces, being the average of the corresponding eight months
1
of the previous five years. Most of the silver imports were of
speculative nature because the Herschell Committee report was leaked
out. It was known to some importers that the mints were to close 
2
down. The Government was forced to accept the silver which was in 
transit on or about 26 June 1893 and was obliged to inflate the
4
currency by coining the silver to the extent of rupees 2 crores.
The expansion of the currency not only brought down the exchange but 
this importation of silver bullion far in excess of the usual demand 
competed with the sale of council bills. The imports enabled the 
Exchange Banks to obtain rupees in India, which in absence of these 
imports could have been acquired through the sale of council bills. 
Secondly, to withhold the sale of council bills for indefinite period 
could prove decisively harmful to the export trade, because most of
1 G.F. Shirras, Indian Finance and Banking, pp. 144-5.
2 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 21 July 1893, L.P., is/vol. v.
3 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 149 (Fin.), 27 July 1893,
Para 2, F.D.I., vol. 40.
4 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 307 (Fin.), 20 September 1893,
Para 7, F.L.I., vol. 176.
r3 P*
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the export trade was financed by the sale of council bills. Kimberley 
was personally averse to the fixation of minimum because it was 
impractical to fix a level that was not justified by the market 
conditions, for, no one could compel any one to buy a bill because 
a buyer could only offer a price he considered worth his while. *
He emphasised that the market needed to recover its equanimity which 
had been completely upset by the currency legislation and urged that
it should not be aggravated any more by resorting to other artificial
2
means, like the withholding of council bills. Kimberley could not 
tolerate this period of suspense any longer and on 13 February 1894, 
he abandoned the **minimum** and sold his council bills freely. As 
a result it became impossible to force exchange to a level that could 
not be justified by market conditions.
This action of the Secretary of State was vigorously criticised 
by the Indian Currency Association, which blamed him for letting the 
exchange fall further by his ^arbitrary interference*1. Kimberley
1 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 18 August and 4 August 1893* L.P., is/vol. v.
2 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 25 August and 26 October 18931 ibid.
3 Telegram S.S., to Viceroy, India Fin. and Com. (Fin and Ac) Proc., 
vol. 4604, No. 175» March 1894.
D. Barbour had this to say regarding the suspension of the bill:
**I have no hesitation in saying that all measures that could be 
adopted in connection with the sale of the bills, the holding of 
them back in order to force a higher rate of exchange than market 
conditions justify is the most pernicious1*. Currency Question from 
an Indian Point of View, p. 18.
4 Vice President Indian Currency Association to Indian Govt., 5 
January 1894, Bic. , to L.No. 40 (Fin.) of 1894, F.E.I., vol. l80.
See also Telegram President Indian Currency Association to Indian 
Govt., 23 January 1894, ibid.
was not prepared to revoke the decision. He firmly maintained that
it was wrong in the first place to have fixed the "minimum", because
it created a gulf between the silver and the demand for council bills,
and termed the fixing of the "minimum" as "extremely mischievous" and
1
responsible for much disorganisation of the trade. But what is
probably more significant is that the controversy between the Secretary
of State and the Government of India further enhanced the atmosphere
of doubt and distrust, which shrouded the currency question.
By 1894 the uncertainties in the exchange remained as ever and
2
exchange continued to be "sick". The fall in exchange was not
checked, in spite of the fact that in nine months £9 million were
3
borrowed by the Secretary of State on account of India. The year 
1894 recorded a deficit of Rupees 35 million. It became imperative 
for the Government to impose additional taxation. Lord Elgin was
4
constrained to impose import duties which brought in Rupees 30 million.
1 Kimberley to Elgin, 16 February 1894, and 9 March 1894, E.P., 
vol. 12.
See also S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 83 (Fin.), 3 May 
1894, F.D.I., vol. 41.
2 H.B. Smith (Xbrivate Secretary to the Viceroy) to Godley, 9 
May 1894, E.P., vol. 29*
See also Godley to Elgin, 1 June 1894; Lord Reay to Elgin,
29 August 1894, E.P., ibid.
See also Elgin to Fowler, 1 May 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
3 R* Hardie*s Minute, 14 April 1894, Fin. Papers, F 1152/94, vol. 1265*
4 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. iv, p. 168.
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The increase in taxation and the contracting of currency, as
Hardie, a member of the India Council said, was like "burning of
1
financial candle of the population at both ends”. This was hardly
2
an auspicious augury for Elgin to start his career as a Viceroy.
By October 1895 exchange began to rise and money in the market
became stringent. The money stringency was caused on account of
various factors. The first and foremost reason was the relative
contraction of the currency. Secondly, in absence of any certain
rate of exchange, people and traders remitted their money out with
every rise in exchange. Foreign capital instead of being attracted
into India, still held out. Thirdly, between November 1895 March
1896, the money position was further aggravated on account of large
3
sale of council bills. This was obvious because during these 
months the export trade was usually most active. The heavy demand 
for remittance from England to India (that is for council bills) 
naturally affected the Government cash balances which were already in 
full use due to famine relief and extension of railways. It was the 
mercantile community which needed more money in circulation. There 
was unfortunately now no automatic means by which the currency could 
expand in response to the demands of the currency and trade.
The stringency of the money market was evinced by the steady
1 R. Hardie's Minute, op. cit.
2 Lansdowne had once prophesied? if soon after the introduction of 
the change in the currency system was to be followed by additional 
taxation or general scarcity, the people would be persuaded that the 
whole misfortune was causedon account of "tampering with the rupee”. 
Lansdowne to Kimberley, 5 October 1892, L.P. , i^/vol. iv.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 328 (Fin.), 4 November 1896, Paras 
8-91 op.cit.
rise in the Bank rate which arose from 3 percent in October to 8
1
percent in November and nearly 10 percent in December* Elgin
warned Hamilton that there was a definite deficiency in the provision
2
of money in India and a commercial crisis seemed imminent. At this 
stage the mercantile community which had long been seeking to secure 
stability of exchange grew restive and demanded some immediate
3
relief.
The administration of Elgin responded to the crisis in a positive
way. The Indian Government realised that the root cause of the
trouble lay in the high exchange ratio of Is. 4d. to a rupee. As
a first step towards easing the tension, they proposed to the Secretary
of State, on the recommendation of Westland, the Finance Member, to
revise the exchange ratio from I6d to 15di a rate at which sovereigns
could be received in Government Treasuries. Westland believed that
the ordinary trade would establish at a lower rate earlier. He
considered Is. 4d. ratio too high and too injurious to the interest
4of trade and commerce.
1 Trade Statements of British India for 1896-7» Pari. Papers, 1898, 
vol. 7 4, / jC.8692_7, p. 6.
Earlier in 1897 the bank rate reached as much as 12 percent.
Trade Statement of British India for 1897-98, Pari. Papers, 18991 
vol. 44, £ “C.9120__7 , pp. 1-2.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 November I8 96, E.P., vol. 14.
3 Annual Report of Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 1897-8, vol. 1, 
p. 5*
4 IndiaiGovt. to S.S. L.No. 328 (Fin.), 4 November 1896, paras 
11, 17-1 8, op. cit.
The Government thought that a low ratio of exchange would 
remove the element of uncertainty once and for all and would benefit 
both the traders and the Government. The Government expected that 
the excess remittances which would be made from England to India 
would come out in the shape of sovereigns or gold* They would be 
presented to the Indian treasury, like council bills, in exchange 
for rupees* So long as the conditions of excess trade demand for 
remittance from Europe remained in force,gold would continue to come 
out to India at the rate of Is* 3d*1 This might prove conducive 
towards the establishment of gold standard in India*
Another proposal to solve the money stringency was made by 
J. Finlay, the Financial Secretary to the Government of India* He
did not agree with the above proposal of Westland to change the gold
point, for he believed that it would throw doubt upon the Indian 
Government's adherence to its earlier proposals* Instead, he suggested, 
that if an emergency arose, the Secretary of State should buy silver
and ship it to India and the Government would coin on its own account
2
and issue it as rupees* However, Lord Elgin, and his executive
1 Westland's Note on the Council Drawings, 17 October 1896, para 
18, E.P., vol. 135 (r).
2 J* Finlay's Confidential Note on 'Currency Question', 22 October 
1896, Para 2 5, E.P*, vol 135 (**).
Strangely enough, it was J* Finlay who in 1894 wanted to contract
the currency by melting down Rupees 3 crores and sell them as 
bullion to check the downward trend of exchange after the closure 
of the mints* That scheme was rejected by Elgin and Westland, 
because that could cause further stringency in the money market* 
Finlay to C.J. Ardagh, 5 February 1894, Private Secretary 
Correspondence, No* 164, E.P., vol. 92*
4
preferred the former to the latter course, because, if Finlay's
scheme was accepted, it would mean that in any emergency, the
1
Government would be obliged to open the. mints.
The proposal of the Indian Government to issue rupees against
gold at 15d to a rupee was unanimously rejected by the Secretary
2
of State and his Council. It was considered improper to interfere 
with the working of the currency policy as laid down in 1893* The 
Secretary of State categorically stated that to reduce "your gold
point to 15d is to allow ephemeral causes to obviate the permanent
3
object of your policy*1. To add strength to his argument, Hamilton
informed Elgin that the Chancellor of the Exchequer disapproved of
the reduction of the ratio to 13d, particularly when exchange was 
4
rising. He finally rejected the Indian scheme with an assertion 
that he was better placed in London in seeking the advice of financial 
and economic experts than what could be had in India.^ Instead he
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 November 1896, op. cit.
2 Godley to Elgin, 3 October 1896, E.P., vol. 31*
See also Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 2 November 1896+ibifl.§ vol. 19*
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 26 November 1896,Ibid., vol. 14.
4 Exchange during this period had risen to 15 2 7 /3 2 d. But the 
fluctuations in exchange remained as ever.
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 12 November 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
Also S.S. to Indian Government, Despatch No. 226 (Fin.),
Confidential, 17 December 1896, Para 9 , F.D.I., vol. 38 
(original).
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suggested the utilization of Rupees twenty million from the 
Currency Reserves.1,
The Indian Government regretted such a decision, and as the 
situation was desperate Westland agreed to utilize Rupees twenty
2
million from the Currency Reserve through the issue of Ordinance.
Finally, the Indian Government dropped the proposal to reduce the 
3
gold point. The real reason for the rejection of the proposal 
for the reduction of the gold point was the threat it held out to 
the gold interests of England. It was feared that English gold might 
go out to India. There was a strong group in "Lombard Street" which 
was against the policy of the introduction of the gold standard 
in India. Hamilton elucidated the point fully by saying that if 
the Bank of England which to a large extent regulated the purchase 
and transmission of gold, found that gold was going out of the country 
to any appreciable extent - "and to relieve your necessities gold 
must go out in large quantities - they ^ ~the Bank of EhglandJ? would 
raise the rate discount J  and stop protanto the remission of
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 19 November 1896, E.P. , vol. 14.
Elgin had of course agreed that the advantage of Currency Reserve 
of Rupees2 crores could be taken, but he penned down two objections:
(a) if the reserve was drawn nothing would be left for next year 
to draw, if need arose; (b) the Indian Government was calculating 
to augment the loan funds which could be made available for the 
railway development. Elgin to Hamilton, 4 November 1896, op. cit.
2 Telegram Westland to Elgin, 4 November 1896; Westland to Waterfield
(Finance Secretaryi India Office), 4 November 1896, Ehc. Westland
to Elgin, 5 November 1896, E.P., vol. 69*
3 Westland to Elgin, 12 November 1896, ibid.
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 25 November 1846,ibid., vol. 14.
4
1
gold”. Finlay, the Financial Secretary to the Government of 
India, in his note had already forewarned that the Secretary of 
State would never agree to reduce the ratio. He wrote, "there is 
almost no prospect that the Secretary of State would accord his 
sanction to a proposal to lower the rate to Is. 3d. The object 
of the proposal and its effect, if successful, would be to attract 
gold to India. This is not an object which the Secretary of State 
would be allowed by his colleagues in the Cabinet and his London 
advisers to advance at a time when the fears of London financial
world already are that gold may be withdrawn from London to a most
2
inconvenient extent."
If the scheme of reduction of gold point was rejected by the 
Secretary of State, the scheme to buy silver for coinage in India 
was rejected by the Indian Government. Vestland explained the 
Government *s point of view by saying that though to buy silver and 
coin it would temporarily relieve the money stringency and this 
type of transaction would, also be profitable to the Government 
because of the difference between the value of coined and uncoined 
silver, but such an operation, would protanto send down the rate of 
exchange. He believed that any more rupees coined would interfere 
with the process of gradually raising the exchange value of the rupee.
1 Hamilton to Bigin, 26 November 1896, Ibid., ,
2 Finlay’s Confidential Note, 22 October 1896, Para 27, op. cit.
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To Westland the purchase and coinage of silver was harmful, and,
t!from point of view of commerce, it may conceivably come in as a
relief, but only as a relief from the consequences of a mistake
which it is easy to avoid and far better both for commerce and for
1
ourselves that we should avoid.n The primary motive of Westland's
suggestion to reduce the gold point was to clear the doubts in the
minds of public regarding the exchange fluctuations and thereby
inculcate confidence by the early stability in the exchange.
To sum up the proposal to reduce the gold point to Is. 3d.
was given up because it did not suit the gold interests of England,
and the policy of coining more rupees was given up because it was
against the established interests of the currency policy of the Indian
Government. As usual business continued to starve. The bank rate
rose still higher. Prices of foodstuff rose very high and went
beyond the reach of a common man. Both Elgin and Hamilton confessed
2
that the soaring of prices was "due to the tightness of money1*.
In February 1897» the Indian Government made another attempt to 
solve the problem by bringing the establishment of gold standard 
nearer to accomplishment. The Indian Government found once again 
that the very obstacle to this policy lay in the notification of 
26 June 1893i because the gold coins were to be received in the
1 Westland to Elgin, 26 January 1897» E.P., vol. 70.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 6 January 1897; Hamilton to Elgin,
12 February 1897 > vol. 15.
Government treasuries only in payment of sums due to the Government 
and in the Mints.1 The Indian Government wanted to substitute 
this by a "free offer” to receive sovereigns and half sovereigns 
of current weight at their reserve treasuries. By so doing the 
Government would provide for a continuous flow of gold into India
y 2at a ratio of lod to a rupee.
In making such an offer, the Government felt no difficulty. If 
the Government received gold in excess to the amount sent in sterling 
towards meeting "Home Charges”; there could be, it was contended, 
other ways of finding relief; like declaring sovereigns and half 
sovereigns to be legal tenders in India. This declaration could even 
avoid any possible embarrassment arising from the Government holding 
too large<a proportion of Government balances in gold, for it could 
render the gold coin available for Government's ordinary payments. 
Secondly, the declaration of legal tender could never cause harm to 
the public - the creditor or the debtor - as long as the Government 
treasuries were open to receive sovereigns and half sovereigns at 
Rupees 15 and Rupees 7\+
Moreover, the Indian Government felt that such a step would lead 
towards the ultimate goal - the gold standard. "We mention it here 
only to shew that the greater facilities which we propose to give to
1 Indian Govt, to S.S. , L.No. 49 (Pin.), 17 February 1897, Para 9, 
F.L.I., vol. 188.
2 Para 8, ibid.
. . .  . 4
the importation of gold coin will not produce any result from which
we do not ourselves see any issue which is strictly in furtherance
1
of our declared policy". Another advantage was that the Exchange
Banks could keep spare funds to India in gold i/"which the Government
undertook to accept^ and such a step could prevent sudden scarcity
2
as it had happened in earlier years.
Any scheme which was likely to attract gold from England to 
India (as the purport of this scheme was) could not readily find 
its approval at the hands of the British Government. In May 18971 
Hamilton put forth two objections against the scheme, first, the 
exchange at I6d was still not stable and secondly, such an action
on the part of the Government would be misconstrued by the public
as a deliberate measure to raise the exchange to l6d, particularly
3
when the exchange was still oscillating around 15d. It may be noted 
that Hamilton had earlier objected to the Indian Goverment's proposal
A
of 15d ratio, under the pretext that l6d ratio was about to be 
achieved and now he objected to l6d because he was not certain that 
it was going to stay. Underneath these objections lay the apprehension 
regarding the introduction of gold standard in India.
With no definite solution forthcoming, the financial condition 
of India grew tighter. The money stringency had reached its breaking
1 Para 10, ibid.
2 Para 11, ibid.
3 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 96 (Pin.), 13 May 1897*
Paras 14-16, F.D.I. vol. 39 (original).
point and the currency question had not passed the test of lime. The
seriousness of the situation could be veil realised vhen the Indian
Government in July 18979 failed to raise public loan at 3 per cent.
Westland asked the Secretary of State to borrov in sterling on
account of India and desperately sought to revise the Railway programme
2
by reducing its estimate by Rupees hundred lakhs. He once again 
ventured to suggest to reduce the gold point, this time to 15id to
3
a rupee. Another proposal to meet the crisis of monetary stringency
was made by Babington Smith, Private Secretary to Lord Elgin. He
suggested that the Secretary of State should borrov money in London,
buy gold and then send that gold out to India. The Indian Government
would place that gold in the Currency Reserve and in turn release
4
the silver for the public demand. This proposal was enthusiastically 
supported by Westland.^
Hamilton was in enigma. With no concrete proposal to offer, 
he agreed to Westland's suggestion to curtail Railway extension and 
undertook to raise sterling liabilities to meet the inability of the
1 Westland's Memorandum, 4 July 18971 &P-* vol. 71*
2 Westland to Elgin, 26 June 1897 ^ "appendixj/, ibid. , vol. 70.
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 13 July 1897 Z^PPettdiacy, ibid., 
vol. 15 •
3 Westland to Waterfield, 22 June 18979 Enc., Westland to Elgin,
26 June 1897 £ appendix_7, op. cit.
4 Elgin to Hamilton (Confidential), 22 June 18979 Hamilton 
Collection, MSS.Eur. D. 509/vol. v.
5 Westland's Memorandum, 4 July 18979 op. cit.
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Indian Government to raise loans. But in no case was he or his 
council prepared to accept the reduction of gold point or send gold 
to India.
By now it was clear that the British Government was opposed 
to the introduction of gold standard in India. At this stage both
France and the United States proposed an agreement on International
2
bimetallism. Hamilton showed great enthusiasm and sent their
proposal to the Indian Government. It was contemplated that France
and the United States were to open their mints to the free coinage of
Bilver as well as gold at a legally fixed ratio of 154 of silver to 1
of gold. This was to be followed by an international agreement and in
the meantime India was to reopen their mints to the free coinage 
3
of silver. Arguing on behalf of the proposal the Secretary of State 
stressed that the implementation of it would not only enhance the gold 
value of silver but inaugurate a more stable ratio. Further, the 
loss sustained by the Government and the individual would disappear
1 Hamilton to Elgin. 24 June 1897 £ appendix_7, 8 July ^  appendixJ7,
and 16 July 1897 ^ ""appendixJ7, E.P., vol. 15.
2 Godley informed Elgin that all members of the Finance Commitee
and India Council were bimetallists and all of them were
for the reopening of the mints on the terms offered by 
France and U.S.A.
Godley to Elgin, 23 July 1897i ibid., vol. 136.
3 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 19 July 1897? ibid., vol. 20.
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and the holders of the rupee value would benefit. The "artificial
and arbitary restriction" of the currency would be removed and would
leave the contraction and expansion of the currency to the natural
forces of the market.*
The Indian Government reacted very swiftly and rejected the 
2
offer. In doing so the administration showed a far greater insight
into the currency problems. The Indian Government rejected the
proposal on four counts. Firstly, the adoption of 15 i silver to £1
of gold would involve a sudden rise - say from present 15d a rupee to
23d a rupee. Such a sudden rise could have a very serious effect
on the Indian trade and could "certainly throw some branches of the
3
export trade into the most depressed condition for a time."
Secondly, the Indian Government stated that no doubt the rise 
in exchange was to diminish their sterling liabilities and large 
surplus could be derived from the revenue, but this could be earned at 
a very great cost. For instance the fall in the prices would adversely 
affect the agricultural classes. "It is no doubt pleasant to think 
of large surplus of revenue", argued Vestland, "which will arise from 
the enormous improvement in exchange; but that is an extremely narrow 
and extremely partial view of the result, for any surplus we so obtain
1 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 129 (Fin.), Confidential,
5 August 1897, Paras 5-8, F.D.I., vol. 39 (original).
2 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 21 July 1897, E.P., vol. 20.
3 Finlay*s Confidential Note on Currency, 22 July 1897 Z”append ix_7, 
ibid,.vol. 71.
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 261 (Fin.), Confidential,
16 September 1897, Para 5, F.L.I., vol. 188.
is obtained at the cost of a heavy burden to the country and of 
a disaster to its commerce.w* Elgin elucidated this point by giving 
another instance of the evil effect of bimetallism. He said that 
at present the shareholder of the East India Railways got return of 
5i per cent on their capital, but if the exchange rose by 6d, the
dividend of the shareholder would increase by 8 to 10 per cent. This
2
he stated would be an "unearned increment"•
Thirdly, in case of the failure of the scheme, the whole burden,
would fall on India alone, because France and the United States both
3
had sufficient gold reserves and India did not possess any. It
was affirmed that mere union of the two, France and the United States,
with no participation of England, and India lending assistance, was far
4
from an International agreement. Over and above, Elgin personally
5
in the Gladstonian spirit felt very unsafe with bimetallism.
1 Westland's Confidential Note on Currency, 22 July 1897 £ appendix^
E.P*,vol. 71*
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 18 August 1897i ibid., vol. 15*
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 261 (Fin.), Para 6, op. cit.
4 Elgin did not trust the political vitality of France and the 
United States' system for a binding agreement. He said,
nI am not quite sure that on a question of policy of this 
kind theobstinacy of the sick man at Constantinople, which 
can baffle the concert of Europe, would not be more reliable 
than the engagement of a French Ministry •••• Nor is the 
prospect more hopeful on the other side of the Atlantic.n 
Elgin to Hamilton, 16 September 1897* E.P., vol. 13*
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 8 September 18971 ibid.
15 *
Fourthly, it was claimed that the circumstances had materially
changed from that of 1893* The exchange was stabilizing and Government
was nearer to the achievement of their aim of Is* 4d. "If we are
let alone*1, said Elgin, **I do not despair of seeing gold tendered
1
at our treasuries before I leave India.w He also forcefully asserted
2
that the time for any more experiments was completely gone. The 
mercantile classes in India were no longer prepared to accept any
3
more of drastic changes. Elgin confessed that there was already a
good deal of artificiality in the present position of the currency, but
then there was ’’still more of it in Bimetallism and, on so gigantic
a scale” that any risks the Indian Government were now running seemed
4
to him ”to sink into insignificance”.
Hamilton never expected such a fury of protest and antagonism 
and showed surprise and disgust at the rejection of the bimetallic
5
scheme. He tried hard to influence Elgin by enunciating the merits
£
of bimetallism as well as its popularity in Ehgland ; by casting doubt
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 11 August 1897» ibid.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 1 September 1897i ibid.
3 Telegrams Bengal Chamber of Commerce; Bombay Chamber of Commerce; 
Madras Chamber of Commerce; 14 October, 15 October and 16 October 
1897 respectively to Indian Govt., Enc. to L.No. 290 of 18971 
F.E.I., vol. 190.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 14 October 1897» E.P., vol. 15*
5 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 23 July 1897<. ibid. , vol. 20.
6 Hamilton to Elgin, 19 August and 23 September 18971
ibid., vol. 15*
5
on the Indian Government schemes, and by reiterating that in India,
both prices and exchange had risen - a combination in recent years
which was new.* Finally, he tried to lure Elgin by suggesting that
if exchange rose to 22d, it would pay for the frontier expeditions
and for the military establishments. The rise in the rupee to 22d
"would give us surplus that would not only meet additional expenditure,
but enable large remissions of taxation and readjustment of land
revenue. I, therefore, do not want to cast away what might prove a
2
veritable sheet anchor in financial reform”• It must be laid to 
the credit of Elgin that such a dubious explanation was not accepted 
by him.
In this round of contest, the Indian Government under Elgin
the
won and Hamilton confessed thaVobjections raised by the Government
3
against bimetallism were "unanswerable”• The cry of bimetallism
as a currency system subsided and accordingly Lord Salisbury informed
the Governments of France and the United States about the inability
4
of the Indian Government to accede to their proposals.
Out of this it may be inferred that any currency system having 
an unnatural basis was harmful to the general public. The contracting 
currency or imprisoned rupee or an artificial exchange ratio were all
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 1 September 1897» ibid.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 9 September 1897i ibid.
Earlier, Hamilton had shown the same feelings when he wrote, "We
corner rupees to the detriment of trade and commerce, but to the
benefit of our expenditure”• Hamilton to Elgin, 19 August 1897i 
ibid.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 21 October 1897i ibid.
the ----
4 Salisbury to French and/United States Govts., 19 October 1897*
Enc. to S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 218 (Fin.) of 18971 F.D.I., 
vol. 44 (copy).
<• 
f.
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inadequate for the smooth working of currency system. Whether an
artificial ratio was l6d or 23d, as long as rupee was widely divorced
from the bullion, it was injurious to the interests of the people.
Even in this long drawn controversy, it was nowhere asserted, not
even once that the currency policy had appreciably benefited the
economic interest of the country.
Unfortunately,at this stage the Indian Government was seriously
involved in a large scale frontier expedition. In 1897» the
waziris rose in revolt, and the Tochi valley was occupied by a British
force. Then followed the attack of Swat tribes upon Malakand, the
raids of the Mohmands near Peshawar and the seizure of the Khyber
Pass by the Afridis. In a few days the North Western Frontier was
aflame from Tochi to Bunner. The British expedition against the tribes
1
cost the Government nearly 5 crores of Rupees. In spite of heavy
borrowing on account of India, the years 1896-7 «»d 1897-8 showed a
2
total deficit of Rupees 7 crores. The deficit could have been
still higher but for the rising exchange.
The currency question remained acutely critical. As an emergency
3
measure it was proposed to curtail the railway expenditure. This 
measure could neither solve the financial difficulty nor take away 
the ambiguity from the currency policy. Anyhow, the Indian Government
1 Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. iv, p. 168.
2 Ibid.
3 To relieve the burden on Indian Exchequer, the Secretary of 
State was prepared to give Imperial grant of £2 to £3 million 
or so for the year 1898-9* Hamilton to Elgin, 10 December 1897 
^"appendix 7, E.P., vol. 15* But in a short time the offer of
the grant was ultimately withdrawn because of British Goverment*s 
military commitments in ; Sudan. Hamilton to Elginf ;7 January 1898 
^“appendix, ibid. , vol. 16.
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was keen on having gold standard as the only way of relieving the
pressure* Elgin impressed upon Hamilton that there could be only
two ways of achieving gold standard: (a) to wait till sufficient gold
could accumulate in the treasury at l6d; (b) to borrow and buy gold
in London and ship it to India* Out of the two, Elgin preferred
the latter one and contested that as the establishment of gold
standard in India was also a matter of Imperial concern, Great Britain
1
must share the financial burden, Elgin felt encouraged that both
O'Hamilton and Be£ch, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were now prepared
2
to consider the proposals of the Indian Government*
The Indian Government's proposals for the gold standard were
3
sent in two despatches of 3 And 24 March 1898* The main features 
of the Government's scheme were: (a) a Gold reserve was to be formed 
in India with the help of borrowing £20,000,000 in Efrgland; (b) 
that the currency was to be contracted and the rupees withdrawn from 
circulation were to be melted down to raise the exchange value of 
the rupee; (c) the silver bullion thus obtained was to be sold and 
gold added to the reserve; and, (d) the Government was not to part 
with any gold till the exchange had reached Is* 4d.
The main purpose of the scheme, irrespective of its merits 
or demerits was to end the period of transition and the policy of
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 11 November and 24 November 1897 /^appeacidixj,
ibid., vol. 15*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 7 January 1898 ^ ~appendix_7, ibid*, vol* 16.
3 L. Nos* 70 and 92 (Fin.), F.L.I., vol. 190*
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••inaction” to possess the same standard as that of England
(though, through artificial method) and to inculcate confidence
in public in the future of the exchange. It was genuinely desired
by the administration to check the fluctuations in exchange so as
2
to encourage the inflow of the capital into India.
Hamilton could not accept the scheme at its face value. The 
changes demanded were so far-reaching and so vital to the economy of 
India and Ehgland as a whole that they were to be submitted to an
independent Commission. Hence in April 1898, the Fowler Commission
3
was appointed to examine the broad monetary policy of India.
It was neither possible for Hamilton nor for Elgin to take 
the matter for granted. But Hamilton took every opportunity to remind 
Elgin of the beliefs and apprehensions of the British public. Time 
and again he warned him of the hazardous journey ahead. On the very 
receipt of the Indian Governments despatch, he informed that the 
opposition had already lfguarded and trenched” themselves. The silver 
monometallists and bimetallists had joined hands much in advance. 
Hamilton said that he himself doubted the vulnerability of the scheme 
on three counts: (a) the Indian Government had taken too sanguine a
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 24 March 1898, E.P., vol. 16.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 12 May 1898, ibid.
Out of the air of scepticism was an eager haste on the part of 
the Europeans to strike when the iron was hot and seize any 
opportunity of a rise in exchange to convert their investments 
and savings into sterling.
3 S.S. to Indian Govt. Despatch No. 67 (Fin.), 7 April 1897,
F.D.I., vol. 45 (copy).
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view regarding the rise and fall of exchange and this could not
be regarded as a sure sign for the establishment of gold standard,
(b) the method suggested was merely to screw up the rupee, irrespective
of the inconvenience it might cause to the trade, (c) the most
important weakness of it concerned the basing of the gold standard
by borrowing £20,000,000 of gold. Hamilton told Elgin, "Our
Lombard Street friends are terribly sensitive upon anything relating
1
to the despatch of gold from this country.N Both the banking and
the commercial classes in London criticised the scheme enormously
2and showed great concern for their gold interests. The scheme of 
the Indian Government was termed as a doubtful venture - "a demand
for gold as might seriously embarrass our own money market91 and
3
"materially affect our own country.91 Lombard Street was determined
to check the outflow of gold and were seriously hinting to raise their
4 the
bank rate. The steps proposed by/Indian Government were considered
highly impractical. E.F. MarriStt wrote that the scheme involved:
initial expenditure, an increase in the amount of the 
sterling debt, and an increase in the weight of the whole 
burden of the debt due to the increased value of gold, 
which the demand by India for gold would lead to several 
years of money scarcity, dear capital, stringent markets,
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 25 March 1898, E.P., vol. 16.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 6 May I8 9 8, ibid.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 1 April and 14 April 1898, ibid.
3 W. Fowler, Indian Currency - An Essay» London, 1899» PP« 27 and 35 •
4 Hamilton to Elgin, 13 May I8 9 8, E.P., voj. 16.
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and currency conditions adverse to the increase of 
commercial enterprise and the general prosperity of 
the country•••.*
The Indian Government scheme, in India, was being criticised
for lacking the element of convertibility* Westland realised that
a gold standard scheme without convertibility would be a farce and
recommended the same and that,too,also at a lower rate of l^ld to 
2
a rupee. This alarmed Hamilton and he asked Elgin not to cause 
any more worries and to drop the scheme of ”convertibility”. He 
wrote, nl am afraid that any idea of associating the establishment of
a gold standard with the convertibility of the rupee into gold will
3
rather increase than assuage the obstacles we have to overcome.”
This new proposal was of course dropped.
In this controversy was introduced another group consisting of 
both Indians and English, which recommended the reopening of the 
Indian mints to the free coinage of silver. They believed that the 
step taken in 1893 had proved to be a failure and the step now 
contemplated would be expensive. It was found impossible to give 
sound arguments in favour of restricted currency, a false rupee and 
12 to 13 per cent Bank rate which was practically equivalent to heavy 
and indirect tax upon the large proportion of produce and manufacture.
1 E.F. Marriott, Indian Currency Question, London, 1899, P* 18.
See also Lord Rothschild*s Evidence, Report of the Indian Currency 
Commission, 1898, Minutes of Evidence, vol. 1, Pari. Papers,
1898, vol. 6 1, /  c.9031_7, p. 268.
2 Westland to Elgin, 19 April 1898, E.P., vol. 72.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 20 May and 1 June l898,ihfcT.., vol. 16.
The Times in a leading article on Indian Affairs wrote that in 18931
the problem of the Government was how, in spite of a fall in
silver ratio, to artificially enhance the rupee to Is. 4d. In 1898
the problem of the Indian banking and mercantile bodies was how,
with the rupee artificially enhanced to Is. 4d. to avoid widespread
disaster. The Government had succeeded in shifting the burden from
its own shoulders to the back of the industrial and trading community,
1
but in so doing had driven the capital out of India. The Bombay
Chamber of Commerce contended that the contraction of money was mainly
2
due to the closing of the mints and recommended it to be opened.
It was argued by the protagonists of the silver standard that
no one had shown that India's standard coin had been deficient in any
of its functions. There was no need of abandoning it. The commerce
of India would rather develop with plentiful supply of good and cheap
money and for this, it was asserted, the monetary standard must be
brought to its natural basis by reopening the mints. ”We are at
this moment having an unpleasant example of the partial asphyxia of
commerce arising from the want of money, and the experience is one
3
we do not wish to see repeated.” Dada Bhai Naoroji and D.E. Wacha
1 5 April 1898.
See also Dada Bhai Naoroji, Poverty and UnBritish Rule in India,
PP. 557-8.
Also Report of the Indian National Congress, 1901, p. 176.
India, 20 May and 8 July 1898.
2 Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, 1898, pp. 206-12.
3 M.D.E. Vebb, Letter to the Editor, Capital, 6 January 1898,
E.P., vol. 80 ^ Newspaper cuttings_y.
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of the Indian National Congress, criticised the Government for
keeping the interest of the foreign trade, while completely ignoring
the internal trade that required an abundance and not a stringency 
1
of currency. The leaders of the Indian National Congress pressed
for the reopening of the mints and for letting the rupee go down
2
to its silver bullion price.
Even those responsible for the Government policy - D. Barbour
and J. Westland-had agreed at one time or the other to the advantages
of an expanding currency over that of the contraction. As early as
1885, D. Barbour in his book The Theory of Bimetallism, had written
that the nevils which attend a contraction of the currency are much
greater than those which follow its expansion? Westland on the other
hand said, nI do not think that any one alleges that the depreciation
of silver which has been going on for 20 or 25 years was in any way
a misfortune to Indian Commerce. Perhaps it was exactly the 
4
opposite.n
Some Englishmen, like R.G/<iffen, the Assistant Editor, of the
A
Economist, strongly recommended that India must go silver standard,
1 Naoroji, Poverty and UnBritish Rule in India, p. 562.
Report of the Indian National Congress, 1898, pp. 100-1.
H.L. Chablani also emphasised,"In deciding upon the monetary 
standard best suited to India, the internal trade of the 
country had a far greater claim upon the attention of the 
authorities." Studies in Indian Currency and Exchange, pp. 9-10.
2 Naoroji's letter to the Editor, India, 27 May 1898.
R.C. Dutt, Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions, 1897-1900» 
Calcutta, 1904, pp. 103-4.
J.A. Wadia, The Artificial Currency and Commerce of India, Bombay, 
1902, p. 127.
3 P. 13* Also p. 154.
4 West land1 s Confidential Note on Currency, 27 July 1897* / ”appendix_7, 
E.P., vol. 71*
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particularly because it suited the economic conditions of the
people, their tastes, their habits and their social outlook. To
force something unnatural was "injudicious and injurious”. The
artificial currency, he said, had already penalized the people;
1
hence, he pleaded for the opening of the mints once again.
Neither the Indian Government nor the Secretary of State was
prepared to revert to the silver standard. Their main reason
was that already there was so much of difference between the bullion
and the rupee that by going back to it, the Government would have to
impose extra direct taxation. Elgin was particularly keen at this stage
to realise gold standard for Indie|at the earliest. Fearing that
the question of silver standard might not get preference at the
hands of the Fowler Commission, he personally took keen interest in
selecting Indian witnesses, both official and non-official, who could
2
impress upon the commission the need of a gold standard for India.
The Indian Government selected three official witnesses, J. Finlay, 
the Financial Secretary, 0'Conor, Director General of Trade and 
Statistics, and A.P. MacDonnell, the Lieutenant Governor of North-Western 
Provinces and Oudh. The selection of the Indian witnesses gave some
1 R. Gyiffen, Letter to the Editor, The Times, 10 May 1898*
See also, his evidence before the Fowler Commission, op. cit.,
Qs. 1 0, 109-1 0, 113; 10 - 238 - 1 0, 248; 10, 050 - 1 0, 0 59.
The Times, 6 June 1898.
E.F. Marriot, n0n Gold Standard”, Calcutta Review, vol. cvi, 1898, 
pp. 63-70.
Monthly Records of Manchester Chamber of Commerce» 1898, vol. ix, 
p. 90 and pp. 153-4.
2 At one stage Elgin had asked Hamilton that he should see that the 
question of reopening of the mints was not considered by the
Committee. Elgin to Hamilton, 24 March 1898. E.P., vol. 16.
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difficulty to the Government* The reason being that their choice
was very limited, because they only wanted to send witnesses of
their tfown taste*1. Hamilton was specially keen that no witness
should be brought from the Indian National Congress - at least not 
1
Naoroji. Elgin was keen to have Jay Govind Law, an influential
the
Bengalee trader and a member of/Legislative Council, who had been a
supporter of the Government policy; from Bombay, Shapurji Bharucha,
another trader who was actively associated with the Indian Currency
Association,and Bam Charan Das from Allahabad, who was a trusted
2
friend of A.P* MacDonnell* Unfortunately none of them could go, and
in the attempts to pursue them,both he and his administrative staff
failed. It was to his regret that he did not know of nany other
4
suitable person likely to goM; and added its importance while 
writing to Voodbum, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, nI do not 
think it makes much difference so far as supplying information is 
concerned but it gives an opening to less satisfactory witnesses and
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 30 August 1898, E.P., vol. 16*
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 1 September and 8 September 1898, ibid. 
At a later stage, when Elgin was confronted with a difficulty in 
finding the native witnesses, he confessed to Hamilton. nI wish we 
could help you to keep Naoroji in the background so far as the 
currency question is concerned.H Elgin to Hamilton, 13 October 
1898, ibid.
2 Elgin to Voodbum (Lt* Governor,Bengal) , 19 August I8 98, ibid*, 
vol* 72*
Elgin to Sandhurst (Governor»Bombay), 20 August 1898, ibid.
Telegram Elgin to Hamilton, (Pr.), 3 September 1898, ibid., vol. 21.
3 Voodbum to Elgin, 24 August 1898, ibid., vol. 72.
Sandhurst to Elgin, 26 August 1898, ibid.
J.J.D. La Touche, (Acting Lt.Governor N.V.P. and Oudh) to Elgin,
8 October 1898, ibid. Ohly Jay Gavind Law wrote a memorandum 
supporting the policy of the Indian Government and this was duly 
sent to the Committee.Enc. Woodburn to Elgin, 30 August 189& ibid.
4 Telegram,El gin to Hamilton, (Pr.), 5 November 1898, ibid., vol. 21.
6perhaps to some political comments11 • *
The Fowler Committee examined the whole question of currency
and came to the conclusion that the only effective currency for
India would be gold standard. They recommended that 4fold .Standard
should be based on the principle of nfree inflow and outflow” of
gold. The British Sovereigns should be made legal tenders and a
current coin in India. The Indian mints were to be thrown open to
the unrestricted coinage of gold. However, the mints were to be
closed to the free coinage of silver. The rupee was to continue
as an unlimited legal tender and the ratio was to be fixed at Is. 4d.
to a rupee. The Fowler Committee held that a fixed exchange could
2
only be secured and guaranteed by an effective gold standard.
All these recommendations were accepted by the Government. In
1899 cm Act was passed by which sovereigns and half sovereigns were
made legal tender throughout India at Is. 4d. ratio. But
unfortunately gold mints were never opened in India and ultimately it
was not gold standard but gold exchange standard which came to be
3
established in India.
1 Elgin to Woodburn, 16 November 1898, ibid., vol. 72.
2 Report of the Indian Currency Commission, 1898, Paras 54-55,
Paras 59 and 66.
3 Gold Exchange Standard has been described by Keynes as ”the use 
of local currency mainly not of gold, some degree of unwilling­
ness to supply gold locally in exchange for local currency, but
a high degree of willingness to sell foreign exchange for payments 
in local currency at a certain maximum rate and to use foreign 
credits in order to do this - the two countries agree”. J.M. Keynes, 
Indian Currency and Finance, p. 2 9.
iT!
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In the assessment of the whole currency question, it may be 
said that the currency policy and the high exchange ratio proved no 
doubt beneficial to the Government - but for the rising exchange, 
the deficit could have been more because of famine and war, and 
surely by 1898, the Government could proudly show surplus, though 
all through Elgin's period of administration, the Government was 
concerned in raising the resources and found extreme stringency in 
the money market. Of course, the salaried classes gained too with 
the rising exchange. The grant of the exchange compensation allowance 
at still privileged rate of Is. 6d. to a rupee had not only increased 
the exchange liabilities for the while but came probably at the most 
inopportune time, particularly when the financial needs of the 
country required all economy and exemplary concern from the Government.
The benefits of the rising exchange were attained at the cost
of a considerable hardship to the Indian cultivators and traders.
Many critics asserted that the Government had improved its financial
condition by merely juggling with the currency. To Dadabhai Naoroji
the "closing of the mints and thereby raising the true rupee, worth
at present about lid in gold, to a false rupee to be worth l6d in
gold is a covert exaction of about 45 per cent more taxation all round
1
from the Indian tax payers"• This allegation was not refuted by 
MacDonnell who wrote to Elgin after giving his evidence before the
1 Dadabhai Naoroji, Statement submitted to Indian Currency Committee 
of 1898, London, 1898, Para 6.
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Fowler Commission that I6d rupee meant additional taxation, "because
although the number of the rupees collected as revenue remained the same,
each rupee represented more commodities. In the long run the cultivator
would have to dispose of more produce to get a sixteen penny rupee. But
the taxation was unconsciously paid, while from another point of view, it
was only a check on a loss to which Government should not have been
subjected." He further added that the taxation of the kind "which a
sixteen penny rupee means will be unfelt and Unknown except from the 
1
agitators."
This attitude of the Government would confirm the view of many 
national leaders that the handling of the currency question 
impregnated a political manoeuvre aimed at confusing the ignorant 
masses by imposing Indirect and hidden taxation.
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 8 July 1898, E.P. ,T5fol. 33.
R. Hardie, Member of the India Council, had stated the same thing 
much earlier* "altering the rupee from a free coin to a monopoly 
coin, very seriously affected the financial obligations arising 
under all land settlements.” Minute, 14 April 1894, Financial 
Papers, F H 89/9 4, vol. 1265.
See also V. Fowler, Indian Currency - An Essay, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
2 The remarkable financial recovery and continuous budget surpluses 
after 1901 had enthused Hamilton to feel very happy and this in 
turn excited a penetrating remark from G.K. Gokhale who said,
"Such an impossible feat as the raising of the exchange value of 
the rupee without involving an indirect increase in the taxation 
of the country can be performed, what is there to prevent the 
Government of India from raising the rupee still higher - say, to 
Is. 6d. or Is. 9d. or even 2s.? The surpluses then would be even 
larger than now and as according to Lord George Hamilton's 
argument, no harm is done to anybody in India by such artificial 
appreciation, there is no reason whatever why such wonderfully 
easy and simple method of increasing the resources at the disposal 
of the Government should not be adopted." G.K. Gokhale, Speeches, 
Madras, 1916, p. 76. See also J.A. Wadia,The Artificial Currency. 
o_P^  cit., pp. 53, 58, 95-7, 107-8.
R.C. Dutt, Economic History of India, London, 1904, p. 596.
.To add fuel to the fire, the depreciation of the silver bullion
and its greater divorce from the coin caused further hardship to
the poor ryot; particularly because the chief savings of the poor
1
were in ornaments. During the times of scarcity and famine a
considerable quantity of silver ornaments found its way to the mints.
the
EveVHerschell Committee had admitted that in 1877 famine, nearly
t 2Rs 45,000,000 worth of ornaments were turned into rupees. As a 
part of the social habit, more than half of the yearly additions to the 
currency before the closing of the mints went into melting pot for
3
conversion into ornaments or as hoards. MacDonnell and O'Conor
both had agreed before the Fowler Commission that large part of the
silver was used as ornament. MacDonnell had himself stated that a
4
quarter of the peasants' savings were in ornaments. In another letter 
he admitted that during recent famine large ornaments were pawned, 
but his statement was ignored for it did not nearly prove that the 
people were impoverished. It was Gokhale who remarked that the 
price of the silver bullion had gone down even when the prices of the 
other commodites had not.^ This must have enhanced the indebtedness
1 Report of the Indian National Congress, 1898,7p. 107.
2 Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 1893» op. cit.; Para 106.
3 (P.F. Shirras, Indian Banking and Finance, p. 156.
4 MacBonnell to Elgin, 8 July 1898, E.P., vol. 33*
5 MacDonnell to Elgin, 5 May 1898, ibid., vol. 72.
6 G.K. Gokhale, Speeches, p. 14.
Thus where the Government gained with the rising exchange, the 
masses lost* As Hardie said, during the crisis the reserves of the 
people in silver could not be converted into money except at a very 
great loss. Merchants were unable to discount their bills except 
at extreme rate such as 12 to 15 per cent per annum and even then 
only to a very limited extent* The resources of the Indian bankers 
were not available in money and they were unable to utilize their 
credit in the usual manner by obtaining advances freely from the Bank. 2
As regards the prices, there was no general fall, except in 
1894, 1895 and 1899* During 1893-91 many strange things happened* 
Whereas the rise in the value of the rupee as measured by its 
purchasing power over commodities immediately after the closing of 
the mints, saw a fall in the prices from index number 129 in I893 
to 120 in 18951 on the other hand there was a fall in the average 
exchange value of the rupee from nearly l4d in 1893 to 13d in 1895* 
Similarly in the period of depreciation in the purchasing power of the
1 Elgin himself had shown great interest in toe rural indebtedness 
and had often written to the Secretaries of State regarding the 
implication of it as a political danger to what he termed as 
"appalling" condition of the people because of rural indebtedness. 
See Elgin to Fowler, 17 July and 30 October 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 R. Hardie's Note on Food Stock, 9 February 1897♦ Enc. Hamilton 
to Elgin, 12 February 1897* E.P., vol. 15.
R. Griffen, Assistant Editor of The Economist, calculated on the 
figures of L. Probyn that ornaments before the mints were 
closed, were worth £3 50,00 0 ,0 00 and were now worth £256,0 0 0,0 0 0, 
quoted in E.F. Marriot, Indian Currency Question, p. 46. See 
also Monthly Records of Manchester Chamber of Cobiberce, 1893, 
vol. iv, p. I39.
3 C.N. Vakil and Murranjan, Currency and Prices in India, pp. 321-30.
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rupee from 1896 and 18971 the prices rose from 131 in 1896 to 
153 in 1897 and on the other hand the rupee sterling exchange rose 
from 13d in 1895 to l4id in 1896 and 15d in 1897* These paradoxes 
were of course due to the work of many other factors* As a matter 
of fact, the artificial appreciation of the rupee should have 
brought a general fall in the prices. This assumption was obviously 
based on the fact£ that shortage of rupees would enhance its purchasing 
power and the prices would fall. This view was equally shared by the 
Government. In the first few years after the closing of the mints 
tt»the free coinage of silver, this trend was counterbalanced by a 
succession of famines and scarcities and also by hoarded rupees, 
having come into circulation,and also probably because of the rise of 
gold prices throughout the world during that period, which helped to 
increase the prices in India.
The impact ofrising exchange and high prices on general public 
must have been pernicious. But it was Naoroji, who pragmatically 
argued that Mthe real and full effect of the closing of the mints 
must be examined by itself, irrespective of other factors.w He 
affirmed that the peasants had to pay a higher amount of revenue to 
the Government as a result of the increase in the gold and silver 
value of the rupee and this was ^altogether independent of whatever 
the actual price of commodites may be.1* If the prices did not go down 
in reality because of the operation of certain other factors, he argued,
1 See the Chart, p•*]!
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it only meant that in absence of the currency changes and with
the continued operation of these factors, prices would have gone
1
up and that the peasants would have gained at that extent.
The currency legislation also affected the cotton goods
2trade unfavourably. After the gold value of the rupee increased,
the. Indian cotton industry no longer possessed its former advantage
and lost to China and Japan its competitive initiative, because China
remained silver standard and Japan fixed a low ratio of £&€ exchange
between silver and gold, thereby acquiring a price advantage over
3
Indian manufacturers. There is no doubt the textile interests
of India, for the Indian owned industry were worst affected. The
decline of the Far Eastern demand for Indian cotton was one of the
4
reasons for five years slump after 1900 in the Bombay Mills.
In its final analysis it may be pointed out that in the 1890s 
the financial position of the Government of India was definitely in 
a serious difficulty and some solution of the problem was essential.
1 D. Naoroji, Statement Submitted to Indian Currency Commission,
1898, op. cit., Paras 7-15*
2 For the impact of currency changes on foreign trade, see P. Ray, 
Indian Foreign Trade 1870-1930* PP- 171-208.
C.L. Chablani, Studies in Indian Currency and Exchange, pp. 5”10.
3 Bengalee, 28 June 1898.
4 D.H. Buchanan, The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India, 
pp. 155• O.K. Gokhale alleged in 1902 that the cotton industry of 
India was in a state of wdreadful depression, in large measures 
due to the currency legislation of Government.n Speeches,
op. cit., p. 10.
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There could be, of course, two opinions about the methods employed.
First, for example, as the Indian National Congress argued that
instead of ^tampering" with the currency, it was worth while to
1
reduce the 'Home Charges' and military expenditure. Secondly,
somrothers would have preferred a lower ratio as in the case of Japan
which had gone gold standard in 1898 but had adopted it at a ratio
with silver which was equivalent to ll£d per rupee. In the context
of low ratio, once Westland made a very significant remark in an
important note which he wrote on 17 October 1896. He said, nIt is
certainly true that falling exchange has compelled us to resort more
it
than once to increased taxation, buty' is certainly also true that
falling exchange has had a great deal to do with the continual
M 2increasing produce of each of our sources of revenue*1. In other 
words a lower rate would have increased production and thereby compen­
sate the loss in the form of additional revenues.
It is also true that much of the results of the Government's 
currency policy were obscured and aggravated on account of war, famine
1 India, 11 November and 4 December 1898.
D any an Prakash. 9 May 1898, Kaiser-i-Hind, 15 May 1898.
Bomb. N.N.R., 1898.
D.E. Wacha, Report of The Indian National Congress, 1898, 
pp. 98 and 101-4.
Dada Bhai Naoroji, Poverty and ilUnBritish Rule in India, pp. 539-46. 
R.C. Dutt, Economic History of India, p. 582.
Bipin Chandra, in recently unpublished thesis, Economic Policies 
of Indian National Leadership 1880-1905, Delhi, 1963» has shown 
the disapprobation of the currency policy by the Indian Leadership 
on various counts and in great detail^ pp. 213-29*
2 Para 21, op. cit., E.P., vol. 135(r).
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and plague. But it is equally and substantially true, as MacDonnell
f U  t f j u t  C j r
admitted, while writing to Elgin that/the currency and the artificial
' ivalue of the rupee on rural economy was not properly examined.
Lastly, it was unfortunate that Elgin’s period of administration 
was a period of trial and transition. It also fell to the burden 
of the administration to raise even additional money in the form 
of import duties and provoke the criticism of the public on account 
of acute scarcity of money in the market. But it could not be taken 
from the credit of Elgin that he tried twice to relieve the pressure 
of stringent money from the public and thereby ease the financial 
tension and terminate the period of transition at its earliest. 
Unfortunately the British economic interests clashed with those of 
the Indian.
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 26 April I8 98, E.P., vol. 72.
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Table No. 1
The following table compiled by the Department of Statistics GovofTvrne-wl" 
i» shows the course of prices in India expressed in index numbers 
(prices in 1873 being equal to 100).
Exported Imported General index Weighted index
Year articles articles number for all number (100
(28) un- (11) un- 39 articles articles) equated
weighted weighted unweighted to 100 for 1873*
1873 100 100 100 100
1883 93 79 89 99
1884 96 7 8 91 108
1885 91 75 87 106
1886 93 80 89 103
1887 94 83 91 104
1888 98 92 96 ill
1889 104 91 101 117
1890 104 91 100 117
1891 103 84 98 120
1892 109 84 102 132
1893 112 89 105 129
1894 110 84 102 122
1895 111 87 104 120
1896 117 94 110 131
1897 124 86 113 153
1898 102 80 96 125
1899 100 87 96 121
1900 124 96 116 143
1 1
Chapter II 
COTTON DUTIES
In the field of political economy, the mid-Victorian and later-
Victorian periods have been called an age of free trade. But free
trade in the strict sense of the term was not applied in India. The
Indian Government had recognised the need of revenue and the Home
Government had accepted the policy. Like other commodities the cotton
piece goods and yarns were subjected to import duties. Between 1844-74,
the duty on the cotton piece goods varied between 10 per cent and 5 per
cent, and on yam between 5 to 3\ per cent, except once, when in 1860-1
1
the duty on yam was also 10 per cent.
By 1870, the circumstances began to change. Indian cotton industry
began to grow. In 1854, there was one cotton mill in India, but by
1873 there were 20 and by 1876, 47 mills. This rate of growth alarmed
the Manchester industrialists. As there was a great scope for the
cotton industry to develop in India because of the plentiful supplies
of raw cotton, cheap labour, and a large home market, Manchester
started employing every effort to eliminate any artificial benefit,
2
however slight, the industry received from Tariff laws. A fierce
1 A Note prepared by Sir Henry Vaterfield, Finance Secretary India 
Office, on the history of cotton duties up to 1879? November 1894, 
Revenue and Statistics and Commerce Departmental Papers of the 
Council of India, 1443/94, vol. 336. £ Hereafter cited as R and
S Paper s_7.
2 E.C. Moulton, Lord Northbrook *s Indian Administration 1872-1876, 
Unpublished, London University Thesis, 1964, p. 273.
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controversy ensued during Lord Northbrook’s period of viceroyalty
to abolish the duties on cotton piece goods and yarn. Although till
the time of Northbrook’s resignation the duties remained in force,
Salisbury had forcefully indicated that the Indian tariff should
conform to the imperial interests. Moreover, to ensure that imperial
interests were protected, he ordered the Government in 1875 not to
pass any important legislation in future without previously consulting
the Secretary of State.
The effective implementation of the imperial tariff policy took
place under the regime of Salisbury and Lytton. In 1878, the import
duties on certain coarser kind^were remitted and in 1879, on all cotton
goods not containing yarns of counts higher than 30* Lytton had
passed this legislation after over-ruling the decision of the majority
2of his executive council. It was solely in the political and 
economic interest of England that such a step was taken. Up to that 
time Indian industry was still in its infancy and there was no keen 
competition between the Indian and the Manchester manufacturers, because 
the former produced only coarse cloth and latterthe finer. Secondly, 
the duties were too low to provide effective protection. Vhat was
1 Ibid., p. 264.
2 C.N. Vakil, Financial Development of Modem India 1860-1924,
Bombay, 1924, pp. 417-8.
For details see L.M.^ (hijral, Internal Administration of Lord Lytton, 
1876-8 0, unpublished, London University Thesis, 1958, Chap. I.
probably most alarming was that Lytton had reduced these duties in 
a period of deficit, famine and war.
The import duties were i abolished in 1882 under the Liberal
I1
Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon. India was now virtually without tariff.
This tariff holiday did not last long. The appalling growth
of military expenditure^ brought about by the frontier troubles,
and the expedition to Burma, the construction of large public works,
the progressive reduction of opium revenue, the exchange compensation
allowance and the fall in the gold value of silver exerted great
pressure on the finances of India. In 1894 the Government was con-
2
fronted with the deficit of rupees 35 million. . There was no other
means of raising revenue except the reimposition of import duties.
The Herschell Committee in 1893 was quite emphatic in suggesting the
3imposition of import duties to meet the financial exigencies. The 
question at issue was; whether to include cotton in the general import 
duty or not? And if this was not included nearly half of the imports
1 The analysis of expenditure on the army in India 1884-5 to 1892-3 was 
forwarded to the Secretary of State in Indian Government L. No.
63 (Mil.), 5 April 1893? Military and Marine Letters* from India, 
vol. 6 9.
2 Westland's Statement, Proc. of the Council of the Governor-General 
in India, 1894, vol. 33* P» 118. Writing a letter to the Editor of 
The Times, 19 February 18951 David Barbour (former Finance Member of 
the Government of India) pointed out that all budgets since 1892-3 
to 1895-6 had shown deficit, in spite of the fact that increase in 
the taxation in the form of income tax, salt tax, petroleum tax 
and import duties had brought rupees 55 million. In addition to 
this 15 million rupees were absorbed from the famine relief and 
from provincial funds.
3 Report of the Indian Currency Committee, 18931 op. cit., para 39*
7f
1
would go free and the deficit would not be met. But its inclusion 
would be disputed on political and economic grounds*
There were certain other factors to be taken into consideration. 
By then the Indian textile industry had increased very rapidly.
Whereas in 1882 there were 62 mills, in 1894 their number reached 142, 
which alarmed Manchester. Secondly, Elgin had come to India under 
specific instructions that no duty would be imposed on cotton goods. 
The political condition of his party was very delicate and the 
Liberals had the majority of only 34 in the House of Commons. Any 
change in the vital cotton tariff could bring down the Liberal 
Government.
In his first private letter to Kimberley, Elgin took a realistic
view and wrote, N1 think you may wish to know that I concur in a
course which is very distasteful to me personally, it is because I
2
cannot see any alternative”. With the unanimous support of his 
executive council he urged the Secretary of State to allow the Indian 
Government to impose import duties, including those on cotton goods. 
Kimberley was not amenable to the Viceroy's proposal. He 
was prepared to concede to the demand of general import duties but not
1 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 19 February 1894, E.P., vol. 17-
2 Elgin to Kimberley, 31 January 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
1
on cotton goods. Elgin again reminded the Secretary of State of
the iniquitousness of the action and stated that if the principle.
of import duties was accepted, he did not find any reason, even as
2a free trader, as to why cotton goods should be excluded.
But the British cabinet was not prepared to take any chances 
with the cotton interest of Manchester. Godley, the permanent Under­
secretary at the India Office, informed Elgin that the position of 
the cabinet was so delicate that if cotton duties>ere imposed - 
** It is possible, not to say probable, that the Government might be 
defeated on the subject in the House of Commons, or might revoke their
consent in deference to obligation, and this would be fatal to any
3
attempt to impose the duties for a long time to come.n It was
feared that over 60 Members of Parliament, who represented Manchester
and Lancashire, whether Liberal or Conservative, would vote against
4
the imposition and this would topple the Government. On 27 February 
Kimberley finally informed Elgin of the cabinet's decision by both 
private and official telegrams that cotton goods were not to be included.
1 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, (Pr.), 30 January 1894, ibid., vol. 17*
2 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 16 February 1894, ibid.
3 Godley to Elgin, 22/23 Febmary 1894, ibid. , vol. 29-
Also Kimberley to Elgin, 2 March 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
4 Ibid.
5 Telegrams S.S. to Viceroy, 27 February 1894, ibid., vol. 17*
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In doing so Kimberley had over-ruled the unanimous opinion of the
1
Council against the idea of exempting cotton from general import duties.
Thus the Secretary of State took his final decision and it was
now Elgin's turn to take his decision. His position was very delicate.
The utilization of the famine insurance to the extent of 10 million
rupees, the curtailment of provincial balances and the doubling of
the duty on kerosene had brought in only as much as to pay the exchange
compensation allowance, which was given to Government officials for
their loss in their sterling remittances due to the fall in the gold 
2value of silver. The financial position looked gloomy. Elgin pleaded 
once again, this time with Fowler:
‘If other import duties are to be imposed, why is not this 
one, and it is not expected from the consideration ofj-hame 
interests>and home interests alone? I don't think it^be 
argued that it is more distinctly protective ... an import 
duty on cotton goods would not really affect the volume of 
trade. On the other hand, the money is absolutely required, 
and I am assured'.'that there is no other source of revenue 
which would not be both inadequate and dangerous. The real 
danger that is apprehended - and I think not altogether 
unjustly apprehended - is a coalition of British and native 
opposition. '3
Further he stated that as the tariff Bill stood, if members were left 
to vote, there would not be a single vote in favour ofthe exclusion of 
cotton goods. Even the members of the executive would vote for the
1 All the 11 Members dissented. Minutes of the Council of India, 
vol. 72, pp. 98-9-
2 Telegram Viceroy to S.S. (Pr.), 6 March 1894, E.P., vol. 17»
3 Elgin to Fowler, 7 March 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
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exclusion of cotton goods from import duties under compulsion.
But Fowler did not heed^his pleadings*
The Tariff proposals were taken to the Legislative Council*
Vestland had clearly stated that the proposed exemption of cotton
was because of the Ehglish pressure applied through the Secretary of 
1
State* But opposition to this developed and Charles Pritchard urged
that this matter must be reconsidered* Elgin was caught in an
embarrassing position and asked the Secretary of State to relieve
him of this position by agreeing to impose a nominal duty of 2J per
cent and sought the assurance that if the financial position did not
2
improve,the matter would be reconsidered* The Cabinet did not agree 
to impose duties on cotton in the first instance but agreed that if
3
situation demanded, it could be reconsidered*
In the meantime there was a lot of controversy raised by non­
official members yboth Anglo-Indian and Indian. When the report of 
the select committee of the Legislative Council was placed for the 
consideration on the 10 March 1894, Hon*ble Playfair moved the 
amendment that cotton duties must be included. It was wrong, he said
to leave one-half of the total import trade which amounted to Rs. 280
4
million annually. He said that the taxation now proposed enabled
1 Proc. of the Council of the Governor General in India, 1894, vol. 33» 
P. 119.
2 Telegram Viceroy to S.S. , 6 March E.P., vol. 17*
3 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 8 March/ ibid.
4 Proc. of the Council of the Governor-General in India, 1894, 
vol. 33i PP* 143-4.
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only to pay the exchange compensation to the officers, the payment
of which became wunduly onerous through the system of taxation
1
adopted to provide the amount required.” He further asserted that
5 per cent duty was not against the principles of free trade, which
he said had been admitted in the past by financiers like J.S. Mill,
Wilson, Gladstone and Lord Cromer.
The Indian non-official members, Gangadhar Bao Madhuva
Chitnavis and Maharaja of Dharbanga, also made scathing criticism
2of the Government. But a very powerful speech came from the official 
member Hon'ble Stevens, who said that the exclusion of cotton from 
the tariff list would strengthen the current belief that nin1his
case and perhaps in others the interests of India are sacrificed to
3
meet the exigencies of party politics in England. 11 Westland also 
confessed; MIf the matters were left to my discretion, I dare say,
4I would incline in the discretion of the Hon'ble member's amendment.w
1 Ibid., P- 145.
2 Ibid., P- 156 and pp. 159-6 0.
3 Ibid., P- 163.
4 Ibid., P* 180.
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He further admitted that Manchester trade was not so reduced in
the world that it could no longer **fight a fair fight1*. Both
Westland and Elgin took shelter under the constitutional authority
2of the Secretary of State and the cabinet. The tariff Bill was 
passed in March 1894.
Public criticism was much more hostile. Six chambers of commerce, 
three trade Associations, and eight other public associations registered 
their strong protests. They all asserted that it was unjust on the 
part of the Government to impose tax on kerosene, which the poor 
section consumed and completely exempt the cotton goods which could
3
bring substantial revenue. Lieutenant-General Brackenbury, the
military member in the Executive Council wrote to Elgin that there
4
was a feeling of unrest among Indians. t4*c. Punjab Government also
5
wired that ^exemption would be discreditable to our administration*1 •
It was the Indian press which made the frontal attack. The
very act of exempting cotton goods from the general tariff brought
many questions into the open. Many newspapers questioned the financial
1 Ibid., p. 182.
2 Ibid., p. 189.
3 Indian Govt, sent 29 Enclosures with L. No 27 (Fin.) of 21 March
1894, all condemning the exclusion of cotton goods from the general
tariff Act. F.E.g, vol. 180.
See also India Fin. and Com. (Statistics and Com.) Proc., vol.
4606, Nos. 212-13, 218, 219 and 2 35, May 1894.
Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, 1895* PP» 195-200.
Memorial, East India Association, 14 June 1894, R. and S
Papers 518/94, vol. 324.
4 Brackenbury to Elgin, 6 March 1894, E.P., vol. 64.
5 Telegram Punjab Govt, to Viceroy, 3 March 1894, ibid.
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administration and denied that the exchange was the sole cause
of trouble. They stated that it was the extravagant expenditure
on civil and military ventures, which was the prime cause and further
asserted that at this time of financial need, it was imperative for
the Government to act vigorously.* Many reminded the Government
that it was too much to tax the patience of the people and wrongfully
deprive them of their money by raising the revenue for famine
relief and using it for other purposes. They called this betrayal 
2
of faith. The Bangavasi, an influential Bengalee paper, termed 
the Indian Government "pure nonentities'1 and "veritable puppets" 
and strongly condemned the selfishness of the British rule in India.
Some even questioned the need of keeping "a mock viceroy" and
4
maintaining a "sham" Legislative Council. Some went to the extent
5
of suggesting a boycott of foreign goods.
Nor was the criticism confined to India only.^ The members
1 Kaiser-i-Hind, 11 March 1894. Bombay Samachar, 13 and 14 March 
1894, Bomb. N.N.R. 1894.
2 Maharatha, 4 March 1894, Gujrati, 4 March, Kaiser-i-Hind, 4 March, 
Bomb. N.N.R. 1894.
Sahachar, 7 March 1894; Hitavadi, 15 March 1894; Bengal N.N.R.
1894.
Karnataka Prakrita, 12 March 1894; The Kerala Patrika, 10 March 1894; 
Madras N.N.R. 1894.
3 15 March 1894, Beng. N.N.R., 1894.
4 Sulabah Dainik, 7 April 1894, ibid.
5 Hindu Panch, 22 March 1894, Poona Vaibhava, 15 April, Danyan Prakash,
16 April 1894, Bomb. N.N.R. 1894.
6 Godley to Elgin, 15 March 1894 and 30 March 1894, E.P., vol. 29.
Lord Reay to Elgin, 6 April 1894, ibid., vol. 29.
Lord Lansdowne to Elgin, 30 May 1894, ibid., vol. 29.
of the India Council vigorously condemned the action of the
Secretary of State, Sir Arbuthnot termed it as a betrayal of good
faith, which was bound to impair the "confidence in the justice of
1
British rule" in India. A.C. Lyall, another member of the India
Council, thought that the exclusion of cotton goods from the import
duties schedule could not be defended on economic grounds "having
2
regard to the existing situation of the Indian finance".
Even in the House of Commons voices were raised against the
measure. Sir George Chesney deplored the action of the Secretary of
State who had not allowed the Indian Government to impose tax on
3
cotton in dire need of its financial crisis.
The first phase of controversy uncovered and brought to the 
forefront many things. Firstly, the financial condition of India 
was revealed to be unsound. There was still a deficit of 15 million
4
rupees. India needed either curtailment of expenditure or rise in
1 Arbuthnotfs Note of dissent, 1 March 1894, India Council Minute 
Book (copies), vol. 5i P* t-2,
2 Ibid., p. 3« See also Memorandum by Lord Farrer on the Indian 
cotton duties, R and S papers, No. 518/94 vol. 324. These papers 
contain very valuable statistical data and give factual criticism. 
These papers were sent to Lord Reay, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State, who further presented to ijf* Fowler on 22 May 1894.
3 Pari. Debates, 4th Series, vol. 22, col. 208, 13 March 1894.
4 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 65 (Rev.), 31 May 1894,
Para 7? Revenue Despatches to India, vol. 15*
Si
the revenue. The import duties without cotton duties were an
economic and political mockery. Secondly, the political and economic
1
influence of Manchester seemed unassailable. Thirdly, the recent 
action of the Indian Government had certainly created an element of 
discontent.
Elgin's role in this phase was unique. He was caught between
his conscience and his politics, between positive action and expediency,
between independence of action and obedience to the superior authority.
But he did what he thought to be the best. He had warned the Secretary
of State much before and eloquently demanded justice for India and
tried his best to waive away the superstition of people in England
that India was rich. When Godley wrote to him that the Secretary of
State did not consider the financial position of India to be so bad
2
as to warrant the imposition of cotton duties; Elgin replied:
You must bear in mind that we have only arrived at a 
solution this year by giving up the famine grant and 
by making calls upon the local Governments - which, I 
am satisfied, would not only be extremely unpopular, 
but also most inexpedient as any part of a permanent 
arrangement, and if you take out those parts of the 
present financial scheme, you will, I think, easily see 
that there is no practical alternative except the cotton 
duties.^
Elgin had tried all means - suggested nominal duty** proposed excise
1 Elgin to Harris (Govenor of Bombay), 14 March 1894, E.P., vol. 64.^
2 Godley to Elgin, 22/23 February 1894, ibid.
3 Elgin to Godley, 21 March 1894, ibid.
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duty, and never was he more truthful when he said this action would
2
lead to political discontent in India.
In this controversy, Elgin had not lost all. He had gained 
one point, that the question of the cotton duties could be opened
3again. When Fowler spoke in the House of Commons on 13 March 1894
and gave a feeler to the Government of India that import duties on
cotton goods could be considered as a compromise with countervailing
4excise duty, Elgin was quick to catch up.
The Government of India in its first major policy despatch of 
5March 1894 firmly stated that the exclusion of tax on cotton could 
not be permanently maintained, particularly because the financial 
position in foreseeable time was not likely to improve, and the
curtailment of military expenditure suggested by Kimberley was not
6 7possible. Provincial contribution was not substantial and the
suspension of Famine Insurance Grant could not be made a permanent feature.
1 Elgin to Fowler, 7 March 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
2 Ibid.
3 Pari. Debates, 4th Series, vol. 22, Col 215-220, 13 March 1894.
4 Godley had suggested earlier of the excise duty to Elgin in 
order to minimise the outcry of protection in England. Godley 
to Elgin, 2 March 1894, E.P., vol. 29* In another letter Godley 
had written that excise duty need not be identical with the duty 
on the imported cotton goods; wIt might be somewhat lower11.
Godley to Elgin, 30 March 1894, E.P., vol. 29-
5 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 8l (Fin.), 28 March 1894* F.L.I., 
vol. 179-
6 SeelFin. Statement l894-5» Para. 121.
7 Ibid., Para 27* 28 and 96.
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In May 1894, the Secretary of State and his Council in their
despatch conceded to the demand of the imposition of the duties
on cotton piece goods and yam, but made it clear that imposition of
duty was in itself a great concession and excise duty must be
accepted as a complementary to it. In the case of imported goods
which did not compete with Indian manufactures, the import duty on
them would not be protective and no equivalent excise would be 
1
needed. It further stressed that Indian cotton industry during the 
last twelve years had developed much faster and if no excise was levied, 
Lancashire would feel very agitated. The Secretary of State left to 
the discretion of the Government of India to devise a scheme which
2
would not be open to Mserious economical objection at the outset.”
1 S.S. to Indian Govt. Despatch No. 65 (Rev.), 31 May 1894, Para 10. 
Revenue Despatches to India, vol. 15-
See also Fowler to Elgin, 30 March 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 65 (Rev.), 31 May 1894, Para 16, 
op. cit. When the said despatch was in its draft from, it was 
committed to many changes*on J. Pields suggestion (Note dated
28 May 1894)* Paragraph 13 was modified and another paragraph 
was omitted because it committed the Secy of State to the idea 
of excise duty too much. A.C. Lyall (Note dated 7 May 1894) asked 
for the omission of certain words in paragraph ten, because they 
were too sweeping and again pledged the Secretary of State too 
much. Arthur Godley concurred (Note, undated) and Fowler agreed 
to the suggestion. Arbuthnot (Note dated 23 May 1894) totally 
dissented from the despatch on the initiation of the principle 
of excise. He stated that Indian Cotton Mill industry was a 
institution of modern growth and needed encouragement and not 
suppression. Already the industry had received a setback on 
account of the currency legislation, and such an action he said 
would tantamount to an extremely partisan attitude towards 
Manchester and would aggravate the already state of political 
unrest in India which was so much there since 1873 he 
beseeched that there was no time for ”rash experiments upon the 
loyalty of the people of that country.” R and S papers, No. 518/ 
94, vol. 324.
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On the receipt of this despatch, Elgin asked Westland to draw the
line of action. Westland went to Bombay to study the functioning
of Indian Cotton Mill Industry and devised a plan to meet the wishes
of the Secretary of State. The Minute of Westland1 dated 14 July
1894, was painstaking, factual and revealing. He gathered his facts
by examining the records and statistics of 140 of the 141 cotton
mills collected by the Indian Millowners, Association and the records
of the Collector of Customs, Bombay.
He came to the firm conclusion that of the total cotton
manufactures in India, 94 per cent was absolutely outside the range
of any competition with Manchester; because it was the coarse quality
2of goods of counts 243 which Manchester could not pretend to supply
3
so cheap as India, as is evident from the following figures:-
1 J. Westland's Minute, 14 July 1894 (Confidential), India Fin. 
and Com. Proc. (Statistics and Com.) vol. 4606, No. 378, August 
1894. The original minute contained 52 Paragraphs. 27 Paras 
were omitted from the Parliamentary Papers entitled as Blue Book, 
vol. 72, (C.7602) 1893* The unexpurgated minute did not catch 
the eyes of the public because it was never made public.
2 The Count of yarn might be called as the number of yards of that 
yarn which would be required to make up the weight of 1/840 of
a pound. 20S are therefore exactly twice as fine as 10S and 
30S are three times as fine. Of these Counts it would require 10 
yards, 20 yards and 30;-yards, respectively to make up the weight 
of 1/840 of a pound.
cit., Para 11.
As regards the Indian mills only, a small proportion of the yams 
produced was used for mill weaving. Of the 141 mills in existence, 
only about 64 or less than half possessed any looms at all; the 
rest were occupied solely in producing yams for export and for 
hand loom consumption, and among the 64 spinning mills, the 
weaving department absorbed only a portion of outturn of yams.
37^ million lbs of yam was annually produced in India, out of 
which 170 million lbs was exported, 129 million lbs was sold to 
handloom weavers and 74 million lbs was used for weaving. J. 
Westland, Minute, Para 15. The trade in yams of Indian manu­
facture greatly exceeded trade in cloth of Indianmanufacture.
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Percentage of Counts
10S and under.......................  19-714 per cent
Above 10S and under 20S.................. . 59*633 n
« 20S " " 30S...................  19*073 n
» 30S « " 40S ...................  1*453 "
w 40S ..............................  -127
Total 100
Manchester had an absolute monopoly of the finer qualities
and the bulk of the trade consisted in piecegoods of about Counts
305 and in yarns somewhat finer.
1
Yarns imported into India.
1892-93 1893-94
From U.K. lbs. 37,337,449 lbs. 41,642,142
Elsewhere 935 *096 1,164,849
Total 38,276,545 42,806,991
The value of the imports of cotton goods from United Kingdom was
Rx
Yarns 2,600,000
Piece goods 22,000,000
Total 24,600,000^
1 Of the above imports, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta each received a
little over 10 million lbs. Of the imports into Bombay, a complete 
analysis extending over 24 years was made by the Bombay Chamber 
of Commerce and the result of that analysis showed that
(a) of grey mule twist, only 0.4 out of 27*21 or*15 per cent 
was of 24S and under;
(b) of grey water twist, only . 15 out of 26.19 or .57 per cent 
was of 24S and under;
(c) and the percentage in both cases had been for years gradually 
decreasing. Ibid., Para 17*
See also K.T. Shah, Trade, Tariffs and Transport, Bombay, 1923, 
p. 267.
2 Ibid., Para 26.
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Six per cent of the above amount or Rx 860,000 worth of produce 
could be considered as a possible competitor in the field of trade 
that was occupied by Manchester. That it was, not only with 
Rx 24,600,000 worth of goods which Manchester sent yearly to India, 
but also with the large quantities which Manchester sent to China,
Japan and East Coast of Africa to which India could (as a matter of 
fact, it did not) send part of its total competitive traffic of 
Rx 860,000. The exports of Manchester to the East were nearly 30 
million sterling, say Rx 45*000,000. So that India got less than 
2 per cent of the market for the finer goods and Manchester 98 per cent. 
This point can be further substantiated by looking at the figures of 
exports from Bombay (as provided by Collector of Customs, Bombay) for 
the year 1892-93 and 1893-94.2
The quantity being in lbs and values in Rx.
1892-93
Quantity Value
1893-94
Quantity Value
Mule twist and yam 
No 15 and lower 
No 16 to 24
55*994,974
113,700,411
1,804,607
4 ,275,830
35,744,084
88,372,568
1,197,484
3,381,086
Total 24S and lower 169*695*385 6 ,080,437 124,116,652 4,578,570
Nos 25 to 32 
Nos 33 to 42
200,358
15,950
9,414
1,043
409,185
44,000
19,742
2,417
Contd:
1 Ibid., Paras 27-8.
2 Ibid., Para 16.
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1892-93 1893-94
Quality Value Quantity Value
Water twist
No 20S and lower 79,136 3,280 112,365 4,607
No 21S to 30S 4,010 165 53,050 2,438
No 31S to 40S (all
sent to Persia) 9 ,80 0 537 30 ,200 1,668
No 41S to 50S (all
to China) - - 385 37
Coloured 781,890 46,011 701,990 41,062
Total 170,768,529 6,140,887125,467,827 4,650,541
These figures sufficiently show that the exports of the counts 
above 24S form only an insignificant proportion1 of the total export 
trade in yarns.
Manchester had a more serious rival in Europe in the cotton 
goods of the Counts 24S than in India, particularly in the 
coloured, printed, dyed and fancy goods. They were largely made of 
Indian cotton, the export of which had been rising and was mixed with 
the American cotton, so as to produce quality goods of the raw- 
cotton. Of the raw cotton in 1892-3 the exports from India were 
4,789,201 cwts of which 528,403 went to the United Kingdom, 443,988 to 
Japan and nearly all the rest, say 3i million cwts to Europe. This 
clearly showed that the United Kingdom was ceasing to be a customer 
for these inferior grades of cotton, as it paid Manchester to go in 
more for the finer qualities of goods. It is clear that it did not
1 Ibid., Para 23- Even of the above figures of the U.K. , about 
half, Westland believed were re-exported to the Continent.
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suit Indian cotton industry to manufacture finer cloth and it could
only concentrate profitably on the coarser, because the Indian cotton
was more suited (being of poorer quality) to the coarse cloth. To
import the American or Egyptian cotton would prove expensive and in
1
this India could not stand the competition of Lancashire*
In a nutshell it was 6 per cent of the total which could come
under the perview of protection. Vest land clearly regretted that an
excise duty be levied on such a small item. He wrote:
I accept the fact that we are directed to impose an 
excise duty so as to prevent this amount of disadvantage 
in respect of these competitive goods occurring to the 
Indian Millowners. I do not alter my opinion that an 
excise duty on cotton manufactures taken per se is an
H a  2expedient worthy of ^middle ages.
He added:
but I assume that if we require to raise money by 
imposing import duties on cotton yarns and fabrics, we 
have to accept the condition that we must deprive them 
of a protective character by levying an equivalent 
excise duty of those classes of Indian manufactured 
goods which come clearly and directly into competition 
with dutiable imported goods from England. 3
Vest land recommended that a dividing line drawn at 24S would leave
1 Ibid., see Para 19*
Similarly it did not suit Lancashire to make coarser cloth out 
of American or Egyptian cotton because it would result in a 
lot of waste.
2 Westlandfs Minute, Para 29. It was to these remarks that Fowler 
had taken an exception and asked Elgin to properly edit and 
excision the Minute. Fowler to Elgin, 13 December 1894, E.P., 
vol. 12.
3 Westland’s Minute, Para 29.
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1
Manchester absolutely unaffected. His suggestions were:
(a) An import duty of 5 per cent ad valorem on all cotton 
piece goods.
(b) An import duty of 32" P®r cent on all cotton yarns above 
Counts 24S.
(c) An excise duty of 3i per cent ad valorem on cotton yarns 
of counts above 24S produced at mills in India.
Westland's minute got an enthusiastic reception. Elgin congratulated
him. The Government of India accepted it in full and forwarded the
2
same to the Secretary of State. Elgin informed Fowler privately
that the question of a countervailing excise duty should not be pushed
3
too far. But the Secretary of State was not prepared to give up
the idea of excise duty though he agreed that effective competition
4between Lancashire and India was no doubt limited. On the whole
1 Ibid., see Paras 31-2 and 4l-3«
2 Indian Govt, to S.S. , L. No. 210 (Fin.), Confidential, 7 August
1894, F.L.I., vol. 179.
3 Elgin to Fowler, 24 July 1894, E.P., vol. 12. He wrote to
Fowler, wIt does not seemto me that it is shown to be in a
condition to be a serious rival to Lancashire and the accounts 
of the Hills in Native states are not encouraging as to the 
prospects of Natives carrying on successfully the better class
of manufactures; but still it gives employment to a large number
of workmen, more in proportion, as Westland points out, than in
England, and I think it deserves every encouragement we can 
legitimately give it.”
4 Fowler to Elgin, 17 August, 1894, ibid.
1
the first impression of India Office was encouraging. But that
was all, the influences of power began to work, the Manchester and
Party interests began to dominate the issue. Manchester Chamber of
Commerce, which had known fully that the exemption of cotton was a
temporary matter, kept on pressing the issue and sent one resolution
2after another to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State.
Fowler informed Elgin that as the matter was of f1prime
importance” the final decision would be taken by the Cabinet. But
he left Elgin in no doubt that the scheme of the Government of India
3
was to be modified. Godley prepared the agenda for the Cabinet
4
meeting which was held on 9 November 1894. Fowler informed Elgin
of the Cabinet decision, WI want you to understand as the matter now
stands, I think the duty on both yams and piece goods should be
5 per cent - that the excise duty should be 5 Per cent - and that the
5
Excise Duty should cover all yarns above 20S.M Elgin accepted it as
1 Godley to Elgin, 23 August 1894, ibid., vol. 29. Godley and Fowler 
were both impressed by the Minute. Commerce
2 Monthly Record of the Manchester Chamber/ Res. , 19 March ,13 June,
5 November, 1894, 1895» vol. vi, pp. 1-2.
3 Fowler to Elgin, 2 November 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
4 Godley to Elgin, 9 November 1894, ibid., vol. 29-
5 Fowler to Elgin, 9 November 1894, ibid., vol. 12. See Telegram
S.S. to Viceroy, 29 November 1894, ibid., vol. 17*
See also Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, Confidential, 11 December 1894, 
ibid. S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch, No. 169 (Rev.), Confidential, 
13 December 1894. Revenue Despatches to India, vol. 15.
A note prepared by M.A.N. Wollaston (Assit. in the Rev. Statistics 
Dept, of India Office) on excise, 10 September 1894, R and S Papers 
No. 1443/94, vol. 336.
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a 'fait accompli' and agreed to the decision of the Home Government.
In so readily accepting the decision, Elgin seems to have been under
the profound influence of two men - Fowler, who was strong, unyielding
and decisive, in words as well as in his actions; and Godley - who
2was as rationalist as persuasive. In early stages, both these men
dominated the decisions of the viceroy. Besides, Fowler was too much
3committed to the Parliament.
Although Elgin had accepted the position, some Members of his
4 5
Executive Council, particularly Pritchard and Miller did not agree
to the Secretary of State's decision of imposing excise on India
cotton goods,and they claimed the right of abstention from voting a
Bill in the Legislative Assemhly which they did not approve of. This
question at once raised a constitutional issue concerning the position of
the
theyiceroy's Executive Council vis-a-vis/Home Government. The 
Secretary of State, Fowler»made the constitutional point in very clear 
and strong words, which had been termed as 'Mandate' of the Secretary 
of State:
1 Telegram viceroy to S.S. , 28 November 1894, E.P., vol. 17*
2 Godley to Elgin, 9 and 29 November 1894, ibid., vol. 29.
3 Fowler's speech of 16 August 1894 in the House of Commons, The 
Times, 17 August 1894.
4 Public Works Department Member.
5 Law Member.
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The existing law subjects the Government of*India 
to the control of the Imperial Government; and'Secretary 
of State, who.exercises that control.is responsible to 
the Parliamen^^verned Iky, ancfvin>vi^e'name of, the 
Queen, and she governs by the advice of a responsible 
Minister. All the powers of the Directors of the East 
India Company, and of the Board of Control in relation 
to the Government of India and its officers and its 
servants are by statute vested in the Secretary of State. 
There is not and there cannot be, any foundation for 
the theory that *the loyal cooperation* of an officer 
of the Indian Government is due only to the Viceroy 
and to the Council, and not to the Secretary of State 
as representing the Queen • • • • So long as any matter 
of administration, or policy, is undecided, every member 
of the Government of India is at liberty to express his 
own opinion, but when a certain line of policy has been 
adopted under the directions of the Cabinet, it is 
clear duty of every Member of the Government of 
India to consider, not what the policy ought to be, but 
how effect may best be given to the policy which has 
been decided upon; and, if any Member of that Government 
is unable to do this there is only one alternative open 
to him.1
And he further emphasised in another letter
I should be very sorry to think that you have in 
your Council any man who would dispute the supreme 
authority of the Cabinet on a constitutional question 
of this description, and by withholding his resignation 
necessitate his dismissal. However, my position is 
very clear and with the cordial support of my colleagues 
I shall immediately advise the Queen to dismiss any 
Member of the Council who so far forgets what is due 
to his own position and die position of the Viceroy 
as to the attempt to continue a member of the Govern­
ment whose policy he is unable to support.2
There was a two-fold significance of Fowler's explanation on
the question of the constitutional issue. Firstly, a very strong
1 Fowler to Elgin, 12 October 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 Fowler to Elgin, 30 November 1894» ibid.
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and controversial principle was laid down by the Secretary of State.
There was already no doubt about the powers of the Secretary of
State and the Cabinet, but the importance lay in the fact that it
1
was decided during Elgin's tenure. Secondly, by his explicit
statement he definitely weakened the powers of the Viceroy's
2
Executive Council and the Viceroy's Legislative Council. To his
own embarrassment Elgin stated:
It is not for me to deny that; but, on my own behalf,
I would say that it does not altogether smooth the
difficulties in»,a Viceroy's path, (which 1 doubt if 
anyone who haMoeen a Viceroy can fully appreciate) if 
he has too often to say to his colleagues 'you must 
submit or resign'. It so happens that this is the 
second case in my short tenure of office when such a 
question has arisen, not as affecting a single . 
individual, but several Members at the same time.
The strong stand taken by the Secretary of State humbled Elgin
who accepted a docile and subordinate role. It was from this period
4
that he earned the reputation of being "subservient to Whitehall".
1 Even Godley wrote to Elgin, "I wish the principle had been 
settled by one of your predecessors". Godley to Elgin, 28 
November 1894, ibid., vol. 29.
2 It is quite difficult to reconcile the obedience to orders 
with the amount of independence which is necessary to allow to 
a legislative body that has the undoubted right to make laws.
3 Elgin to Fowler, 14 August 1894, Wolverhampton Papers, MSS.Eur.
C. 145.
4 For detail see Fowler to Elgin, 12 October, 9 November, 23 November, 
30 November and 7 December 1894 respectively, E.P., vol. 12.
Elgin to Fowler, 7 August, 14 August, 30 October, 28 November 
respecti\*ly, ibid.
Elgin to Miller, 9 August and 7 November 1894, respectively, 
ibid., vol. 65.
Elgin to Pritchard, 28 December 1894, ibid.
Miller to Elgin, 9 August and 30 October 1894, respectively, ibid. 
Pritchard to Elgin, 29 December 1894, ibid.
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It was against this background that the legislation based on
the Secretary of State’s terms was introduced on 17 December 1894
in the Viceroy’s Legislative Council, In the presentation of Tariff
Amendment Bill and the Cotton Duties Bill, J. Westland was frankly 
1
apologetic* Opposition to the Bill came from the official and
non-official members alike. Hon’ble Fazul Bhai Vishram pressed
for the raising of the limit for excise limit from 20S to 24S count
2
in the select committee, but failed. When the Bill came for 
discussion in the Legislative Assembly on 27 December 1894,
Stevens, the nominated official member, spoke against the Government
3
measure. Playfair also made a strong attack on the introduction
of the principle of excise which was imposed on the Indian goods. It
seemed to Playfair that Indian export trade in cotton yarn would
diminish because the excise would inflate the prices. The increase
in the level of taxation would also affect the sale of coarser yam
within the country. He said that nthe manufacturing industry may
languish to the detriment of the grower as well as of the spinner of 
4
Indian Cotton.11 Fazul Bhai Vishram, Mohiney Mohan Roy, Griffith
1 Proc. of the Council of the Governor General in India, 1894,
vol. 33? PP* 384-92 and p. 404.
2 Ibid., p. 421.
3 Ibid., p. 438.
4 Ibid., p. 402.
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Evans and P. Mehta did not lag behind in making a strong attack
1
on the Government measure. The Bill was defended by Lieutenant
2
Governor of Bengal and Lieutenant General Brackenbur^y On account
of solid and united opposition of all non-officials, Elgin was
3
alarmed. He took an unusual step of exercising his vote. He also
made a speech which was not without significance either as an
individual case of a Viceroy or in the constitutional history of
British India. He explained the Mandate of the secretary of state.
Vis-a-vis the right of the members to votes-
In every legislative body a man must sit ... by what 
in modem parlance is called a mandate, and that 
mandate must be given by some authority ... Here 
we have no election, and I am glad to say no party* 
but everyman who sits by the authority and sanction 
of parliament, and to say that he can refuse to obey 
the decisions of Parliament would be absurd. But 
that is not all. Parliament has provided for the 
Government of the Indian empire. The British Raj can 
be provided for in no other way. 4
He went on to say that this power was exercised through the Secretary
of State and his Council and it was but proper to obey its orders.
Exhorting the Council to vote the amendment he said, r,If this Council
does not adopt this amendment, it will take upon its shoulders the
responsibility of losing this bill and of losing perhaps altogether
1 Ibid«> PP* 402-37.
2 Ibid., pp. 443-6.
3 9 votes were in favour of the amendment and 11 against (including 
Lord Elgin) one abstained (Stevens).
4 Proc. of the Council of the Governor General of India, 1894, 
vol. 33, P- 447.
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the financial resources which we so much need.*1 Such a statement
coming as it did from the head of the Administration could not
but influence the members unduly.
Thus a controversial and unprecedented step of imposing excise
was instituted on a developing industry, of which the burden was
to be borne by the poorest of the poor. Such a principle had not
2been accepted by the Imperial Government before. Even Samuel Laing 
3
and Lord Lytton the two free traders of great enthusiasm had
rejected it. Westland described it ftas an expedient worthy of 
4
Middle Ages'1. On March 1894 he had assured the Legislative Council 
that Government neither could nor would sanction the imposition of an
5
excise on the local manufacture. Such a tax could neither be
1 Ibid., p. 449.
Later, Elgin tried to clarify his position and denied to Fowler 
that he argued for his "Mandate theory". "I assert the supremacy 
of parliament and allege that the Secretary of State is the only 
proper exponent of what Parliament means, I reserve absolutely 
the right of voting to men who act under a due sense of their 
responsibility. I only mention these points because it is 
generally assumed that I argued for your 'mandate* overriding 
everything. Even as regards the Members of the Executive that is 
not what I said or intended." Elgin to Fowler, 9 January 1895»
E.P., vol. 13*
2 Harris to Elgin, 21 April 1894, E.P., vol. 64.
3 During his period of Indian administration Manchester asked 
for the excise duty to be imposed on Indian goods. He termed 
it as an "abominable proposal" and "I think that the Manchester 
gentlemen who made it ought to be ashamed of themselves." Lytton 
to Louis Mallet 15 March 1878, vide L.M. Gujral's, Internal 
Administration of Lord Lytton, p. 38.
4 See above, p.cp
5 Proc. of the Council of the Governor General. 1894, vol. 33*
pp. 119-2 0.
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productive nor economic. It had been proved beyond doubt that
there was no competition between the Indian Cotton goods and Lancashire 
2
goods. Westland had stated that import of English goods was only
2 per mile and yet 20 per cent of Indian production was put to
3unnecessary hardship.
It may be observed that the margin cf profit on spinning counts 
above 24S from Indian cotton was exceedingly circumscribed and the 
result of the imposition of an excise could unquestionably be to 
reduce the production of the higher counts to something infinitesimal 
and the revenue from the excise to a corresponding level. Nor could 
the benefit be confined to Ehglish manufacturers alone, as although the
1 See Report of the Indian National Congress, Res. No. 1, 1894, p. 31.
2 See above pp.arM*- See also Secy. Millowners' Association, Bombay, 
to Indian Govt., 10 September 1894, India Fin. and Com.
(Statistics and Com.), Proc., vol. 4606, No. 796, November 1894.
Even Fowler had stated that the dividing line of 20S would be 
raised if experience so proved. Fowler to Elgin, 30 November,
13 December 1894, and 25 January 1895 * E.P., vols. 12 and 13.
3 The protective duty can have two objections; one, which can 
be raised on behalf of the general public of the country 
which imposes the duty and that the duty benefits a certain 
class of manufacturers at the expense of the tax payer (such 
an objection is taken into consideration by an independent 
sovereign state). Certainly the import duty on cotton did not 
do so, therefore such a thing was inapplicable. And the second, 
which concerns the foreign manufacturer when his goods can be 
handicapped on a competition against the native manufacturer.
(in a dependency like India such an objection can also be 
considered). But where was the competition? As Griffith Evans 
said, "This necessary evil if limited to 24S, affects only 6 
per cent of the Indian production, whereas if fixed to 20S
it will affect and possibly paralyse 19 per cent.1*
Proc. of the Council of the Governor General in India, 1894, vol. 331
P. 425
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proposition was still small there was an appreciable quantity of both
goods and yarns being imported both from America and the Continent
where heavy protective duties were levied on all Indian produce**
It can be further argued that in a country like India where a
large majority of population dependsupon agriculture for their
subsistence, manufacturing industries demanded the fostering care
of the Government by every legitimate means - not the repression which
excise brought in its train*
It may be further observed that the excise duty, which was a
’’retrograde” measure; and politically and economically unjust in
its ’’conception and incidence” and financially not useful as a source
of revenue brought into prominence the overpowering influence of an 
the
authority - (of/Secretary of State), whibh took away from the
4
Legislative Council all independence and its representative character.‘ 
If the agitation in India was strong against the imposition of 
excise on the counts 20 and above; the uproar in England was no less,
1 For statistics see Appendix to Westland’s Minute, op* cit*
2 The Times, 31 December 1894 and 4 January 1895*
”It is a gratuitous insult to the Government of India that 
the Council should be asked to pass it and the insult is 
greater and its infliction the more unpardonable, that the 
circumstances are such that the Government of India is 
required to choose between becoming the instruments of its 
own humiliation and furnishing a practical proof of the 
justice of the imputation which constitutes the insult.”
The Friend of India, Calcutta, 16 January 1895» E.P., vol. 76.
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that the excise was not sufficient to exclude all possibilities
of protection.* The agitation was as strong in Manchester as
2
it was in the Parliament. Fowler had a hard job in taming the
turbulent nHousen. He feared that in the Parliament the members of
3
his own party might vote against the Government. R.G.C. Mowbray, a 
Conservative Member of the Parliament, informed Elgin that a big 
meeting was held at Manchester on the 14 February under the president­
ship of Sir Henry James and reported that Lancashire was in a very
agitated mood and nfor two hours I felt like Mary Queen of Scots being
4
thundered by John Knoxrt. Lancashire wanted either the exemption 
for customs below 20S or the excise to begin at a lower count
Sir Henry James did not lose any time and moved an amendment 
in the House of Commons on 21 February, which was supported by Lord 
George Hamilton.^ He stated that legislation of December 1894 was 
against the Principle of free trade and was harmful to the trade of 
Lancashire and to the commercial interest of Ehgland. Fowler denied 
the allegations and fairly defended the Indian Government measure. He
1 Fowler to Elgin, 2 January 1895» ibid., vol. 13*
2 Fowler to Elgin, 1 February 18951 ibid.
3 Fowler to Elgin, 8 February 1895i ibid.
4 Mowbray to Elgin, 14 February 18951 vol. 30*
5 Fowler to Elgin, 15 February, 1898, ibid., vol. 13«
6 The Times, 22 February 1895•
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also stated that Great Britain raised £20 million of her revenue
1
out of custom duties including £3 million on imported Indian tea.
2
G.J.Gc&ehen supported the Liberal Government and Government triumphed 
by 304 votes to 109* In the leading editorial, The Times of 22 
February fully supported the Government, praised Fowler and defended 
the action of the Government of India as "just, equitable and 
impartial”.^
While the controversy had not fully subsided, the Scottish 
manufacturing interests raised their protest. They contended that they
4sent large quantities of dyed yarns of low counts to Burma on which
they had to pay tax, whereas Bombay yarn did not pay any duty. There-
5
fore, they asserted that it formed a clear case of protection.
Sir Henry Fowler, who had defended the Indian Government measure 
on 21 February in the House of Commons, wrote to Elgin the very next 
day - "My own inclination is towards exempting the coarse counts 
from customs”• As a consequence, the Indian Government agreed to
1 Ibid»
In the course of debate Sir George Chesney further elucidated 
the point that England imposed 200 per cent import duty on 
Indian tea and five times that proportion on Indian £igar.
2 Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 30, Col. 13491 21 
February 1895*
3 The Times, 22 February 1895*
4 'Large quantity* was a very vague term. There was no statistics 
kept for such goods entering Burma.
5 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 17 (Rev.), 31 January 1895»
Para 1, Revenue Despatches to India, vol. 16.
6 Fowler to Elgin, 22 February 1895» E.P. , vol. 13- Telegram S.S. 
to Viceroy, 22 February 1895* ibid., vol. 18.
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exempt the coloured yarn of 20S and under and reducedthe duty from 
5 per cent to \ per cent (thereby waiving 4j per cent) through 
executive action.1 However, it was stated by the Indian Government 
that there was absolutely no evidence, or even allegation of any 
other item in which duties could have protective effect. The half 
per cent was required to maintain equality being about equivalent
2to import duty paid by the Indian manufacturer upon dyeing materials.
The exemption of certain goods into Burma involved the 
violation of two principles - one, that the exempted yam into 
Burma could be taken into India free and second, that it was contrary
to the principle and practice of Government's Customs legislation to
3
deal separately with one port. To this effect, the Government of
India made a tacit confession in their despatch:
Though it would introduce a new principle in levy 
of duties on transit from one part of India to another, 
that anomaly is not greater than the levy of the excise
duty itself and must be accepted as the excise duties
are.not on its own merits,but as the condition of the 
fairness of the imposition of cotton import duties.4
1 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 22 March 1895 * ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Elgin to Fowler, Confidential, 1 April 18951 E.P., 
vol., 138.
4 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 98 (Fin.), 1 May 18951
F.L.I., vol. 182.
10
But Fowler was not prepared to accept even the retention 
of i per cent and reported to Elgin that he was being pressed by
j
more representations from the Scottish and Lancashire manufacturers.
But Elgin was so far not prepared to yield, for there was again
2
commotion in the Viceroy's Executive Council. This had no effect
on Fowler and he accepted the retention of \ per cent duty only as
3
a temporary measure. He further informed Elgin that he was under
4
the pressure to meet the deputation from Lancashire on 27 Hay 1895* 
The deputationists professed that they were unjustly treated in
5
respect to the cotton duties. Fowler did not seem to be impressed.
1 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, 27 March 1895* E.P., vol. 18.
2 Elgin to Fowler, 1 April 18951 Confidential, ibid., vol. 138.
3 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, 21 May 1895* India Sep. Rev. Fin. and 
Com. Department Proc., vol. 5031* No. 767, July 1896. ^Hereafter 
cited as Sep. Rev. Proc._7 See also Indian Govt. Notification,
25 May 1895* ibid., No. 775* July 1896.
4 Fowler to Elgin, 17 May 1895, E.P., vol. 13.
5 Lancashire deputation to Rt. Hon. H.H. Fowler, 27 May 1895* India
Sep. Rev., Proc., vol. 5031* No. 785* July 1896. The deputation
was accompanied by Mr Holland, M.P. and consisted of the 
following representatives of the industry. Mr Tom Garnett, 
President of the United Cotton Manufacturers' Association, Mr 
Gordon Harvey, Mr V. Noble, Mr V. Thompson, Mr Calder Clegg,
Mr John Whittaker, Mr Luke Barker, Mr W. Tattersal, Secretary,
Mr T.F. Mack ins on, the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners 
Association, Mr Joshua Rawlinson, The North and North East 
Lancashire Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers Association and 
James Mawdsley, operative Secretary.
The Lancashire arguments were conspicuously loaded with threats 
of their political and economic strength. During the discussion, 
Fowler was reminded of the said at least five times by the 
successive representatives.
i
n
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While reporting his iiterview to Elgin he said that Lancashire argued
1
on the same lines as Scottish manufacturers. He stated that their
case was not based on facts and if the facts were forthcoming, he
2
pledged that he would remove the inequality. The result of this
was that Manchester drew up a formal statement of their case and
sent it to the Secretary of State on 9 July 1895-
In the meantime the Liberal Government was overthrown. The
Conservatives came back to power; the significance of which on the
cotton duties controversy might not be under-rated. Godley informed
Elgin that the Conservative had won with an overwhelming victory
and stated, nOne feels safer and less likely to see experiments tried
which were considered dangerous, who knew India best.” But he gave
4
a warning that the question of cotton duties might give trouble.
But the most revealing letter to Elgin came from Lieutenant General 
Brackenburry. He wrote, nI am rather anxious as to the effect this 
change may have on the Cotton Duties question. Lord George Hamilton, 
you may remember, voted with and spoke in favour of Sir Henry James'
1 Scottish cotton manufacturers of Glasgow to S.S., 3 April 1895,
Enc. No. 1, to Despatch No. 99 (Bev.), 5 September 1895) Revenue 
Despatches to India, vol. 16.
2 Fowler to Elgin, 12 June 1895, E.P.,vol. 13.
3 Statement drawn by John Whittaker, on behalf of Joint Committee
of Cotton Manufacturers, 9 July 1895• India Sep. Rev. Proc.,
vol. 5031, No. 791, July 1896.
4 Godley to Elgin, 30 July 18951 E.P.,vol. 30.
Same feelings were recorded by Sir A.P. MacDonnell (Lt. Gov. 
of N.W.P. and Oudh on leave to England, to Elgin, 21 July 
1895, ibid.
C
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Motion. His brother is one of the M.P.s for Manchester. Sir
Henry James is in the Cabinet, Lord Salisbury had the Cotton Duties
1
repealed. Lord Cross is strong on Lancashire interests.”
The new Ministry, however, neither contemplated, nor did anything 
new. Yet the thumping victory of the Conservative Party must have 
influenced Elgin.
Lord George Hamilton the new Secretary of State in his
first private letter to Elgin clearly opened his mind on the long
2drawn controversy. With this letter he sent the Lancashire 
memorial. The contention of the Memorialists was that the Indian 
manufacturer had a very substantial advantage over Lancashire as 
he paid excise duty on the grey yam value only, while the 
Lancashire manufacturer had to pay an import duty on the value of 
the finished goods, bleached, woven, dyed or printed. They represented 
that Indian woven goods made from yams just below the excise line 
could compete with and take a place of imported woven goods liable 
at 5 per cent duty. The Lancashire deputation laid stress on the 
statement that it was impossible to work fairly to both the Indian 
and British manufacturer on artificial dividing line at 20S or at any 
other count and they cited the experience of 1878-82 in India to show
1 Lt. Gen. Brackenbury to Elgin, 30 June 18951 ibid., vol. 66.
The new Cabinet consisted of three former Secretaries of State 
besides Hamilton; Lord Salisbury, Lord Cross and Lord Devonshire.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 16 August 18951 ibid., vol. 13*
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that any attempt to draw such a line would break down and would
1
result in fiscal inequality. Commenting on the memorandum,
Hamilton fully agreed with the deputationiststhat excise on yarn
was insufficient and hammered on the pledge of his predecessor to
the Parliament "that no savouring of protection should be associated
with these customs duties, and that the excise duties should completely
counterbalance the customs duties.... The unconditional promise Sir
of
Henry Fowler gave as to the removing/all protective tendency can
2
not be escaped, and it is obligatory upon both of us."
Elgin assured Hamilton that he would do his best to accommodate 
his views. He wrote, "you could find no one more ready to acquiesce
3
in the extreme gravity of any decision.11 Elgin sent all the papers
4
to Westland for his information and comments. The first impression
of Westland was that "Manchester 'case was greatly overdrawn and open
to challenge even in its general features; but that I admit they
have enough of case, in the eyes of the public at all events to render
5
it necessary for us to do something towards meeting their claim."
1 Lancashire Memorial, Enc., ibid.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 16 August 1895i op. cit.
Also Hamilton to Elgin, 26 September 1895» E.P.» vol. 13.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 3 September, Hamilton Collection, MSS. Eur.
D. 509/1 vol. 1. ^Hereafter cited as H. c._7
4 Elgin to Westland, 4 September 1895» vol. 67 (E.P.),
5 Westland to Elgin, 6 September 18951 ibid.
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Elgin agreed that something must be done to meet the claims of 
Lancashire.^
In the meantime Hamilton kept on pressing that Lancashire
trade was in a depressed condition and he was under obligation to
meet another Lancashire delegation. He emphasised that customs
2
duties must be changed.
Elgin sent to Hamilton the note prepared by Westland on the 
representation of Manchester. In this note Westland discussed the 
question of the abolition of the duties but agreed to exempt all 
imports up to 20S from duty.
Hamilton was not entirely pleased with Westland's note and 
in a letter to Elgin he attached his own note on cotton duties in
reply to Westland's Memorandum. He admitted that a certain but very
/
limited amount of goods under 20S were imported into India from
England, but asserted that the small value of goods did not "justify
the infringement of the parliamentary engagement made nor would such
4
a plea be listened in the House". Hamilton thought that Lancashire's 
arguments as to the difference between the initial value of the 
yam and the final value of the completed cloth constituted protection
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 10 September 18951 H.C., D. 509/1, vol. 1.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 3 October and 31 October 18951 E.P., vol. 13.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 16 October l895i H.C., D.509/1, vol. 1.
4 Hamilton to Elgin, 7 November 18951 E.P., vol. 13*
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for Indian goods, was unanswerable, and on principle Lancashire
was correct, though he agreed with Westland that actual difference
1
and consequent amount of protection given was overstated.
Hamilton appreciated the proposal of Westland to abolish both
existing import duties and excise and its substitutioi^by all round
duty by weight on the value of the piece goods. ^Assuming that the
substitution of weight for value affects actually equally both
2
sides, it seems a basis for settlement.n
Westland explained to Elgin that the reason for assessment 
by weight was to make excise assessment exactly equal to the import 
duty. Moreover, it could be easily fitted into the working of the 
excise system. Two-thirds of the imports were grey shirtings in 
which value by weight was almost uniform and the value of Indian 
made fabric over counts twenty was almost the same. There could be 
loss of revenue only if it was necessary to apply the same system to 
white goods, but Indian competition in these was very small. Under 
this scheme, the coarse goods consumed by the poor, being mostly under 
count 20S would escape the taxation altogether. In this respect
3
Westland had won a great victory.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
Hamilton after duly consulting Lancashire had agreed to the 
proposals of Westland,providing weight to be substituted for 
value in assessing the tax, that is substitution of a tax per
pound of cloth in place of 5 per cent ad valorem. Hamilton to
Elgin, 29 November 1895? ibid. , vol. 13, (,E.P-r)
3 Telegram Westland to Pr. Secy, to Elgin, 17 November 1895? ibid.,
vol. 67?
Westland to Pr. Secy, to Elgin, 18 November 1895? ibid.
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Hamilton soon realized that he had misunderstood Westland's
note and had interpreted the suggestion contained in it as applying
to all piece goods above 20S, including the bleached goods. This
was because Hamilton had asked for the opinion of George Lord,
an influential Manchester merchant, on the proposal of Westland (not
withstanding the fact that he had himseif prohibited the Indian
Government to consult Indian Chambers on the matters of policies);
who stated that ad valorem principle was the only practicable one
2
for bleached and printed goods. Hamilton iisisted on this and the
3Government of India yielded.
The Government of India proposed to tax cloth and leave yarn -
4
both imports and excise. Hamilton agreed and suggested that in lieu 
of rising exchange the duty might be reduced to 3i per cent and 
advised the Indian Government to do so by an executive order.5 
Surprisingly, Hamilton found in Lord Northbrook a great sympathiser 
with the proposal of taxing the cloth and exempting the yarn and 
maintaining a uniform duty on cloth for customs and excise.^ Northbrook
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 7 November 1895? ibid. , vol. 13-
2 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 5 December 1895? ibid., vol. 18.
George Lord to Hamilton, 3 December 1895?
Enc. Hamilton to Elgin, 6 December 1895? ibid., vol. 13*
3 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 11 December 1895? ibid., vol. 18.
4 Ibid.
5 Hamilton to Elgin, 13 Decenber 1895? ? vol. 13*
6 Ibid.
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even personally wrote to Godley showing his full concurrence and
support to the Governments advocacy. He wrote; **The Indians really
want protection, and are quite incapable of understanding (or of
admitting their validity if they do understand) any arguments based
1
upon the most ordinary rudiments of political economy.1* The support 
of Northbrook strengthened the hands of the Government. Elgin agreed 
to the proposals, but did not agree to implement it by executive
2
order and in turn informed Westland to prepare for the new legislation.
The controversy about cotton goods and yarn leads us to examine
some basic questions. What constitutes protection? How far was the
claim of Manchester justified? Was there any ground of compromise? The
answer to all these questions depends upon the validity of their facts
and figures, analysis of the arguments of the Home Government and that
of the Manchester group.
It was claimed by Lancashire that 250 million lbs of yams of
20S and tinder was annually manufactured in Ehgland and that they had
3
substantial interest in the trade.
But it was nowhere asserted that more than a very limited portion 
manufacture
of that/was destined for, or in any way found its place in Indian 
markets. There was no statistical information available to that effect.
1 Northbrook to Godley, 29 January 1896. Encl. Godley to Elgin,
1 February 1896, E.P., vol. 31.
2 Elgin to Westland, 26 December 18951 ibid., vol. 67*
3 Lancashire statement submitted to S.S., objection No. I & II,
9 July 18951 India Sep. Rev. (Pin & Com) Proc., vol. 50311 No.
7911 July 1896. (Hereafter cited as Lancashire statement).
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It was sufficiently well known that, save in one* instance of drills, 
it was not presented at any appreciable extent in the cloth imported.
If any misapprehension existed on this point, it was the manifest 
duty of the representative of the English Cotton manufacturing interest 
to remove it, and they could have had no difficulty in doing so, as 
English spinners and manufacturers were perfectly informed as to the 
ultimate destination of their production. That they had done only 
in the case of drills, could alone be sufficient to dispose of any 
allegation that competition either existed or could exist in yarns of 
20S and under or goods made from there, while, as to goods woven 
from the higher counts, there was not only nno instance given of 
existing competition but no suggestion of possible competition in the
1 Percentage of grey drills imported into Bombay on the total value 
of entire cotton goods from 1890-5*.
Calendar year January 
to December
Value of entire 
cotton goods 
imported ex­
cluding yarns 
Rs.
Approximate
average value Percentage 
of grey
drills imported 
Rs.
1890 8,75,64,722 15,21,241 1.73
1891 8,03,80,929 20,83,559 2.59
1892 7,08,68,829 13,51,091 1.90
1893 7,78,42,481 1 8,63 ,602 2.39
1894 10,01,13,677 19,43,648 1.94
Average of 5 years 8,33,54,127 17,52,628 2.11
1895 (11 months) 6,14,04,294 14,55,654 2.37
Bombay millowners* Association, 7 January 1896, Para 391 India 
Sep.Rev. (Fin & Com) Proc., vol. 50311 No. 879* July 1896. (hereafter 
cited as Millowners* statement).
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1
future except by means of subst itution.w
It was asserted by Lancashire that the exemption from the 
excise duty of yams 20S and below encouraged the manufacture of 
duty free cloths. As such exemption resulted in the Indian 
manufacturer to avoid the excise duty altogether by substituting
2
the manufacture of cloth non-excisable yams for excisable yams.
If such an allegation was true and buyers were captivated by
this exceedingly simple and ingenious process, the coarser goods
of Indian manufacture could have displaced the heavily sized shirtings
of Lancashire years ago. Moreover, as the Indian millowners asserted
certain cloths could not be substituted. Some modification did take
place in 1878, when the bait of 5 per cent difference induced
Lancashire manufacturers to strike out a new like for themselves.
What was practicable then, however in making a purer 30S/30S could
not now be practicable in dropping down from 30S to 20S. The change
3
in appearance of the quality could be too great. Besides, in going 
above 20S the increased cost of spinning Indian cotton, owing to its 
short and weak staple could be very heavy. On the other hand,
Lancashire on going much below 28S to 30S was, by using high class
1 Ibid., Para 8.
2 Lancashire statement object No. v, op. cit. Noble's conversation 
with Fowler, Lancashire Deputation, 27 May 18951 India Sep. Rev.
(Fin & Com), Proc., vol. 50311 No. 785 1 July 1896. i/~Hereafter 
cited as Lancashire Deputation_7.
3 Millowners* statement, Para 58, op. cit.
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skilled labour, would be working below her economical rule. Over and
above, there was no proof that substitution had already taken place.
It was stated by Lancashire on the strength of Westland's
statement in the 'Blue Book* that with American Cotton at Jd per lb
they could produce coarse counts of 20S or under as cheaply as was 
1
done in India.
This contention of Lancashire was obviously wrong because it had 
not taken into consideration the cost of either American or Indian 
cotton. This could be seen from the average prices of standard
qualities of American (mid-uplands) and Indian (good Dhollera) Cotton 
from 1891-5 per lb.2
1891 1892 1893 1894 1895
Mid uplands 4f <*- 4-iZd 4ld 3 *M* 4 -2 d4 64 a
Good Dhollera "32 3 64*
Difference 43- 64* H 1
41,
64* &
Percentage of difference 18.24 15.75 12.50 17.37 17.37
Average difference ..,___  16.24 per cent
1 Noble to Fowler, Lancashire Deputation, op. cit. As a matter of 
fact Noble had misquoted Westland. What he actually said was
"It would obviously never pay Manchester to use up American cotton 
at 4d a pound in making a class of goods which their Indian 
competitors can make up as well as out of cotton that only costs 
3d." Pari. Papers, 1895? vol. LXXII, (C.7602), (called Blue Book),
p. 8.
2 Millowners1 Statement, Para 24, op. cit. This statistical data 
was based on Reuter's Telegram. As a matter of fact, on 15 
February 1895? when American cotton was quoted in Liverpool at 3d? 
good Dhollera was quoted at 2 9/16 per lb. Reuter's Telegram,
15 February 1895? Para 2 5, ibid.
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The most important feature of the Lancashire's protest related
to the allegation that their export of piece goods to India for
February 1895 were 28.62 per cent less in quantity and 39*12 per
cent less in value, for March 44.12 per cent less in quantity and
50.96 per cent less in value, for April 31-26 per cent less in quantity
and 42.32 per cent less in value than the corresponding months of 1894;
1
and that, it was due to the custom duties and insufficient excise.
The year 1894 could not be taken as.' the basis of comparative
statistics because of two exceptional events—- (a) The closure of
the Mints in June 18931 which temporarily advanced the exchange rate
from 14-Jd to l6d. The importers took advantage of the temporary high
rate as they did in 1890-1 to put their goods on the Indian market
as fast as possible. The imports continued very actively long after
exchange had begun to fall and indeed the trade was carried on to the
end of the year with unusual vigour, importers being apprehensive that
the rupee might continue tor fall until it reached the level of its
intrinsic value in silver. The result was that the value of imported
merchandize by the end of the year exceeded that of preceding year.
_ 2
by no less than 18 per cent. In the imports of merchandize, it 
could be found that the largest increase, amounting to more than 
half of the whole - Rx 6£ million out of an aggregate increase in all
1 Thompson to Fowler, Lancashire Deputation, 27 May 18951 op. cit.
2 Trade Statements of British India, 1893-4, Pari. Collection,
No. 194 (C.7604), p. 6.
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kinds of merchandize of Hz lly million - occured in cotton goods,
including yams. The increase in cotton goods, amounted to 68 per
cent of the whole increase, the value of these goods being little
1
more than half of the aggregate import trade.
d^lt is probable that this great speculative trade would have 
been followed by a pause in 1894-5 but a new incentive to speculation
was given by the prolonged discussion of the propriety of including
2
cotton goods in the import tariff - a discussion which was followed
by the knowledge that the Government of India were in favour of
such an inclusion. As a result of this anticipation the importation
of the grey and white goods were much in excess of even the inflated
imports of 1893-4.^
During the first four months of 1895 the trade had fallen :
4
as could be expected after two years of unnatural inflation. There­
fore, it may be wrong to attribute any portion of this decline to 
the effect of the customs duty in restricting the consumption. The
1 Ibid., p. 6.
2 Elgin had informed Fowler that in anticipation of import duty
on cotton goods, large stocks were being sent to India.
Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 7 December 1894, E.P., vol. 17*
3 Trade Statements of British India 1894-5i Pari. Collection,
No. 194 (C.7997), p. 19.
4 Fowler had stated to the deputationists that the trade in 
the first four months of 1895 higher than previous first 
four months of any year except 1894.
Fowler to Lancashire deputation, 27 May 1895? op. cit.
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import duties which were levied on cotton goods before 1882 did not
1
restrict consumption and they were not likely to do so now* The
present restriction might, with greater reason, be attributed to
the disinclination of traders to pay duty on goods which they could
not be=obte=0 sell until the market was cleared of the accumulated
stocks, imported before the imposition of the duty*
The combination of two factors of over-supplied markets and
2
fiscal uncertainty resulted in a large contraction of trade.
But there is yet another way of looking at this question* Even
if there was a decline in the general volume of trade between
United Kingdom and India to the full extent claimed, nIt could not 
in justice be written down to the maleficent influence of an in­
sufficient excise until it could be shown that the deficiency had
3
been supplemented by the products of the Indian mills*n
It was alleged by Lancashire that the present arrangement of
the countervailing duties omitted a very important source of raising 
4revenue.
1 Trade Statements of British India, 1894-5* Pari. Collection,
No. 194 (C.7997)i P- 19- See also Millowners' statement, Paras 
10-13i op. cit. Letter of William Fogg (Manchester merchant) 5 
Novermber 1895» to the Editor Manchester Guardian, vide, Millowners' 
statement, Para 67.
2 Trade Statements of British India, 1895-6, Pari. Collection No. 194, 
(C.8297), p. 6.
3 Millowners* statement, Para. 731 op. cit.
In course of conversation with Lancashire deputation, even Fowler 
had stated, HI do not know where the trade has gone because there 
is no corresponding manufacture in India.n Fowler to Lancashire 
Deputation, 27 May 1895» op. cit. For statistics,see India Sep.
Rev. (Fin & Com) Proc., vol. 5031» Nos..\ 880-1, July 1896.
4 S.S. to Govt, of India Proc. , Despatch No.. 99 5 September
1895, Enc. No. 3, Revenue letters to India, vol. lb.
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But it was amply known that the arrangements of the counter­
vailing excise were never intended for the purpose of raising 
revenue* They were imposed as a safeguard against protection and 
from that point alone it would have been economically as unjust as 
an excise levied in Lancashire,
1
Lancashire claimed that they had large trade in grey, bleached,
dyed and printed goods of 20S and under. In the examples presented,
that showed that the Indian manufacturer was protected to the following
extent per piece.^
On grey goods.............  2*31 per cent
On bleached goods  ..........2,62 11 11
On dyed goods.............  2,92 11 11
On printed goods.........  3*92 11 n
The statement of Lancashire apparently has no evidence in any
shape of recorded documents. This contention was even summarily
3
dismissed by Westland. Even if 60 million yards of Lancashire cloth 
was imported into India, as was claimed, it was an insignificant 
proportion to their total export to India which amounted to nearly 
1000 million yards annually and it was not proper to penalize 94
4
per cent of the Indian manufacture which was below the count of 24S, 
the
Over and above,/Government of India had already reduced the import 
duty on dyed yams of 20S count and under to i per cent - its importance
1 'Large trade' is a very vague term until and unless it is backed 
by facts and figures.
2 William Thompson to Fowler, Lancashire Deputation, 27 May 1895» 
op. cit.
3 Westland to Elgin, 6 September 1895? E.P., vol. 67*
4 Fowler to Lancashire Deputation, 27 May 1895? op. cit.
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was not sufficient to demand special consideration.
It was further pointed out by Lancashire that the statement in the
Blue Book that the cost of the stores was 25 per cent was erroneous
1
as it was fallacious.
It was a fact that the statement in the Blue Book was a mere 
oversight but the duty on stores used in Indian Mills in making cloth 
was more than three times the rate stated by English representatives.
It could be judged from the above facts that if competition 
existed as was alleged by Lancashire, then their demands could be 
justified taking into v^ew the colonial status of India. It mightibe further conceded that^the Lancashire demands were in theory, if not
A
in practice, reasonable, then the Indian Millowner Association and
Bombay chamber of commerce were more than ready to redeem even this
theoretical objection of the Lancashire by agreeing to exempt from
import duty all cloth and yarns of 20S and under (although they had
to bear the import duty on mill stores). They suggested to put them
on the same footing as similar local produce. They also suggested
that the excise should be imposed on the market value of all Indian
2cloth made from yarns over 20S instead of on yarn only. Such a 
scheme, if accepted, would not have resulted in the loss of much 
revenue. It would have been an equitable tea: also. Above all, 
poorer classes, who consumed the coarse cloth, would not have been
1 Lancashire Statement, objection No. 3» 9 July 1895» op. cit.
2 J. Monteath, Act. Secy, to Bombay Govt. Rev. Dept.
to the Secy. Indian Govt. 23 January 1896, Para 4, India 
Sep. Rev. (Fin & Com) Proc., vol. 5031* No. 865, July 1896.
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1
burdened with this taxation.
But that was not to be. The Government of India had agreed
2earlier and in turn received congratulations. The reply of the
Bombay Millowners1 Association was not even considered. Westland
3
had stated - Mwe would be too obviously setting it aside.11 The
action of the Government of India without going through the Millowners1
Association proposals was smother clear cut pointer that the
4Government was under the mandate of the Secretary of State.
Against this background, we may now turn to the Cotton Duties
and Tariff Bill which Westland introduced in the Legislative Assembly
5
on 23 Jemusiry 1896. There was nothing new in his method of
the
presentation. He stated that much of/Manchester9 a case was over­
drawn, but they had a case on two issues. First, that the substitution 
could take place and Lsmcashire goods could be prevented from competing
with coarser kinds of cloth. Secondly, that the tax levied on yam
£
was higher than levied upon the completed articles and he added
1 See also Paras 6-^, ibid.
Besides, famine of 1896 was showing visible signs of its occurrence.
2 Godley to Elgin, 3 January 1896, E.P., vol. 3*«
3 Westland to Babington Smith Pr. Secy, to Viceroy, 8 January 
1896, ibid., vol. 68.
4 The Bombay Gazette, 27 January, 1896, ibid. , vol. 77* ^Newspaper 
Cuttings_7#
5 Westland had shown his speech to Elgin and he made a few observations 
of his own. Elgin to Westland, 13 January 1896, ibid. , vol. 68.
6 Proc. of the Council of Governor-General, 1896, vol. 35» PP» 34-5*
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*If Lancashire trade were in flourishing condition, I 
can not help thinking that these differences would have 
been considered to be more theoretical than practical.
But we can not concede from ourselves the fact that 
Lancashire trade has recently been in a depressed 
condition, although we certainly contend that circum­
stances out of which this depression arises have nothing 
to do with Indian cotton duties.*1
If that was the excuse of the Government of India, how did they 
justify so very sweeping a measure as the subjection of the whole 
of the Indian mill cloth to excise? The Bombay Chamber had un­
equivocally stated that if Lancashire wished to export coarse cloth,
2
it could do so and they had no objection to their goods coming free.
Westland had made the best of a bad job. He reduced the duties
all round to 3i Per cent. On the burden of the excise tax he said
that he did not call it a burden because the Indian millowner would
3
pass it on to the consumer. There was no doubt that in all cases
the consumer had to pay but why was this consolation not offered
4
to the Lancashire millowners? Because such an offer could never be 
accepted.
On 3 February, the Cotton Duties Act was amended and so was
5
the Tariff Act. Tariff Act abolished the duty altogether from yarns
1 Ibid*» P* 35*
2 See above, p.lie
3 Proc. of the Council of the Governor-General in India* 1896, 
vol. 351 P* 42.
4 J. Piele, Minute of dissent, 10 April 1896, Dissent of India 
Minute Book (copies), vol. 5i P- 27«
5 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 6 February 1896.,
India Sep. Rev. (Fin & Com) Proc., vol. 5031* No. 9131 July 1896.
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of all kinds and other cotton manufactures . from 5 per cent to 3i
A
per cent ad valorem. Cotton Duties Act similarly exempted yams
of Indian manufacture and imposed duty of 3i per cent on woven goods
1
of all counts manufactured by Indian mills. A minor change was 
introduced to rectify the objections of Indian millowners. Westland 
imposed ad valorem duties for all imports and tariff values for 
the chief classes of mill goods. This he explained would approximate 
closely to the actual values and would not be dependent on day to
2
day changes in price or in estimates of price by different millowners.
This action meant a remission of taxation of Rupees 5*2 Lakhs or 
(37 per cent) on Manchester goods and an increase of Rupees 11 Lakhs
3
or (300 per cent) of taxation on Indiaimade goods. What that
amounted to was poignantly stated by J. Piele.
The Act puts an excise on all the coarse cloth manufacture 
of the Indian mills. On what similar manufacture does it 
put a duty on the other, the Lancashire side? On none 
whatever. For there is none. There is no import trade of 
coarse goods from Lancashire, so that *tax all cloth* means 
*tax Indian cloth *, and free all yam? But Indian yam has 
always been free. It is Lancashire yam which is freed so 
that formula really means *tax Indian cloth and free 
Lancashire yam *.4
1 Ibid*
2 Proc. of the Council of Governor General in India, 1896, vol.
35, PP- 54-5.
3 R.C. Dult, Economic History of India, p. 543* C.N. Vakil,
Financial Development of Modem India, p. 433-
4 J. Piele, Minute of Dissent, 10 Apri} 1896, Dissent of Indian 
Council, Minute Book (copies) vol. 5, P- 33-
All the unofficial members of the Leg. Council vehemently criticized 
the Govt, action but without any avail.
For Indian National Congress reaction see P.C. Ghosh, The 
Development of Indian National Congress 1892-1909, Calcutta,
I960, chap. II. Without any exception all the newspapers 
Native and Anglo Indian, severely criticised the Government.
1 2 4
What prompted the Lancashire to demand such an unequal status
or what might be euphfbistically described as an equal status? There
were two reasons: first?that Lancashire had never cast a friendly
eye on the Indian textile industry ever since its growth, Lancashire
never wanted that India should become industrially strong. That
was written very broadly in their memorandum also
Lancashire would hail with satisfaction legislation 
of a kind that would tend to make India prosperous and 
wealthy by encouraging agriculture and larger exportation 
of the produce of its own soil, which would prove best 
source of wealth of such a country, also by a free
admission of its products into this country, thereby
developing a free exchange of trade such as would bring 
comfort and contentment to the inhabitants there as well
•4
as here.
But it was well known that with famine economy, it would be
impossible to develop prosperity without industrialization. It was
no wonder, therefore, as G.D.H. Cole has stated that Victorian
Capitalist looked at the world with the eyes of traders in finished
consumable commodities and ntheir creed of laissez-faire followed
2
logically from their economic ambit ionsrt and to this Marx would 
have said - the evils of ’Powers of Production1.
Secondly, other European countries were economically developing 
very fast and England was losing the industrial monopoly, which she
1 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 99 (Rev.), 5 September 1895? 
Enc. No. 3? Revenue Despatches to India,vol. 16.
2 G.D.H. Cole, Introduction to Economic History 1750-1950? London, 
1953? P. 93.
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once enjoyed. It was fallacy to suppose that the pace of Industrial
Revolution in England would remain unabated. The 'great depression
of 1873-961 in England was both a cause and consequence to that
effect. British productivity in this period had shown clear signs
of relative stagnation and considerable weakening of Britain's
1
economic position. Hoflbian's estimate showed that annual rate of
expansion which had been 3 to 4 per cent had fallen diring this period 
2to 2 per cent. The cotton industry also experienced declining
3
growth of production.
This was bound to have its effedt on the pattern of British 
trade, particularly on exports. When the British exports were falling 
on account of the stiffer opposition everywhere, it was inevitable that 
the avenue of their expansion would be diverted to neutral or
1 A.E. Musson, The Great Depression in Britain, 1873-96: a 
Reappraisal, The Journal of Economic History, vol. xix, June 
1959, p. 206.
2 W. Hoffman, British Industrial Production 1700-1950« Oxford, 1955i 
pp. 31-5.
The annual rate of manufacturing growth of U.S. between 1873 to
1913 was 4.8%, 3*9% of Germany, 3*7% for the world as a whole
and only 1.8% for the United Kingdom. Folke Hilgerdt, Industrialization
and Foreign Trade, League of Nations, 1945$ P* 132.
Not only this, the U.K.'s share of world manufacturing production 
was sharply declining: in I87O it was 31*8% between 1896-1900 it 
had fallen to 19*5$ ,whereas that of the U.S. had grown from 
23.3 to 30.1% and that of Germany from 13*2 to 16.6%.
Folke Hilgardt, Industrialization and Foreign Trade, p. 13*
See also William Ashworth, A History of the International Economy 
I850-195O 1 London, 1954, pp. 35-8.
3 See S.J. Chapman, The Lancashire Cotton Industry, Manchester, 
1904, pp. 23-3 3, and 70-71.
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1
non-protected markets. Consequently this was bound to have
its effect on India. The natural tendency in face of foreign
competition, the growth of protectionist tendency, the British
policy towards colonies and dependencies therefore tightened up -
"a return during this period to the idea of empire, in the hope of
2
finding salvation in colonial market."
To sum up it may be said that cotton duties controversy brought
on surface many things. It sacrificed India's interest to the political
3
and economic interest of England and "raised serious doubts about
the British Government's claims to disinterestedness and impartiality
4in governance of its great dependency". It initiated a principle 
of excise which could not be approved by any serious student of 
economics. Valentine Chirol wrote, "No measure has done greater 
injury to the cause of free trade in India or more permanent discredit 
to British rule than this Excise duty on Indian manufactured cotton,
1 As a matter of fact, it was with these countries that British 
trade expended. The Board of Trade's statistics clearly show 
this shift in the distribution of British exports. See Annual 
Statement of Trade Statistical Abstracts, Pari. Paper, 1903» 
vol. LXVII (cd.1761), 1904, vol. LXXXIV (cd.2337).
2 A.E. Musson, op. cit., p. 228.
See J. Gallaghar and R. Robinson, 'The imperialism of the Free 
Trade', Economic History Review, vol. vi, 1953-54, pp. 1-15«
Parker Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, New York, 19271 
chap. iii.
J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: a study, London, 1954, ed., Part 1, 
chap. iv.
3 Lord Reay to Elgin, 13 March 1896, E.P. , vol. 31*
4 P. Hamety, 'The Indian Cotton Duties Controversy', English 
Historical Review, October 1962, vol. 771 P- 701.
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for none has done more to undermine Indian faith in the principles
of justice upon which British rule claims and on the whole most
1legitimately claims to be based.11 By this action and its clear
2discrimination the Government antagonised the Indian industrial class. 
It also showed more than once that Indian administration played 
a very docile role. Being Elgin's first act, and that too which 
went against the Indian interests, Elgin started his long rule . 
of five years on a wrong footing. It may be emphasised that the 
policy followed towards India in connection with cotton duties was 
a mere continuation of the same policy which started in 1875* Even 
during Elgin's period the change of Ministry did not inaugurate 
anything new.
In this context of controversy, it is not proper to put whole 
blame on Manchester. Manchester no doubt enjoyed a special treatment 
as MacDonagh apologetically described the ^Manchester technique of
3
exercising pressure ... upon susceptible statesmen.*1 Yet, the 
opinion of Manchester was shared and felt by the majority of the 
people in England - whether in Scotland or Wales, whether in Oldham 
or London, Liberal or Conservative, industrialist or a labourer.
Even among working classes Toryism dominated. As H.J. Hanham
1 IndianUnrest, London, 1910, pp. 276-7*
2 Percival Spear, India, A Modern History, Michigan, 1961, p. 307*
3 0. MacDonagh, 'The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade', Economic 
History Review, 1961-2, vol. xiv, p.tf^ L
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in his book Elections and Party Management, states: ^Several of the
leading cotton union officials were Tories, including the most able
1
of them, Thomas Birtwistle,11
Lastly, it may be said that the controversy sowed the seeds
of discontent, if not of unrest, the echoes of which were heard in
India. Of this J. Piele said:
It supplies a weapon to our enemies on the platform 
and in the press. It is a dangerous thing to set a sense 
of wrong which we can neither deny nor entirely explain 
away, circulating above ground and underground among the 
millions of India. The safety and strength of our 
empire rests on our being unscrupulously and fearlessly 
just.^
1 Manchester, 1959* PP* 326-7«
2 J. Piele, Minute of Dissent, 10 April 1896, Dissent of India 
Council, Minute Book, vol. 5» P* 39*
This part was ordered to be omitted by the Secretary of State 
when it was printed in the orders of the House of Commons.
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Chapter III 
RAILWAYS
Elgin's Viceroyalty forms a period of considerable activity
in the promotion of railway expansion in India. He viewed the
expansion of railway to be the most important and fllegitimate” work
for a Viceroy to do, "far more so, in my opinion, than wars or
1
expeditions ...." He was of the opinion that a very large contruction 
of new railways in India would improve the trade and prosperity of 
the people. The expansion, he believed, was not possible without the 
substantial aid of private enterprise. But private capital needed 
to be induced on account of the falling gold value of the rupee. It 
needed firm and direct guarantee. Elgin boldly acknowledged this 
fact. For the proper and speedy utilization of private enterprise, 
and to guard against the exploitation of the promoters, he also 
thoroughly reorganised the railway branch of the Public Works Department 
and inaugurated the policy of railway planning in India. What he wanted 
was investors and no promotors. In this and other dispositions about 
railways he was abundantly successful. The railway lines were extended 
from 18,459 miles in 1893 to 22,491 miles in 1899*^
1 Elgin to Westland, 8 July 1895» E.P., vol. 67•
In the same letter he wrote, "For myself, it is a branch to which 
my own inclination and previous training predisposed me".
2 Pari. Papers, 18991 vol. lxvi, Appendix A.
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To get an overall idea of the railway activities in the period 
of Elgin1s administration, it may be fitting to trace briefly the 
past history of railways in India*
The first sod of the Indian railway was turned in 1849* But it 
was not before 1853 that the first railway line was opened between 
Bombay and Kalyan. It was lord Dalhousie who was largely responsible
f
for giving the real fillip to the railway construction in India*
He was convinced of the importance of railways both for the internal
order and the external security. He had accurately gauged the
important role which India would play both as a supplier of cheap raw
materials to the British industries and as a market for their 
2
finished goods*
In well known Minute of April 1853, Dalhousie laid great 
emphasis upon the necessity of forming a system of ,Trunk Lines1 
connecting the interior of each presidency with its principal parts 
and the several presidencies with each other* For this he maintained
1 Sir Theodore C* Hope, in his paper, *The Rationale of Railways 
in India5 eulogized Dalhousie for raising the question of 
railways out of the ^theoretical and pedantic treatment into 
the higher atmosphere of political, military and commercial 
expediency, tempered by common sense*. Journal of the Society of 
Arts, 1890, vol. xxxviii, p. 708* ^Hereafter cited as J.S.A T T
2 W.W* Hunter, The Marquess of Dalhousie, Oxford, 1895, PP« 193-4* 
See also L.H* Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875«
New York, 1927, p* 212*
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that it was the duty and the interest of the state to encourage the
1
investment of "English capital and Ehglish energy” in India* The
beginning of the railway was made by the construction of the lines
2
by the "guaranteed companies11 incorporated in England.
The terms of agreements with the guaranteed companies were 
onerous to the Government. The first companies with which the 
Government entered into contract were the East Indian and the Great 
Indian Peninsula Companies. Interest at 5 Per cent per annum was 
guaranteed to the Coppany on capital paid into the Treasury for 
ninety-nine years. The guarantee was agreed to be given as an advance 
which was to be repaid with interest at 5 per cent from the profits 
above the guaranteed minimum, in such a way that half of the profits 
was: to be credited to the company and the other half was to be 
applied, firstly towards payment of interest on the debt, and then 
towards the extinction of the debt. When both the debt and interest 
were discharged, the companies were to take the whole of the surplus 
net receipts. At the expiration of the term of ninety-nine years the
3
whole property was to become the property of the Government.
1 Quoted in J.M. Maclean, 'The State Monopoly of Railway in India', 
J.S.A., 1884, xxxii, p. 262.
2 Daniel Thorner has discussed in detail the role of Ehglish 
financiers and promoters and the reason for, and the nature and 
extent of their pressure and method applied on the East India 
Company. Investment in the Empire, 1825-49» Philadelphia, 1950, 
Chapters i and vi.
3 H.M. Jagtiani, The Role of the State in the Provision of Railways, 
London, 1924, pp. 94-6.
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4,255 miles of railway were opened in India up to 1869 when 
the policy of guaranteed companies was given up. Though the 
railways greatly improved the political, military and commercial
i
situation in India^ financially they were still a liability. Soon 
the defects of the guarantee system began to show. It was found that
the guarantee had been fixed at too high a rate, which deprived the
2companies of all incentive to economy and construction. It was 
realised that greater the amount spent, the greater would be the 
amount of stock which would stand at premium. ^Consequently the 
earnings which might have been sufficient to pay interest charges on 
a reasonable expenditure, proved inadequate to meet the guarantee on 
the outlay actually incurred and the Government had to make good 
the deficit.”^
The failure of the guarantee system and the increasing financial 
burden of the guarantee forced the authorities to find a new solution.
1 D.U. Buchanan, The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India,
New Tork, 1934, p. 183.
L.H. Jenks states that the cost of railway per mile in India was 
as high as £18,000 whereas some of the railways in the United States 
were built, including the cost of the land for only £2,000 per 
mile. The Migration of British Capital to 1875< P* 222.
2 So long as the Ehglish capitalist was assured of 5 per cent on 
the security of the revenues of India, 11 it was immaterial to him 
whether the funds that he lent were thrown into the Hooghly or 
converted into brick and mortar11. V.N. Massey's evidence before 
the Select Committee of the House of Commons, Q 8867, quoted by 
C.N. Vakil, Financial Development in Modem India, p. 195*
3 Imperial Gazetteer, vol. iii, p. 368.
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In January 1869 ? Lawrence wrote a Minute scrajping a system under
which Hthe whole profit goes to the Companies, and the whole loss
1
to the Governmentw. Lawrence and his advisers recommended that
all future railway extension should be carried out by the direct
agency of the Government. This was agreed to by the fHome Government *,
with a proviso that a definite annual sum should be devoted to this
purpose which was then fixed at £2 ,5 0 0,000.
The experiment of railway construction exclusively through
the agency of the state lasted only a decade. Though financially 
2
cheaper , it came under severe criticism for the want of speedy 
construction. Between 1869-1880 only 2,493 miles of railway were
3
constructed. The slow growth was primarily due to the fact that
the state revenue had proved insufficient for railways, particularly
as a result of the famines of 1874 and 1879, the Afghan war and the
4fall in the gold value of silver.
1 Quoted by Horace Bell, The Railway Policy in India, London, 1894, 
p. 94.
2 The state proved cheaper agency than the companies in the 
construction of railway. The average cost of a standard gauge 
under guaranteed companies was estimated at £13,000 per mile. The 
average in the case of state line was only £10,000.
N. Sanyal, Development of Indian Railways, Calcutta, 1930, p. 118.
3 H.M. Jagtiani, The Role of the State in Provision of Railways, p. 115«
4 It has been argued by many scholars like N. Sanyal and H.M.
Jagtiani that there was nothing wrong about the state ■. 
construction but the limitation which was imposed upon the Govern­
ment of India by Select Committees of 1871-4 and 1878-9 not to 
expend more than £2^ million a year out of the borrowed capital
in productive Public Works resulted in slow growth, op. cit., 
p. 84 and p. 128 respectively.
See also Amba Prasad, Indian Railways, London, 1980, pp. 5&-5«
The famine commission of 1880 underlined the paramount 
importance of railways for famine relief. The Commissioners urged 
and recommended an immediate addition of not less than 5*000 miles
1
and subsequent construction of 20,000 miles for protective purposes.
Besides, the British mercantile opinion was rapidly growing in
favour of larger railway expansion and more and fuller participation
2
of private enterprise.
Between 1880-4, the elements of the new policy were formulated. 
The agency of the Companies was reintroduced for the construction 
of new lines as well as for the working of the state-owned railways. 
The policy of the state construction continued side by side. The
assistance to Companies was to take the form of a "limited guarantee1*
3
or ftsafe or reasonable guarantee**, a term difficult to define.
The departure in railway policy dating from l88l may be regarded as
the beginning of a **new policy** which implies a complete abandonment
4
of the policy of 1869-70.
1 Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, Pari. Papers, vol. lii,
^"C.259i_7 , pp. 170-88.
2 A. Bedford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, vol. li, 
Manchester, 1956, p. 33-
3 It is. impossible to define, with exactness the term Reasonable 
guarantee'• Horace Bell fails to define it. 'The Recent Railway 
Policy', J.S.A., 1898, vol. xlvi, p. 531*
Amba Prasad is nearer the truth in considering that there was no 
systematic policy of guarantee, but was *'left to the circumstances 
of each case." The Indian Railways, p. 58.
4 H. Bell,'The Recent Railway Policy in India, J.S.A., I8 98, . 
vol. xlvi, p. 532.
See also Vera Anstey, The Economic Development of Modem India,
p. 132.
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In 1881 and 1882, four companies were brought into existence 
to undertake new construction and manage the lines without any 
guarantee at all. The lines were the Bengal Central, the Rohilkhand
Kumaon, the Bengal and the North-Western and the Southern Mahratha•/
Railway. This policy did not prove a success. The first two
were soon bought by the state, the third was subsidised by the
Government by adding the Tirhout State Railway, a profitable line,,
for its success. The last was given a sterling guarantee of 3i
1
per cent in the form of ’’assistance11 - the assistance, however,
^taking the very substantial and attractive form of a sterling
guarantee, somewhat above the English market rate, together with a
2
prospective share of surplus profits and free grant of land.”
The main terms of the guarantee were: (a) the railways were to be 
the property of the state, only the capital was provided by the 
Company, (b) the interest on the capital raised was 3i per cent, and 
(c) the state retained nearly \ of the surplus profit. These 
companies, therefore, unlike the old guaranteed companies were merely 
agents to work the property belonging to the Government and performed
1 The word assisted seemed in fact to have been ninventedn in 
order to screen the facts that such companies were guaranteed, H. 
Bell, ’The Recent Railway Policy in India’, op. cit., p. 532.
2 Ibid.
3 For detail, see A. Prasad, The Indian Railways, pp. 59-60.
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the function of raising the money and constructing the lines.
Failing to attract private enterprise and capital, without
sterling guarantee, Indian Government proposed on 19 March 1893,
to invite capital on a rupee basis, for the construction ** principally**
of branch lines.* The Secretary of State agreed to the terms and
the Indian Government issued a Resolution on 13 September 1893, with
2
a view to encourage the construction of feeder railways by private
3
enterprise. The essential features of the new Resolution were:
(a) the investor was to select the general direction of the branch 
lines; (b) he was to raise his capital and place that capital in the 
hands of the Government; (c) the branch line was **to be worked by the 
state for not more than 30 per cent of gross earnings, including the 
provision of rolling stock and the free use of land**; and (d), that
1 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 23 (Ry), Railway and Telegraph 
Letters from India, vol. 35* Enclosed with it is the draft of 
the Resolution. /"Hereafter cited as R.L.I._7
See also S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 69 (Ry), 27 July _
1893, Railway Despatches to India, vol. 13 /"Hereafter cited as R.D.1^/ 
Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 62 (Ry), 18 October 1893, (with 
Enclosure) R.L.I. vol. 35*
S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 104 (Ry), 30 November 1893,
R.D.I., vol. 13-
Public Works Departmental Papers of Council of India, 1933/93, 
vol. 396. /"^Hereafter cited as P.W •_7
2 By branch or feeder lines, the Government meant lines chiefly of 
local interest, and they formed the small feeders of the main 
line.
3 Pari. Papers, 1897, vol. lxv, /""88_7, PP* 2-6.
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1
a rebate was to be given by the parent line on traffic inter­
changed with it, so as to make some return on the approved capital 
of 4 per cent.
This Resolution failed to get any response. It was considered 
that the conditions imposed on the investors, whom it was intended 
to attract were neither clear nor certain. Secondly, the investors 
who had looked towards some sort of guarantee as a wconvenient" 
system, naturally professed doubt of its sufficiency. It was also 
asserted that the limit offered in Paragraph 7 of the Resolution, 
to 10 per cent of the gross earnings of the main line from traffic 
interchanged between the main line and the branch was too unequal for 
universal application, for in some cases it could be either too 
little or too much. Added to this was the obvious difficulty of 
estimating the value of the rebate or the probable receipts from
3
the local traffic. Also, as the exchange value of the rupee was 
reaching its lowest figure, as in June 1894, it reached the depth of 
Is. ojd. , the terms could hardly be received favourably.
1 Rebate was a payment to a branch line by the parent line 
from the earnings of ; latter from traffic interchanged with 
the branch. It was limited to (l) a specific proportion of 
those earnings, and (2) the amount which, when added to the 
net earnings of the branch, made up a certain fixed dividend 
on the capital of the branch.
2 Note by Offg. Director General of Railways, Lt.CoJ.. V.S.S.
Bisset, 24 January 1894, Para 8, E.P., 132 (S), ix.
3 H. Bell. J.S.A., 1898, op. cit., p. 533*
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The unsettled condition of the currency question was causing
great hindrance to the extension of railways. On one hand, sterling
capital could not be freely employed without the fear of increasing
sterling liabilities, and on the other hand private English capital
would not be forthcoming until assured of covering the risk. When
Elgin came, the railway policy was at crossroads. In the first
place, there was a need of a well laid out policy; in the second
an organisation to implement the policy.
Elgin considered the resolution of September 1893 to be the
first obstacle towards a resolute railway policy and the utilization
of private enterprise. He was aware that the Secretary of State in
1884 had imposed a limitation to the extent of £3i million on the
Government borrowing for Public Works. He believed if rapid
expansion of railway was to take place ^ eyond this limit, the aid
of private enterprise was essential. He was personally inclined to
think that for the general improvement of the country, the immediate
returns were of little significance and he was eager to Mgive more
1
encouragement to private enterprise*• The Secretary of State,
Fowler, was also of the same opinion. He stated that until a way could
be found to offer more attractive terms than those of September 1893»
2
little progress could be made. It was in the attempt to offer
1 Elgin to Fowler, 1 May 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 Fowler to Elgin, 9 November 1894, ibid.
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better terms to the private enterprise for branch lines that a
clear railway policy was laid and an important departure in the
railway policy was effected.
The need for the change was growing both at Home and in
Calcutta. The first move for the change came from the Indian
Government, when Col. Bisset, the Director General of railways,
1
asked for the revision of the terms. But it was the Secretary of
State who first officially recommended the alteration of the
resolution. This had happened on account of constant pressure on
the Secretary of State from the mercantile community of England.
The question of railways which always formed a subject of great
interest had suddenly drawn more attention by the 1890s. The London
_ ,2
Chamber of Commerce, in its letter of 19 June 1894 and Duff Bruce, 
the Consulting Engineer, Assam-Bengal railway in his letter of 6 June
3
1894 to the Secretary of State advocated an enlargement of the terms 
of the Resolution. Duff Bruce suggested the replacement of the
1 Bisset wrote, RAs surely as the certainty of guarantee is withdrawn 
so surely must the possibilities of a big return on capital
to be enlarged and to get railways made in India with English 
money, Government must be prepared to open their hearts and 
allow that people who risk something shall have a chance of 
profiting by their venture.11 Note by the Director General 
of Railways, 24 January 1894, Para 12, op.cit.
2 P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 4787, No. 84, October 1895.
3 Ibid., No. 86, October 1895*
rebate of traffic (Section 7 of the Resolution) by a fixed guarantee
of 3i per cent to be paid by the main line to the branch line
shareholders of their capital after payment of which fixed sums and
working expenses all should be divided in the proportion of $ to the
owing (branch) company and $ to the working (main line) company.
Another suggestion was made by V. Shelford in a paper laid
before the London Chamber of Commerce that the 'rebate of traffic'
principle should be maintained, but the existing maximum of 10 per
cent on interchanged traffic might be raised to 40 or 50 or even 60
2per cent without any real risk of loss to the state.
The value of the above notes was discussed by C.S. Calvin,
Secretary, Public Works at the India Office. In his note of 8 June
1894, he stated that Bruce's suggestion would be a "too radical
departure from the policy under trial*. He believed that the limit
of 10 per cent for the rebate in question *to be too low an one, and 
for «
I would seek/relief in enlarging this limit*. He supported
Shelford's proposal, which the Public Works Committee accepted in
full and suggested to the Secretary of State to write to the Indian
Government for the revision of the terms of the Resdlution of 15
1 Ibid.
2 W. Shelford's Note on extension of Railways in India, ibid.,
No. 88, October 1895*
3 P.W. 1071/94, vol. 412.
See also C.S. Colvin to O'Callaghan, undated, Enc., O'Callaghan 
to H.B. Smith, 11 July 1894, E.P., vol. 6 5*
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l
September 1893* In August 1894, the Secretary of State moved for 
the amendment. 2
Calcutta and Bombay were equally restive for the change* In 
the Presidential Address to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Arthur 
Allan underlined the importance of feeder lines and pressed the 
Government to offer favourable terms to the private enterprise. He
3
went on to advocate the cause of the guarantee system. The
4
Bombay Chamber also demanded the amendment of 1893 Resolution.
The decisive step towards the change was laid down by Lord
5
Elgin in his Note of 31 December 1894. In this exhaustive Note 
Elgin emphasised the general view of the Government fs railway policy
1 Ibid.
2 S.S* to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 62 (Ry), 2 August 1894,
Para 6 , R.D.I., vol. 14*
The Mercantile community was exerting great pressure on the 
Secretary of State for a long time* As early as June 18931 an 
influential delegation consisting of representatives of the 
cotton and woollen manufacturers of Lancashire, Yorkshire etc. 
waited upon the Secretary of State and urged for the speedy 
construction of railways and for more facilities for the private 
enterprise. The delegation included many members of the
Parliament, like Villiam Coddington, Sir James Kitson, V.H. Hornby,
J.F. Leese, S.W. Sidebotham, Sir Villiam Houldworth, C.P.
Huntington, J.M. Cheetham, R.G. Mowbray, Thomas Snape, J. Leigh,
M. Oldroyd, V.H. Holland, C.V. Cayzer.
S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 63 (Ry)i 13 July 18931 Ehcs.
1 and 2, R.D.I., vol. 13*
See also Memorial of the President of the United Kingdom of 
Commerce, P.V.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 4787^ No. 90, October 1893*
3 Report of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 1894-51 vol. 1 pp. 9-10. 
The committee of Chamber also recommended the same, p. 82.
See also Report of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 1895-6, vol. 1, 
pp. 5-6. There were many more who asserted for a definite guarantee, 
particularly those like Marquess of Tweesdale, who had substantial 
railway interests in India. Marquess of Tweesdale to Elgin, 11 
January and 7 March 1894, E.P., vol. 29*
4 Bombay Chamber of Commerce to Indian Govt., 27 March 18951 P*V.D. 
(B.C.), Proc., vol. 4785, No. 46, June 1895-
5 Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, 9 October 1895. H.C., MSS. Eur. D. 509/1-
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in order to encourage private enterprise. As a first step he
agreed with the Secretary of State to alter the Resolution of
September 1893 and increase the terms of rebate. Though he was
convinced that without some sort of guarantee the situation was not
going to improve, yet for the present he was not inclined to advocate
1
a different principle other than increased rebate. The Indian
Government telegraphed the Secretary of State on 5 February 1895
suggesting to increase the returns to branch lines from gross earnings
on the traffic interchanged with main line from 10 per cent to 15 
2per cent. But Fowler considered this to be too little a concession
to warrant a change. He wired back on 12 February recommending Mto
enlarge the rebate to the extent required to make up to 4 per cent
return provided that rebate shall in no case exceed net earnings of
3
main line from interchanged traffic.w
The verdict of the Secretary of State was opposed very strongly
by both the Public Works Member, Charles Pritchard and Finance Member, 
4
James Westland. They objected to his suggestion on the ground of
1 Ibid., p. 4.
2 Telegram Viceroy to S.S. P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 4787* No. 95> 
October 1895*
3 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy P.W. 358/95? attached v.t6’ P.W.
760/951 vol. 436.
4 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 1 March 1895»ibid.
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its being “equivalent to a firm guarantee**. They objected on two
other counts also. One was that such a scheme necessarily meant
the increase in the capital value of the line, if owned or made by
a private company and secondly it could adversely effect the state
2
revenue in case the Government decided to buy. Pritchard tenaciously
held to the spirit of the Resolution of 1893 and Westland deterred
3
anything which involved more spending.
Viceroy concurred in the views of his colleagues against the 
“firm guarantee11 as implied in the proposal of the Secretary of State, 
but not withstanding this, he preferred the construction of branch 
lines by “separate companies“. He also suggested that the percentage
1 Ibid-
The Railway Minute of the Public Works Department, India 
Office confessed that the Secretary of State's offer amounted 
to a firm guarantee. In that context, Pritchard and Westland 
had correctly assessed the intentions of the Secretary of State.
2 Elgin to Fowler, 6 March 1895i E*P«, vol. 13*
3 Ibid.
From the very beginning Elgin and Fowler had realised that 
Pritchard and Westland obstinately objected to the policy of 
rebate. ^~Elgin to Fowler, 6 February 18951 ibid. 7 At one 
stage Fowler wrote a stinker against Pritchard saying that 
“Government here feel that they cannot leave this question 
any longer unsettled, in order to meet the views of Sir Charles 
Pritchard.“ Continuing the same tone towards Westland,
Fowler complained to Elgin that “At all events he seems to 
ignore the cardinal principle that railway facilities create 
traffic, and his idea that new lines, and especially branch 
lines are constructed for the purpose of dealing with existing 
traffic requirements is opposed to the railway experience of 
every country in the world.*1 Fowler to Elgin, 29 March 18951 
ibid.
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of net earnings rebate to the Branch should not exceed 34 per cent
instead of 4 per cent.* Elgin had two motives in restricting the
Secretary of State's proposal to small branch lines and their
construction by separate companies. One was to mitigate the fears
of his colleague and another was his desire to see feeders develop 
2
quickly. In the case of large lines he did not want the Government 
to offer such a high dividend, particularly when Government could 
get capital on a lesser interest in the market or by giving direct
O
guarantee of 3 per cent or 24 per cent. Fowler accepted the
suggestion of less dividend but did not restrict either the length
4of the branch or that of its construction by separate companies.
The Indian Government accepted the proposal for the construction of 
branch or feeder railwa^m'&rovided that capital is in rupees" and 
further added that, "we wish it to be clearly understood that offers 
in sterling on this basis whether in London or India will not be
1 Telegram Viceroy to S.S. 1 March 1895* op> cit.
2 Elgin actually wanted the main lines, whether the state railways 
or private or state railway managed by the company to construct 
their own branch lines. Only in cases where neither of them 
desired to construct, then an inducement to this extent 
[^""guaranteeing the dividend to 34 per cent_7, might be given
to separate companies. "To lay down that all branch lines must 
be made by companies independent of the main lines has always 
appeared to me to be to introduce a most unnecessary complication 
into a system already almost intolerably complicated." Elgin's 
Note, 31 December 1894, p. 6, op. cit.
3 Elgin to Fowler, 13 February 1895 and 6 March 1895* E*P*, vol. 13*
4 Telegram S.S. to Viceroy, 12 March 1895* P*V.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 
4787, No. 99* October 1895*
See also S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 29 (Ry), 28 March 
1895* R.D.I., vol. 15*
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1
admitted." But Fowler was not prepared to commit himself as a
rule to the extension of sterling capital and stated, "each offer
2
in London must be considered by me on its merits". Accordingly 
the Indian Government published the amended Resolution on 29 
March 1895- 3
The result of publishing the amended resolution without any
reference to sterling was unfortunate. The press and the public,
the
particularly/English mercantile community, objected to the reduction
from 4 to 3i per cent of the dividend to the branch lines whose
capital was in rupees. They stated that the Government instead
of encouraging rupee capital boosted the sterling interest because
4
their dividend remained at 4 per cent. They would have preferred 
its reduction to 3i per cent. The Bombay Chamber of Commerce showed
1 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 23 March 1895, P*W.D. (R.C.) Proc., 
vol. 4787, No. 100, October 1895*
2 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 27 March 1895» P»V. 492/95 attached 
to : P.W. 760/95, vol. 436.
3 Res. P.W.D. on 'Extension of Railway^ by Private Agency', Pari. 
Papers, 1897, vol. lxv PP.- 14-15, Sect. 3 (i) and ii.
The amended resolution did not mention any rebate or dividend
for sterling offer. In resolution of September 1893, the dividend 
to branch line was 4 per cent, whether the capital was provided 
in rupee or in sterling, though it did not contain any such 
indirect guarantee as offered by the Resolution of 1895*
P.W.D., Res., No. 924, 15 September 1893, P* 4, Sect. 1(7), 
op. cit.
4 Extracts from Bombay Gazette, 1 July 1895; Statesman, 11 July 
1895; The Times 14 and 17 September and 4 and 10 September 
1895, Register No. 463, Private Secretary's Correspondence,
E.P., vol. 96.
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its annoyance when it wrote, nThe Chamber thinks that effects of
the alteration as proposed by the Government of India Resolution
of 29 March, will be to render the conditions more complex and
obscure than ever, as sterling and rupee capital are to be differently 
1
treated.M Even Elgin agreed that ^Sterling dividend on sterling
2schemes ought to be somewhat less than 3i Per cent on rupee scheme.n 
On the whole the amended resolution was an improvement over the 
resolution of 1893* The intention of the alterations was to give 
increased inducements for the investments of the rupee capital, 
but the public misunderstood the offer and instead of welcoming the 
very substantial increase in the security ^ which was as good as 
a firm guarantee_7 , *b© public persistently fixed upon the difference
of rate, 3£ per cent instead of 4 per cent, ignoring altogether that 
they were the minimum rates. What this resolution suffered from 
was not the element of inducement but want of clarity.
The significance of this resolution might not be under-rated.
It was the first step towards the reintroduction of the guarantee system 
in order to attract private enterprise. At this stage, the railway
1 Bombay Chamber of Commerce to Indian Govt., 20 May 1895» P*W.D.
(R.C.) Proc., vol. 4787i No. 276, November 1895*
2 Elgin's Note on Railways, 27 July 1895* P-l? Enc. Elgin to 
Hamilton, 9 October 1895» H.C., HSS.Eur.D. 509/1.
See also Elgin to Fowler, 17 April l895» E.P., vol. 13*
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policy implied only an indirect or imperfect guarantee to be
given from the net earnings of the railway line and not from
the whole revenue of the state. This in itself was a big change
and quite a departure from the old policy.
The need for the change in the branch line policy was soon
realised. The private enterprise was not yet satiated. Their
pressure was not yet exhausted. Government under Elgin also
realised that a fresh resolution defining more clearly the terms
to be offered to private enterprise was desirable.
On the initiative of Elgin, the Indian Government decided
to cancel the Resolution of September 1893 and March 18931 and issue
1
a new resolution. They were resolved to give an absolute
guarantee for the branch line construction. On 17 April 1896 a
2
new Resolution was published. The main feature of the resolution 
was that the Government allowed the promoter of a company an option 
between a rebate sufficient to make up a dividend of 34 per cent 
(on the terms stated in the resolution of March 1893) and an nabsolute
3
guarantee” of interest, the rate being 3 per cent. In either case
1 Elgin's Note on Railways, 27 July 1893* PP- 2-3. Enc. Elgin 
to Hamilton, 9 October 1893, H.C., MSS.Eur.D. 509/1.
See also Elgin's Memorandum on Railway Policy, 9 October 1895* 
p. 1. Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, MSS.Eur.D. 509/1.
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 78 (Ry), 9 October 1895,
Paras 2-3, R.L.I., vol. 37*
2 Pari. Papers, 1897, vol. lxv ^ f~88_7,PP* 15-18.
3 Ibid., Section 2, vi (a) (b). The proposals of these financial 
concessions were made on the basis of Elgin's Memorandum on 
Railways of 23 September 1895, Paras 6-8. Enc. Elgin to Hamilton,
9 October 1895, op. cit.
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it was provided that any assistance given by the Government was
to be on a silver basis whether the capital was raised in silver 
1
or sterling. The new resolution also limited the length of the 
branch line to 100 miles. This definitely took away the ambiguity 
from the previous resolution and thereby clearly demarcated the
2
difference between branch and larger or main line construction.
The success of the resolution was immediate. As many as 7 branch
3
line constructions came under the perview of the new resolution.
Until the old resolution was cancelled, there was only one 
"statement of terms11 opened to the promoters. That was in the resolution
1 Ibid. See also A.C. Trevor to Elgin, 27 September 1895i E.P., 
vol. 67*
2 Fundamentally, Elgin's administration did not desire that all 
branch lines should be made on the basis of a guarantee. They 
believed that as branch lines were constructed chiefly for 
local interest, they should, in normal cases be subscribed by 
persons directly interested in the district opened. The Govern- 
ment believed that profit earning companies must make and 
manage their own branches. Still, there would always remain 
some branches which neither existing companies nor state would 
be prepared to take. It was to this class that new resolution 
was intended to be applicable.
Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 78 (Ry), 9 October 1895i Para 12, 
R.L.I., vol. 37.
See also Elgin's Note on Railway Policy, 27 July 1895» P*3* 
op. cit.
3 They were: (l) Hymens ingh-Jamal pore, (2) Sultan Pur- 
Bogra-Kaliganj, (3) Bhagalpur-Bansi-Badyanath, (4) Gogri- 
Baptiahi with branch, (5) Segowli-Ruksaul, (6 ) Surat- 
Nandunbar-Amalner, (7) Amalner-Jalgoan.
See Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896,
Para 12, R.L.I., vol. 38.
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that dealt with branch lines only. Yet in practice proposals 
had been made Mto apply its terms to lines which by no possibility 
could be called branches or even extensions* like South Punjab 
Railway which was 400 miles long. Therefore, there was a need to
1
simplify and declare the general policy towards all construction.
As stated earlier, it was in lieu of the Branch line resolutions that
a railway policy towards private enterprise came to be firmly
established. No doubt in its making it had taken a hammering
for nearly two years, in which the efforts of Elgin were singular.
As early as 31 December 1894, Elgin had stated that larger lines,
if to be constructed by private enterprise, must be given an absolute
2
guarantee of interest. At that stage neither his executive council
nor the Secretary of State was inclined to come forward publicly
in favour of such a policy. But soon the opinions began to waver.
3
Fowler promised to consider the question of guarantee. The new 
Secretary of State, Hamilton,seemed to be in agreement: nA limited
guarantee, with a prospective increment is what the public would like,
1 See Elgin’s Note on Railway Policy, 27 July 1895? P- 2. op. cit.
2 Elgin's Note on Railway, 31 December 1894, pp. 3-4, op. cit.
3 Fowler to Elgin, 16 May 1895* E.P., vol. 13*
and this, I think, we could give.”1 By July 1895 Elgin was 
gratified to find that there was substantial agreement in his 
council on the policy of guarantee. By September 1895» Elgin was
delighted to know that the Secretary of State and his Council were
2 the 
convinced for the change. On 9 October 1895,/Indian Government
officially proposed to announce the adherence to the guarantee system
3
for the construction of the railways by the companies. The offer
for the larger lines was made on the basis of a Hplain guarantee”,
4
•'which was presumed to be in sterling”.
The Public Works department at the India Office, in its
departmental minute of December 1895) counselled the Secretary of
5
State for the acceptance of the guarantee system. The joint 
Finance and Public Works Committee recommended on 9 January 1896
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 31 October, 1895* ibid.
Also Hamilton to Elgin, 10 January 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
2 Elgin's Memorandum on Railway Policy, 9 October 18951 P*l)
Ehc. Elgin to Hamilton, 9 October 1895) MSS.Eur.D. 509/1*
3 Indian Govt, to S.S. L. No. 78 (Ry)) 9 October 1895) paras 9-10, 
op. cit.
4 Railway Minute, P.W. 1880/95) vol. 447 of Indian Govt. L.No. 78 
(Ry) of 9 October 1895) Paras 9-H*
Telegram Hamilton to Elgin, (Pr), 5 December 1895) E.P., vol. 18- 
Telegram Elgin to Hamilton, 7 December 1895) ibid.
5 Railway Minute, P.W. 1880/95) vol. 447*
On 10 December 1895) Godley had also recommended in his note 
to accept Indian Governme&'s proposals without imposing any further 
limitation. P.W. 1880/95) ibid.
H. Waterfield, the Financial Secy. India Office, in his note of 
14 November 1895 concurred in the proposals provided it be ”a 
cardinal point in the new policy that the interest will, on the 
larger lines as well as on the branches, be paid in rupees, on 
the rupee amount entered in the capital account.** ibid.
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the following terms of construction of the main line > railway.
(a) On a sterling basis, a limited guarantee of per 
cent_7 plus such share of surplus net profits as may 
be agreed upon.
(b) On a rupee basis, a somewhat higher guarantee, "^*3i P«r 
cent_7 plus such share of surplus net profits as may be 
agreed upon.
The proposal of the Indian Government was endorsed and accepted
2by Hamilton and his committee.
For the correct appraisal of the policy, it is necessary to 
examine and analyse the reasons which impelled the Government to 
undertake the policy of wguaranteew towards the privateenterprise.
To do this it is imperative to go into its historic perspective.
The policy at least in theory after 1880 was to refuse guarantees 
and either to construct lines with state money and through state 
agency or through unaided private enterprise. But private enterprise 
had failed altogether to come forward. For example, the Bengal 
Central Railway was started as an independent line, but the moment it 
failed to pay, the pressure was brought to bear, which made the 
Secretary of Stfcte take it over. Similarly, the Bengal and North-Western
1 Ibid*
2 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 9» (Ry)? 6 February 1896,
R.D.I., vol. 16.
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line had to be aided by leasing them the Tirhort state line in order
to make the concern a paying one* In 1889, Delhi-Kalkha Railway
was formed as an independent line, but as soon as it began to work,
1
the company demanded exemption from the contract* It may be safe to 
assume that unaided companies did not exist*
In many cases, either a direct sterling guarantee was given, 
as in the case of South Mahratha Railway and Assam-Bengal Railway 
or the promoters tried to win giarantee in a round about way. An
example could be taken to substantiate this point* It was
2
J* Westland who examined this point with facts and figures when 
a promoter ^~Col. Filgate_7 offered to take over and complete the East
Coast line on the terms which were to make the capital of the line
as follows:
A - 450 Lakhs Government money
B - 500 Lakhs Company money
C - 400 Lakhs either Government money or debentures
It was assumed that 'C' would be divided into
(i) - 200 Lakhs debentures
( ii) — 200 Lakhs Government money
1 In 1896, the Govt, had to supplement the net earnings by giving 
an annual subsidy as to secure the company 3t per cent dividend', 
to the shareholders after payment of debenture interest. H. Bell,
fThe Recent Railway Policy’, J*S*A*, 1898, p. 533-
2 J. Westland's Note on Railway and Railway Finance, 16 February 
1895, vol. 132 (S).
3 As Government would actually have spent 450 lakhs under A, this 
was a fairly probable supposition.
. . .  1
Under the proposal of the promoter, if the line paid on the
whole 2 per cent, or 27 lakhs nwhich may be taken as a certainty”,
the return would be thus distributed:
32 per cent return on (C) - 7 lakhs
3t cent return on (B) - 17l lakhs
And then the Government would get the balance of 2^ Lakhs as its
interest and return upon 650 lakhs contribution, being about 4/10
of a per cent.” To Westland this was "only another name for a
direct guarantee; only whereas the company would hardly dare to
ask for a direct guarantee of over 3 par cent, they can, by wrapping
it up in words in this fashion, ask for 3i»n And he further
stressed, "we need not attempt to shut our eyes to the fact; and
the first lesson to be drawn from it 1 take to be this - that it is
far better that the guarantee should be straight and simple one than
2
it should be wrapped up in round-about methods.n
Over and above, the inducement of rebate was not a success.
C.H.T. Crosthwate, the Member-in-charge of Public Works in the Secretary
1 J. Westland's Note, 16 February 1895- Para 6, op. cit.
2 Ibid., Para 9*
Private enterprise as understood in England did not exist in 
India, so far as railways were concerned. Elgin had rightly 
stated that genuine self reliant Indian Railways were few and 
far between. The schemes laid before the Government as private 
enterprise were normally the "promoter schemes, where the real 
interest was to float the company and little else.” Elgin's 
Memorandum on Railway Policy, 9 October 1895* P«l* op« cit.
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of State's Council, opined, nI believe the offer of a rebate even
1
with higher interest will rarely be taken." "Experience has shown 
that no response will be made" stated Gen. R. Strachey, "on any 
appreciable scale of magnitude, to invitations to capitalists to 
undertake railways in India at their own risk, such as have been
2
ineffectually made by the Government during a long series of years."
Though the construction of railway through the state was 
considered to be the best and the cheapest, but this method suffered 
on account of the want of continuity. During famine and war, the 
Government resources had to be diverted. If railway development was 
to continue, it was essential that money should be regularly forth­
coming. In this context, only the private companies could be 
useful. "The debt of India is really increased?1, argued Crosthwaite, 
"just as much by indirect borrowing as by direct loans. But the 
effect on the credit of the Government may not be the same. By 
raising money through a company the loan is marked off distinctly 
as raised for railway construction and is separated from the general
unproductive debt of the country. For this advantage, such as it
3
is, a heavier rate of interest will have to be paid." Hence the
1 C.H.T. Crosthwaitefs Memorandum on the Railway Policy, 24 
December 1894T, P*l, P*W. 1880/955 vol. 447-
2 Minute by Gen. R. Strachey, Inc. S.S. to India Govt., Despatch 
No. 69 (Ry)i 6 September 1894, R.D.I., vol. 14.
3 C.H.T. Crosthwaite*s Memorandum on Railway Policy, 24 December 
18951 op. cit.
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need for a guarantee.
In the days of ”fluctuations of exchange11 the investors needed
safe and firm returns and this, it was argued could be provided
only through a plain system of guarantee.
In its final analysis and assessment, it would, perhaps be
best to understand that the whole thinking in Government and outside
1
was obsessed with the guarantee system. One fact ought to be
recognised that the adoption of the guarantee system almost bred
a habit with the investors to look for a guarantee, so it did
even with the policy makers in subsequent years. Thomas Robertson
Report onlhe Indian Railway of 1903 upheld the principle and stated
2
that nunguaranteed enterprise*have always been unpopular.M Mackay
Report of 1908, stressed still more for the encouragement of
3
private enterprise. Even the Acworth Committee of 1921 was equally
4
favourable to private enterprise.
In formulating the policy, Elgin was primarily influenced by
1 There was hardly any opposition from the official quarters 
towards the change, except from Charles Pritchard. R. Hardie,
in his Minute of 23 July 1894 had merely warned the Secretary of 
State that his policy of offering more liberal terms ^  in form 
of rebates_7 to private enterprise, as conveyed in his despatch 
(Ry) No. 61 of 2 August 1894 were more onerous to the Government 
and that he preferred plain guarantee to the indirect one.
P.W. 1071/94, vol. 412.
2 Report on the Administration and Working of Indian Railways, 1903, 
Pari• Papers, vo 1. xlvii, ^  Cd.1713_ Para 117. See also Paras 
129-132.
3 Report of the Committee on Indian Railway Finance and Administration, 
1908, Pari. Papers, vol. 75^ Cd. 4111_], Para 8.
4 Railway Committee Report, 1921, Pari. Papers, vol. x ^ ™Cd.l512_/, 
chap. vii / Summary of the Report^^, pp. 86-89.
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the falling exchange and the chequered history of the private enter­
prise. He was convinced that the only solution to the impediment 
lay through offering lfplain guarantee”. Though he was conscious 
not to increase sterling liabilities, yet he was not prepared to 
curtail it on the argument of adverse exchange. ”1 cannot help
thinking that the indirect advantages of the railway extension go
1
far to counter-balance even the loss on remittance.” Elgin was 
of the firm belief that without railway expansion, the financial 
condition of India could not improve and for this he was prepared 
to pay the price. In doing so he had acknowledged the value of 
accepting the plain facts.
He had also recognised that the Railway policy and railway 
expansion without the system of proper control, planned programme 
and efficient organisation could never succeed in India. Administration 
of Elgin set out to establish such a machinery as well.
There were various reasons which necessitated systematic 
planning. One was, if private enterprise was given some facili­
ties, it needed to be controlled as well, particularly when
2
there was hardly any ”genuine self reliant Indian Railways”. The 
Government did not want to repeat the old mistake in which profits
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 19 February 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
2 Letter to the Editor, The Times, 10 September 1895*
went to private company and losses to the Government. The Government 
was interested in giving full scope to private enterprise, but in 
aiorganised order. nX see no way in which*1, admitted Elgin, **the 
railways of India cannot be wholly divorced from state control, 
the prejudice thus created can be avoided, except by the Government 
taking up the perfectly rational position that it does not throw 
the whole of India open to the company promoter, but will give free 
scope to private enterprise, the more genuine the better, by placing 
before the public the real requirements of the country.n*
For the systematic growth of railways, it was essential to 
regulate the railway programme and maintain coordination between 
public works departments in London and India. The inconsistency of 
approach of the two was actually exploited by the promoters. Whenever 
they wanted to circumvent the Indian Government they went to the 
India Office and something was done against the wishes of the Indian 
Government. The grant of 3i per cent sterling guarantee to Assam- 
Bengal Railways in 1892 by the Secretary of State in total disregard 
to the advice of the Indian Government was one such case. Another 
case of this type occurred as late as October 1895* when Hamilton 
announced to the very surprise of many, the sanction of 3a cent
*
1 Elgin's Memorandum on Railway Policy, 9 October, p.2, op. cit.
2 Crosthwaite to Elgin, 4 April 1895* E.P., vol. 30.
Also Godley to Elgin, 1 March 1895* ibid.
guarantee to the promoters of Bhagalpur-Bansi-branch line, without
consulting the Indian Government, particularly when a systematic
1
pattern of a policy was being evolved, "All I have to say is that, 
unless we do something of the kind, it is futile to ask us to 
pursue a consistent policy, because every forecast that we make is
at any moment liable to be upset by the introduction of new and
2possibly incompatible item." Elgin's main desire was to shut out
3
all avenues which a speculative promoter tended to exploit. He 
believed that uniformity of policy and approach was pre-requisite 
to a sound policy. The control of the programme was, therefore, "far 
more important part of the new policy than any particular rate of
4interest or rebate."
1 W.S.S. Bisset to H.B. Smith, 19 October 1895i E.P., vol. 67*
See also Bisset to H.B. Smith, 20 October 1895i ibid.
Elgin to Hamilton, 29 October 1895» ibid., vol. 13.
Hamilton to Elgin, 31 October and 13 November 1895* ibid.
A. Godley confessed about the mistake. "The concession of certain 
terms to Sir W. Hudson ^ "the promoter of Bhagulpur-Bansi tftencbj 
without previous reference to you, was a serious mistake. We must 
say *Peccavimus'•" Godley to Elgin, 15 November 1895» ibid., vol. 30.
2 Elgin's Memorandum, 9 October l89ff, p. 2, op. cit.
3 Elgin wrote to Lord Reay, the Under Secretary of State, "I would 
very much like to get past the promoter and deal with bona fide 
investors". 22 October 1894, E.P., vol. 29.
4 Elgin's Memorandum, 9 October 1895i P* 2., op.cit.
The promoters exploited this situation in another way. Many 
officers of the Public Works Dept, who retired, soon joined some 
railway syndicate and tended to take advantage of their erstwhile 
position. One such example was given by Elgin himself. As highly 
placed an officer as 0 'Callaghan after retiring from the Secretary­
ship of P.W. Dept, took up a job with a syndicate. When he was 
secretary he had opposed the construction of a line from Mughal 
Serai to the coalfields of Palamow and thence via Sini and Midnapur 
to Cuttack, which Pritchard, the P.W. Member had highly recommended. 
0 ’Callaghan retired in July 1895 and soon after an offer was made by 
him on behalf of a syndicate for the construction of this very line, 
on terms to which he had known* Sir C. Pritchard was committed from 
departmental discussion of the subject. It was to avoid such-like 
confrontations that Elgin wanted a planned railway policy, ibid.
159
In order to attract a genuine investor it was as important
to check 'speculative jobbers' as it was to avoid delays. At times
the departmental delays were appalling and in some cases, like
1
that of 'linking up* scheme it took more than three years to start 
a project sanctioned by the Secretary of State. These delays were 
primarily caused by the rivalry between the Finance Department
and the Public Works Department in which each encroached on the
2
territory of the other. To Elgin it was "labour in vain". Elgin
felt that the most important need was to amend the departmental
procedure and to lay down certain general lines of policy affecting
the railway which could help to prevent the interference into the
3
harmonious action by smoothening the differences beforehand.
This was achieved by Elgin by establishing a committee of 
experts, comprising the official of the Public Works and Finance 
Departments and presided over by the Viceroy. The main business of
1 See below pp. n9- ^
2 For detail see Elgin to Westland, 8 July; Westland to Elgin,
11 July 1895, E.P., vol. 67.
3 Elgin to Westland, 8 July 1895, ibid.
4 The idea of forming a committee of experts was opposed by 
Westland quite vigorously. He thought that the purpose of 
Committee and Railway Conference was to usurp the financial 
control of the department.
See Westland to Elgin, 25 August; Elgin to Westland 24 and 25 
August; A.C. Trevor to H.B. Smith, 24 August; Bisset to 
Smith, 15 September 1895, E.P., vol. 67*
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the Committee was to organise the working of the railways on a
planned basis - to examine the schemes, select the best According
to the need and implement them as quickly as possible.
The Committee met on 16 September 1896. The first thing Elgin
did was to propose the idea of having an annual railway conference.
1
He got this idea endorsed by his colleagues.
The deliberationsof the jlrst conference were sent to the Secretary 
of State in November 1896. In this despatch the Government policy
towards the railway construction as a whole was recorded. It also
2
underlined their reasons for preferring a particular scheme. As
a first step, the conference had obtained reports from several local
3
Governments regarding their railway requirements. After full
consideration the conference divided the railway construction scheme
4
into four classesi
Class A. Urgent lines - subdivided into (i) immediate,
(ii) early.
Class B. Lines not urgent - sub-divided into (i) ready,
(ii) incomplete.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 2 November 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S. L. No. 7 6, 4 November 1896, P.W. 2109/96, 
vol. 475*
3 See P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 4786, Nos. 339-43, August 1895-
See P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 5001, Nos. 183-241, March 1896.
See P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., vol. 5003, Nos. 211-222, July 1896.
4 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896, Para 7, 
op. cit.
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Class C. Lines set aside - sub-divided into (i) postponed 
for farther consideration, (ii) rejected*
Class D. Lines to be made without state assistance - sub­
divided into (i) Native State Lines, (ii) Lines to 
be undertaken by private enterprise.
The classification was entirely Elgin's idea. nI say I have
done so, for the whole thing was so much of a child of my own that
1
1 found it necessary to rewrite a good deal of the despatch.11 This 
classification was put forth as an original piece just to avoid 
obstruction, confusion and much talk which noramlly occurredin 
conferences.
Paragraph 14 of the Indian Government despatch of November 1896 
was the most important one, as indicating generally the various 
factors the Government had taken into account in formulating its 
scheme. The distribution of railway lines on the basis of provincial 
divisions was deliberately avoided, for it could ensue provincial 
rivalries. It could have been equally impracticable to base it on 
the administrative areas of the railway companies, because the 
railway lines passed from one into the another. Elgin decided to base 
the classification and their distribution on more general terms, 
depending upon the importance of each case and each area.
Secondly, Elgin decided to keep the composition of the 
conference to a small assemblage. Unlike Hamilton, Elgin did not
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 2 November I8 9 6, E.P., vol. 14.
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want the conference to be overcrowded by the representatives
of Local Governments and of large railway companies. He said, WI
should keep the shifting of schemes to a smaller official body11.*
As an established rule 1 May of the year was fixed as the date up to
which recommendations from Local Governments and Administration
2
could be considered.
The railway conference, which became an annual feature was the 
first consultative body of its own type - a precursor to the Railway 
Board and organised planning. For the first time the schemes and 
proposals for railway extension, with adequate explanations attached 
to individual schemes, were presented, discussed and decided upon 
promptly. It was no surprise when Hamilton paid the following tributes 
to Elgin on organising the railway on new and scientific planes. He 
considered Elgin's system of classification as "excellent"• He fully 
shared the reasons giventy Elgin against a classification by provinces, 
Seaboards or Companies, as conclusive. He agreed with the Viceroy 
that any such division could provoke and aggravate rivalry and controversy.^
1 Ibid. The first railway conference was composed of Elgin, J.
Westland, A.C. Trevor (P.W. Member), Col. Bisset (P.W.D. Secy),
Col. Gracey (Dir. Gen. of Rys), J. Finley (Fin. Secy), Col.
I.S.M. Hamilton (off. Quarter Master General), A.R. Besher, (off. 
Accountant General P.W.D) Secy of the Conference was F.B. Herbert.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896, op. cit.
Railway Conference in 1896 dealt with 133 projects, 116 of which 
were recommended by Local Governments. Para 5i ibid.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 4 December 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
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Elgin was equally thrilled that his scheme was accepted. It
was symptomatic of Elgin to acknowledge his achievement modestly -
"so far as 1 am concerned, it is a sort of work that interests me
1
so much that I need no incentive."
The success of a railway policy and planning largely depends
upon sound financial arrangements. Before 1896, there was no fixity
in the ways and means of the railway. Estimates were prepared but
seldom adhered to. On the initiative of Lord Elgin in 1896, the
Government decided up to a definite sum for a planned period of three
years. The purpose of this three year plan was to secure regular
growth and to save the Government the embarrassment normally caused
on account of shifting and changes of schemes. The Secretary of
State accepted the idea and sanctioned Rs 27 crores for a three 
2year programme.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 23 December 1896, ibid.
2 S.S. to Indian Govt. Despatch No. 59 (Fin), 2 April 1896, Para 5i
F.D.I., vol. 16%
The fixing of a "standard" of 27 crore for the next three
years was accepted but debate actually took place between Elgin
and Westland to the meaning of "standard". Westland thought this 
indicated the fixation of limit, beyond which their programme 
was not to be expanded. Elgin argued that it merely meant 
minimum, and therefore the limit could exceed but not be reduced. 
The agreement reached was that in a bad year, the assistance 
would come from the Secretary of State's borrowing in London 
and in a good year when the Government had large funds, it could 
be left to them to expand it even beyond the standard. Elgin 
to Hamilton, 31 March 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
4
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Though 27 crores was fixed as a "standard" for three years,
" the Public Works Department distributed the amount of ten crores 
for first two years and remaining 7 crores for the third. This 
arrangement was quite indicative of the fact that if 10 crores 
were spent one year, the proposal would be made to increase the 7 
crores of 1898-99 or demand would be made to increase the total 
outlay. Westland correctly pressed upon the Viceroy to limit the 
railway expenditure and argued that the railway construction should
1
be undertaken keeping in view the financial prospects of the country.
But the enthusiasm of Elgin could not be subdued. Even before the
year expired he suggested the increase of the outlay from 27 crore
2
to 28 crores "to maintain the progressive rate of growth". In 
addition, the Government demanded a further sum of Rs 1,66,50,000 
which they estimated would be spent by old guaranteed companies 
outside the limit of 28 crores. The Indian Government had read 
the financial despatch of 2 April from the Secretary of State as 
entitling them to treat capital expenditure by the three old guaranteed
1 Westland to Elgin, 25 August 1896, ibid., vol. 69*
Actually Westland had been a constant opposer of the heavy 
outlays of the railways.
See Westland to Elgin, 16 October; and Elgin to Westland 16 
October 1895» ibid., vol.67.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 2 November 1896, ibid. , vol. 14.
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 327 (Fin), 4 November 1896,
F.L.I., vol.
16
railway companies as outside this limit. The totaT, combined
with the expenditure on lines already in progress, made up a grand
total of Es 2 9,6 6,5 0 ,0 0 0 (2 ,6 6,5 0 ,0 0 0 in excess of 27 crores limit)
to be spent in three years from April 1896 to March 1899* With
impending famine, it was by all standards a very ambitious scheme.
The Secretary of State approvingly stated, "The care evidently
bestowed upon the schemes, and the strong personal interest you
were taking in them, counterbalanced the arguments of famine
2
and financial difficulties.M
By the middle of 1896, the famine andplague had attained a 
strong foothold in India but the enthusiasm of Elgin was still high. 
The Indian Government further inquired, whether it was the Secretary 
of State's intention to permit the construction of branch lines under 
the guarantee alternative of their Resolution of 17 April 1896, 
irrespective of the limitation of the 29$ crores programme. The
1 In addition to the imperial expenditure (28 crores), Indian 
Government anticipated that some 2 ,7 6 3 miles of line would be 
constructed or commenced, at a cost of Rs 17,85,40,000, before 
31 March 1899 by the following agencies: (i) The old guaranteed 
companies, (The Great Indian Peninsular Co., The Bombay, Baroda 
and Central Indian Ry.$ the Madras Ry.) (2) Native; States; (3 ) 
Branch line, companies and (4) Assisted companies.
Indian Govt* to S.S. L.Nn. 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896, Para 10-13 * 
op. cit. The details of the railways to be undertaken by Companies 
and Native. States (outside the 28 crores limit) will be found in 
Enclosure No. 3 * the details of the imperial outlay during the 
3 years in Enclosure No. 2, of the Indian Govt. Despatch No. 76 
of 4 November 1896.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 11 December 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
See also S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 1 (Fin), 7 January 
1897, F.D.I., vol. 17.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 72 (Ry), 29 June 1897* Para 1,
R.L.I., vol. 39*
H i
m
majority in the Viceroy’s exeuctive favoured that it did not include 
the allotments for the construction of branch lines in this total 
outlay. In their evidence they referred to the Secretary of State's
railway despatch of 28 January 1897, which completely excluded the
1 2 3branch lines from this limit. But both Vestland and Vaterfield
strongly urged for the inclusion of such branch lines within the
limit of 29j crores. C.S. Colvin in his departmental minute also
sided with Vestland. The Joint Public Vorks and Finance Committee
4
also endorsed the view of Vestland. But Hamilton did not agree with 
the interpretation of his Committee and opined that the paragraphs 
10, 139 14 of the Secretary of State's despatch of 28 January.
1897 "specifically state that these branch lines are outside the 29
* 5 he| crore limit". But/further added that under the"present circumstances",
1 6
it was found necessary to undertake "no new construction".
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Despatch No. 8 (Ity), Para 10, R.D.I., vol. 17.
But in the Financial Despatch No. 39 of 2 April I8 96, Para 3 and
No. 1 of 7 January 18971 Para 9* itwas clearly stated that
railways whose capital was raised under a direct guarantee 
were included within the limit.
2 Views of Vestland were given in Para 4 of the Indian Govt.
L. No. 72 (Ry), 29 June 1897, R.L.I., vol. 39.
3 H. Vaterfield's Note, 26 July 1897, P.W. 1330/97, vol. 489.
4 Joint Minute of P.V. and Fin. Committee, 2 September 1897, ibid.
3 Hamilton's Minute, 20 September 1897, ibid.
6 S.S. to Indian Govt. Despatch, No. 106 (Ry), 4 November 1897;
Para 2, R.D.l., vol. 17.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 16 October 1897, ^ ""appendixj^,
E.P., vol. 15.
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Furthermore, during July 1897 the Governmentwas obliged to
consider their position regarding ways and means because of the
appearance of famine, plague and military operations in the North
Vest Frontiers. These demands came upon the Government at a
most trying time of the year, so far as the supply of the fund was
concerned, for under ordinary circumstances Government cash
balances including even loans, receipts, ran down throughout the
five months July to November. In view of this, the Government was
obliged to ask the Secretary of State to greatly reduce his drawings,
and as the military operation became more extensive, he not only
had stopped altogether but remitted back to the Government a crore
1
of rupees out of the amount that he had already drawn. Besides,
the criticism was mounting from Vestland and the members of the
2
Legislative Council to curtail the railway expenditure. Elgin and
1 Financial Statement, 1898-99* Para 37. See also Para 59*
2 Vestland was the most ardent critic of railway expenditure.
It was he who relentlessly took pains to see that the expenditure 
was curtailed. As a matter of fact he had never accepted Elgin's 
railway policy. wYour Lordship is awaren, he wrote, ttthat I have 
never accepted the Railway Policy, except in the sense that 
having done my best to state the financial side of the question,
I accepted the orders which the Secretary of State passed on the 
subject.w. Vestland to Elgin, 1 November 1897*
For detail, see Vestland to Vaterfield, 22 June 1897* Enc. Vestland 
to Elgin, 26 June 1897 ^ ""appendixE.P., vol. 70.
Vestland to Elgin, 13 October and 1 November 1897* ibid., vol. 71- 
Members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, Syani, Balwant Rai 
Bhuskute and Griffith Evans asked the Government to temporarily 
suspend expenditure on the railways. Proc. of the Council of the 
Governor-General in India , 1897* vol. xxxvi, pp. 193* 208, 224.
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the Public Works Department reluctantly agreed to reduce the railway 
expenditure in 1897 by 1 crore of rupees. It was a disappointment 
for Elgin that he could not succeed to expend a larger outlay for 
railways.
Out of the controversy one important development took place.
Originally the railway programme was intended to include the state
railway and construction by companies, out of the funds raised by
them or advanced by the companies, but now the 29§ crore also included
construction by branch line companies and old guaranteed companies.
The whole question of financing railway was henceforward looked on
as one of ways and means, and all expenditure, for which Government
had financial responsibility, was included in the programme. Though
the companies were permitted to continue sterling borrowings on their
own account, ; they ceased to have the same freedom as before,
and their claims to a place on the programme competed on equal terms
2
with those of other lines.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 29 June ^ ""appendix^, ^3 September and 
21 October 1897? E.P.,vol. 15«
2 On the insistence of Elgin, the Secretary of State had laid down 
that all money obtained in India for other than branch lines 
should be raised as a general rule by the Indian Government and 
expended on the state lines or lent to the companies.The Govern­
ment was to raise as much money in rupees in India as they could 
profitably raise and the balance was to be raised in sterling. 
For detail see Elgin to Fowler, 16 October 1894, E.P., vol. 12. 
Elgin to Hamilton, 9 December 1895? ibid., vol. 13*
Hamilton to Elgin, 31 March 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
Brackenbury to Elgin, undated, ibid., vol. 67*
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It may not be wrong to say that the railway forecast for
three years was planned by the administration of Elgin on excessive
scale. But in the process of formulation they were now sure that
with the rising exchange, and . e n d ' of the Chitral disis, the
financial position of India would improve and this could be best
utilized for productive purposes. They could never realise that
the improvement of exchange would increase the drawings of the
Secretary of State and deplenish the cash balances in turn, from
which, in past years, such large railway advances had been made.
Nor could they visualise that 1896-7 would witness famine, plague and
Tribal risings. In the occurrence of these events, the administration
had to yield and curtail railway expenditure. Many lines sanctioned
by the administration, like Muthra-Nagda railway (354 miles long)
were postponed. The forecast of the next three years, 1899-1902
1
was also limited to 20.3 crores.
On one hand Elgin instituted the idea of a consultative body 
to regulate the railway expansion according to the planned programme, 
on the other, he also set out to reorganise the Public Works (Railway 
Branch) department. Both Fowler and Elgin thought that the railway 
department was not working well. There were incalculable delays.
Files did not move. Sir Charles Pritchard had lost the confidence of
1 See Elgin to Hamilton, 13 September 1898, vol. 16.
Hamilton to Elgin, 24 August 1898, ibid.
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the department. There was acute rivalry between O'Callaghan,
1
the Public Works Secretary and the Member-in-Charge. As a part
of the preliminary reorganisation, Elgin took Pritchard into
confidence and appointed Col. Bisset as Public Works Secretary at
the retirement of 0'Callaghan and also appointed a Director General
and a Consulting Engineer for railways, at first stage for one year
2
pending final changes.
The need for the reorganisation of the department was essentially 
felt by 1896 when the railway programme was classified. The 
Secretary of State and his Council wanted decentralization to be 
introduced so that private enterprise could be speedily utilized.
In that context it was considered to have a separate office of Director 
General of Railways outside the Secretariat and bring a person from
1 Pritchard had at one stage framed a charge sheet against
0 'Callaghan. Elgin had to intervene becauseof 0 'Callaghan's 
impending retirement and the fear of publicity it could fetch. 
Ultimately Pritchard agreed to bum papers about the case.
For detail see Brackenbury to Elgin, 19 October; Pritchard to 
Elgin, 8 October 1894; Elgin to Pritchard, 15 October, Elgin 
to Brackenbury, 18 October; Elgin to Pritchard, 19 October 1894, 
E.P., vol. 65*
2 Elgin to Fowler, 29 May and 3 July 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
See also Fowler to Elgin, 27 July 1894, ibid.
Hamilton to Elgin, 19 September 1895 and 31 January 1896, 
ibid., vols. 13 and 14.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 31 (Ry)» 14 October 1896, P.W. 
1942/96, vol. 38.
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 6 (Ry), 17 March 18971 
R.L.I., vol. 39*
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England, like the English General Manager of the railways.* But
both A.C. Trevor (Public Works Member), and Elgin shoved less enthusiasm.
Elgin wrote: WI doubt very much any man accustomed to the independence
and authority of a General Manager of a railway company in England
ever consenting to such a position. The Secretary of the Department he
might tolerate as it is possible, though not pleasant to tolerate
a thorn in the flesh; but the civilian member, with little or no
technical knowledge, but insisting, in accordance with tradition,
that his orders are the orders of the Government of India till over-
ruled by Viceroy or Council, would I am sure fatally interfere with 
2
his usefulness.M For the same reasons he was not enthusiastic
the
about the Railway Board. He felt that to hav^Railway Board without
3
nfUll financial independence** was incompatible with the whole structure.
Actually Elgin was not against any progressive suggestion. But 
he believed that until and unless the whole structure of railway was 
modified the scheme like that of a Railway Manager and the establishment
1 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch Nos. 47 and 54 (P.W.), 19 November 
1896 and 27 May 18971 Public Works Despatched to India, V0I4. 13'
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 August 18971 E.P., vol. 15*
See also Elgin to Trevor, 13 February 1897; Trevor to Elgin,
7 July and Elgin to Trevor, 12 July 18971 ibid., vols. 70 and 71*
3 The establishment of Railway Board in 1905 did not mean that
the entire control of railways came under it. The Board remained 
under the Member-in-charge. Its main duties included the 
preparation of the annual programme of railway expenditure, the 
control of the state lines, the supervision of company lines 
and many cognate duties. See Res. No. 256G of 18 February 1905 
and Note by Sir F.R. Upcott, Chairman of the Railway Board, app.
No. 18. Mackay Committee Report, pp. 359-61, op. cit.
of a Railway Board would be like dog in the manger. When on
his arrival in 1894, Lord Reay, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for India,wrote that the opinion in India Office was of
sending a person from England who had experience of railway 
1
management; Elgin pronounced his judgement in a very judicious
way: HAny one who has had to do with Railways at home, as I have
had, knows that in projects for new lines the General Manager, meet
face to face with the promoters and thebargain is struck. I am
aware that such a course out here might be inconsistent with your
financial control, unless limited in some way; but I am confident
that such an experienced Railway Manager would be fish out of water
2unless he had some freedom of action in making bargains. ** In 
this context Elgin predicted the criticism of the Mackay Committee 
that the friction between the Government of India (member-in-charge)
and the Railway Board was because the latter had no financial control
3
which it should be vested with. It goes to his credit that Elgin 
diagnosed the disease 10 years in advance.
In the same context Elgin had made another very careful 
suggestion. He stated that the Member-in-Charge of the Railway should 
not be a trained official, wbut one of shrewd practical men ... devoted
1 Lord Reay to Elgin, 20 April 1894, E.P., vol. 29*
2 Elgin to Fowler, 29 May 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
3 Mackay Coiranittee Rep. 1908, p. 25, op. cit.
m
themselves for years to railway working, combining it perhaps
1
with a seat in Parliament.” The importance of this lay in the
fact that nearly 25 years after, the Acworth Committee had this
to say about the Member-in-Charge: ”If a man could be found to
combine the qualifications of a capable administrator, parliamentarian
2
and railway expert, he would be an ideal selection for the post.”
Elgin was, therefore, fully conscious in matters of railway organisation
and administration, and his lack of enthusiasm for Railway Manager
and Railway Board was not due to any aversion to it, but because it
did not fit in the existing machinery; yet in more than one way
his reforms were forerunners of further advances in Railway department.
Before the reorganisation was instituted by Lord Elgin's
administration, the Public Works Department consisted of a Secretary
who was both responsible for Railway and Works Department; the
Director General of Railway who was responsible head of the railway
administration and, as a Deputy Secretary, exercised general
control over both companies and state lines; and Consulting Engineer
3
who was an adviser without executive responsibilities.
4The Government suggested the following recommendations:
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 August 1897* E.P., vol. 15*
2 Acworth Committee Report, 1921, p. 25, op. cit.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., 11 August 1897* L.No. 219 (Fin and Com),
P.W.D. (Gen) Proc., vol. 3224, No. 88, August 1897.
4 Ibid., Paras 10-16.
(i) Public Works Department to be separated into two branches - 
the Railway branch to be under the Secretary to the Government of 
India in the Railway department and the works branch, including
all accounts, organisation establishment cases, other than those 
relating to railways, under a Joint Secretary.
(ii) The office of the Director General to be abolished and 
merged into that of the Secretary to the Government in the Railway 
department.
(iii) Similarly, the office of the Consulting Engineer was 
also disposed of and his duties were to be combined with those of 
Chief Engineer and Deputy Secrety in the Railway department with 
the title of Director railway construction and Deputy Secretary, 
Railways.
(iv) The Government recommended the establishment of the 
Second Deputy Secretary under the title of the Director of Traffic, 
an officer especially selected for his qualifications as a traffic 
expert.
There were three reasons for disposing of the establishments 
of Director General and Consulting Engineer. The first was to 
economise and avoid duplication of work. Second, that three top 
officers of the railways, the Secretary, the Director General and the 
Consulting Engineer were all selected from the same cadre. They 
had probably been rivals throughout their career, and had succeeded 
each other in the several steps. If any one of them was placed in
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the position of independence outside the department or Secretariat,
1it could lead to bitter jealousies. Thirdly, the Indian Government
intended to relieve, especially the Director General,of the functions
and responsibilities attached to his position as administrative head
of the state railways and to devolve them upon the Managers and
2
Engineer-in-Chief of the several lines. ”1 think it is an accepted 
policy of the Government of India that we should as far as we can 
see our way from time to time entrust the management and working of 
the larger system to the Companies.M He further stressed: wIf 
we were to re-establish an independent Director General of Railways, 
we shall have an official with a staff who would naturally oppose 
any curtailment of their sphere of influence, and whom it would be
4
difficult to adjust to any reductions we thought fit to introduce”.
These proposals with elucidated reasons were accepted by the 
Secretary of State. He wrote: ”They ^ ""proposalbJ  make a decided 
advance in the direction of decentralization, inasmuch as they enable 
at once to devolve on the managers of lines executive functions and 
responsibilities now centred in the Director of Railway and in the 
future to adopt further measures of decentralization.^
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 August 1897» E.P., vol. 15*
2 Indian Govt, to S.S. L.No. 219 (Fin and Com), 11 August 1897*
Paras 14-15i op. cit.
3 Elgin to Trevor, 12 July 1897* E.P., vol. 71-
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 August 1897» op. cit.
5 S.S. to Ind. Govt. Desp. No. 29 (P.W.) 14 October 1897* Par 16.
P.W. 1627/97 vol. 492. See also Govt, of India Res. No. 3386 G,
23 December 1897* Encl. with Ind. Govt, to S.S., L.No. 1 (P.W.)
20 January l898f P.W. 249/98, vol. 509*
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The significance of the new establishment was twofold:
First, it was yet another step to encourage private enterprise; and 
secondly, it outlined the future composition of the Railway Board, 
which consisted of three members (including the chairman), one 
administrative expert, one technical expert and one companies 
r epr es ent at i ve .
After laying down the essentials of railway policy for rapid 
expansion, Elgin devoted his energy to put theory into practice.
As it is not possible to deal with each and every case of railway 
construction, it may, therefore, be convenient to confine the study 
to a few important projects - dealing broadly with various parts 
of the country* 1
One of the first important lines to be constructed was Vazirabad-
Lyallpur-Khanewal branch of the North Western State Railway* This
scheme was carried out in two stages* First, in October 1894, a
line from Wazirabad to Lyallpur, traversing a total distance of 96
2
miles was started at the estimated cost of Rs 33i603 per mile*
1 The administration of Elgin sanctioned following miles of railway 
to be constructed through the state and private companies on both 
broad and metre gauge railways.
(a) In 1894-5i 651 miles. Administrative Report of the Railway in 
India. Pari. Papers, 18951 vol. lxxiii, ^ ~ C * 7 8 4 P a r a  5 , p. 16.
(b) 1895“6» 2394 miles. A.R.R.I., Pari. Papers, 1896, vol. lxii,^^. 
8l36_7> Para 6 , p. 15.
(c) 1896-7, 1054 miles, A.R.R.I., Pari. Papers, 1897» vol. lxv,
JTC.85l8y, Para 3 , p. 2.
After 18971 very few miles of railways were sanctioned because 
of the famine and plague.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 65 (Ry)y 10 October 1894, Paras 4-7* 
R.L.I., vol. 36. See also Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 3 October 1894, 
E.P., vol. 17. S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 63 (Ry) 1 6
December 1894, R.D.I., vol. 14.
Second part of line was started in 1896, further extending it
from Lyallpur to Khanewal, a distance of 84 miles.* The construction
of the line was significant, for, this line tapped the fertile
2Chenab colony in Rachna Doab and connected the colony with Karachi 
port via Multan. Combined with the canal, this railway revolutionised 
the condition, the former enabling production of wheat on a vast 
scale and the latterjiacing it on the market. The rail not only 
facilitated the cheap movement of surplus food but enormously 
relieved the pressure of population in the congested districts of 
the Punjab. This vast area was until 1892 sparsely populated, and in 
the census of 1891 it numbered 70,000. In 1901, the census showed that
1 Indian Govt, to S.S. L.No. 76 (Ry) 4 November 1896, Enc. No. 1 
Statement No. 1, p. 471 E.P., vol. 135 (**)•
See also, Para 14 of the Despatch.
Govt, of Punjab to Indian Govt. 6 May 1896, Para 3-4, P.W.D. (R.C.) 
Proc., vol. 5003, No. 214, July 1894.
See also Elgin to Fitzpatrick, 15 March 1896,E.P., vol. 68.
See also Fitzpatrick to Elgin, 21 March 1896, ibid.
2 The area lying between the Chenab and the Ravi and irrigated 
by the lower Chenab canal wascalled Chenab colony. This was 
once a waste and desolate area, unpeopled except for a race of 
pastoral nomads known as 'Janglis'. This wasteland was called 
'Sandal Bar* which was situated in the districts of Jhang, Lyallpur, 
portion of districts Montegomery and Lahore and Tehsil, Khanghah 
Dogron and Hafizabad of district Gujranwala. It was in 1889 that 
perennial canal of the first magnitude was opened. The headworks of 
the canal are at Khanki, a village near Gujranwala ^ f"now in West 
Pakistan^. The total area watered by the canal at the end of 
1903-4 was 5»255 sq. miles. This area became so fertile that
it soon  ^earned the reputation of being the granary of the 
Punjab.
For details see Imperial Gazetteer, Provincial Series, Calcutta 
1908, Punjab, vol. I, pp. 208-210, and vol. II, pp. 211-221.
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immigrants numbered 539,493*
Another line started in early 1895 and completed by November
1897 was Delhi-Samasata Railway or South Punjab Railway. This
line was the branch of the North West Railway and was financed by
the private capital raised on the terms of the branch line Resolution
of 1895. The line passed through Rohtak, Jindh, Tohana, Bhitanda
2
and reached Samasata, a distance of 400 miles. This provided the 
shortest route from Delhi to Karachi and was of immense commercial 
advantage. Also, the line gave an alternative route to the Punjab 
and therefore, militarily and politically was equally advantageous.
Yet another line to be constructed as a part of the North 
Western State Railway was Rohri-Kotri, covering a distance of 206 
miles, with a bridge over the Indus at Kotri. This line was 
primarily made to safeguard communications between Karachi and Quetta, 
because the existing line used to get inundated during the monsoon.
All these lines^ had one thing in common. They added great 
importance to the port of Karachi and in each case they were the
1 Imperial Gazetteer, Provincial Series, Punjab. Vol. 11, p. 221.
Most of the immigrants came from the following districts: (a)
Sailkot (103,000), Amritsar (68,000), Jullundhar (57,000),
Gurdaspur (44,000), Hoshiarpur (35,000), Lahore, (29,000), Gujrat 
(25,000), Ludhiana (18,000), Shahpur (16,000) and Ferozepur (15,000).
2 A.R.R.I., 1895-6, Pari. Papers, 1896, vol. lxii, / “C.8136J7,
Pflrfl 5 9 P*
A.R.R.I., 1897-8, Pari. Papers, 1898, vol. lxiv, ^C.8921 
Para 7, P* 5*
3 See the Map.
shortest routes. For instance ,Wazirabad-Kehanewal provided the 
direct and shortest route from Karachi to Jammu. Similarly Delhi- 
Samasata route provided not only the shortest route to Karachi but 
formed the shortest rail route from Calcutta to Karachi. Rohri- 
Kotri line, which was primarily constructed for military reasons 
also provided an alternative route to Karachi from Rohri to cope 
with large traffic.
One of the most important questions regarding the railway 
expansion related to the "linking up case11. The linking up case 
meant the joining up of the metre gauge lines in Northern, Central 
and Western India. There were four different and disconnected 
systems of metre gauge lines which had drawn closer over the years 
due to the railway expansion but were separated from each other by 
few miles only. The four systems were:
(i) Northern System (comprising Bengal and North Western 
Railway and Tirhot Railway, North-Bengal and Assam-Bihar 
Railway) which had a total length of 1173 miles.
(ii) Rohialkhund-Kumaon Railway and Lucknow and Barielly 
Railway with a total mileage of 275 miles.
(iii) Raj put ana-Mai wa Railway which had a total length of 1900 
miles.
(iv) The Kathiwar Railway or Southernmost system was 333 miles 
long.
The first was 40 miles away from the second and the second 
was separated by 45 miles from the third and the third was within
40 miles of the fourth. These gaps were crossed by sections of 
two railways on another gauge. A section of the Oudh and
<v
H[ohilkhund broad gauge Railway, not more than 85 miles in length
separated the first three mentioned metre gauge systems.
The South West end of Rajputana-Malwa system of the Kathiwar Railway
was separated from it by 39 miles of broad gauge line belonging
to Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway. This several thousand
miles of railway on one gauge constituted four separate lines
which were kept apart by a distance of about 120 miles of railway
on another gauge.*
In June 1892, Lord Cross realised the immense value of the
link and he intimated the Indian Government to take the necessary
steps. There were two reasons which had impelled Lord Cross:
one, that an unbroken link would be advantageous to the internal
trade, for it could facilitate the conveyance and distribution of
salt from Rajputana without break and would promote at the same time
the export of the horthem produce in exchange. Secondly, the
unbroken line of communication across India was very desirable "upon
military and political grounds". The purport of the proposal,in
short, was to connect all the metre gauge railways from North East
2Bengal across India to the Western sea coast.
1 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 6l (Ry), 23 June I8 9 2, paras 
2-3, Ehc. Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 10, 15 February 1893, P-W.D. 
(R.C.) Proc., No. 482 of 1892, P.W. 392/93, vol. 375*
2 Ibid., Paras 5-10.
See also for the past history of the case, Indian Govt, to S.S.,
L. No. 34 (Ify), 5 June 1894, Paras 1-16, R.L.I., vol. 36.
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Unfortunately till the middle of 1894, the Government could 
not agree to the avenue of alignment for the linking up of the 
Northern system. There were two opposite views taken by the 
experts on the railways. Pritchard and Westland proposed that the 
linking up should take place via Bareilly and Soron, because this
link could be favourable to the development of Oudh and Rohilkhand
1 +■State Railway. As Oudh and Rohilkhand ran from Lucknow to Barielly,
therefore, any link on that line would naturally increase its
2
traffic and enhance its importance. The other, led by 0’Callaghan,
3 4Crosthwaite, Elgin and supported by trading interest wanted the
5
link via Cawnpore-Lucknow. This could obviously be beneficial
to the Bengal and North-Western Railway. This had resulted in
deadlock. To expediate the matter, Elgin appointed a committee of 
£
experts. Ultimately the Government put forward that the linking up
1 Pritchard to Elgin, 21 March, 1 May and 24 May 1894, E.P., vol. 14. 
Westland’s Minute, Paras 1-6 and Para 11, Enc. Indian Govt, to 
S.S., L.No. 34 (Ry), 5 June 1894, P.W. 1286/94, vol. 415-
See also Elgin to Fowler, 17 April and 15 May 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 0 ’Callaghan to Smith, 13 May 1894, ibid., vol. 64.
3 Crosthwaite to Elgin, 24 April 1894, ibid.
4 Elgin to Fowler, 24 April 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
See also Fowler to Elgin, 11 May 1894, ibid.
5 Letter from Upper India Chamber of Commerce, 12 April 1894,
Enc. Crosthwaite to Elgin, 24 April 1894, op. cit.
of
6 Committee of experts consisted/Callaghan (P.W. Secy), Col.
Bisset (Dir. Gen.), and Col. Gracey (Consulting Engineer).
Report of the Committee, 24 April 1894, P.W. 1093/94, attached 
to P.W. 1286/94, vol. 415-
m
should be effected by
(i) a separate metre gauge track between Cawnpore and Lucknow
(running along the broad gauge track) constructed by the
1
state as a part of Oudh and Rohilkhand State Railway.
(ii) The section from Lucknow to Bahramghat was also to be
constructed as an integral part of the Oudh and Rohilkhand 
Railway.
(iii) The bridge over Gogra and the approaches to the bridge
the
up to Bahraaughat were to be constructed bj/Bengal and
North-Western Railway.
(iv) As a compromise proposal, the Government also recommended
the construction by the state of a new metre gauge line
connecting Bareilly with Soron, so as to join the metre
gauge systems administered by Rohilkhand-Kumaon Railway
2Company with Cawnpore-Achnera Railway.
The Secretary of State accepted the first three recommendations
but not the last. In so doing, he considered that the double links
one at Soron and ahother' at Cawnpore were wunnecessarily expensive1*,
3
particularly when the purpose could be served with one only. In
1 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 34 (Ry) , 5 June 1894, Para 17, 
op. cit.
2 Ibid, Para 21.
3 S.S. to Indian Govt., Desp. No. 77 (Py), 25 October 1894,
Paras 8-9, R.D.I., vol. 14.
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November 1894 work was started on Cawnpore-Gogra metre gauge link*
This link was no doubt important from trade point of view, but the
maximum advantage went to the Bengal and North Western line at the
cost of the state line. In doing this, the Government had an ulterior
motive* They wanted the Bengal and North Western Company to construct
metre gauge railways south of Gogra from Bhatni (east of Gorakhpur)
to Azimgarh and Benares with branch to Ballia, in all about 210
1
miles* Principle object of these lines was political. Actually
in 1893» when Hindu-Muslim riots took place, the Government had a
lot of difficulty in sending troops. To avoid any risk of the
occurrence again and to take quick and decisive action, the Government
wanted to have an unbroken link in and around the area. Secondly,
the construction would protect the eastern districts of Gogra-Ganges
Doab from famine and facilitate the interchange of produce between
sub-Himalayan districts of the Gogra and Rajputana, Patna, Gazipur 
2
and Benares* As the Government resources were absorbedto the 
maximum (3i crore limit) and construction was considered essential;
1 Report of the Committee of experts, Paras 25-26, op* cit.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S*, L.No* 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896, Encl. 
No. 1, Statement No. 1, p. 2 5, E.P*, vol. 135(&)•
Actually during the famine of 1896-971 the Ganga^Gogra 
Doab lines were utilized for laying the earthworks as part 
of the famine relief.
the Government recommended to utilize the private agency.
However, at that stage the Public Works Committee declined to
sanction the construction of metre gauge lines in Ganges-Gogra and
recommended instead the East Indian Railway Company to construct the
2
broad gauge line in district in question. Though C.S. Colvin,
3
Godley and Fowler were all inclined favourably towards the Indian 
Government, but on account of the strong opposition from J. Strachey
t
4
and R. Hardie could not succeed in getting the proposals through.
For the time being the decision of the Secretary of State was reserved 
There was, however, a sufficient room for the company and the 
Indian Government to exert their pressure. The Indian Government
1 The recognised policy of the Government was to construct broad 
gauge lines in Ganges-Gogra Doab. See Note prepared by H. Walpole, 
18 July 1894 'a few facts about linking up*. Clause (h) and (i), 
which referred to the number of previous correspondence to that 
fact. P.W. 1286/94, vol. 415. The Indian Govt, considered the 
importance of the line so much that they were prepared to waive 
this condition. Besides, the metra gauge was cheaper and could 
serve the purpose. See also the Report of the Committee of 
Experts, Para 12, op. cit.
2 Minute by P.W. Committee, 30 August 1894, P.W. 1383/94 attached 
to P.W./2005/94, vol. 426.
See also a separate minute by R. Hardie, 27 October 1894, ibid.
3 C.S. Colvin's Confidential Note, 4 September 1894, Godley's Note 
of 18 August 1894, Fowler's Note of 17 August, P.W. 1319 
attached to P.W. 2005/94, vol. 426.
See also A.C. Lyall's Note, 8 October 1894, P.W. 1383/94, attached 
to P.W. 2005/94, vol. 426.
For detail see Railway Minute (Dept), 10 August 1894, P.W. 1319/94, 
attached to P.W. 2005/94, vol. 426.
4 J. Strachey, Minute, 22 November 1894, ibid.
5 Telegram, S.S. to Indian Govt., 17 December 1894, P.W. 2005/94, vol 
426.
See also S.S. to Indian Govt., Desp. No. 98 (Ry), 20 December 
1894, Para 2, R.D.I., vol. 14.
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again addressed the Secretary of State on the issue and pressed
for the acceptance of the Bengal and North-Western Railway Company’s
1
proposal, which they said was most favourable to the Government*
Under their own proposal, the company was to raise their own money,
thereby avoiding pressure, on the Government finances. Besides,
the company in submitting the proposals had added another project
for carrying out extension of the Tiirhoot system with a line from
2
Hajipur to Katihar (in all 162 miles) with a bridge over Kosi.
3 4A.C. Lyall once again supported. Hardie again dissented. Hamilton
accepted the Indian Governments plea and Joint Public Works and
1 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 80 (Ry), 16 October 1895; Ehc. No. 3? 
Memorandum by Mr. Izat, Agent and Chief Engineer, Bengal and 
North-Western Railway, 5 July 1895? P-W. 1938/95? vol. 448.
Govt, had also received a proposal from the Indian Railway 
Syndicate who applied to build the lines in question on the broad 
gauge,but their scheme did not include, like that of Bengal and 
North Western Railway Co., a branch to Ballia nor a bridge over 
Gogra. See Enc. No. 1 to the above despatch. Indian Railway 
Syndicate to Indian Govt., 13 June 1894.
2 The company agreed that capital spent on Tirhoot extensions 
was to be treated as capital of that railway and that spent on 
the Doab lines as capital of the company, for the purpose of
the division of the residue of the net earnings. The two amounts 
were to be equal, viz. Tirhoot capital Rs 1,24,75?000 and the 
company’s capital Rs 1,25,50,000. The company were prepared 
themselves to raise the whole amount by either sterling or rupee 
debentures. Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 80 (Ry), 16 October 
1895? Paras 6-7, P.W. 1938/95? vol. 448.
3 A.C. Lyall’s Note, 20 December 1895, P-W. 1938/95? vol. 448.
4 R. Hardie's Note, 14 December 1895? ibid.
f.
T?
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Finance Committee approved on 20 December, and the Secretary of
State finally informed the Bengal and North Western Railway to go
ahead with the construction. * At last the Company gained the
2
significant contract to construct 373 miles of Railways.
There were three important outcomes of the alignment. First, 
a continuous link was established from North to Central India and 
from it to Western India, which was of immense political, economic 
and commercial value. Second, it indicated the enthusiasm of the 
administration for the utilization and encouragement to the private 
enterprise. A way was found to expend beyond the Government borrowing 
by giving concession to private enterprise in the form of the selection 
of avenue of alignment, so that more construction could take place. 
Third, the substitution of metre gauge line for the broad gauge 
in.the area otherwise earmarked for broad gauge was a realistic and 
a purposeful step towards cheaper railway construction.
It was the branch line construction which had received the 
most notable attention from Elgin's administration. For the rapid 
construction of the feeders, the administration had not only amended 
the Resolution of 1893 but also introduced a new Resolution of 1898.
1 Walpole (Under Secy of State) to Secy. Bengal and North Western 
Ry, 23 December 18951 ibid.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 26 December 18951 E.P., vol. 13.
2 A.R.R.I., 1895-6, Pari. Papers 1896, vol. lxii, ^"~C.8l36_7>
Para 5* P- 14. The division of the line was as follows:
(a) The construction in the Ganges-Gogra Doab (211 miles) was to be 
undertaken by Bengal and North Western Railway (Company section)
(b) And the Tirhoot extension was to be the part of Tirhoot State 
Railway (162 mile). See S.S. to Indian Govt., Desp. No. 71 (Ry),
27 August 1896, R.D.I., vol. 16.
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The purpose of the feeder line construction was twofold: to
create traffic of both men and goods and open up the interior
for the development of the local produce. The construction of
these lines proved as useftil in enriching the areas as to protect
them from scarcity. Unfortunately as rapid a construction as
possibly the administration wanted did not take place due to
diversion of the financial resources for famine, plague and frontier
fighting. Nevertheless many branch lines were constructed under the
terms of the Resolution.
Bengal took lead in the construction of branch lines.1 One
such line was Mymensingh-Jamalpur-Subhankhali (metre gauge) in all
63 miles in length. The line mostly traversed through the Jute
districts of the Northern and Eastern Bengal, the entrepots of
2
the valuable and extensive trade. Similarly another branch line,
Sultanpur-Bogra-Kaliganj was opened to the Jute interests from
3
Rungpore district and tea interests from Assam. Another metre 
gauge branch line was opened from Segowli to Ruksaul. At Segowli 
it left the Pertabjunj branch of the Tirhoot State Railway and ran 
up to Nepal frontiers near Ruksaul. It was constructed as much for
1 For the lines recommended by the Bengal Govt, see P.W.D. (R.C.) 
Proc., vol. 5001, Nos. 217-219, 231-232, March 1896.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896, Enc4 No. 1 
Section No. 2, pp. 2-4, E.P., vol. 135(h).
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 61 (Ry), 21 July 1896, P.W.D., 
(R.C.), Proc., vol. 5003, No. 463, July I896.
3 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
See also P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., ibid., Nos. 524, 555-558, July 1896.
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political reasons as to encourage trade between Nepal and India.
At the recommendation of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and
the Bombay Government an important branch line was constructed
2running from Surat-Nandurbar-Amalner-Jalgoan. The line was purely
commercial, for it brought central provinces in direct communication
3
with Gujrat. The importance of the line lay in the fact that
the whole of the capital was locally raised in rupee. It was a
new and satisfactory departure. The event was considered so vital
4
that Elgin himself went to cut the first sod of the line. Another 
branch line for which the capital was successfully raised in India
5
was opened between Ahmedabad-Prantij.
In Central Provinces, a branch line of 2*-6w gauge and 60 miles 
long was constructed between Raipur-Dhanti-Rajjim. This connected 
Raipur with Bengal -Nagpur Railway and passed through rich grain 
producing district of Chattisgarh and provided the shortest route
1 Ibid., p. 16.
See also P.W.D. (R.C.) Proc., ibid., No. 73? July 1896.
2 This line is also called Tapti valley.
The lengths of the line was: Surat-Amalner, 162 miles; Amalner- 
Jalgoan, 3&i miles.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 76 (Ry), 4 November 1896, Ehc. No. 1,
Sect. No. ii, pp. 31-32, op. cit.
4 The Times, 3 December 1896.
5 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 76, 4 November 1896, Para 10, op. cit.
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1
between it and the famine districts of Deccenu A very important 
famine line was constructed in the Central Provinces running from 
Katni to Saugor. This line passed through scarcity areas and 
during the famine the earthworks were laid as a part of the famine 
relief.
In Madras State, Calicut-Cawnpoee branch line was constructed.
It opened the areas all along the western ghat and catered to the
2
tea plantations. At Calicut it joined the main line to Madras.
In short, Jute, tea and cotton areas were the main avenues 
where branch line construction was concentrated. The construction 
of these lines not only gave full scope to the private enterprise 
but also resulted in speedier railway expansion and opening up of 
the new country. Of these, the raising of the capital locally for 
some railway lines was the most outstanding feature.
As a matter of fact the maximum railway expansion in India 
during the period was on larger and broad gauge line. Lord Elgin 
sanctioned nfar more standard gauge lines than any Viceroy did
3
before or since”. The biggest and the most useful commercial lines
constructed were Madras to Bezwada, Cuttack to Midnapur and Sini
4
to Midnapur and Howrah. This completed the Northern end of the East
1 Enc. No. 1, Sect. ii,to Indian Govt, lettercf November 1896, pp. 
35-36, op. cit.
2 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
3 Lovat Frazer, India Under Curzon and After, London, 1911, p. 3^ 9-
4 The length of these lines was well over 600 miles. Bezawada~
Cuttack line was sanctioned by Lord Lansdowne's administration, but 
this portion was completed during Elgin's period.
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Coast Railway and linked on one side Madras, Cuttack and Calcutta 
and at the same time provided an alternative means of approaching 
Calcutta from the West, thereby bringing Bombay-Sini-Calcutta into 
one line. These lines played an immensely important role in 
developing the trade and industrial potentialities of the various 
areas that they touched. The very look at the adjoining map will 
show their importance. Probably the most important achievement
was that Calcutta was linked now directly to Madras, Bombay and 
Karachi, and in many cases provided not only the shortest but altern 
ative routes as well. The dream of Dalhousie was at last fulfilled.
Assam-Bengal Railway (742 miles long) which was primarily 
started for tea plantations saw some more expansion during the 
period. Though the Indian Government was as reluctant to proceed 
further on the horthern section of the line as they were when it was 
sanctioned, yet the Secretary of State persisted in its completion.1
1 The Indian administration under Elgin many times appealed to the 
India Office to curtail at least the Horthern Section, from 
Badarpur to Lumding and further North up to Mukum. Elgin personally 
emphasised to Fowler, tfconsidering the under developed state of 
the country north of the hills, the heavy and unproductive works 
in the hills ... was a scheme that could not pay if constructed 
now, and that no injury would be done to the company by a proposal 
to restrict operation in the meantime to the portion now under 
construction ... ^"Chitagong to Badapur_7M. Elgin to Fowler,
19 May 1894. MSS.Eur. F8^/l2. Elgin lamented once again when 
part of the line was destroyed by the earthquake in 1897. wHow 
many Lakhs or crores it will add to the ever increasing total 
of its cost I cannot guess. If it turns out that that disastrous 
hill section is completely wrecked, I shall be sorely tempted to 
make one more attempt to induce you to allow us to shake ourselves 
clear of this ill omened undertaking.11 Elgin to Hamilton, 7 July 
1897. MSS.Eur. F85/15* All this was without avail and this white 
elephant and relic of bygone days exerted great pressure on
Indian finance.
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Another large line sanctioned and started was the Mandalay-Kunlon
metre gauge line of 270 miles length at an estimated cost of Rs 
1
225 Lakh. It was entirely constructed for political and military
reasons, in spite of the fact that the Government was facing
2
financial difficulties.
It is indeed very difficult to ascertain the nature of the 
railway expansion accurately. Was the expansion motivated by
1 Railway Minute, undated, P.W. 135/96, attached with P.W. 357/96, 
vol. 455*
2 England feared the division of China into sphere of influences 
in which Russia and France had already trenched themselves well. 
Capt. Bower, the intelligence officer of the area, to
whose recommendation this line owed its origin had revealed 
that "although the Chinese Empire is effete and corrupt to 
an almost inconceivable extent, it has its uses to us • •..
We cannot be blind to the fact that two aggressive nations, 
one on the North and one on the South are working in harmony •••" 
He did not think it probable that China would be parcelled 
out among the different powers, but he did think that spheres 
of influence might come to be tacitly recognised. Therefore, 
he recommended that British influence should reach across 
Burmah up to Yunan. Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 155 (Pol),
30 July 1895* Enc~ No. 1, Capt. H. Bower to Assit. Quarter 
Master General, Intelligence Branch (Conf), 22 June 1895,
P.W. 1493/95 attached P.W. 1839/95, vol. 447-
The trading interest of England was equally keen to extend
the trade areas beyond Burmah.
See for details, S.S. to Indian Govt., L.No. 63 (Ry), 2 Encs.
13 July 1893, R.D.I., vol. 13-
Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 6 (Ry), 17 January 1894, R.L.I. 
vol. 16.
P.W. 1493/95, and P.W. 1529/95, attached with P.W. 1839/95, 
vol. 447.
Also Elgin to Hamilton, 30 July 1895, E.P., vol. 13.
Hamilton to Elgin, 23 August 1895, ibid.
m
political-cum-military or commercial-cum-economic reasons or both?
To answer this, it may be stated at the outset that no Imperial
and colonial Government initiated a policy, much less a railway
policy, which did not have political advantages. Therefore, all
railway construction in India was influenced by that consideration.
In some cases railway lines were made exclusively for political and
military reasons, like Mandalay-Kunlon, Rohri-Kotri, and tSfe others
for both political and commercial, which benefited the economy of India,
if not immediately then ultimately, if not directly then indirectly.
It is true that only few lines were made exclusively as famine
lines, like Sagaur-Katri, though many lines were constructed which
brought grain to traces liable to famine in years of draught.
No doubt much expansion in the last decade of the nineteenth
century concentrated on tea plantations, Jute and cotton interests,
but surely they proved great foreign exchange earners for India.
Though so rapid railway expansion was probably beyond the financial
ability of India but railways developed hitherto under developed
1
areas like Assam and Rachna Doab. It is true that railway extension
1 There was a great growth of the immigrant population ever since 
1881. Between 1881-1891* the population increased by more than
11 per cent and another 12 per cent by 1901. Imperial Gazetteer 
of India (Provincial Series) Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1909*
Cal., pp. 43-4. Volume of tea production also increased immensely.
The following figures give some idea.
Product ion Exported
I885-89 (average of 4 years) 910 Lakhs lbs. 870 Lakhs lbs.
1890-94 " n 1250 w 11 1190 n ff
1895-99 w 11 1580 M 11 1540 n "
B. Prasad 'Effects of Improved Transport upon the Distribution of 
Industry and Population, unpublished, London University EL Sc.
Thesis, 1954, p. 133-
mbenefited investors, bankers, iron and coal „ mine owners, but
it positively acted as an important ingredient or adjunct in
the growth and ramification of modem commerce; both internal and
external. There is no doubt that railway investment did not pay
till 1899 and there were annual losses, but it is equally certain
that but for railway expansion the financial position of India
could have been worse. The system of guarantees came back and the
1
guarantee of 3 per cent on sterling borrowing was reasonably 
high but that was the only convenient means for getting rapid 
railway construction in India.
Though the expansion of railway during this period of study 
was to a large extent motivated by political and extra commercial 
reasons, yet Elgin's personal intention was to see greater expansion 
towards more productive avenues, like tea, cotton and coal areas.
He was personally not in favour of the construction of Mandalay- 
Kunlon railway; he discouraged the construction of the Northern section 
of Assam-Bengal railway,and was vehemently against the idea of 
extending railways beyond India's frontiers in the North Vest.
When military pressure was exerted on him to sanction the railway
1 Actually Elgin had proposed 2^ per cent guarantee on money
borrowed in London (El gink Note, 27 July 18951 P*3i op.cit.) but 
thfe Public Works Committee and the Secretary of State were 
unanimous in giving sterling guarantee of 3 Per cent. (Godley 
to Elgin, 9/l0 January 1896)*E*P», vol. 31* See also Hamilton 
to Elgin, 10 January 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
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beyond Khyber, he wrote: riFor my part I must say at once that
I cannot regard a policy of this kind as either desirable or
necessary ... I am not prepared to initiate a procedure which
would mean the immediate locking up of a large sum in unproductive 
1
works . ..." It was largely due to Elgin's insistence that
construction beyond Khyber in the tribal areas did not take place.
Elgin indeed devoted considerable attention to the expansion
of railways in India, and worked feverishly to regulate a railway 
2
policy. A remarkable feature of his railway policy was the 
encouragement given to the branch line construction and utilization 
to some extent of rupee capital in India. This had earned the 
praise of the Acworth Commitee, which recorded: "It has enabled 
^"the Branch line Res. of 1896^7 lines to be built which would
otherwise not have been built and thereby helped considerably to
3
develop the country." An outstanding feature of the railway 
administration was the laying of a planned programme without which it
1 Elgin's Note on the Construction of Railway (Military) in the 
North-Western Frontier, 15 August 1898, Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, 
15 September 1898, H.C., MSS.Eur. D 509/12.
See also Elgin to Gen. G.S. White (C-in-C), 22 November 1898, 
E.P., vol.-71*
2 More than 4000 miles of railways were constructed during Elgin's 
tenure of 5 years. Never before had so much railway been 
constructed in the total span of 5 years.
The year 1899 saw the maximum amount of construction 
miles_J7 of railways and all these lines were sanctioned by 
Elgin's administration. N. Sanyal, Development of Railways in 
India, p. 193*
3 Acworth Committee Report on Railways, 1921, Para 1771 op. cit.
mwas impossible to pursue any policy, however well considered and
accepted either as a method of providing capital or the agency
to be used in construction. The establishment of an annual railway
conference was probably his greatest contribution. Hamilton was
right when he wrote, **there are a few things you have done in y*our
Viceroyalty which will be of greater benefit to India than the
1
establishment of this Conference.1*
Railway construction was a passion with Elgin. He genuinely
felt that it was through this method that the Government could
substantially improve the condition of the vast population of
India. While addressing the Legislative Council in 1896, he expressed
his belief that the great railway system of India could be made **an
all powerful agent in the promotion of the material and social
2
advancement and the political tranquility of the people.** Elgin 
might not have been a Dalhousie, but for his enthusiasm, railway 
expansion till the end of the nineteenth century would have been 
naive.
1 Hamilton to Elgin J September 1898, E.P., vol. 16. Fowler was 
equally happy about Elgin’s Railway policy. Before relinquishing 
the office of the Secretary of State, he paid tribute to Elgin. 
See Fowler to Elgin, 28 June 18951 E.P., vol. 13*
2 Proc. of the Council of the Governor-General in India, 1896, 
vol• xxxv, p. 345.
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Chapter IV 
THE FAMINE W 1896-7 
Indian famines have been a recurring calamity since time 
immemorial. Whenever the seasonal rainfall, which plays a crucial 
role in determining crop yields failed, a large part of India was 
subjected to famine. In earlier times, on account of the lack of 
communications, the failure of food crops actually meant absolute 
want of food. Therefore, the scope for offering relief during the 
earlier periods was very limited. During the Company's rule, very 
little attempts were made to organise measures to meet the challenge 
of famine. Systematic and effectual planning to prevent sufferings 
and mortality incidental to famine belongs to the later period.
In the middle and the later part of the nineteenth century, a 
great change took place in the very nature of the famines in India.
On account of the improved means of transport the famine no longer 
denoted ffan absolute dearth of foodn. It meant a severe and widely 
prevalent distress among the population caused by a failure of crops
1 This is not a study of the general famine policy of the British 
in India. Nor does it deal with the economics of famine and 
the wider aspect of the question of poverty in India. Such an 
attempt is not possible when dealing with a specific period of 
administration. The policies of the Indian Government vis-a-vis 
the study of the economic conditions have been exhaustively made 
in a recent publication: B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India 1860-1945* 
Bombay, 1963•
2 For a synoptical view of famine chronology since 1769-1880, see 
The Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, Pari. Papers, vol. lii, 
i/""C.2591_7t pp. 22-3. See also A. Loveday, The History and Economics 
of Indian Famines, London, 1914, pp. 29-43*
Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1901, p. 1.
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over a large area which at once diminished the local food and deprived 
the great majority of the people of their means of livelihood. It 
was no longer the question of want of food but want of money wherewith 
to buy food.^
The first organised effort of the Government to deal with 
famine was made in i860, when the Government opened a few large 
relief works to provide employment on account of the failure of 
the autumn crop. In 1865i the Government received a rude shock, 
when more than a million people died in Orissa for want of effective 
relief. As a result Sir George Campbell conducted a thorough 
enquiry and inspired the Indian Government to undertake more 
resolute steps in future. The resolve of the Government was soon 
put to the test. In 1873, the autumn rains failed in Bengal and 
Bihar. The Government under Lord Northbrook at once organised extensive 
relief. The determination of the Government to save every life,
2
whatever the cost, f,was for the first time translated into action1*. 
Unfortunately, this famine was followed by another in 1877-8, in 
which the loss of life and cattle was enormous.
In 1880, the Indian Government appointed a Commission to evolve 
a certain system to meet the challenge of the famine in India. The
1 A.P. MacDonnell's remarks, Discussion on the paper presented by 
T.W. Holdemess: 'The Indian Famine of 1899 and the measures 
taken to meet it', Journal of the Society of Arts, 1902, p. 454.
2 B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India, p. 86.
For details see E.C. Moulton, Lord:.Northbrook's Indian Administration, 
1872-76, unpublished, London University Ph.D. Thesis, 1964, 
chapter iv.
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Famine Commission of 1880 recommended a twofold famine policy -
first, relating to the measures to be instituted before and during
the impending famine, and second, suggesting long-term steps to
1
minimise the effects of the future famines* In the former 
category, they recommended the establishment of certain rules or 
codes for the famine relief works* The purpose for the establishment 
of famine codes was explained by the Commissioners in some detail* 
nThe duties involved in relief measures are complicated and multi­
farious, the utilization of large stores of accumulated experience 
and a carefully considered and prepared plan; they cannot be safely 
left to individual energy and resource, or be dealt with on a system 
improvised only when the emergency has arisen •••• We recommend, 
therefore, that the Government of India should, as soon as possible, 
issue a set of rules embodying the main principles that should govern
the administration of famine relief, and that these rules should be
2
authoritative in all parts of British India*n
On the basis of the recommendations, certain rules or codes 
were formulated by each province for the first time in June 1883 •
1 See Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, Para 112.
2 Ibid., Para 113*
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These rules were further revised in August 1893* All provincial
1 . . . .codes emphasised three-fold points. First, the civil officers
were to keep watch on any signs of scarcity and rise in the prices
of food grain in their areas. Secondly, the officials were
required to keep in reserve certain schemes under which the people
in distress could be employed for productive purposes as relief
works. This principle of relief work was actually the most
important feature of all the provincial famine codes. Thirdly,
the ratio between labour and wage was to be so regulated as to
prevent the relief work looking light or unduly attractive, for
this might induce those who were not in distress to seek employment
2in the relief work. The relief labour was classified under various 
classes performing specific work or task depending on the ability
and the capacity of the labourer. They were divided into four
3
classes:
Class A - Professional Labourer.
Class B - Labourers not professional.
Class C - Able bodies, but not labourers.
Class D - Weakly, fit for light employment.
1 See Memorandum on the Provincial Famine Codes, pp. 3“3^ i 
Appendix to Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, vol. ii,
Pari. Papers, 1899, vol. 33, /""C.9258_7-
2 Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, Para 131*
3 See below also, pp.Xltt-n
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On protective and preventive measures, the Famine Commissioners
urged for more rapid extension of railways - to the extent of
20,000 miles. They also recommended the creation of a famine
fund as an insurance against famine.
Fortunately, the period from 1880-95 was ’comparatively*
free from any major agricultural calamity. There were, however,
minor scarcities necessitating relief but none of them was of a
very serious nature. By 1896, over 20,000 miles of railways were
also constructed - a step towards which Elgin's administration
had played no small role.
At the end of 1895» the distress came in the four districts
of Banda, Hamirpur, Jhansi, and Jalaun in Allahabad division in
consequence of deficient south-west monsoon and the failure of the
winter rains of 1895-6. Already due to the prolonged period of
drought since 1892, the stock of the grain in the Province was very
low. In consequence, not more than i of the average yield was 
_ 2
expected in 1896. By the beginning of the year, the prices of the 
food grains rose and the area of the Allahabad division was suddenly 
in the grip of a famine.
Immediately the test works were started. Executive staff was 
strengthened. Relief circles were formed. Sites were selected for
1 Narrative of North-Western Provinces and Oudh Famine, chapter 11 
p.9* Pari. Papers, 1898, vol. 62, ^“C.873S|
2 MacDonnell to Elgin, 18 March 1896, E.P., vol. 6 8.
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the poor houses. The Government forests were opened to the cattle.
In many cases the Government suspended land revenue for the 
autumn instalment in the areas affected. The local Government
1
also advanced loans to the land-owning and cultivating classes.
Though the relief was organised effectively and promptly, the works 
were contracted prematurely in anticipation of monsoons, which 
caused a lot of hardship to the people.
The rains did not come. There was practically no rainfall
during July, a little rainfall in August and by September the hope
for monsoon was disappointed. The month of October closed with
”the entire Indian Continent face to face with the most wide-spread
2
... and the gravest impending famine of the century”. Starting 
from the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, this ”grim spectre” 
stalked aside towards South Punjab, Central Provinces, Central India, 
Bengal and spread over several parts of Bombay, stretching southwards 
on the borders of Madras Presidency. 225 ,000 square miles of tract
3
and more than 62 million people were affected in British India.
1 Narrative of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, pp. 10-11, op. cit. 
See also MacDonnell to Woodbum (Member Viceroy fs Executive 
Council), 4 May 1896, Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, 6 May 1896, H.C., 
MSS.Eur. D 509/2.
2 Holderness Narrative of Famine 1896-71 Para 3 , Revenue and 
Agriculture (Famine) Proc., vol. 5209, No. 23, December 18971 
^Hereafter cited as Famine Proc._/
3 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 339* The famine 
stretched into 504,490 square miles comprising a population of 
96,931iOOO people. Holderness, Narrative of Famine, Para 10, 
op. cit.
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The gradual transformation of a local into an all India
famine was first indicated by the Governments of North-Western
1
Provinces on 30 September 1896, They reported the total damage 
of the Kharif crops, doubted the prospects of rabi crops and 
envisaged the programme to open relief on a large scale. Soon
2
the Government of Bengal reported the failure of vital rice crop. 
Lieutenant-Governor Mackenzie feared Macute distress in the part of
3
Bihar and considerable pressure in many parts of the country11.
4Similar reports poured in from other provinces. Elgin said with 
grief: f,It is not only that this will be a bad season, but that
it follows other bad ones, and the people have nothing to fall back 
upon. Burma, Madras, Bengal, Mysore and Coorg are, I believe, 
looked upon as safe; but if we have distress in all the remaining
provinces, it will be an area terribly larger than anything that
5
is commonly affected at one and the same time.” Taking price index
1 N.W.P. and 0. Govt, to Indian Govt., Indian Famine Proc., vol.
4?82, Nos. 1-2, November 1896.
2 Commissioner Patna Division to Bengal Govt., 8 October 1896,
Enc. Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt., 16 October 1896, ibid.,
No. 15i December 1896.
3 Mackenzie to Elgin, 10 October 1896, E.P., vol. 69*
4 See C.P. Govt, to Indian Govt., 23 October; Bombay Govt, to 
Indian Govt., 5 November; Madras Govt, to Indian Govt.,
16 November; Punjab Govt, to Indian Govt., 23 November 1896,
Pari. Papers, 1897» vol. 64, /f"c. 8302J .
5 Elgin to Hamilton, 14 October 1896, E.P. , vol. 14.
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of the food grains as the barometer of the intensity, Elgin’s 
concern seemed to be justified. The prices of the food grains within
the past three months shot up to 50 to 100 per cent throughout
1
the country. The gravity of the situation was well overboard
when the grain riots took place in Delhi, Agra, Nagpur, Muzaffar
2Nagar, Mhow and Bombay.
The Indian Government undertook some prompt measures. They
immediately appealed to the Secretary of State to stop the drawings
3
of the council bills, to which he agreed. The purpose of this
was to withhold sufficient money in the Indian treasury to meet
the demands of the famine. Secondly, the Central Government restored
the famine insurance grant to its full from rupees 1 crore to in
1896, which had been curtailed in 18^-6 on account of continuous
deficit in the budget. The provincial balances which were partially
4absorbed earlier were also given back to the Provinces. Thirdly, 
an extensive railway programme was started in most affected areas. 
Elgin privately got some railway lines sanctioned from the Secretary 
of State, particularly in the - Azimgarh district of North-Western
1 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 31 October, 1896, ibid., vol. 19*
See below also, p.>n
2 See Telegrams Viceroy to S.S., 3, 6, 15 and 31 October 1896,
E.P., vol. 19.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 30 October 1896, ibid., vol. 16.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 March 1896, ibid.
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Provinces and Oudh and the Saugor-Katni railway in the Central
1
Provinces to provide the relief works. These were the areas
affected very badly in the beginning. By the end of the year 1896,
2
28 large relief works were in operation in the Punjab, 64 in the
North-Western Provinces, 67 in Bengal and 80 in Bombay. On the
relief works in general, the Government was already spending at
3
the rate of rupees one Lakh per day. Fourthly, the Government
reduced the railway freight for food grains to J and in some cases
4up to 60 per cent. The main features of the Government famine 
policy in 1896 were: (a) to discourage any sign causing panic; (b) 
leave the supply of food grains in the hands of the private trade; 
and, (c) leave the execution of famine relief work in the hands 
of Provincial Government*.
In order to avoid panic and undue alarm, the Government 
refrained from making public references to the famine and relief 
works. This silence was misunderstood by the public. The Indian 
press which kept a close watch on the pulse of the people felt agitated 
over the alleged indifferent attitude of the Government. They
1 Elgin to MacDonnell, 10 February 1896, ibid., vol. 68.
Elgin to Lyall (Chief Commissioner, C.P.), 27 June 1896, ibid.
2 Normally a large relief work consisted of 4000 to 5000 workers.
3 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 10 January 1897? E.P., vol. 20.
4 Report of the Famine Commission, I898, Para 389-
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asserted that the famine conditions had been prevalent ever since 
the beginning of the year, yet the Government had not officially 
recognised the famine. They questioned the right of the Government 
to take so nsanguine” a view of so emergent an event. The Indian 
newspapers reflected the miserable conditions of the people who 
were "selling off their movables and cattle to buy rice”. Many
1
starved for two or three days after which they could manage one meal.
2
The Government’s attitude of 11 indifference” was severely assailed.
The newspapers proclaimed the right of the people to know what 
steps the Government contemplated to take in order to save the people
3
from the impending widespread scarcity. They repeatedly reminded
the Government that famine was everywhere. The Bangawasi wrote,
ftSo great is the prevailing scarcity that even mothers have forgot
sic_7 their love for their dear ones. A few days ago three girls
4;were sold to prostitutes by their mothers.11
The wisdom of keeping silence over the famine was even questioned 
by men like Mackenzie, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and
1 Sanjivani, 1 August 1896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
2 Burdwom San3 ivani, 18 August 1896, ibid.
See also Bengalee, 17 October 1896.
3 Sanjivani, 3 October 1896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
4 7 November 1896, ibid. See also Mahratha, 27 September,
Indu Prakash 28 September, Kesari, 29 September, Bomb. N.N.R.,
1896.
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J. Woodbum, the Executive Member-in-charge of the famine. The
Lieutenant Governor warned Elgin that if there was no rain in
November the rabi crop would be damaged beyond repair and that,
,!coming on the top of four bad harvests’1, he said ’’means for Bihar,
and probably for many other places, black famine .... We have not
declared famine or serious distress yet anywhere but the wolf is 
1
at the door.w
The ”indifferent attitude11 of the Govemmtstt towards the famine
was further criticised, when Elgin did not cancel his autumn tour
of the princely states. There was hardly any influential Indian
2newspaper which did not urge the Viceroy to cancel the tour. Elgin
was repeatedly asked to emulate the good example of Northbrook
and stay at Calcutta. Many reminded him of the sympathetic attitude 
3
of Ripon. For not cancelling his tour many newspapers poured 
their emotions in very strong words, The Bangawasi wrote: ,!There is 
no ignoring the prevailing scarcity - no minimising the widespread 
nature of the impending calamity .... It is, therefore, a matter of 
regret that the Viceroy should at present moment be touring about to
1 Mackenzie to Elgin, 2 November 1896, E.P., vol. 69.
2 See Mahratha, 18 October, Kesari, 20 October 1896, Bomb. N.N.R., 
1896.
Capital, 7 October 1896, ibid.
Bengalee, 17 October 1896.
3 Champion, 13 December 1896, Bomb. N.N.R., 1896.
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the disappointment of the distressed people who cannot be
1
reassured by the optimistic utterances made by His Excellency ... n
Another, influential paper, The Hitavadi commented: MThere are
on one side the wails of poor, miserable famine-stricken people,
and on the other the sound of noisy festivities. You hear on one
side a cry of hungry people for food, and on the other the sound
of revelry in stately edifices, on the eve of tiger hunt, the
2
preparation of which are all complete.11
There was some truth in the charges levelled against Elgin 
and his administration. The earlier attitude of the Government 
definitely misled the people. But in fact the Government was quite 
alive to the grave situation. As early as January 1896, when famine con 
ditions were noticed, Elgin showed great concern. He desired that 
he should be regularly informed about the agricultural condition and 
about any possible signs of distress. At one time he pulled up 
the North-Western Provinces Government for not showing proper 
vigilance. He asked Babington Smith, his Private Secretary, to 
write to MacDonnell - ftIt seems that this is not the first time 
that the officers responsible for the preparation of these reports 
have omitted to give notice of distress until it has been brought 
before the Government of India in some other way.11 He insisted that 
the Indian Government must be promptly informed, nso that they are in
1 14 November 1896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
See also Bengalee, 14 November 1896.
Hindustani, 16 December 1896, N.W.P. and 0.N.N.R., 1896.
2 11 November I896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
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a position to deal more rapidly and effectively with any
1
application for sanction to special measures.w In turn the
district officers were asked to give report of the distress immediately.
By June the Indian Government was fully alive to the “strains1* of 
2
famine. In a private letter to Hamilton in September, Elgin,
3
in fact, admitted that the famine conditions had emerged. He
further informed him that the relief machinery was being organised
4
throughout the country. J. Voodbuyn,the Member-in-Charge of famine, 
made a public statement in the Legislative Assembly on the 15 October 
about the agricultural prospects. He affirmed the determination 
of the Government to effectively meet the challenge. Elgin went 
to the extent of pledging any financial help to the local Governments 
(particularly the most affected ones like North Western Provinces and 
Oudh and Central Provinces) for relief works. He believed in the 
need of scrupulous economy in general measures, but for the famine 
he was prepared to spend any amount. A little later he wrote to 
Lyall that for the relief works which on the face related to the
1 H.B. Smith to A.P. MacDonnell, 4 January 1896, E.P., vol. 68.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 2 June 1895» ibid. , vol. 14. See above,
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 16 September 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 30 September 1896, ibid.
5 Proc. of the Council of the Governor General in India, 1896, 
vol. xxxv, pp. 382-5.
See also Woodbum to Elgin, 23, 25 and 27 October 1896,
Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, H.C., MSS.Eur. D 509/iii-
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1
famine, he was prepared to pledge any amount of financial aid.
If Elgin was so ready and prompt about the measures, why did 
he not publicly state it? There was only one reason for it. He 
did not want to cause any undue confusion or alarm in the minds 
of the public, till he was sure about the intensity and seriousness 
of the famine. He firmly believed that the great administrative 
success lay in maintaining high spirits both among the people and 
the officials. This principle guided Elgin in all his decisions 
about the famine. When John Woodburn on 15 October 1896 made a 
statement about the agricultural condition of the year, Elgin added, 
nIf, therefore, the worst comes to worst, I hope we shall have noK
difficulty in bringing every influence to bear in the common cause.
If I may speak from my own feeling in the matter, there is not a man 
who would not strain his utmost to prevent the loss of a single life. 
But just because I feel this strongly, I also feel that at this
1 Elgin to Lyall, 22 January 18971 E.P., vol. 70.
See also C.P. Govt, to Indian Govt., 16 December 1896, India 
Famine Proc. , vol. 5203, No. 43, January 1897*
Telegram Indian Govt, to C.P. Govt. , 25 December, ibid. , No. 44. 
Elgin to MacDonnell, 21 May 1896, E.P., vol. 68.
Elgin to MacDonnell, 29 October 1896, ibid., vol. 69.
In the Legislative Assembly, J. Woodburn publicly stated, ,!They 
^Government of India_7 grudge no expenditure that is necessary 
to meet it.”
Proc. of the Council of the Governor General of India. 1897» 
vol. xxxvi, p.7. In the same sitting Elgin endorsed the remarks 
of the Member in the same tone: ”our means are ample: our
determination to use them is absolute.” p. 10.
As a matter of fact the famine measures continued in the North- 
Western Provinces almost without break since February I896. The 
local Government was rather more active in the months after 
September.
See also MacDonnell to Elgin, 20 October 1896, E.P., vol. 69- 
See also MacDonnell to Woodburn, 23 October 1896, Enc. Elgin to 
Hamilton, 28 October 1896, MSS.Eur. D 509/iii.
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present moment our first duty is to keep cool and not to excite
1
unnecessary fears.*1 A little later he wrote, "the Native papers
show their invincible tendency to exaggerate, and my humble efforts
2
to keep up people’s spirits are not at all to their liking*.11 All 
his endeavours were directed to avoid any cause of panic. It was 
for this very reason that he personally redrafted John Woodburn's 
official statement about the famine which was delivered in the 
Assembly on 7 January 1897- The original statement appeared rather
3
11 gloomy" to Elgin. This action of Elgin was deliberately planned
to keep the morale of the public high. Besides this, he kept the
spirits of his officials alive by constantly lending them his valuable
encouragement. When Lyall’s administration was assailed by the
press and the Secretary of State for want of showing proper
vigilance in matters of famine in the Central Provinces, Elgin sij£|j5y*
4
and publicly supported him.
1 Proc. of the Council of the Governor General in India, 1896, vol. 
xxxv, p. 387»
Commending the speech of the Viceroy, The Times of India wrote, 
"There is at any rate no cause for panic, and those will be 
doing a very ill service ... who seek to exaggerate the 
possibilities of the coming trouble or throw doubt upon the 
ability of the Government to cope with it.11 24 October 1896.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 23 December 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
3 Elgin to Woodburn, 5 January 1897? ibid., vol. 70.
4 See Elgin to Hamilton, 17 February, 31 March 1897? ibid., vol. 15. 
Elgin to Hamilton, 20 January 1898, ibid., vol. 16.
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It partly explains why Elgin did not cancel his autumn
tour of the princely states. Probably his not cancelling the
tour was a tactical mistake. It certainly cast doubt on the intentions
of the Viceroy, though the real utility of the cancellation of
the tour might be doubted, the psychological and political gain
1
from the gesture would have been immense. Another reasonwhich 
perhaps influenced Elgin for not cancelling the tour was that it 
would have been mistaken as an interference in the administration 
of the relief works in the various provinces. He explained this 
point in great details to MacDonnell, MI am sure you do not 
sympathise with the silly notion that I ought to run about the 
country poking my head into all sorts of places, and interfering 
with business that is much better done by others. But on the other 
hand, I hope you all know well that I meant what I said when I
2
promised that if I was ever wanted anywhere I would present myself.ft
Unfortunately, another controversial point in the earlier 
stages of the famine policy emerged on the question of appeal to the
1 When Northbrook cancelled his tour and personally supervised 
the famine in Calcutta, he was well acclaimed by everyone. But 
during this famine neither Elgin nor his senior officials 
attached much value to it. It is very interesting to note 
MacDonnellfs reaction to it. He said, staying of Northbrook 
did no good that he knew came of it. f,The machinery of the state 
went no better, while as wag said, the B(e)arings got heated.11 
MacDonnell to Elgin, 4 March 1897? E.P., vol. 70.
2 Elgin to MacDonnell, 28 February 1897? ibid.
Actually Elgin did visit some famine affected areas in C.P.,
N.W.P. and 0. and Bihar.
2i;
public for charitable relief fund. It had been symbolic of good 
gesture on the part of the public to come to the aid of the miserable 
and the needy in the hour of distress. The English people in 
particular had in the past shown generosity during famines. In 
1877-8, the private charity from England alone amounted to £700,000.
It was but natural that during this year of calamity a timely appeal 
should be made. The question of the establishment of charitable 
fund and making an appeal to England was for the first time raised 
by John Woodburn who wrote to Elgin that na movement of the kind 
would be quite right and proper and would have a good political 
effect both in India and England. I am, therefore, inclined to
1
say that I should, under thew.circumstances, give it my best support. 11
This demand was favoured and urged equally by the Secretary of State
and the press both Indian and Anglo-Indian.
In November the Government considered the question of appeal
2at the repeated requests of George Hamilton. In the same month also, 
India had a substantial rain fall. This made the Government optimistic 
about the prospects of the rabi crops. They thought that the danger
1 Woodburn to Elgin, 23 October 1896, E.P., vol. 69*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 9 and 20 November 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
Also Telegram S.S. to Viceroy (Pr), 16 November 1896, ibid., 
vol. 19. Hamilton wrote to Elgin stressing that the public in 
England was desirous of opening the fund earlier and both Lord 
Mayor of London and the Lancashire cotton and Spinning Association 
were very anxious to launch an appeal for charity to redeem the 
Indian grievance about the cotton duty controversy.
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of a grave famine had receded. The Government thus decided
1
to defer for some time the launching of an appeal for charity.
In the meantime Elgin took counsel from his colleagues and invited
their opinions. A.P. MacDonnell, the Lieutenant Governor of the
North Western Provinces and Oudh, whose knowledge and experience
of Indian famines was widely respected, stated, tfif the decision
has to be taken on North Western Provinces figures alone, then I
think the necessity or expediency of making the appeal is now at 
2
least doubtfUl.n Most of the other local Governments also suggested
3
postponement until Christmas. The executive council was also
unanimous in holding this view. Elgin personally considered that
4
it would be ^pre-mature11 to appeal at this time. But Mackenzie 
in India was the lone official voice who advised that appeal for 
public charity be made immediately. He wrote; 11 It seems to me, 
however, that Government need not run counter to the public conscience 
or throw cold water on offers of subscriptions, especially when these
1 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., (Pr), 24 November, E.P., vol. 19- 
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 25/26 November, ibid., vol. 14.
2 MacDonnell to Elgin, 30 November 1896, Enc. Elgin to Hamilton,
3 December 1896, H.C., MSS.Eur. D 509/iii-
3 Fitzpatrick to Elgin, 5 December 1896.) Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, 
Sandhurst to Elgin, 2 December 1896. ) 23 December 1896, ibid.
Havelock to Elgin, 12 December 1896. )
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 7 December 1896, ibid.
Elgin to Hamilton, 16 December 1896, ibid.
Telegram Viceroy to S.S. (Pr), 12 December 1896, E.P., vol. 19-
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come from outside India.Similar advice poured in from the India
Office. Hamilton again wrote, "Politically I think such subscription
will be beneficial, and tend to soften any feeling which may still
2exist in connection with the cotton tariff.*1 The Times also
counselled likewise and warned the Viceroy against taking **so
3
sanguine a view**. Yet Elgin calculated to defer the appeal and
Hamilton regretfully agreed.
This decision added fuel to the fire. It was taken to mean that
the Indian Government did not recognise the existence of famine.
The Charu Mihir wrote, **he declines to accept England's
aid, simply to avoid the humiliating admission that there is famine 
4
in India." The Indian Spectator and The Voice of India questioned: 
"Are Government determined to show to the world that they can
5
manage a vast national calamity with their own unaided resources?"
1 Mackenzie to Elgin, 8 December 1896, ibid., vol. 69*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 17 December 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
See also Queen Victoria to Elgin, 27 November 1896. Family 
Collection. ^"mSS. vol
See also Godley to Elgin, 20 November 1896, E.P., vol. 32.
3 14 December 1896.
4 22 December I896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
See also Bangavasi, 26 December; Sahachar, 30 December;
Hitavadi, 1 January 189?) ibid., 1897.
Bengalee, 16 January 1897-
5 27 December 1896, Bomb. N.N.R.,1897.
See also Indu Prakash, 28 December; Mahratha, 27 December
1896, ibid.
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Another paper of North India wrote, “Perhaps they will not recognise 
the existence of the famine until one-third of the population was
Indian Press joined hands with the press in criticising the
Government. The Times of India commented: risuch a step as the
Government of India has taken at this juncture is on the face of
it hurtful and impolitic, and one that should never have been
resorted to •••• People who are hoping against hope that Lord
Elgin may be able to vindicate the course that is being followed
are amazed at the silence of the Government on the subject, and are
asking how much longer the faction who think ill of all the measures
of men in authority are to have their case made out from them by the
Government itself. It becomes more difficult every day to resist
the conclusion that the Supreme Government is allowing itself to
be lulled into the belief that a famine is a mere episode, which
will be enacted upon a very limited area, and which may easily be
2
coped with by the unaided resources of the state.11 The criticism 
in England mounted too. Dada Bhai Naoraji, Wedderburn and Hjrdaman 
held many demonstrative meetings in London. Hamilton admitted to 
Elgin that public pressure was very hard and the Congress had been
1 Bharat Jiwan, (4 January 1897» N.W.P. and 0. N.N.R., 1897*
Pryag Samachar, 7 January 1897» published an article entitled 
•Cruelty of Lord Elgin the Viceroy to the People*, N.V.P. 
and O.N.N.R. 1897-
2 2 January 1897•
For the first time the Anglo
e 
VS
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very active. He asked the Viceroy to start the fund immediately
for he did not want that agitators should get credit for having
1
forced the hands of the Government. By then it had also become
very clear that rains in November were hardly sufficient to ward
off the famine. On 14 January 1897, a simultaneous appeal for
charity was launched in Calcutta and London by the Indian Government
2and the Secretary of State. The response to it was at once very
)
3enthusiastic.
The attitude of the Government towards famine was not all
too surprising because from the very beginning the Government
intended to be cautious and avoided any hasty steps. They certainly
4wanted to work on surer grounds before launching an appeal. Though 
the Government never abandoned the idea of appeal to private charity, 
yet its postponement in the given circumstances was certainly 
impolitic. Without much effort the Government would have earned the 
manifold sympathies of the millions.
1 Hamilton to Elgin, $1 December 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
2 Elgin's address to the leading citizen of Calcutta,
Speeches by Earl of Elgin, 1894-99* PP* 320-5*
3 Up to 12 March 1898, the date of the dissolution of the 
central executive Committee of the famine fund, the total 
fund collected amounted to Rs 1,70,27,540. The Report of the 
Famine Commission, 1898, Para 5i2.
4 See Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 64 (Fam), 23 December 1896,
Pari. Papers, 1897, vol. 64, ^"c.8 3 0 2 pp. 176-8.
21'
The second and the most important aspect of the Governments
famine policy relates to the question of the supply of food. In
the traditional British thinking of laissez faire, the generally
recognised policy of the Indian Government was to rely on the
ordinary operation of trade during famine to meet the wants of the
country. This policy was implemented during the famine of 1877-8
and it was endorsed by the first Famine Commission.
Whenever prices of food stocks rose to a high pitch, it was
feared that the food supplies might totally fail. In the famine
of 1896 also the prices rose suddenly and sharply. For example,
the Kanpur wheat which was being sold at 16 seers per rupee, in
2
early 1896, shot up to 8 seers a rupee in October 1896. In view of 
the exorbitant rise in food prices, the position of the Government, 
with regard to the food, came under active consideration and discussion.
1 The Commissioners wrote: ffWe have no doubt that the true
principle for the_jGovemment to adopt as its general rule of 
conduct in this ^  famine_/ matter is to leave the business of 
the supply and distribution of food to private trade; taking 
care that every possible facility is given for its free action, 
and that all obstacles material or fiscal are, as far as 
practicable, removed. 11 Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, 
Para 153.
See also Resolution Govt, of India, 22 September 1869 on the 
policy of non-intervention in the operation of trade during 
famine. Quoted in C.H. Philips, Select Documents on the History 
of India and Pakistan, vol. iv, London, 1962, p. 668.
See also Lytton's Minute on Famine Policy, 12 August 1877* 
ibid., p. 670.
2 Holderness Narrative of Famine, op. cit., Para 21.
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The attention of the Government towards this was drawn by
the Indian Press, particularly the vernacular. They forewarned
the Government that a country like India where there was Malways
a chronic food scarcity11 and where “Rice11 was always in shortage,
1
the Government should take steps to stop its export. The Bangavasi
reported that it was beyond the ability of the poor to buy rice
at 7 or 8 rupees per maund, where a short while ago it was sold
2
for 2 or 3 rupees a maund. It was urged that the ^only means
now of saving the people from starvation and death is to stop the 
3
export of corn.11 In its next issue the same paper further stressed
4that the Government should import food grains on its own account, 
and urged upon the Government to follow a liberal policy of Lord 
Northbrook when on Government account food was imported into the
country and not the dangerous policy of Lytton, when no food was
5
imported by the Government. The Bombay Gazette asked the Indian
1 Charu Mihir, 20 July 1896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
2 12 September 1896, Bengal N.N.R., 1896.
3 Sulabh Dainik, 3 October 1896, ibid.
See also Zamanah, 30 September; Anis-a-Hind, 16 September; 
Hindustani, 13 October 1896, N.W.P. and 0.N.N.R., 1896.
Kesari, 20 October, Indian Spectator, 18 October, 1896,
Bomb. N.N.R., 1896.
4 3 November 1896, ibid.
5 9 November 1896, ibid.
211
Government to give up the policy of non-intervention. It wrote 
that nadhering to principles of free trade is advantageous in 
some cases and on some occasions.11 In ordinary times the Government 
ought not to interfere with trade but during large scale emergency, 
like famine, the Government must resort to importation on its own 
count and should not rely upon the economic principles of demand 
and supply.^
The Poona-Sarvajanak Sabha, the ardent mouthpiece of the
Indians sent a memorial to the Government to stop export and start
2
the import of food into India. Some others reminded the Government
to keep vigilance on the *Baniah1 who might hoard and further
3
aggravate the situation. Some even suggested that Government must
4open fair price shops to check the growth of rise in prices.
Siyani, the President of the Indian National Congress of its twelfth
session?, told the Government that the most pressing problem of 
the hour was not irrigation or railways but the stock of food in 
the country. If need be, the Government must import from Persia,
5
Russia and America.
1 19 October and 18 November 1896, E.P., vol. 77 (Newspapers Cuttings).
2 Summarised in India, 16 January 1897*
3 Sahachar, 11 November 1896; Bangavasi, 14 November; Dainik-o-
Samachar, 22 November 1896, Bengal, N.N.R., 1896.
4 Mahratha, 18 October 1896, Bomb. N.N.R., 1896.
5 Report of the Indian National Congress, 1896, pp. 57-8.
The early criticism of the Press did not make any impact.
The Indian Government instructed all the local Governments to
refrain from interference with private enterprise in the matter
1
of purchasing or importing grain for famine relief. When the Bengal
Government for the first time raised the question of food supply,
the situation took a difficult turn. The actual spark of the
controversy was provided by Bourdillion, the Commissioner of
Patna Division. After making a detailed survey of the Division,
taking into account the three harvests of the year together with
stocks in hand (assumed to be equal to three months supply); he
came to the conclusion that there would be an estimated shortage 
2of 550*000 tons. Commenting on the report, the Bengal Government
doubted the ability of the private trade to provide so huge a
deficit and was inclined to the opinion l!that little reliance can be
3
placed on supplies from within the province.11 The Lieutenant 
Governor went on to say: l!It is necessary to report that, in view 
of the unparalleled highness of prices and of the extent of the
1 Telegram Viceroy to S.S., 15 October 1896, E.P., vol. 19-
2 Commissioner Patna Division to Bengal Govt., 11 November 1896, 
Paras 96-104 and 112, Enc., Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt.,
18 November 1896, India Famine Proc., vol. 4982, No. 21,
December 1896.
3 Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt., 18 November 1896, Para 17, 
ibid.
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area over which there has been shortage of crops throughout India,
the situation as regards the food supply is not free, even in
1
Bengal, from elements of doubts and anxiety.” The Lieutenant
Governor came to the conclusion that some intervention must
take place. His resolve was further strengthened by the outcome
of his meeting with officials and other public men which was held
at Sonepur on 20 November 1896. Everyone was convinced that the
only way out of the present difficulty was to increase the present
2stock of food by more importation. Thus the Bengal Government 
recommended to the Indian Government to authorise them to make
advances of money to the traders and other persons in Bihar so that
3
they could import or purchase food grains. In making such a
recommendation the Bengal Government assumed that the question would
4
appear ”to be more one of finance than of interference with trade.w
1 Para 19 , ibid.
2 Proceeding of the Conference, Enc. Bengal Govt, to Indian 
Govt., 26 November 1896, ibid., No. 22, December 1896.
See also Finucanefs (Revenue Secretary to the Govt, of Bengal) 
diary of the tour of the famine stricken area, 23 November to 
5 December, pp. 1-7, ibid., No. 26, December 1896.
Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt., 30 November 1896, with Ehcs. 
ibid., No. 23, December 1896.
3 Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt., 12 December 1896, Para 4,
India Famine Proc., vol. 5 2 0 3, No. 71, January 1897*
4 Bengal Govt.fs Resolution, No. 5133, 10 December 1896, Para 13, 
India FtiLimvibtte Proc., vol. 4982, No. 2 5 , December 1896.
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This caused quite a stir in the Government circles. Elgin,
whose adherence to the principles of free trade was amply known
at once retorted: l!I am sure we shall not agree to anything of
1
this kind.” Earlier, he reiterated to the Secretary of State:
uAny interference with trade, either in way of prohibiting exports,
or promoting imports, would be a very extreme measure, for which
there is certainly no justification.” He believed that private
trade was resourceful enough and already it was providing the
3
supplies by importing surplus rice from Burma. But the question 
of food supply was too vital to be brushedaside by mere assurances.
As the question was of all India importance, Elgin immediately went 
into the merit of the case. He consulted the members of his 
Executive. The Executive Council unanimously approved the principle 
of non-intervention. The views of the Executive Council were best 
summarized by Westland who opposed the suggestion of the Bengal 
Government on three grounds: (a) that such a scheme would create a 
bigger administrative problem of supervision and control and 
subsequently cause greater confusion, (b) this would be more 
expensive and would tend to increase the dependence of the people
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 3 December 1896, E.P. , vol. 14.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 11 November 1896, ibid.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 19 November and 23 December 1896,
ibid.
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on the public Exchequer, (c) there was yet no reason for taking
1
such an extreme measure. Besides, 0 'Conor, the Director General
of Statistics and Trade, assured Elgin that there was °more than
2sufficient11 food stock for another three months. Elgin was 
favourably influenced by the advice of MacDonnell, who officially 
stated his strong aversion tfto departure from the principle of
3
non-intervention.0 MacDonnell was very confident of the 'Baniah1 
and the private trade. This support from MacDonnell must have
i
strengthened Elgin in the policy of absolute non-intervention.
Elgin decided to over-rule the Bengal Government. He went even 
a step further. He dealt with the question in great detail and
4
published the Indian Government’s reply in the Gazette of India.
The important purpose of doing so was to remove fear from the minds 
of theprivate traders that the Government ever intended to come 
into the market.
The Indian Government reiterated their confidence in the 
efficacy of the private trade. °The Governor-General in council0,
1 Westland to Elgin, 21 December 1896, ibid., vol. 69«
See also Ibbetson (Revenue Secretary, Indian Govt.) to H.B.
Smith, 16 November 1896, ibid.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 6 January 18971 ibid., vol. 15*
3 N.W.P. and 0. Govt, to Indian Govt., 23 November 1896,
Para 16, Pari. Papers, 18971 vol. 64, f^~C. 8302J .
4 Indian Govt, to Bengal Govt., 4 January 1897> India Famine 
Proc., vol. 5203* No. 74, January l897»
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their reply read, f,believes that the intervention of Government
as a purchaser or importer would do infinitely more harm than good,
as it would cripple and discourage the agency which is best able to
gauge the need, which is impelled by self interest to anticipate
1
it and which alone is best able to supply it effectively•ft The
function of the Government, they went on to explain, must be 
confined to assisting the trade with information, guaranteeing by 
means of its relief system that the demand of the public for food 
would be an effective demand, giving every possible facility for the 
free movement and distribution of grain, like the reduction of 
the freight. tfThe fact that there are hungry men in a district”, 
the despatch emphasised, Mis not in itself sufficient to induce a 
flow of food towards that district in the ordinary course of trade, 
there must also be money available with which the hungry may pay 
for it. And this guarantee Government provides by undertaking (as 
it does) to find work for all who are in danger of starvation, and 
to pay them at rates which will suffice to buy them a subsistence 
ration at whatever prices may from time to time, be locally current.11 
Another reason they advanced was that the Bengal scheme would be 
tantamount to givingna blank cheque11, the effect of which on 
other provincial administrations was bound to be vital. The
1 Ibid., Para T
2 Ibid., Para 6.
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Government thus rejected the Bengal Government appeal on the
ground that it could not be carried into effect without involving
interference, or at any rate without bearing the appearance of
intervention, for such a case would be almost worse than the
reality, since, while producing all its evils, it could carry with
1
it none of its advantages.11 This decision of the Indian Government
was approved by George Hamilton who wrote: “I am sure the less
you interfere with private trade, the better, for any dislocation of
so ubiquitous an instrument might lead to a wholesale disorder, for
2
the consequences of which you should be held responsible.11
Thus there were two main reasons for the Govennent to over-rule
the Bengal Government. Firstly, their firm belief in the private
trade, added by the conviction that alternative to this would lead to
confusion. In order to seek maximum cooperation from the private
3
trade the Government intended to give all conceivable help. Elgin
1 Ibid.. Para 11.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 7 January 18971 E.P., vol. 15*
3 So strong was the belief in the private trade that the Indian 
Government rejected the offer of ship loads of grain from Canada and
U.S.A. (as a part of charity) for the sake of avoiding to arouse 
suspicion in the minds of traders. Government preferred money to 
grain. See H.B. Smith to Col. J.V. Ottley (Secy. Indian Fam.
Charitable Relief Fund, 29 January 1897i E.P., vol. 70.
W. Ottley to H.B. Smith, 29 Janujury and 3tJfebruary, 1897* ibid.
Telegram Viceroy to Lord Aberdeen,*'§vG^vof Canada, 3 February 1897.ibid.
A similar offer was made by Russia and was rejected on a little 
different ground. The best explanation of this is found in
MacDonnell's letter to Elgin: “Bulky gifts attract attention and 
out of their distribution political capital can be made. Besides, 
there is nothing we are more criticised for by natives of all 
classes than our refusal to import grain, and thus pull down the 
market rate.... We can easily decline all gifts of grain on the 
ground that we do not interfere with the private trade in grain. If
Russia gives help it must be by money contributions to the English or 
Indian fund. The money is not earmarked.11 MacDonnell to Elgin, 30 
November 1896, Enc. Elgin : to MacDonnell 3 December 1896. H.C.,
MSS.Eur.D 509/iii*
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and his advisers were sure that a little restriction would draw 
the private trade into hoarding. Secondly, some rains in the 
months of November and December had brought a fresh wave of optimism 
in the mind of the Indian Government and they at least hoped that the 
rabi crop would be two-third of the normal - hence no need of 
int ervent ion.
But the winter rains stopped all of a sudden. The intensity
of the scarcity widened. The danger to the rabi crop became real.
More deaths on account of hunger were reported. There was a
repeated attack on the Government's famine policy in the British Press.
1
Many English newspapers published pictures of hungry and dying men.
This criticism alarmed Hamilton. He confessed that he had never
2visualised that famine would be so widespread. On the 15 January 
1897 he officially urged the Indian Government to be more careful
and keep watch, "not only on food supply generally, but its local
3
distribution". On 29 January Hamilton wrote to Elgin for the first
1 Reference to the criticism of the British press is found in the 
private correspondence of Elgin and Hamilton. Hamilton feared 
that British press criticism was bound to find its way into 
’Native Press’$ "My main regret is that these allegations find 
their way into native newspapers, and are used as a weapon for 
attack upon the Indian Government." Hamilton to Elgin, 26 February 
1897- To Elgin, such press criticism appeared as "scandalous
and mischievous lies". Elgin to Hamilton, 17 February 18971 
E.P., vol. 15-
The Secretary of State also feared the increasing criticism of 
"Naoroji and Co." The socialists led by Hyndpman held a meeting in 
St. James Hall and made ’virulent* attack on Government. This 
incident^ was given wide publicity. Hamilton to Elgin, 12 
February 1897 ? E.P., vol. 15.
V\<X>W»\^ Vv E M k  _
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 15 January 1897» E.P., vol. 15*
3 S.S. to Indian Govt., Despatch No. 10 (Rev), 15 January 1897»
Para 8, Revenue and Agricultural Despatches to India, vol.\%
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time to consider the ways and means in advance, ”if due to emergency”
the Government had to import food. He advanced three suggestions:
(a) direct purchase of food stock by the Government, (b) purchase
of food stock indirectly by giving advances (same as Mackenzie
had earlier suggested) and, (c) encouraging imports by bonus.
Out of the three, he personally favoured the first and went on to
say: nI do not want to unduly press you, but summing the situation,
I should say that we ought to err on the side of over precaution
1
rather than on that of risk or chance.”
2Members of the India Council, particularly Hardie and
3
Crosthwaite were more agitated. They pressed the Indian Government
to regulate the food supply on their own count. In a special Note
on the question of food supply Hardie criticised the Government and
wrote: ”The famine policy of the Government is based on economic
theory that the Government should not interfere with private trade -
a policy which is in effect little else than that the Government
4
should do nothing at all.” He submitted that private trade under 
this grave emergency could not proivde the relief required for the/I
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 5 February 1897» E.P., vol. 15*
2 Chairman Finance Committee, India Office.
3 Chairman Public Works Committee, India Office.
4 Hardie’s Note on Food Supply, 9 February 1897- Enc. Hamilton 
to Elgin, 12 February 1897» E.P., vol. 15*
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population for two reasons. Firstly, the machinery of private
trade did not exist in the interior of India to the extent necessary
to secure the object in view. Secondly, the private trade was
hampered by the limited supply of money available in India on
account of the currency legislation. According to him, the prices
of the stock had risen and the scarcity had been rather intensified
because the food grains tended to move into the Government relief
centres while creating hardship to the majority of the people who
did not come to the relief works. He, therefore, strongly recommended
that if the Government imported or purchased food for their relief
works "only”, then the pressure could be largely eased on the bulk
of the population, who did not come to the relief centre.* This
system, as Godley said, in a way would not have been new because
2the Government already purchased for the army and the gaols.
3
Crosthwaite, like Hardie also argued on the same lines. Even
Queen Victoria asked for the purchase of food grains on the Government 
4
account. In addition to this, it may be stated that the very success
1 Ibid»
2 Godley to Elgin, 12 February 189$>, E.P., vol. 136.
3 Crosthwaite to Elgin, 10 February 189$. Family Collection.
4 Queen Victoria to Elgin, 5 February 189$, unpublished letters, 
Family Collection.
See Queen Victoria to Elgin, 19 February I89/&, unpublished 
letters, Family Collection.
mof the relief system entirely, depended upon food being purchasable
everywhere by the persons relieved. Supposing the inonsoon again
failed, and the dealers refused to sell grains then the whole system
would collapse. Therefore, the protagonists for the intervention
urged the Government to hold a reserve stock of food grains in
event of sudden collapse of private $rade to feed the population
on relief for two or three months.
Elgin vehemently denied that the food stock had been or
likely to be exhausted in the near future. He saw a downward trend
in the prices of the food stocks, particularly in the Punjab where
1
the fall was 15 per cent. The Government decided to adhere to
their earlier stand. But before doing so they extensively examined
the question of food stock vis-a-vis private trade.
The central Government realised that the problem of estimating
the total food stock in the country was immensely difficult. But
they were satisfied after their enquiries from the local administration
about the food stock in hand till the next crop. Punjab possessed
enough stock not only for local consumption but also for some export
2to other provinces. Similarly, the position of the North Western 
Provinces was not considered as bad now as it was in the beginning 
of the year. There also existed a considerable stock with the grain
1 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 6 February and 22 February 1897» E.P., 
vol. 20.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 33 (Fam), 10 May 1897? Para 4, Revenue 
and Agriculture Letters from India, vol.\t
See also Memorandum by Director General of Land and Records and 
Agriculture on existing food stocks in the Punjab, 5 March 1897*
Enc. Punjab Govt, to Indian Govt., 11 March 1897% Indian Famine :Proc., 
vol. 5204, No. 127, March 1897.
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dealers and agriculturists. Although Central Provinces1 stock 
was considerably depleted, yet some reserve still existed in the 
richer districts. The Province as a whole, the Government 
believed, was fairly well exploited. In Madras and Bombay the crop 
failure was limited to the districts of Carnatic and Deccan where 
the population was sparse. Elsewhere in Bombay, Sind and in Southern 
districts of Madras there was a good harvest. In Bengal, there 
was a great loss of rice crops, but the depleted stock was supplemented
from the inflow of Burma rice, where there was a surplus of l|- million
2tons. The Indian Government contended that the general indications
regarding the position of the stock of food were good, the prices
were stable and the markets were not excited.
The Government had no complaint against the private traders
on account of their hoarding and unwillingness to sell. They also
asserted: t!It must not be overlooked that export of fisod grains from
India to foreign countries has for months past virtually ceased, and
that great economy is everywhere exercised under pressure of high
3
prices by nine-tenths of the population.11 The Government believed 
that even in contingency of the failure or delay of monsoon rains, they 
would have enough for at least two months' consumption throughout the
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 4 March 18971 E.P*, vol. 70.
2 Indian Govt, to S.S., L. No. 33 (Fam), 10 May 1897? Para 6-10, op. cit.
3 Ibid. Para 11.
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country. In case the monsoon failed prematurely, there would then
be at least the possibility of reaping 4 anna crop over the whole
country (which was actually much lower average than that of 1896)
and if added this to what remained from the older stocks, a supply
equivalent to perhaps two months could be in reserve. So it
seemed to the Government hardly possible that in the worst event,
the ,!failure of supplies11 should come upon them so suddenly that
foreign supplies could not be brought into the country in the ordinary 
1
course of trade. Only in the final eventuality - the failure of
n 21897 Monsoons, the Government might intervene.
Elgin said that it was nmischievous!1 to think that private 
trade had failed. Private trade, he maintained, had taken advantage 
in placing food at the disposal of the public through the means of 
railways. For example, the private trade imported rice from Burma 
with the help of their own resources. Already, as much as 300,000 
tons of rice was imported and another 600 ,000 tons were available 
for the market. This he believed was sufficient to feed the entire 
army of relief workers in the provinces of Bengal and North VestemProvinces.
1 Ibid. Para 12.
2 It was Lord Northbrook who suggested to Elgin that if Monsoon 
again failed or stopped earlier, then the Government must resort 
to importing, otherwise he fully appreciated Elgin’s food 
policy. Lord Northbrook to Elgin, 19 March 1897? Family 
Collection.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 10 February, 24 February and 10 March 1897?
E.P., vol. 15.
Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 33 (Fam), 10 May 1897? Para 10 and 13, 
op. cit. As a matter of fact Elgin personally kept watch over 
the movement of Burma shipment of rice to outside markets. He 
was assured by Fryer, C.C. of Burma and Playfair, the chairman 
of Bengal Chamber of Commerce that needs of India would be considered 
most. India Famine Proc., vol. 5205, Nos. 141-7? May 1897*
23;
Elgin did not agree with the reasoning of Hardie that the Government 
should export food for its relief works from the external resources 
and leave private trade undisturbed to supply the rest of the population 
from local supplies. In repudiating his charge he wrote; nThe 
private trade of a district exists for the supply of the people within 
it, and to suddenly restrict its operations where perhaps 20 per 
cent of the population are on relief works, would so absolutely dis­
locate it that I am convinced that, far from lowering the prices 
to those outside the Government works, it would be much more likely 
to run them up. I do not think Mr. Hardie has allowed enough for 
the manner in which the improvement of railway communication has 
equalised prices all over India. There is no longer the sharp
1
division between local and external stocks in any particular area.11 
Thus the Indian Government was fully convinced that they could not 
have done more to relieve the strain on the local stocks.
As to the suggestion that the Government must buy food stocks 
in advance for the relief workers in the eventuality of the failure 
of the monsoon, the Indian Government raised objection on two grounds. 
Their preliminary objection was on the score of expense. The purchase 
of so large a stock would block rupees two crores. If the contingency 
did not arise the Government would have to dispose of the stock 
cheaply and thereby lose half the money spent. This, the Indian 
Government thought, was not an insuperable objection where the lives
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 3 March 1897? E.P., vol. 15*
23;
of millions were involved* But the real objection lay in making
the trading class distrustful of the Government by introducing ,!an
unknown element” into its calculations and by creating an artificial
level of prices, nHowever, clearly we defined our intentions”, the
Indian Goverment wrote, ”the trade would be always apprehensive
that the Government reserves would be poured into the market, or
1
that the Government would be driven to extend its operation.” And
finally the Government closed the discussion by emphasising: ”We
are strongly and deliberately of the opinion that, even in the worst
conceivable emergency, so long as trade is free to follow its
normal course, we should do far more harm than good by attempting to 
2
interfere.”
This attitude of the Government has led Dr Bhatia to believe
that the policy of non-intervention was carried out to the ”absurd 
3
limit”. ‘He further strengthened his charge by stating that where
the loss of crop in the year was estimated at one-third of the average 
annual production or ”18 or 19 million tons”, the total imports against 
this from Burma only_7 during the same period amounted to only
1 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 33 (Fam) , op. cit., Para 13*
2 Ibid., Para 14.
3 B.M. Bhatia, The Famines in India, p. 240.
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1
6 Lakhs tons. To him this was a sufficient indication of the 
failure of the Governments food policy. Unfortunately, Dr. Bhatia 
does not amplify or argue his point and errs on the side of over 
simplification.
The key to the understanding of the Governments food policy
lies in two questions, (a) If the loss was £ of the total food
grains in India, as claimed, then what was the total production?
Did India produce the surplus food? Or was there some accumulated
surplus of stock? (b) Did the imports increase and exports decrease
correspondingly to the loss of the produce - say to the extent of $
during this crisis? The answer to thefirst question is indeed
very difficult - for total grain production in British India
cannot be accurately assessed. The Famine Commissioners in 1880
after careful inquiry had come to the conclusion that India
produced a surplus of 5*165*000 tons over and above the total con-
2
sumption. This sum was available for export or storage. T.V. 
Holdemess, the special officer of 1897 famine, calculated that 
since the writing of the report, the population of the same area had
1 Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1898, Para 585•
Shortage of crop during famine 1896-7 was as follows:
Punjab - 25 per cent of the total yield
N.V.P. & 0- 40 it ft tt tt tt tt
C.P. - 50 H It ft tt tt tt
Bombay - 35 tt tt tt tt tt tt
Bengal - 33 ft tt tt tt tt tt
Madras - 20 tt tt tt tt tt tt
Holderness* Narrative, Para 27, op. cit.
2 Para 156
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risen by 17 per cent. In comparison, the area under food grains
had risen by only 8 per cent. On these figures a surplus of the
food grains could not remain as high as 5>165*000 tons and fell to
1
only 1,700,000 tons. But a little later the information supplied
by the local Governments to the Famine Commission of 1898 - showed a
surplus of 9i million tons. This contradiction is inexplicable.
Coming from the Government sources within a span of one year it
would only show that the exact information was not attainable. It
may be safe to assume that in any case the surplus could not be as
high as $$ million tons. It might not be as low as 1,700,000 tons,
but certainly it could not be more than what was estimated in i860.
Secondly, even the estimated surplus of 1,700,000 tons in 1897
must have been gradual, the fall being corresponding to the area of
cultivation yearly and the simultaneous rise in the population. One
tends to agree with the Famine Commissioners that there must have
3
been some surplus nin ordinary years”. But this could not be 
gauged accurately. Even if it be believed that Holdemess1 estimate
1 Holdemess * Narrative, Para 24, op. cit.
2 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 587*
In 1902, the Government estimates showed a surplus of 6.1 
million tons or excluding Burma, Assam and Coorg 4*5 million 
tons. Quoted in B.M* Bhatia, The Famines in India, p. 226.
3 Ibid.
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was correct, then there was some surplus left after the internal
consumption and export. For example in 10 years, before 1896 the
export of food grains averaged l£ million tons from British India
1
and 1 million tons in last 5 years before the famine. In 1897*
though the scarcity was extremely acute yet ,fthe stock at the
2
end did not seem to have been close on exhaustion.n But the 
availability of food did not in any case indicate an abundance or 
prosperity. Nor did it mean that people did not die of starvation. 
They died, not because there was absolutely no food (of course 
during the famine the normal supply was thoroughly dislocated) but 
because of the inability of the people to purchase the food even 
when it was available. It was primarily the lack of purchasing 
power which proved fatal to many. Even the surplus which had been 
variously explained and calculated, largely varied according to the 
ability of the community to consume food at the given time. Some­
times the surplus of product ion over consumption was more because 
of people*s lack of means to buy it. Had there been full caisumption 
of food according to the needs, then the calculation of surplus 
could not be so high or at times so varied? The poverty in India 
was amply visible even in ordinary days, but during famine it was 
much more so. Certainly the large dislocations of the normal supply 
amounting to 18 or 19 million tons added to this extreme hardship.
1 Holdemess' Narrative, Para 24, op. cit.
See also The Trade Review of the relevant years of British India.
2 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 588*
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The people had to get adjusted to the price mechanism of demand 
and supply. Some of the scarcity must have also been enhanced 
by hoarding on the part of the private traders and by farmers.
Another significant point regarding the availability of the 
stock in India can be studied in analysing the nature of the 
movement of food stock internally from one place to another. There 
was a large export from comparatively surplus districts to the 
more distressed. Following is the statement showing the trade 
movement of food grains from one place to another between January 
1897 to September 1897*1 
Bengal North-Western Provinces and Oudh
Districts
Patna
Darhanga 
Monghair 
Bhagalpur
Central Provinces
Import
(tons)
+ 14,620
+ 44,141
Jubbulpore
Nagpur
Raipur
Sambalpur
Punjab
Hissar
Jullundar
+ 12,065 
+ 17,365
+ 35,985
Export Districts 
(tons)
Banda
Allahabad
- 31,055 Bullanshahar
- 27,554 Aligarh
Bombay
Poona
Bijapur
- 14,337 Panch Mahal
- 22,599 Shakurpur
Madras
Malabar
- 30,138 Godavari
Import
(tons)
+ 23,573 
+ 45,529
Export
(tons)
- 28,017
- 26,482
+ 38,672 
+ 25,512
- 23,399
- 74,414
+ 32,539
- 52,976
1 Holdemess’ Narrative, Appendix vii, op. cit.
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These selections of statistical figures do not represent exactly 
a methodical pattern of in and outgoing traffic of food stocks from 
one to another district of the same province. It serves only as a 
pointer that a movement in food stocks was taking place from 
some surplus areas to the deficit areas. These movements took 
place with the aid and resources of the private trade whose confidence 
and energy was boosted by the encouragement it received from the 
Government and the provision of railway facilities.
In the examination of the second question regarding the rise 
and fall of imports and exports, we find that in 1893-4, the import 
of the food grains into India was 341,740 cwts; in 1894-5* 483,523 cwts 
1895-6, 306,333 cwts and in the famine year of 1896-7; it increased 
threefold - 1,080,602 cwts and continued on the same scale in 1897*8, 
when the import was 1,07^,415. Similarly, the export from British
India declined more drastically. Whereas in 1894-5, the export 
of grain was 48,864,395 cwts; in 1895-6, 48,332,973; in the famine 
year it slammed down to 32,420,134 cwts and continued the downward 
trend in 1897-8 when the total export was 30,890,379 cwts. The 
most interesting feature was the decline in the export of wheat to 
almost nine times in the famine year. Where in 1895-6, the export
1 Tables relating to Trade of British India, 1893-4 to 1897-8, 
Pari. Papers, 1899, vol. lxvi, part 1, "^"c.912oJ7, p.8.
Cwt is one hundredweight = 112 lbs. 20 hundredweight ■ 1 
Ton or 2240 lbs.
1
was 10,002 ,912 cwts, in 1897-8, it came down to 1,910,533- These 
figures show that if the production of food stock suffered, the 
other features like imports and exports also varied, correspondingly 
in upward and downward directions. Lastly, the very scarcity must 
have affected the rate of food consumption itself.
If it is supposed that food was availablesthough in a very 
limited quantity, then the question arises as to what was the best 
means of distribution? Again, was it necessary to regulate the 
supply? The ideal answer would be that the state should have 
organised and regulhted the food supply, particularly when there 
was so much of poverty. But was it practicable in the given 
circumstances? Again was it consistent with the spirit of the time?
The policy of intervention and state control was not feasible 
for various reasons. The civil administration was fully occupied 
with famine relief operations and plague. The Public Works Department 
was exhaustively engaged. In 1897 the army was occupied in the 
North Western frontiers. Further, the regulation of food supply 
would have been extremely difficult if not impossible for lack of 
trained and experienced staff. Half control could have been 
doubly dangerous. Even a modern state with all its vast resources 
finds it difficult to implement such a policy of state control in the 
supply of food grains. Besides, the principle of intervention was 
not popular with the thinking of the age. Even the nenlightened11
1 Ibid., p. 22.
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Indians did not approve of the state control. The Indian National
Congress never boldly suggested State intervention. S.N. Banerjee's
influential nevspaper The Bengalee, too, never came out in the
open in support of Government intervention in the trade of food
grains. In his very forceful speech in the Congress Session of
1896, Banerjee discreetly omitted any reference to the food policy.
It is possible that there was some tendency on the part of
the private traders to make maximum profits, during the crisis.
But the Government failed to find any evidence of a general combination
among dealers to keep up the prices. MacDonnell who investigated
the question in detail in his province did not find any proof to 
2
that effect. It was, therefore, politic and wise to solicit the 
cooperation of the private trade to the maximum limit. Keeping this 
point in view, the Government reduced railway freight and provided 
regular information about the course of the grain trade to the 
dealers. Arrangements were made in each district by which the
district officer at the end of each week received a weekly return from
each railway station in his district of the imports and exports of the 
grain, so that a grain dealer could readily despatch the grain at the
1 Bengalee, 9 January, 1897*
Bengal National Chamber of Commerce in a special memorandum of 
15 December I896 urged the Government not to interfere in the 
private trade. They wrote, any attempt as a purchaser or importer 
would be Mischievous11. Enc. Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt. , 22 
December 1896, India Famine Proc., vol. 5203, No. 50, January 1897*
2 MacDonnell to Elgin, 4 March 1897, op. cit.
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1
place where it was most required. Each local Government maintained
personal contact with the important grain dealers for food requirements 
2
of the markets. The Government believed that minimization of 
administrative problems would leave more room for the officers to 
concentrate their activities on the field of relief works.
In addition to the administrative convenience, the pursuance 
of the policy of non-intervention had some other advantages. One 
was the tightness of money. No trader could afford to tie up large 
money by hoarding the grain for the doubt in the continuance of 
high prices. This necessarily checked speculation. Similarly the 
uniformity of prices throughout India also acted as a deterrent to 
the speculators. Although, the universal prevalence of high prices 
must have caused acute suffering, specially amongst the poorer 
classes of the town, the implementation of control and 
regulation of import and export trade would have created suspicion 
among the traders, and induced them to hoard. This could result in 
enormous sufferings of the people before the Government could think 
of effectively plugging the hole. Therefore, it appears that the 
Government's decision was wise. Before upholding the policy of non­
intervention, they had twice given a very careful consideration and 
examined the issue in detail. In deciding so the Government was never 
more unanimous. Neither was the Government's attitude rigid. In
1 Holderness Narrative, Para 100, op. cit.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 31 March 1897? E.P., vol. 15*
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the exceptional cases where the private trade could not work
effectively, the Government did intervene. For instance the
Government imported grain in the Palaman district in Bengal, in
Bhadrachalam Taluk of Godavari district in Madras, in Shetphal relief
work in Poona district in Bombay and in Mandla and Balaghat in
Central Province.*
Much of the controversy seemed to have been caused due to
the unfavourable comparison drawn with the famine policy of Lord
Northbrook. Howsoever, liberal Northbrook*s policy was, it could
have hardly worked in the present circumstances. Famine of 1873-4
was limited to a small area of Bengal, Therefore, it was not
difficult to supervise and regulate the import of grain trade. Yet
Northbrook did not fully control the food trade. Exports continued
to remain unchecked. Sometimesthe same ships which brought Burma
2
rice to Calcutta, carried the freight of Bengal rice to Burma.
Besides, it was probably imperative to purchase rice on the Government 
account for the lack of communication. In 1873-4 there was only one
railway in Bihar (the area of famine), and that ran through the two
southern districts of Patna and Shahabad. In 1896 there was at least 
one line of rail in each district, and in the Patna division 589 miles 
of railway. In 1873-4 the Son canals had been just opened. In 1896
1 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 585*
See also Indian Govt, to C.P. Govt., 15 February, Para 2, India 
Famine Proc., vol. 5204, No. 49, March 1897*
2 George Campbell, Memoirs of My Indian Career, vol. 11, p. 324.
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they supplied water communication for many miles. The road mileage
1
in the division touched 12,500. By now the relief work was also 
streamlined and well regularised. Therefore, the administration, 
in 1896 was much better equipped to follow the policy of non­
intervention and certainly well advised to follow it because of the
large extent of the area under famine. Even Lord Northbrook whole-
2
heartedly supported Elgin's policy. From the practical point of 
view the policy pursued was the only feasible one.
The third feature of the famine strategy was the administration 
of the relief works which was left in the hands of the Provincial 
Governments. Lord Elgin believed that the detailed work of the 
relief must be left to the local Governments. He gave fervent 
expression to his belief while addressing the legislative assembly in 
October 1896: f,It is upon the local Governments that, whatever 
happens, we must rely to carry out the measures that may become 
necessary .... We are justified I think in our belief that the work 
will be done, and will be done well.” He added, was to the share
of the Government of India, it is not for us ourselves to enter into
the arena and to take charge of the operations. We should hamper the 
proper authorities, and not assist them. Our duty is to devise means
1 Holdemess Narratives, Para 3 2, op. cit.
2 Lord Northbrook's speech in the House of Lords: The Times, 2 
February 1897- He said: nSpeaking generally there could be no
doubt whatever that the more trade was left untrammelled the
greater was the possibility of meeting the demand for grain
or any other article that was necessary.”
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for helping the local Governments with the wider knowledge of
the whole circumstances available to us and to supply the sinews
1
of war where required.11 Thus the success of the relief measures
depended largely upon the efforts, planning and efficiency of the
respective Provincial administrations.
North Western Provinces and Oudh was the first venue of the
famine and it was here that the first famine relief measures were
undertaken. The province was specially privileged in having A.P.
MacDonnell at the helm of the affairs who had wide experience of
2
famine ever since 1874. The basic features of his administration 
were efficiency and economy. To achieve the dual purpose, he 
introduced new innovations in the field of relief organisation and 
relief distribution. Firstly, the Government reversed the policy 
of the code of small relief works and introduced the system of 
large relief works managed by the department of Public Works. The 
main reason for laying stress on large relief works was to increase
3
greater returns out of them. Due to the expansion of railway it 
was not difficult to find large works.
1 Proc. of the Council of the Governor-General in India, 1896, 
vol. xxxv, p. 389*
2 MacDonnell was well known for his report on the Food Supply and 
Statistical Review of the Relief Operation in the distressed 
districts of Bihar and Bengal during the famine of 1873-4.
3 N.W.P. and 0. Govt, to Indian Govt., 23_November_l896,
Para 20, Pari. Papers, 18971 vol. 64. ^ C. 8302
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The small works were executed locally by giving advances to
Zamindars or Landlords. This system was tried earlier in the
Bundelkhnnd famine of early 1896 and proved a success. It was more
fully developed in January 1897* The rules provided for the execution
of small works of "village utility” by village landlords. The
landlords were under the obligation to employ village labour and to
pay certain rates of wages out of the loans advanced to them. When
the work was duly completed, one-fourth to one-half of the advance,
as agreed on was to be remitted back to the Government. The balance
was to be refunded by periodical instalments. In case some landlords
could not undertake or were unwilling to bear the cost, the collector
could execute the work either directly or through the zamindar 
1
as an agent. Under this scheme, the Government gave loans and
« 2advances to the extent of Rs 42,13,831* North Western Provinces and
Oudh was the only Government "which used to any extent the system
of partly recoverable" advances. This system offered a substantial
inducement to the landlords to undertake works of general village
utility and it was also economical to the state than village works
3
at its sole cost. The advances given for developing local resources 
indeed proved very useful. For example 550,759 temporary wells were 
constructed in the years of famine. The number of masonry wells
1 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 101.
2 Ibid., Para 349*
3 Ibid. , Para 101.
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constructed was 4,227, and many others were repaired and improved. 
Other facilities for irrigation, such as embankments and tanks, were 
largely extended. It was calculated that the additions made to 
various sources of irrigation at the moment were sufficient to 
protect 1,381,494 acres and produce 465,000 tons of food.
In December 1896, the Government of the North-Western Provinces 
introduced a very important change in the organisation of the famine 
relief. The Government abolished the fourfold classification 
of the relief workers. Instead, it introduced twofold classifications 
called 'diggers1 and 'carriers1. The main motive to bring this change 
was economic. Wage 'A' and 'C' of the 'Code' was abolished. Wage B 
and the lowest wage D was now awarded respectively to diggers and the 
Carriers. The following table shows the difference between the grain
equivalent wage and dependents dole by the Code and the resolution
2
of 5 December 1896 which brought this latest change.
1 Narrative of North-Western Provinces and Oudh Famine, p. 24, 
op.cit.
2 Report of the Famine Commission» 1898, Para 100.
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By the Code of 1895 By Resolution of 5 December 1896
Males Females
Chattacks Chattacks
Males Females
Chattacks Chattacks
Class A 
Professional 
labourers 21
Class B 
Labourers not 
Professional 19
Class C
Able bodied not 
Labourers 16
Class D
Weakly, fit for 
light employment 14
Adult dependent 14
Children voider 14 
years of age from 
i to i of the adult 
male wage (i.e. from 
about 14 to 5 
chattacks) according 
to the age and 
requirements.
19
17 Diggers 19 16
15
13 Carrier Class 14 13
13 Adult dependent 12 10
Working children Chattacks
above 12 and under
16 years 10
Working children
over 7 and under 12 6
Not in arms and under 
7 years infants in 
arms extra pie to the 
mother.
In the justification of this change it was said that a full 
day's work on the relief works was done only by a Jhinority of the 
workers employed as l,diggersrt and that the majority, whether able 
bodied or not, consisted chiefly of women and children and was lightly 
worked as carriers. It was also stated by the local Government that 
as the people came in family groups to the works, the joint earnings 
of the family "ought to be so restricted as to be sufficient only
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for its subsistence, and that for this purpose the minimum code
1
wage for the majority was enough.”
This was a rigorous change. It was criticised by the Famine
Commission of 1898. In the important matter of periodical
conversion of the grain wages into cash wages with reference to
prevailing prices, the Commission commented that the new rules were
harsher for the labourer than provided in the Provincial Codes,
because fluctuations of less than 10 per cent in the price of grain
were ignored. Between the rate fixed and actual prices, there
was * frequently considerable difference. For example, in Allahabad
district the conversion rate remained at 10 seer a rupee from March
to July 1897i but the grain was as dear as 8i seers a rupee. These
changes were introduced in order to achieve economy in the administration
of the famine measures. This necessarily imposed extra hardship on
the people. The lowering of the wages produced a general complaint
that the daily wage paid to them was not sufficient to ”allow them
to satisfy their hunger”. It implied that there was some reason
to fear that many people must have been ”severely pinched”, particularly
in June and July, ”a considerable number of incapable people failed
h4to get the relief that was desirable. But the Government believed
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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that stringent measures could be redeemed by efficient and prompt
decisions. In thissphere the local Government shoved extra care,
the Lieutenant Governor personally supervised the famine measures.
For this untiring effort he was complimented by the Viceroy, the
1
Secretary of State and the Queen. The two most leading vernacular
weeklies of the Provinces Ams-i-Hind (urdu) and Hindustani(Hindi)
2of the Provinces commended the famine administration. The famine 
commission also singled out MacDonnell*s administration for showing 
incessant activity and watchfulness, Ha constant grasp of the 
situation, skill in combining all forms of relief, and a great power 
of enlisting the services of the leaders of the native society .... We
agree in the general verdict that the result was a conspicuous success
3
and a great administrative feat.
At one time more than l£ million people were on direct relief 
of the North-West Provinces and Oudh. The direct expenditure on relief, 
excluding establishment and incidental charges came to Rs 1, 67,15,147. 
The money spent against loans and advances was Rs 42,13,831; revenue 
suspension, Rs 1,44,64,875 and remission Rs 65,19,100. Rs 48,87,527 
of the Indian Charitable fund, as a part of their share was also
1 Thr recognition of his famine services the Indian Government 
awarded him G.C.I.E*
2 See the Columns from August 1896 to September 1897, N.W.P. and 
0., N.N.R., 1896 and 1897.
3 Report of the Famine Commission. 1898, Para 147.
appropriately utilized.
Similar relief measures were taken in the state of Bengal.
The relief organisation of the province had come into full function
by the end of November 1896. The distressed tracts were blocked
out into relief charges and relief circles. A charge contained an
area of about 25,0000 persons. A relief circle comprised an area
of about 30 to 40 square miles with a population of about 25 ,000  
2
to 30,000. In its main feature of the relief the Government followed
the North-Western Provinces system of recognising the two main classes
3
of workers - the Diggers and the Carriers, with its wage scale. As 
in the North - Western Provinces and Oudh, similar hardship of the 
stringent measure must have been felt in Bengal. The Bengal Government 
was too meticulous in enforcing the task work and often resorted to 
fining. As the ordinary wage for the majority of the workers 
corresponded to the minimum wage of the provincial code, it was 
found that workers were fined for short work considerably below this 
wage which must have imposed extra hardship on the people.
If the system of relief distribution on the works was unduly 
stringent, the gratuitous village relief was liberally employed in 
Bengal. For example, in the province persons in receipt of gratuitous 
relief were always more than on the relief works. In May 1897 the
1 Ibid., Para 349*
2 Resolution, Bengal Govt., 10 December 1896, Para 2, op. cit.
3 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 108.
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number stood as 414,324 and on works 376,295? in June 459*000 and 
3 6 0,6 9 8; in July 423,186 and 218,181; in August 316,424 and 109,402 
and in September 108,148 and 35*426 respectively. The reason 
why so much of gratuitous relief was given could be found in the 
general poverty of the people and the density of the population in 
the affected areas.
As regards the nature of relief works, the Bengal Government 
followed a different policy from the Government of North-Western 
Provinces. Whereas in the North-Western Provinces the backbone of 
the system was the large relief works, in the case of Bengal, with 
few exceptions small works remained throughout the basis of relief. 
There were two reasons for the preference of small relief works.
First, the great mass of the labouring and cultivating population 
was said to be greatly averse to seeking work at a distance. Secondly, 
there were very few large works ready for execution. The construction 
and deepening of village tanks for drinking purposes were considered 
to be more useful than roads.
In Madras Presidency the relief of the distress was confined to 
four districts of the Deccan and to the two northern districts of
1 Ibid., Para 110.
Actually in no other province so large a gratuitous relief 
was given.
For this liberality there was a lot of criticisms at the hands 
of Elgin and Hamilton, though the former never discouraged the 
Bengal Government in any correspondence.
1
Gan jam and Vizagapatam. Early and prompt measures were taken
from the very beginning. In marked contrast to the famine organisation
of the other Governments!, the Madras Government deviated from the
code towards liberality. Acting on the advice of the Sanitary
Commissioner of the Madras province, the Government recommended
the abolition of the two lowest classification of labourers from the 
2
Code. It was decided that all relief workers should be placed in
one or other of the two highest classes and given A or B wages.
The C and the D wage was abolished. The task of each gang of the
relief works was closely adopted to the working capacity. Fining
3
below the lowest wage level was prohibited. The basic reason
for taking such humane view was that the existing level of wages
4
for the relief worker was not considered safe. Due to this 
consideration, the labour test was Mless severe in Madras than else­
where, while the average wage paid to relief workers was higher 
and that throughout the greater part of the relief operations, the 
tendency was to relax provisions of the code in favour of workers,
1 At the time of the greatest pressure, in July 18971 the total 
area of the province declared to be affected covered 26,073 
square miles with a population of 5*67^,000 persons. Report 
of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 301.
2 Madras Govt, to Indian Govt., 4 May 1897* India Famine Proc., 
vol. 5206, Nos. 109-111, June 1897.
3 Ibid.
4 Madras Govt. Res. 18 February 18971 ibid.
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not to tighten them as in other provinces.” Havelock, the
Governor of Madras, proudly wrote to Elgin: ”We might have erred
on the side of indulgence, but perhaps this is safer than to err
2on the side of severity.” The liberal policy did have a profound
effect in keeping down the mortality rate within 4 per cent of the 
3
normal rate.
Other local Governments like Bombay, Punjab and Berar executed 
prompt and extensive relief works, and were distinctly successful
4
both as regards the saving of human life and mitigation of distress.
It was only the Government of Central Provinces which failed 
in organising the machinery of relief works promptly and efficiently.
The province had unfortunately suffered from famine condition ever 
since 1894, particularly in the three districts of Saguar, Damoh 
and Jubbulpore. But strangely, the first direct relief measures were
1 Indian Fam. Com. Report (1898), Para 190.
The reason why the famine administration was so liberal was 
explained by H.E.M. James, the Secy, of Indian Fam. Charitable 
Relief in a letter to the Governor of Madras, Havelock: ”The
fact is that I believe Mr.
Commissioners in Madras^/ both have so vivid a recollection 
of the terrible mischief done by Sir Richard Temple in 1876-77 in 
driving off the Works all persons who seemed at all well-to-do, 
that in this famine they have run to the other extreme^.” 16 
June 1897, Enc. H.E.M. James to H.B. Smith, 18 Junejt*)),
E.P., vol. 70.
2 Havelock to Elgin, 11 May 1897, E.P., vol. 70. Actually when
the order* prohibiting fines were issued in March 18971 the total
workers on the relief were 81,000. It rose to 157,000 in April,
312,000 in May, 507,000 in June, and 773,000 in July 1897- Report 
of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 131.
3 Ibid., Para 309*
le Fanu and Mr Cole / The Famine
4 Ibid., see Paras 319-31
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1
taken in December 1896 only. This lack of vigilance on the part
of Central Provinces Government was specially criticised by the
Famine Commission of 1898* They wrote, "It seems to us that
dangerously little was done by Government in all three districts in
1894-9 5, and that the theory that though privation prevailed among
2
the poor classes it was not too acute, was too sanguine.'1
Asserting the same criticism they further charged the Government
with staking too much on the hope or chance of better harvests in the 
3
future.
After having realised the gravity of the situation, though late,
the Government organised extensive relief. C.J. Lyall, the 
. 4
commissioner made a thorough tour of the whole province. Following
the example of North-Western Provinces and Oudh, large relief works
under the Public Works Department were opened. Subsidiary to these
5
large works, small works of local utility were started. But by then
1 See Report on Famine in Central Provinces, Paras 1-20, India 
Famine Proc., vol. 5207? No. 9j July 1898. Actually Lyall 
privately admitted to Elgin for taking a little less serious 
view of the situation and apologised for the mistake. Lyall to 
Elgin, 30 November 1896, E.P., vol. 69-
See also Indian Govt, to C.P. Govt., 4 January 1897* Para 7?
Indian Famine Proc., vol. 5203, N. 47? January 1897-
2 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 271.
3 Ibid., Para 278.
4 Lyall to Elgin, 25 December 1896,12 February and 21 March 1897? 
E.P., vols. 69 and 70.
5 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 114.
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enough damage had been inflicted. The death rate rose much above
the normal. From the average of 33*76 per cent (per mile, per
\
year) it increased to 49*31 in 1896 and 69*34 in 1897* According
to the official report of Central Provinces, 91*397 people died 
2of famine. But this figure appears to be low and was even doubted
3
by the famine commission of 1898. Many of the starvation deaths
were attributed to the lack of proper and timely appreciation of the
situation. In passing its judgement on the Local Governments, the
report said: "We regret to have to express the opinion that the degree
of success in the saving of life and relief of the distress was not
4
all that it should or might have been.**
The public criticism had its effects. For showing lack of 
proper vigilance C.J. Lyall was duly reprimanded. He was immediately 
transferred from his post, much to his regret, and sent to the 
India Office as a Revenue Secretary. In such a way his Indian career
1 Ibid« * 294.
2 Report on Famine in Central Provinces, Para 22, op. cit.
3 Para 298.
See also T.W. Holderaess to H.B. Smith, 4 April 1897* E.P., 
vol. 70. The total mortality on account of this famine had been 
variously estimated. William Digby, puts the estimate of deaths 
to4.5 million. Prosperous British Rule in India, p. 129.
In an article 'India under Elgin' the total deaths due to 
famine were estimated as 150,000. Quarterly Review, 1899* vol.
189* P* 3^ 5* Unfortunately neither the Famine Commission nor the 
Indian Govt, gave mortality figures in any cut and dry form.
4 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 299*
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(which should have taken him very high in the executive hierarchy) 
was suddenly terminated. Secondly, the tragedy of 1896-7 had 
taught a lesson to the local Government to start relief in time.
During the famine of 1899* the Government showed extra care and 
prompted immediate measures. Of the total famine units (1135 
million) given as relief in 1899 famine, nearly 50 Pe** cent (555*8 
million) were in central provinces.
It is clear that relief administered through the machinery of 
the local Governments was extensive, varying and at times 
insufficient, depending on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
provincial Government. The Government of North-Western provinces 
showed as much awareness of efficiency as of the need of economy.
The Madras Government gave top priority to the saving of human 
life by giving generous relief. Only the Central Province 
administration was unable to grasp the gravity of the situation and 
therefore was a failure.
To sum up it may be said that a large scale government relief 
was undertaken; actually, nfar greater them any that has yet been 
recorded.11 In the beginning of the famine, in October 1896, there 
were only 5 0 ,0 0 0 persons on relief and in time of acute distress, 
in April 1897* their number rose to >3 million. In all total
1 B.M. Bhatia, The Famines in India, p. 253.
2 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 404.
number of units relieved were 821 million, each at the cost
of 1.42 annas a day per person. This was equivalent to an average
of 2,220,000 persons relieved day by day for the period of one
2
year, at the rate of rupees 32.7 per head per annum. The total
3
relief expenditure in the famine of l896-97was as follows:
Direct expenditure on relief Rs 6,22,64,970 /"This does not include
1,84,11,519 the establishment and 
2,10,73,135 incidental charges. 
1,17,90,898 If included, it will
1,49.04,571 make Rs. 727OOOOO. J
12,84,45,093
Loans and advances 
Suspension of Land revenue 
Remission
Indian charitable fund 
Total
If the loss of revenue under salt, excise, custom and the 
loss of railway freight is added (which was rupees 1,2^,04,000 and 
2,98,19*000 respectively) the grand total comes to more than 17 
crores of rupees. This was the largest single expenditure on any 
famine in the nineteenth century - it was higher than that of the 
much publicised famine of 1899, when the total expenditure including
4
the private charity was 16*5 crore of rupees.
Finally the Indian Government appointed a commission to examine
1 Out of which 479 million (58 per cent) were relieved on works 
and 342 million (42 per cent) gratuitously.
2 Report of the Famine Commission, 1898, Para 339*
3 Ibid., Para 349.
4 Report of the Famine Commission, 1901, Para 22.
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the measures taken and suggest recommendations for future guidance.
2The Commission was headed by Sir J.B. Lyall and included an Indian,
3
Rai Bahdur B.K. Bose, an advocate from Nagpur.
The Commission made a useful and exhaustive critical survey of
the whole situation. In their findings and recommendations, by
and large they agreed with the ’’principles11 as laid down by the
Commission of 1880. In some avenues the report made valuable 
4
suggestions. Firstly, they accepted the innovation of the North- 
Western Provinces and Oudh Government regarding the twofold classi­
fication of relief works, - the ’Diggers* and the ’Carriers*, as
1 See the following in connection with the appointment of the 
Famine Commission.
Elgin to Hamilton, 14 October 1897» E.P., vol. 15»
Hamilton to Elgin, 15 October 1897? ibid.
Telegrams, S.S. to Viceroy (Pr), 11 November 1897; Viceroy to
S.S., (Pr), 15 November 1897; Viceroy to S.S., 22 November 1897;
S.S. to Viceroy, 22 November 1897; &nd S.S. to Viceroy,
30 November 1897* E.P., vol. 20.
Indian Govt, to S.S. L.No. 86 (Fam), 25 November 1897- Rev.
Letters from India, vol.1%
Resolution^ Indian Govt, on Famine, 23 December 1897- Pari. Papers, 
^ C. 8737J  1898, vol. 62, pp. 6-8.
2 Earlier, C.A. Elliot was selected but. on the advice of J. Woodbum, 
the Executive Councillor, who was at that time on leave in London, 
Lyall was appointed. It is not clear why this change was made. 
Probably it was feared that Elliot might be more critical.
Woodbum to Elgin, 12 November 1897* Correspondence from Abroad, 
E.P., vol. 32.
3 The other members of the Commission were Surgeon Colonel J. 
Richardson, T.W. Holderness and T. Higham.
4 See the summary of the recommendation, Report of Indian Famine
Commission, 1898, pp. 319-325.
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convenient and desirable. But they did not agree to its wage
scale and instead adhered to the original full ration of Class
!A ’ for the diggers. For the other class (carrier) they recommended
o
the wage scale to be 75 per cent of the first. Secondly, they 
also suggested that all relief works should be classed in the 
programmes under either the heads of "Public Works" or "Village 
works", devoted mostly to the development of irrigation projects.
And finally, regarding the policy of contracting ordinary public 
works in time of famine, they suggested that so far as Imperial or 
Provincial finances and establishments could possibly permit they 
should be fully maintained or expanded in districts not recognised 
as actually distressed but in which there was reason to suppose the 
existence of an exceptional demand for labour. By recommending 
this they tended to avoid the extra hardship caused to the people who 
were forcefully driven back from the works near the beginning of the 
monsoons.
In the final analysis it might be said that the famine of 1896-7 
gave the Indian Government quite a difficult time. It came at a time 
when the cotton duty controversy was still fresh, and currency changes
1 Indian Fam. Com. Report. I8 98, Para 439.
Earlier, T. Higham, who was appointed a special famine officer in 
connection with the inspection of famine relief who made the same 
suggestion for its acceptance. See Notes by T. Higham, Pari. Papers 
/ “C.8823_7, 1898, vol. 62. See also Note on the task of a’Carrier 
Unit on Famine Work', T. Higham, Report of Indian Famine Commission, 
1898, vol. vii (appendix) Pari. Papers ^  C.925^J7 1899, vol. “33 
PP. 33-42.
2 Ibid., Para 432.
3 Ibid., Para 421.
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were just beginning to take effect. Nor did it come alone. It 
was accompanied by plague and war on the North-Western Frontier 
of India. But Elgin’s administration did not lose its nerves.
Although in dealing with the famine he never innovated any new policy 
- the policy as laid in 1880 was followed in its detail, in devising 
the famine strategy he led hi s team through the troubled water without 
chaos or confusion. He neither had conflict with any local 
administration as Lytton had had, ncardid he over expend as Northbrook 
did.* The relief measures were not necessarily extravagant but 
more exacting. In handling the administration of famine he was his 
own master who neither showed any subservience nor deliberate 
obstinacy. The Secretary of State fully supported him, his colleagues 
and subordinates cooperated with him. His energetic railway policy 
which resulted in adding nearly ^ 000 miles of railway proved a useful 
asset in the utilization of relief works. Besides, the Commission 
appointed by the Government left : ' valuable recommendations for
the future guidance of famines in India.
But the most important outcome of the famine of 1896-7 and the 
one that followed on its heels in 1899 was that the economic aspects 
of the British rule became the most important target of the Indian
2nationalists. Famine, it was urged by leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji,
1 See E.C. Moulton, Lord Northbrook’s Administration, op. cit., 
chapter iv.
L.M. Gujral, The Internal Administration of Lord Lytton, op. cit., 
chapter ii.
2 See Causes and Cure of Famine, Speech delivered on 30 April, I9QI1 
in London, vide His Speeches and Writing. See also, Dadabhai 
Naoroji, Poverty and^ritish Rule in India.
!\
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1 2  3 R.C. Dutt, D.E. Wacha, William Digby and many more, was the
result of India's poverty. It was the question of poverty - the
root cause of all suffering which attracted most attention. They
urged for economic changes and better utilization of India's 
4resources. It was during this period that 'drain theory' became 
a catchword with the nationalists.
The Government also began to realise the need of a change in 
their attitude towards the people. This change in the attitude 
of the Government towards the subject of the prevention of famine 
was probably the most important development of the period. It was in 
this context that the Punjab Alienation Act was passed on 19 October
5
1900. Actually the work in connection with alienation of land on
1 Economic History of India (India in the Victorian Age),op. cit., 
pp. vi-xlxl
2 Presidential Address to the Indian National Congress, 1901 
Session. See also P.C. Ray, Indian Famines; Their causes and 
Remedies, Cal. 1901
\V (U tu . . .
3 The Prosperous British Rule (London 1901), d+fr- iv .
See also Major Cecil B. Phipson, India's difficulties; some ways 
out of them: Indian Poverty and Indian Famines (London 1903)
In England an Indian union was formed which included Marquis 
of Ripon, Lord Hobhouse, Sir Raymond West, S.S. Thorbum, 
Wedderbum and Vaughn Nash.
4 The 1896 session of the Congress, Res xii stressed need for
husbanding the Indian resources.
See also Annie Besant, How India fought for freedom, p. 247•
5 For principle and features of the Act - See C.H. Philips,
Select Documents on the History of India and Pakistan, iv,
pp. 646-7•
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account of unchecked borrowing had been in progress for some time
back.1 On 26 October 1895, Denzil Ibbetson, Officiating Revenue
and Agriculture Secretary to the Indian Government invited the
views and the proposals of local administration on the problem of
land transfers. Ibbetson remarked that the gift of the free power
2
of transfer was an "evil” and a Mpositive political danger.” 
Unfortunately due to so many pressing problems, nothing much could
be achieved except that a useful attempt to ^advance its discussion11
3
was made. Another preventive measure was started in the beginning
of the new century. The Government devoted considerable attention
to the development of irrigation, so as to reduce the dependence of
crop on the vagary of the seasonal rainfall. A plan of rupees 44
4
crores for the next twenty years was drawn in 1905*
1 See for detail S.S. Thorbum, Mussalmans and Money Lenders in 
Punjab, London, 1886.
5.5. Thorburn, Report on Peasant indebtedness and Land Alienation 
to Moneylenders in parts of the Rawalpindi division, 1896.
5.5. Thorburn, His Majesty*s Greatest Subject, London, 1897? P* 151* 
M.L. Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, London, 
1932, chapters i, x and xi.
2 Indian Govt., Confidential Circular to Local Govts., 240ctober 
1895? Enc. Indian Govt, to S.S. L.No. 58 (Rev), 30 October 1895? 
Revenue and Agriculture letters from India, vol. 14.
3 Elgin’s Minute, vide Summary of the Administration of Lord 
Elgin, Revenue and Agricultural Department, p. 45*
4 Report of the Irrigation Commission, 1903, para 114.
♦
Fortunately, there was a great contrast between the beginning 
of the new century, which ushered in hope and new changes and the 
nineteenth century which was unceremoniously closed with two ghastly 
famines and a dastardly plague. Politically - the very occurrence of 
famine was a stigma - an unfortunate event, which made Elgin’s 
rule unpopular, not for what Government did but the fact that it 
occurred. Paradoxically enough, though British rule to a very great 
extent had been responsible for the economic growth in India, yet up 
to the end of the nineteenth century the effects of the British
1
rule f,on the prosperity of people were undoubtedly disappointing.”
1 Vera Anstey, Economic Development of Modem India, p. 5*
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Chapter V 
PLAGUE AND SEDITION 
"For India, 1897 has been a y e a r of calamaties, Famine, Plague, 
earthquake, floods - offended Nature seems to hare arenged herself,
1
on the people add the rulers alike, with these and other afflict ions •B
This was how B.M. Malabari summarized the events of 1897* Added to
these frowns of fortune were riots, murders, polities! trials and
the change in sedition laws* Undoubtedly the last years of the
viceroyalty could have been hardly more inauspicious and hectic*
Of all the troubles, it was plague which gave the Government
and the people by far the most anxious time* Although in real terms
famine was a much greater social and economic evil, in combating
that challenge the Government had long evolved a famine policy* In
case of plague there was 'neither any policy nor any systematic
machinery to deal with it* In the first place, therefore, the steps
taken to encounter the disease were experimental and often conceived
in a spirit of alarm, fear and haste. When the trade of Bombay was
2
seriously threatened with the outbreak of bubonic plague, the
1 B.M. Malabari, India in 1897* Bombay, 1898, p* 3*
2 Plague is an acute infection of the blood by a bacillus which 
is usually introduced by the rat-flea and is often infectious.
Col* W* Glen Liston: ’The Plague', Millray lecture,
British Medical Journal, 31 May 1924, vol. 1, pp. 951-2.
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Government undertook some strong measures which came in conflict
with the social and religious beliefs of the people. The result
of which was the outbreak of violence in various parts of the country.
This necessarily assumed political importance and ultimately prompted
the Indian Government and the Home Government to take stock of the
wider issues of administrative policy towards India.
The presence of plague in the city of Bombay was officially
recognised on 23 September 1896. The responsibility to deal tfth
plague was entrusted upon the Municipal Authorities. On 6 October
1896, the Bombay Government gave special powers to the Municipality
to clean, disinfect, remove or destroy any insanitary property and
2
take away the patient to the hospital or put him in isolation. The 
provisions of this notification, particularly the removal of the sick 
from their homes to the hospitals evoked great resentment from the 
public. They began deliberately to conceal the cases. Many more 
migrated out of the city which resulted in the closing down of mills
1 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 2 October 1896, B.P., vol. 19*
See also Report of the Indian Plague Commission, 1901, Para 21. 
See also Indian Govt* to S.S., L.No. 1 (Sanitary), 27 January 
1897) Para 2. The first suspected case in Calcutta took place 
in October.
See Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 12 October 1896, E.P., vol. 19* 
See also Mackenzie to Elgin, 10 October 1896, ibid., vol. 69* 
By December the port and city of Karachi were also affected. 
Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 30 December 1896, ibid., vol. 19*
By April it had travelled into the interior of Indiav
Report of the Indian Plague Commission, Para 10j>«
2 Municipal Commissioner's Report, Para 7* ^~Herafter cited as
Snow's Report after the name of the chaimanJ7-
1
and the dislocation of the economic life of the town. The public 
expressed their grievances by resorting to complete hartal £ strike^ 
throughout the city c h i 29 October* On the same day 1000 mill 
workers attacked a Municipal hospital* The Government apprehended 
serious violence* Ganging the emotions of the people, the Bombay 
Government immediately issued a proclamation by which the earlier 
notification of 6 October was tacitly withdrawn* The public was 
assured that there would be no compulsion for the removal of the
2
sick and no insistence for the evacuation of the infected houses*
One important outcome of this development was that it' became 
clear that the people would not tolerate anything infringing or 
affecting their social and religious customs* Much tact, persuasion 
and skill were needed to evolve a plague policy with which the public 
could cooperate*
In the meanwhile, during the winter months, the plague epidemic 
assumed serious proportions* Mortality rate increased and Bombay's 
foreign trade declined* In the first six months of plague more
3
than 9000 deaths were recorded in the Bombay Presidency, and during
1 J* Nugent (Member Executive Council, Bombay) to J* Woodbum,
6 January 18971 Enc. Woodbum to H*B* Smith, 10 January 1897,
E.P., vol. 70. From October to December 18951 nearly 250000 
people had fled from Bombay* Statement of Moral and Material 
Progress in India, 1896-7» Pari* Papers, 1898, vol. 63, p. 29*
2 Report of the Indian Plague Commission, op* cit* , Paras 600 
and 605*
3 Report of the Indian Plague Commission, op* cit., Para 27*
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the financial year 1896-7) the aggregate value of the trade of
1
the port of Bombay fell off by 9 par cent* This fall in the trade 
was neither very extensive nor was it entirely dne to plague.
Actually the decline in the overall foreign trade of India in the
„ 2 
same year was only 3*6 per cent from the preceding year* Further,
the shrinkage in the export from Bombay and Karachi was largely
due to famine, yet it was actively feared that western countries
would object to carry on trade with India and that there would be a
larger decline in trade unless more positive steps nere taken to
suppress plague* Both the Indian Government and the Home Government
realised the gravity of the situation* Lord Elgin immediately
dispatched Surgeon-General Dr Cleghom of the Indian Medical Service
to Bombay to report cm plague* He prepared a memorandum in which he
expressed dissatisfaction with the Bombay Government's handling of
plague* He stated that plague was a disease of dirt and insanitary
conditions and, therefore, needed thorough and strong sanitary measures*
He recommended two main measures: first, the evacuation and
segregation of the sick; and secondly, the destruction of unhygienic
3
surroundings and dwellings* The Home Government, particularly the
1 Statement of Moral and Material Progress in India, 1896-7)
Pari* Papers, 1898, vol. 63) P« 180.
2 Trade Review of India, 1896-7) Pari. Papers, f^"c* 8692^, 1898, 
vol. 64, p. 6.
3 Cleghom's Memorandum, Director General of Indian Medical Service, 
16 January 1897) Enc* Indian Govt* to S*S*, L.No. 1 (San),
27 January 1897) Revenue Letters from India, vol. 19* ^Hereafter 
cited as Rev* L*I •J.
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Secretary of State, George Hamilton, who vas frankly wmore
concerned about plague than famine1* for the reason that a "market
once lost, or even partially diverted is not easily regained,**
1
goaded the Government of India for still stronger action. In
addition to compulsory segregation and evacuation he asked for
2the closure of Indian ports to Haj pilgrims. Such an action, he 
believed, would please the European countries and thus act as a 
great deterrent against the possible loss of trade.
Elgin was more disposed to accept Cleghom's recommendations. 
Unlike Hamilton, he was moved not only by economic considerations
but was inclined to take stock of social and religious implications
3
of such a policy. Before giving a final reply to the Secretary of
State, the Viceroy decided to gauge the opinion of local Governments,
4
particularly the Government of Bombay. The Bombay Government
5
agreed to close their port to pilgrim traffic. Similarly all other 
local Governments, except the Bengal Government, agreed that the
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 21 January 1897, E.P., vol. 15*
See also Telegram, S.S. to Governor of Bonftay, 13 January 1897*
Enc. Sandhurst to Elgin, 20 January 1897» ibid., vol. 20.
2 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, 10 and 12 February, 1897» ibid.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 3 February 1897* .ibid., vol. 13*
4 Telegram, Viceroy to Govt .Bombay, 13 February 1897 , ibid. , vol. 70. 
3 Telegram, Govt. Bombay to Viceroy, 14 February 1897, ibid.
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Bombay port should be closed but after observing quarantine rules
and medical precautions, the pilgrims should be allowed to proceed
1
from Calcutta and Madras. It was the candid opinion of most of 
the responsible officers that total prohibition of Haj would be 
"politically injurious". John Voodburn, the Home Member, personally 
undertook a survey of the muslim feelings and came to the conclusion
that total prohibition would complicate rather than ease the
2 3situation. Such was the opinion of MacDonnell also. It might
be further stressed that after 1 February 1897 no pilgrim ship
had gone from Bombay. In response to the protection of trade and
commerce the Indian Government had already instructed the Bombay
Government to adopt any measure to prevent the outbreak, including
4
the stoppage of pilgrims and the checking of the railway passengers.
In compliance with the wishes of Dr. Cleghorn, the Municipal organisations
1 See Elgin to Hamilton, 10 February 1897, ibid., vol. 15*
See also Telegrams, Punjab Govt., 14 February 1897; C.C. of 
Central Provinces, 14 February; N.V.P. & 0. Govt, to Viceroy,
15 February 1897* Enc. FI gib to Hamilton, MSS.Eur. D 509/ iv.
2 J, Voodburn's Note, 14 February 1897, Hie. Elgin to Hamilton,
17 February 1897, MSS.Eur. D 509/iv.
3 MacDonnell to Elgin, 16 February 1897, E.P., vol. 70.
4 Indian Govt, to Bombay Govt., 6 February 1897, Enc. Indian 
Govt, to S.S., L.No. 5 (San), 10 February 1897, Rev.L.I., 
vol. 19.
in Bombay, Madras, Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Oudh were
provided with summary powers by their respective provincial
Governments so as to restrict abatement of overcrowding, evacuation
1
and cleaning of the affected areas. In so doing the Government
not only took almost all precautionary measures but also retained
their confidence in the municipalities which was a very important
step in soliciting the cooperation of the public.
After taking into account all shades of opinion, Elgin
forcefully reiterated his views against total prohibition of Haj
pilgrimage. He wrote: "It was an axiom of Indian administration,
established by teaching of bitter experience, that to enforce
orders which the ignorant masses could regard as infringing religious
2
privileges must be dangerous.* Elgin's view was supported by the
3
majority of the Executive Council. But nothing short of total 
prohibition appealed to Hamilton. He over-ruled the Indian Government. 
In over-ruling the Indian Government, Hamilton supported by Lord 
Salisbury, was merely motivated by imperial considerations and 
did not take into account the possible political implications. He
1 Indian Govt*, to S.S., L.No. 7 (San), 24 February 1897* Para 3, 
ibid.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 17 February 1897, E.P., vol. 15*
3 Two Military Members, Collins and Gen. White and Law Member, 
Chalmers, dissented from the majority opinion.
4 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, 18 February 1897, E.P., vol. 20.
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himeelf confessed to Elgin, "I am always sorry from here to press
you to do something, the benefit of which we feel in Europe and
1
the danger and drawback of which you hare to bear in India,w From
20 February, for the first time, the annual Haj pilgrimage was 
2
suspended, obviously to the annoyance of Elgin, who recorded:
WI must confess to some surprise that those whom you consulted were
unanimous in recommending the step, but perhaps it is another
illustration of the fact that it is the men who were actually
concerned in the administration on the spot who were most keenly
alive to the possible presence of waves of sentiment, 91
This action of the Home Government was not an isolated one
but was coupled with many other restrictive instructions to change
the structure of plague administration in Bombay, Hamilton believed
that it was beyond the powers of the municipal authority to shoulder
so huge and onerous a responsibility. He considered it essential to
substitute the municipal authority by an executive body of a few 
4
officials. In the first instance, both Sandhurst, the Governor of
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 26 February 1897, ibid,, vol, 15.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 19th February, 12 March, 2 April, 
1897, ibid.
2 Report of the Indian Plague Commission, op. cit., Para 696.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 10 March 1897, E.P,, vol. 15.
4 Telegram, Hamilton to Sandhurst, 6 January 1897, Enc. Sandhurst 
to Elgin, 20 June 1897* ibid., vol. 20.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 7/8 January 1897, ibid., vol. 15.
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Bombay and Elgin were not favourably disposed towards Hamilton's 
1
views* But soon the pressure of the Ehglish and the Anglo-Indian
press increased. The Government's plague policy was condemned as
2
weak, foolish, timid and obstinate. Unfortunately, under the 
bellicose and hysterical attitude of the India Office and Ehglish 
press, the Bombay Government by March 1897*succumbed to their 
pressure and relieved the municipal authority of their plague duties, 
and appointed instead an executive committee offour under surgeon
3
Brigadier-General Gatacre. The Committee was given the widest
possible powers. It was authorised to evacuate any building,
destroy it, forcibly search the private homes, segregate the patient
4
and remove him to hospital.
To fulfil these tasks search parties were used which acted as 
flying squads. They visited houses in order to detect the cases or
1 Telegram, Sandhurst to Hamilton, undated, Enc. Sandhurst to 
Elgin, 20 January 1897i ibid., vol. 70.
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 27 January 1897* ibid., vol. 15* 
See also Elgin to Sandhurst, 22 February 1897* ibid., vol. 70.
2 See The Times, 16 March and 22 March 1897*
See The Times of India, 29 January 1897*
See The Ehglishman, 5 February 1897*
See The Pioneer, 27 and 28 February and 3 March 1897*
3 Other members of the Committee were, Mr. Snow, the Municipal 
Commissioner, Surgeon-Major Dimmock of Indian Medical Service 
and Mr. James, an Engineer from the Bombay corporation. Indian 
Govt, to S.S., L.No. 9 (San), 10 March 1897* Para 3i Rev.L.I., 
vol. 19*
4 Indian Govt. Notification, 20 February 1897* Ehc. Indian Govt, 
to S.S., L.No. 9 (San), 10 March 1897, Rev.L.I., vol. 19*
See also Gatacre Report on Plague, page 5*
See also Indian Plague Commission Report, op. cit. , Para 28.
insanitary surroundings and were supported by a cordon of soldiers
to prevent the people from escaping.1 These search parties were
not always sensitive to the feelings of the local people. An
evidence of the reckless attitude of the search parties could be seen
in the very words of a Cit^ Health officer, who said "We treated
houses practically as if they were on fire, discharging into them
from steam engines and flushing pumps quantities of water charged
2
with disinfectants." The most intolerable feature of the search
parties which were exclusively composed of the British officials
related to their invasion of the privacy of an Indian house - for
the Indian women, Hindus and muslims alike practised purdah.
Secondly, the behaviour of the British soldiers was not often quite
up to the standard. Sandhurst himself was not too sure of the 
3
"Tommies? This lack of concern for the private property and other 
social customs excited distrust and alarm among people. The feelings 
of the people in Bombay ran high. By the end of March riots were 
only avoided by the timely withdrawal of all British search parties 
and by incorporating the Indian element into them.
1 Report of the Indian Plague Commission % Para 581.
2 Quoted in the Memorandum of the Army Sanitary Comltission Report of 
the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay, 1896-97* India Home Proc. 
(Municipal) , 16$6,vol. 5646, No. 9* January . Another example
of the nature of their work could be deduced from the contents of 
one of the Governor's weekly telegrams, stating their activities 
in Bombay city. It read: "130 dwellings condemned, 109 recommended 
for alterations, tiles removed from 1027, floors dug in 492, 547 
lime washed, 299 vacated, 3 destroyed by fire etc." Telegram,
Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, 14 March 1897» E.P., vol. 20.
3 Sandhurst to Elgin, 17 March 1897* ibid.» vol. 70.
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These measures which were already exceedingly unpopular
did not deter the India Office from suggesting some more stringent
steps, like corpse inspection and a system of land quarantine. The
latest suggestions were made by Dr. Lowson, the Medical Director
General at the India Office, who ardently believed in very vigorous
and drastic measures. Hamilton and his special committee on
plague recommended to dispatch Dr Lowson and Dr Reade to India to
carry out their schemes. Both of them, who had previous experience
_ 2
of plague in Hong Kong, arrived in Bombay on 1 March 1897* With 
their arrival a new chapter in the history of anti-plague operation 
was opened.
No sooner did Dr Lowson land in Bombay than he started 
advocating land quarantine. He proposed a sort of sanitary cordon 
across the affected places in order to completely seal off the 
infected areas. He found a passionate supporter to the idea in the 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Mackenzie. However, Elgin and his 
executive council generally with the exception of Collen, came out 
forcefully against land quarantine. The Indian Government rightly argudd 
that land quarantine would be ineffective and could not be
1 Plague committee consisted of J. Piele, S.C. Bay ley and 
Charles Crosthwaite.
2 Sandhurst to Elgin, 1 March 1897y E.P., vol. 70.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 17 March 1897* ibid., vol. 2 0 .
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administratively feasible* It would give opportunities for
^oppression and extortion11 and quarantine stations could themselves
1
become centres of serious outbreak* It was argued that any
additional restriction on the movement of the people would be
2bitterly resented and might lead to disastrous consequences*
The Bombay Government could not, however, check Dr Lowson's 
measures for corpse inspection* Under the influence of the 
Secretary of State, Sandhurst agreed to put this into practice. The 
purpose of inspecting the dead was twofold: to ascertain the cause
of death and to detect the suspected cases in the houses of the 
deceased* Surely the examination of the corpse, particularly that 
of the ladies was bound to excite the religious prejudices of the 
public. It appeared relatively too inflammable an issue to be 
more useful medically* Elgin, who was as baffled by plague as any 
one else, but unlike many others realised the probable effect of 
such an issue. He for once refused to take a panicky view of the 
situation* He termed Dr* Lowson,s opinion as *rashn ” lacking in 
experience** and urged Hamilton not to commit the Government to more 
severe measures. It was as much to Elgin’s insistence as to lord 
Sandhurst’s concurrence with him, that Bombay proper escaped the
1 Indian Govt* to S*S*, L.No. 12 (San), 31 March 18971 Para 7i 
Rev.L.I., vol. 19*
2 Ibid.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 7 April 1897» E.P., vol. 20.
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practice of corpse inspection, through Poona and Karachi were
less fortunate* It was, therefore, not a matter of surprise that
in June 1897 sharp violence broke out in Poona* Elgin had done his
best to forewarn Hamilton* He discreetly wrote: "I am not sure
that it would be safe to conclude that the Bombay Government were
not well advised in feeling their way towards the very severe
restrictions they now impose* For myself I shall wait till the
history of this Plague is written*n In yet another letter he
2
emphasised that Ma very small spark might cause an explosion11*
Dr* Lowson still insisted on the extension of corpse inspection 
in Bombay city* But the Bombay Government was now no longer prepared 
to tolerate any rash measures for fear of open violence* They 
discreetly packed off Dr* Lowson to Calcutta, where he and Mackenzie 
formed a formidable team* The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, with
3
the aid of Dr* Lowson, revived the demand for land quarantine*
Elgin reacted swiftly and sharply* He wrote curtly to Mackenzie: 
nI will only say that no amount of protest from Dr* Lowson will 
convince me that any responsible authority in India can shirk the 
consideration of the political dangers of forcing the people prematurely 
into methods repugnant to their ideas of right and wrong* Much can
1 Ibid*
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 April 1897 (appendix), ibid.
3 Mackenzie to Elgin, 10 May 1897, ibid. * vol. 70*
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be done by kindly leading, much can be lost by rigid and
unsympathetic attitude*" He plainly told the Lieutenant Governor
that the system of land quarantine was not even favoured by
Dr* Cleghorn, the highest medical authority in India* Talking about
Dr* lowson, he wrote **1 believe that the Home Department had no
wish to enhance his (Dr* Lowson) importance as an adviser, but
felt bound to forward the Bombay recommendation* I sometime wonder
if Bombay in their hearts wished to see his energies employed 
2
elsewhere*n Lest Elgin's weakness were over-emphasised) the
Viceroy categorically told the Secretary of State that if Bengal
Government passed any legislation in favour of Ladd quarantine, he
3
would be constrained to over-rule and disallow such an act. Elgin 
at last succeeded in restricting the more ominous and vulnerable 
tendencies.
In the meantime plague restrictions began to bite* The muslins 
showed strong resentment against the suspension of pilgrimage and 
compulsory removal of the sick* In the muslim centres of the North- 
Western Provinces and Oudh there was a smouldering of bitter feelings
1 Elgin to Mackenzie, 17 June 1897, ibid*
In a separate letter to Sandhurst, Elgin showed his disappointment 
with Mackenzie: WI do not believe that Mackenzie has managed to 
arrest a single genuine case, though he has several bogus ones, 
and has caused a great amount of inconvenience and heartburning* * 
Elgin to Sandhurst, 3 May 1897, E.P*, vol. 70,
2 Elgin to Mackenzie, 31 May 1897, ibid*
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 25 May 1897, ibid., vol. 15*
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1
against the Government. These restrictions were not only
disliked by the Muslims but were also hated by Hindus. There
was a unanimity between the two communities in registering their
condemnation of the Government measures. The emotions were almost
at a fever pitch. Indian newspapers, who really represented the
feelings and reactions of the people were extremely critical of the
Government b hand ling of the plague. The Hitavadi, wrote: "The
plague regulations have made the people more uneasy than the plague 
2itself." The most despised regulation related to segregation and
inspection of females. The Hitavadi commented that the "inspection
is most offensive to female modesty, as it is made on a crowded
3platform by touching various parts of the body." The executors
of the Government policy were named as "brutes", "butchers",
4
"barbarous" and "wild bulls".
The final outcome of these emotions resulted in open-violence. 
Plague riots broke out in the Punjab, Mysore, Calcutta and Bombay 
and the most serious of all in Poona, where the restrictions were
5
the severest. On 22 June 1897, the chief plague officer V.C. Band
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 4 March 1897, E&c. Elgin to Hamilton,
10 March 1897, MSS.Eur. D 509/iv.
See also Elgin to Hamilton , 24 and 31 March 1897, (appendix), 
E.P., vol. 15.
See also Woodburn to H.B. Smith, 23 March 1897, ibid., vol. 70.
2 Hitavadi, 26 March 1897, Bengal N.N.R., 1897.
3 12 March 1897, ibid.
4 Kalaputra, 18 April 1897, Sudharak, 3 May; D any an Prakash, 10 May, 
Kesari 27 April, and 6 May; Mahastra Mitra, 29 April 1897. Bomb. 
N.N.R. Report, 1897*
5 See Poona Memorial to W.C. Rand, 17 April 1897, J«P. Papers 
1896 A/97, vol. 456.
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1
and Lieutenant C.E. Ayerst were fatally shot. On the same
2
evening Captain Ross was assassinated in Peshawar. Almost
3
simultaneously serious riots took place in Chitpur, Calcutta.
These riots coincided with the Tribal rising, in the North-Western 
frontier of India. Last but not the least, there was a great 
excitement in India on the Turkish victory over Greece in the
4
Greeco-Turkish war, which gave stimulus to Pan-Islam movement. 
Although circumstances and reason for these various disturbances 
were different but all these events taken together became a source 
of great concern and suspicion to the large section of the Anglo- 
Indian community. Their fears were further aggravated when the 
real issues were confused with imaginary and alarming news published 
by the English press in India and outside India.
The Pioneer stated that there was a well-planned conspiracy 
throughout India and the Poona murders were deliberately planted to
5
coincide with the Jubilee. Echoing the same sentiment, the
1 Sandhurst to Elgin, 27 June 1897, E.P., vol. 70.
The Pioneer, 25 June 1897*
2 Ibid.
3 The Times, 1 July and 3 July 1897.
4 See Hamilton to Elgin, 14 Hay and 21 May 1897 (appendix),
E.P., vol. 15*
See also 'The Musalmans of India and Sultan', The Contemporary 
Review, vol. lxxi, ^February 1897'J*
See also Lepel Griffith, 'The Breakdown of the Frontier Policy1, 
The Nineteenth Century, vol. xlii, ^ "October l897_7*
5 The Pioneer, 11 July 1897.
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Englishman wrote that the commulative developments exhibited a
1
large scale antipathy of the Mnativesl> against the British. The
Times of India saw in the events a clear "sign of preparation and 
2
organisation". Many others reported that there was a general 
unrest comparable with the rising of 1857* The St. James Gazette 
wrote that Chitpur and Poona riots and other accidents "bears too 
much resemblance to that which was allowed to be brought about in 
the parts of India«... Every sensible man is very well aware that 
the old antipathy of East to Vest was not ended - has not even, it 
may be, really diminished. Sometimes it reaches a point at which 
the different sects will sink their mutual hatreds for a space to 
unite against the common enemy. They did so in the early days of
3
mutiny."
The Times specially took a conservative view. It repeatedly 
stressed that events of the time represented a political danger to 
the Einpire. Elucidating its point, The Times gave reference to 
the incident in the Punjab, that on the jubilee day, a certain 
rowdy element (mostly children) disturbed the opening ceremony of 
the statue r of Queen Victoria in Lahore. Commenting on this 
incident, which in any other circumstances would not have been
1 The Englishman, 2 July 1897*
2 The Times of India, 9 July 1897•
3 The St. James Gazette, 3 July 1897» E.P., vol. 79* (Newspaper 
cuttings).
See also The Morning Post, 3 July 1897» ibid.
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worthwhile, the Times wrote: NAnd this happened, be it be
remembered in the capital of the Punjab, the most loyal province
of India, which turned back the tide of the mutiny and stemmed
the National Congress movement. If ... such things are done
there, what may not occur in Poonah, Benares, and Calcutta, the
1
head centres of Brahmin or Bengali disaffection.In view of
the outcome the Times recommended the control of the vernacular
2
press - the mouthpiece of sedition. In a special article on Indian
3
affairs, the Times repented its call to check the Indian press. It
constantly drew attention to "a new danger from possible combinations
by masses of ignorant men, accustomed to work together in their daily
life, but totally ignorant of the motives and designs of those who
4
would use them for their own ends.”
1 The Times, 2 July 1897*
2 5 July 1897.
3 V.V. Hunter was the special correspondent of The Times in India.
4 The Times, 19 July.1897.
It is strange but refreshing to see that The Observer, 4 July 
1897)took a very realistic view and came out against the move 
to decry the Indian Press. It wrote: ttIt would be unpardonably 
silly if the Government were to import some of those continental 
methods of Press censorship which we are never tired of decrying
• ••• The Native Press with their violent and illogical diatribes, 
may not be a very satisfactory gauge of popular feeling, but it 
is a rough and probably true index as to what is currently said in 
still more violent and illogical circles below, and an approximate 
guide to -much underground movements is better than no guide at 
all.” E.P., vol. 79 ^ Newspaper cuttings^.
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The question boils down to one fact: were these outrages
the result of a calculated political move against the British Raj?
Was India inseminated with a wave of unrest and sedition? Was
there any need of controlling the vernacular press?
Lord George Hamilton, appeared convinced by the utterances
of the English press. He felt certain that the noutragesn in Poona
were not the outcome of personal revenge or religious fanaticism but
the work of a critical and hostile press which preached and sowed
1
the seeds of sedition. He assumed that the vernacular press
offered a favourable medium to the Brahmins of Poona, Hto fan the
flame of ignorance and prejudice, and they have done so successfully.M
He believed that the hostile Muslim feelings, the popularity of the
Turkish victories and the rapprochement between Hindus and Muslims -
all indicating a serious trend dangerous to the British Raj.
Hamilton suspected a definite connection between the Fan-Islamic
movement and the Tribal rising, which he surmised was fostered by
3
the vernacular press. He wrote, *It seems to me impossible that 
so widespread a combination of disturbance can be indigenous.n
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 24 June 18971 (appendix), E.P., vol. 15*
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 2 July 1897« (appendix), ibid.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 30 July 1897 (appendix), ibid.
See also Telegrams, S.S. to Viceroy (Foreign 5ecr&0il2 
August, 16 August and 18 August 1897i ibid., vol. 2 0 .
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Hamilton attributed this unpopularity to "the processes of education, 
of an unlicensed press, and the development of national feelings or 
religious enthusiasm which they ^ Pressj/ work to create, all tend 
to make the onslaught against our Government more powerful while 
the powers behind the authorities do not correspondingly multiply. 
Speaking of the overall situation, Hamilton wrote: "Not since the
2
Mutiny has there been such combination of difficulty inside India.”
He feared that the "Native troops”, who formed the main pillars of
British imperialism in India were being gradually influenced and
there appeared to him already some visible signs of unrest. He could
think only of one remedy - the adoption of "exceptional measures” to
3
control the Indian press. He expressed similar views in the House
4of Commons on 1 July 1897• On 10 July he telegraphed Elgin to bring
5
a new Press Act and change the sedition laws immediately.
Elgin, on the other hand, was sceptical of any such widespread
danger which warranted so sweeping a treatment But it induced him to
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 19 August 1897, /""appendix^, ibid., vol. 15-
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 12 August 1897, £_ appendixJ ^ ibid.
3 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, (Pr. Conf), 3 July 1897, 
ibid., vol. 20.
4 Pari. Debates, H. of C., 4 Series, vol. L. p. 863*
5 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, (Pr. Conf), 10 July 1897,
E.P., vol. 20.
6 Telegram, Elgin to Hamilton, 4 July 1897 ^ ""appendixibid.
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investigate the real truth. Accordingly Elgin wrote confidentially
to MacDonnell, Mackworth Young, Lyall, and Sandhurst enquiring as
to whether there was any visible element which lent support to the
view that the Poona murder, the Peshawar outrage, the Calcutta riots
and the Tochi business were evidences of a general movement which
1was alleged to be taking place in India,
Regarding the Poona murders it was evidently known that they
took place as a reprisal against the plague measures which were
2exceedingly unpopular in Poona and other places, Sandhurst and 
K,C, Ollivant, the Home Member of the Governor's executive council, 
were of the opinion that the murder of Rand was due to the personal
3
vendetta against him. C,S, Bayley, the superintendent of the 
department of Thagi and Dakaiti who carried out a thorough investi­
gation, never found any semblance of evidence linking the Poona
4
tragedy with anything else. Nor has any evidence cropped up since 
then,
1 Elgin to MacDonnell, Sandhurst, Lyall, Mackworth Young, 6 July 
18971 (appendix); 6 July (appendix); 11 July (appendix); 11 July 
(appendix) respectively, ibid., vol. 71*
2 Bombay Govt, to S.S., L.No, 52 (Jud), Conf., 29 July 18979 Para 3i 
J. and P. Papers 1657/971 vol. 454.
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 29 June 1897, E.P., vol. 15*
3 Sandhurst to Elgin, 27 June 18971 ibid., vol, 7 0 .
See also Telegram, Sandhurst to Elgin, (Pr), 15 July 1897, 
ibid., vol. 71-
See also Ollivant to Woodburn, 10 July 1897, Enc. Voodbum to 
Elgin, 16 July 1897, ibid.
4 C.S. Bayley to H.B. Smith, 12 July 1897, J- and P. Papers 
1896A/97, vol. 456.
28i
As to the murder of Captain Ross at Peshawar, the Punjab 
Government's enquiries revealed no clue or collaboration with any 
outside influence. It was merely an act of a muslim fanatic - nothing 
beyond it.1
Nor was there any evidence available which could trace any 
bearing of Chitpur riots to any such general wave of unrest. Actually 
the trouble originated on a Controversy over a plot of land belonging 
to Sir Jotendra Mohan Tagore which was wilfully occupied by a 
Muslim, Himmat Khan, who falsely alleged that the plot contained a 
mosque. On 30 June 1897» the police got possession of the land. Next 
day nearly 2000 Muslims assembled and again rebuilt the mosque. The 
police went and dispersed the crowd. To avoid trouble Sir Jotendra 
Nath agreed not to force the eviction. But the Bengal Government 
thought it judicious to carry out the orders of the court. On 2 July 
1897 the rioters attacked Tallah pumping station and also some
2
Europeans. The police resorted to firing and some people were killed. 
On 6 July many mill hands in Barrackpore struck in sympathy with 
their cause. Many Europeans who feared an attack on mills fired 
indiscriminately till the mob was bogged down by the police. Many
1 Mackworth Young to Elgin, 15 July 1897» ^"appendix_7, E.P., 
vol. 71.
2 Telegram, Chief Secy. Bengal Govt, to Secy (Home) Indian Govt.,
3 July 18971 India Public (Home) Proc., vol. 3131, October 18971 
No. 123.
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were killed and many more were injured. Stevens the officiating 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, believed that these riots were caused
due to the Europeans taking & very alarmist and exaggerated view
2
of the situation. He said that the general behaviour of the 
English was panic-stricken and wrong. Reporting to the Indian 
Government, the chief secretary of Bengal wrote: "There has been 
much unreasonable excitement in Calcutta among the non-officials,
3and much foolish correspondence has been admitted into the papers."
Stevens asserted, there was no doubt that muslim feeling was
agitated on account of the plague rules. It was in the same vogue
that Pan-Islam movement in Bengal carried their sympathy. He was
firmly of the opinion that the Chitpur riots were an isolated event
4
which needed no overestimation.
1 Telegram, Lt.Gov. Bengal to Viceroy, 6 July 1897, India Public 
(Home) Proc., vol. 3181, October 1897» Ho. 133*
See also for details A.H. James, Commissioner of Police Calcutta, 
to Chief Secy. Bengal, 22 July 1897* India Public (Home Proc) 
vol. 5181, October 1897, No. 150.
Also J.P. Hewet Secy (Home) Indian Govt, to Bengal Govt. , 13 
August 1897, India Public (Home) Proc., vol. 5181, October 1897, 
No. 154. See also Calcutta Review, October 1897, PP« 391-4.
2 C.C. Stevens to Elgin, 8 July 1897, Bnc. Elgin to Hamilton,
14 July 1897, MSS.Eur. D 509/6.
The Lt.Governor reported to Elgin that one Captain Petley made 
some very inflammatory speeches and on 7 July he took a party 
of naval officers to Barrackpore without any authority.
3 W.C. Belton, Ch. Secy. Bengal to \\J.P. Hewet, Secy. (Home), 
Indian Govt., 7 July 1897 (Conf), J. and P. Papers 1796/97, 
attached to 1813/97 vol. 456.
4 Stevens to Elgin, 8 July 1897, op. cit.
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There was no foundation in the charge that the army vas
disaffected. The recent performance of both the Muslim and the
Sikh Sepoys against the tribesmen had proved their loyalty to the
Raj. There was no manifestation of any malevolent feeling on the
1
part of the army, asserted Elgin and C.S. Bayley. Similarly
no proof was forthcoming indicating the Amir's connivance with
either the tribes or the sepoys. Kabul and Constantinople were
2
distinctly apart.
On the whole, Assam, Burma, the Central Provinces, Berar and
Madras were perfectly quiet and "free from agitation and ill 
3
feelings'1. In the North-VesternProvinces there was some excitement, 
particularly amongst the Ifoslims and some natural sympathy with 
Turkey but there were no indications of any sedition. MacDonnell 
reported that there was dissatisfaction with the existing orders
of things on the part of the English-educated classes, but their
4purpose was not to destroy or supplant the British Government.
Alike, the vernacular press was not disloyal but dissatisfied. He 
frankly confessed that much had been exaggerated by the "hysterical"
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 6 July 1897, E.P., vol. 15*
C.S. Bayley to H.B. Smith, 12 July 1897, op. cit.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 4 August 1897, ^~appendix_7, E.P., vol. 15-
See also Elgin to MacDonnell, 17 January 1898, ibid., vol. 72.
3 C.S. Bayley to H.B. Smith, 12 August 1897, op. cit.
4 MacDonnell to Elgin, 16 and 19 July 1897, ^"appendix_7, E.P., vol. 71- 
See also Memorandum on state of public feeling in Rohilkhand 
division as related by district officers at a conference held in 
Barielly on 12 July 1897, J* and P. Papers 189&A/97, vol. 456*
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English Press and added, nPerhaps the Pioneer is doing more harm
than any Native paper by its needlessly alarmist letters tinder the
ft*' i
heading *ttfe signs of times f.w Bayley too was of the opinion
that most of the European fears were exaggerated by the needlessly
2
dismayed and panic-stricken Anglo-Indian Press. MacDonnell
who had experience of the Home Office, considered it neither necessary
nor desirable to remedy the situation by controlling the press.
However, he did not object to taking judicial action against any
3
patently seditious paper.
C.J. Lyall, the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces
and formerly Home Secretary to the Indian Government, also attached
no political significance to the Calcutta or Poona riots. He agreed
that the sympathy of the Muslims with Turkey was a disturbing factor
but in no case was it dangerous. He said that though of late the
vernacular press had become hostile, but it had not "in any part
of the empire, with which I am acquainted, gone the length of producing
serious and active disaffection.n He advised strongly against the
4
resurrection of the Vernacular Press Act. Such was also the
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 August 18971 ^~appendix_7, E.P., vol. 71*
2 C.S. Bayley to H.B. Smith, 12 July 1897* and P. Papers,
1896A/97, vol. 456.
3 MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 August 1897» £ appendix_7, op. cit.
4 Lyall to Elgin, 17 July 1897 ^"appendix^, E.P., vol. 71«
1
opinion of both Stevens and Sandhurst.
Macworth Young, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab,
on the other hand, discerned among some people a growing feeling
of impatience with the authority. This feeling, he said, was more
alive in the urbanised and educated section of the society and was
encouraged by the newspaper editors, unsuccessful pleaders and
disappointed aspirants for Government jobs. He found the Indian
2
press "scandalous" and largely responsible for the Poona riots.
He personally favoured the re-arming of the Government with the 
"Lytton Act" but hastened to add: "1 realise that the spirit of 
the times is against anything in the shape of the Press Act and the 
extension of the Criminal Law is the only practical method of dealing
3
with such firebrands."
From the evidence given above it could be deduced that there was 
in India discontent but no disaffection, resentment but no sedition.
Much of the bitterness was due to the plague rules. The 
vernacular press was not outrageously scandalous. It was the 
Anglo-Indian press which was often irresponsible. Even in Bombay 
where the Indian press was deemed to be the fountainhead of sedition, 
the Government's annual report issued on 27 July 18971 found only
1 Stevens to Elgin, 15 July 1897 appendix_7, ibid.
Sandhurst to Elgin, 25 July 1897» / appendix /, ibid.
2 Macworth Young to Elgin, 15 July,/"appendix 7, ibid.
3 Ibid.
12 papers out of 200 using offensive language which could be "near
1
the verge of seditious writing". On the other hand, the press
2
of Madras far from being hostile was distinctly friendly*
Strengthened by the opinions of the officials, Elgin finally 
surmised - "If special executive powers against the press are
3
intended we consider them undesirable".
Elgin's opinion did not please Hamilton. In addition to the
strengthening of the law against sedition by adopting summary
procedure at Simla, he urged and repeated his preference for
4executive action to suppress the "Native Press".
Hamilton's latest communication upset Elgin, but he declined
to hurriedly legislate at Simla and to revive Lytton's Press Act.
He argued that any legislation produced under the pressure of panic
would not be durable and, may even be dangerous. Secondly, the
implementation of so strong and extreme measures "would do absolutely
nothing to assist in the detection and punishment of those concerned
5
in the recent outrages." Therefore, he asserted, there was no
1 Quoted by Elgin, Elgin to Hamilton, 4 August 1897* /"appendix^/, 
E.P., vol. 71*
2 Report on the Nature of Vernacular Press of Madras, Chief Secy. 
Madras to Secy. (Home), Indian Govt., 21 June 1897* J. and P. 
Papers 1498/97* vol. 452.
3 Telegram, Elgin to Hamilton (Pr), 17 July 1897* ^""appendix_7,
E.P., vol. 20.
4 Telegram, Hamilton to Elgin (Pr), 19 July 1897* /f"appendixJ7,
E.P., vol, 20.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 14 and 23 July, 1897* 
ibid., vol. 15-
5 Elgin to Hamilton, 20 July 1897* ^""appendix^, ibid.
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Justification in passing an Act of the kind at Simla* He then 
elucidated the point of difference between him and the Secretary 
of State: "In your telegrams you imply that, unless we are
unanimously opposed to it, we ought still to consider the 
strengthening of the executive powers by which I suppose 1 am to 
understand some such powers as were conferred by Lord Lytton's Act*
1 am afraid that I should have to oppose that, whatever the opinion 
of the Council**1*
Elgin knew that public opinion in Ehgland had been led 
astray by the gross misrepresentations of the Anglo-Indian Correspondents. 
The Poona murders could have been serious at any time; but without 
the "scandalous exaggerations" from Calcutta there would have been 
nothing to suggest a widespread conspiracy throughout the empire*
Elgin urged that
if, as a result of a deliberate and careful investigation, 
it is determined that the powers of the Government of India 
to deal with the Sedition are insufficient, I do not think 
it is likely I should refuse any support to proposals 
for amendment of the law, even if they go in a direction which 
I generally disapprove* But what I <do not think I can fairly 
be asked to do is to prejudge the case against my own side*
If I stood alone, it might be different* The remedy then 
will be simple, for I could stand aside and let someone else 
play the part I refused •••• I must confess your yesterday's 
telegram has disturbed me and it may be well if I unfortunately 
am compelled to differ from you that you should know that I 
have not decided lightly.^
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. See also Telegram, Viceroy to S*S* (Pr), 22 July 
1.897, ibid., vol. 20.
In this long letter Elgin made two things clear:
(a) that he was fundamentally against a Vernacular Press 
Act and would prefer to resign than to agree to it;
(b) that he would resort to non-executive action against 
sedition but not without due consideration and deliberation*
This resolute stand of Elgin had the desired effect* Hamilton
agreed, though reluctantly to drop the demand for a Vernacular 
1
Press Act* Perhaps the most significant outcome was that Calcutta 
regainedthe initiative once again in dealing with matters of vital 
administrative importance, which it had lost in connexion with the cotton 
duty controversy* Secondly, Elgin had refused to be committed to 
any negative restrictions* Though his attitude might not be 
considered to be liberal, it was calm, cautious and calculating* 
Hamilton's attitude in this whole affair deserves some 
explanation.
Hamilton knew and realised from the very outset that there
was no general movement of any kind, but he found in the murder of
Rand an excuse to crush the press* In the very first telegram after
Rand's murder, Hamilton wrote to Sandhurst whether the outrages
2
could be connected with theincendiary tone of the press. The very
3
next day he expressed the same sentiments to Elgin. A little later
1 Telegram, S.S* to Viceroy (Pr), 23 July 1897 /"appendix 7, ibid.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 12 August 1897 / appendix_7T ibid* , 
vol. 15*
2 Telegram, S»S» to Sandhurst (Pr), 23 June 1897* MSS.Eur. D 50$/l.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 24 June 1897 ^ "appendix_7, E.P., vol.
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he wrote to Elgin that both he and the Judicial and Public 
1
Committee of his council were strongly of the view that advantage
should be taken at this juncture to legislate and restrict the
2vernacular press. To make it sound more convincing he suggested to
the Viceroy that the initiative must come from India and this, he
wrote, "you have, especially if Rand's murder can be associated
3
with his personal denunciation by the press.M He was obviously 
more insistent to do it quickly, lest the tempers might cool down 
and the opportunity sLip.
Though Elgin refused to be hustled, Hamilton kept up the 
pressure. Replying to Elgin's long letter of 20 July, Hamilton 
wrote:
In my earlier telegrams I rather pressed the immediate 
alteration of the law, as I thought we could more easily 
carry public opinion with us in England, when the shock 
of the two murders at Poona had generally affected the 
public. It is really a question of tactics, and tactics 
depend on local considerations, and what may be judicious 
in England may have an opposite effect in India; but my 
own political experience is in favour of utilizing without 
hesitation for the accomplishment of a difficult but 
necessary task any unforeseen advantage an exceptional 
occurrence may give.
1 The members of the committee were, J. Piele, A.C. Lyall, Charles
Crosthwaite, Denis Fitzpatrick and Bayley.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 8 July 1897 2["appendix_7» vol. 15«
3 Ibid.
4 Hamilton to Elgin, 12 August 1897 ^ "append!acJ7»
In the same letter he again stressed
the*
I dread the day when the northern or/fighting races, 
from whom we draw recruits, take to reading the 
vernacular press. Prevention rather than conviction 
should be our object. A summary executive power 
exercised without noise, or demonstration, is what 
oriental peoples appreciate •••«
Hamilton was obviously more anxious about the future than about
the present.1 He wrote: "I am anxious toutilize the present
opportunity, when we have a House of Commons ready to assent to
anything the Government of India may demand, to try and put our
2house in order for future troubles."
This illiberal view was not suddenly acquired by Hamilton.
Ever since he became the Secretary of State for India he had been
constantly pressing Elgin to pass some restrictive laws. If there
was one thing which he feared most, it was the Indian Press. Writing
in September 1896, when no riots or any other trouble had taken
place, he had dwelt on the danger of allowing the freedom of press.
He could not trace in the papers he read any symptoms of loyalty to
3
the British rule. In another letter he wrote, "I grant that 
Indian native press do not advocate the overthrow of our rule but 
their everlasting criticism and imputation of motives must ultimately
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 19 August 18971^ "”aPP«ndix_7, ibid.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 26 August 1897y/ append!^, ibid.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 16 September 18971 
ibid.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 30 September 1897* /~appendix_7, ibid*
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 17 September 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
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make an impression 31st as a perpetual drop wears out the stone. 11 *
He added: "Every year we turn out more and more educated Natives,
eveijryear the press will increase, and become more powerful. Its
circulation may now relatively be small, but it must continually
increase, and, if there is nothing to counteract it, its effects
must be yearly more and more pernicious."^
This was only one aspect of his concern. He also wanted to
see the influence of the Indian National Congress decline by merely 
3
ignoring it. He was equally determined to see that the Hindus 
and the Muslims remained disunited. He believed that when the 
Hindus and Muslims were disunited they were an administrative 
problem, but when they were united they would become a political 
problem and a political problem was worse than an administrative 
problem.^
Elgin, on the other hand, thought precisely the opposite.
First, he said, it would be as much wrong to set the clock back by 
bringing in Lytton*s Act, as ; to look far ahead to the dangers of 
distant future. He wrote to Hamilton, "I feel the force of what
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 30 October 1896, ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Hamilton to Elgin, 17 July 1896, ibid.
Also Hamilton to Elgin, 11 December 1896, ibid.
4 Hamilton to Elgin, 3 May and 14 August 18971 ibid., vol. 15*
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 21 January 1898,
ibid., vol. 16.
you say of dangers that nay arise in the future, the comparatively
distant future. So far as we can, we must, I admit, frame our
measures so as to guard against these dangers. But at the same
time there is a danger in looking too far ahead, and not observing
1
the rocks that may be under the bows." Secondly, it was too much
to expect from a man belonging to Gladstone's and Ripon's party
to enact a law already repealed. Even then Elgin was prepared to
go far, if there was any apparent danger to the empire. He
approached the problems of India not as Hamilton did - from narrow
and limited view, nor also, as probably Ripon would do - from a
positively liberal point, but in his own way from a deliberately
cautious and non-alarmiSt view.
He was genuinely convinced that the ''Native Press" was not
hostile. Actually much of the muddle was created on account of the
extra-suspicious attitude generally adopted by the European officials
2
towards the Indian Press. His colleagues like Trevor and Westland 
entertained serious misgivingsagainst the press and would welcome 
some means of repressing it. But Elgin was not influenced by them. 
Writing to the Home Member he said, "Personally I do not consider the 
Native Press to be either so seditious or so dangerous as I know some do.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 7 September 1896, 2f"aPPen(* i Ibid* < vol. 16.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 27 July 1897* ^"appendix_7, ibid., vol. 15-
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I doubt whether any amendment of the law relating to sedition is at
this moment required, and if it is not required, it cannot be
d e s i r a b l e . H e  maintained that it was the Anglo-Indian Press
which excited racial feelings by publishing false and exaggerated 
2
stories. He rightlycalculated that it would be a political 
mistake of the first magnitude to enact extreme measures and merely 
decided to resist the demand for any such measures.
Elgin's approach towards the Indian Press had been very 
consistent from the beginning. He had not found in the selections 
from the "native press" which he "conscientiously" studied, any 
trace of a design to "substitute for British authority a native, far 
less another foreign rule". Nor did he attach much importance to
what he called the "vapouring of the papers" as some of the "thin-
3
skinned" bureaucrats did. In fact Elgin, immediately after his 
arrival, was put to a very severe pressure from his colleagues to 
change the press laws. This happened when in June 1894, Crosthwaite,
1 Elgin to Woodbum, 20 July 1897 j ^/"append!x_7, ibid., vol. 71*
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 13 July 1897 * /f”appendi*7, ibid., vol. 15*
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 14 July 18971 i/appendix_7, ibid. 
Danik-o-Samachar Chandrika from Bengal very pertinently 
remarked, "The Anglo-Indian Papers are doing their best to 
create disaffection, and if any Press law becomes necessary, 
it will be necessary for them." 19 July 1897* Bengal N.N.R.,
97‘ 7 October 1896,
3 Elgin to Hamilton,/E.P. , vol. 14.
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then the Lieutenant Governor of the North-Western Province and
Oudh considered prosecuting Bishan Naryan Dhar, the writer of an
allegedly seditious pamphlet, which criticised the Governments
1
pro-Muslim and anti-Hindu bias. Elgin had written: "what I want
to say now is that I think the majority of my Council are distinctly
in favour of strong measures to put down 'false and seditious
writings1 .... 1 consider some (both vernacular and English) papers
perfectly shameless, but 1 think it is impossible to exaggerate
their importance, and that where 96 per cent of the population is
illiterate, and secret agencies (for example tree smearing) can
defy detection, it is better not to drive everything under 
2
surface.*' It was on the strong insistence of Elgin that Crosthwaite 
reluctantly agreed not to prosecute B.N. Dhar.
1 Crosthwaite to Elgin, 12 June 1894, ibid., vol. 64.
2 Elgin to Fowler, 12 June 1894, ibid., vol. 12.
See also Elgin to Fowler, 19 June and 3 July 1894, ibid.
See also Elgin to Crosthwaite, 16 June 1897) ibid., vol. 64.
In July 1894 Elliot,the Lt.Gov. of Bengal wanted to institute 
proceedings against Hitavadi, an influential Bengalese newspaper 
and again on the advice of Elgin the matter was not pursued. Elliot 
to Elgin, 28 July 1894, ibid., vol. 6 5*
See Englishman, 2 June 1894; Spectator, 5 May 1894, E.P., voj.. 74. 
See Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, 7 May 1894, ibid., vol. 17*
See also Elliot to Elgin, 15 April, 19 June 1894, ibid., vol. 64. 
See also Elgin to Elliot, 8 June 1894, ibid.
See also Crosthwaite to Elgin, 8 May 1894, ibid.
See also Harris to Elgin, 19 May 1894, ibid.
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 52 (Pub), Enc. 17 October 
1894, India Public (Home) Proc., vol.^cciOctober 1894, Nos. 200-4.
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The very circumstances of their existence inclined the Anglo-
Indians to take alarm at any unusual development in India. The
1
tree-smearing episode is too well known to be repeated here. It 
was, therefore, fortunate that at the head of the Indian administration 
was a statesman like Elgin who took a sensible view and refused to 
act in panic.
Elgin's attitude towards Hindu-Muslim issue also differed
considerably from that of the Secretary of State. He stressed the
need to tackle any problem concerning the two communities with
2
11 absolute impartiality11. He even did not hesitate to impress
this point on Queen Victoria, who was specially interested in placating 
the Muslims. In September 1894, when Hindu-Muslim riots took place 
in Poona, she wired, nMohamedans should be protected, and their 
worship not disturbed. They are real supporters of British
3
Government”. To this Elgin replied that his Government was
committed to the policy of impartiality and informed the Queen that
4
reasonable men existed on both sides. As a matter of fact, Elgin
1 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 8 May and 4 June 1894, E.P., vol. 17*
See also Elgin to Fowler, 24 May; and Fowler to Elgin, 1 June 
1894, ibid., vol. 12.
MacDonnell to Elgin, 6 June and Elgin to MacDonnell, 6 June 1894, 
ibid., vol. 64. 1897
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 24 March/^~appendix_7, E.P., vol. 17-
3 Telegram, Queen to Viceroy, 17 September 1894, ibid., vol. 125 ©•
4 Telegram, Viceroy to Queen, 18 September 1894, ibid.
See for details of riots Proc. of Poona riots, 13 September 1894, 
Ehc. Bombay Govt, to S.S., L.No. 21 (Jud), 22 December 1894,
J.P. Papers 32/951 vol. 3^9 •
See also The Times, 15 October 1894.
had shown great interest in the Hindu-Muslim issue. On his arrival
in India he undertook determined measures to avoid any clashes
between the communities on ^ d festival and deliberately avoided
taking any sides. All local Governments were specially armed with
preventive powers. It was a great achievement on the part of Elgin
that no untoward incident took place during the Id festival in 1894.
Their common dislike of the plague measures brought the Hindus
and the Muslims rapprochement closer together in 1897- This baffled
and disturbed some. Many emphasised that the Muslim sympathies
towards the British Raj had been sacrificed for small imperial
reasons and they urged to take necessary steps to win back the
Muslims. One of the ardent advocates of this approach was E.E.C.
Ollivant. He wrote, "there is a common ground of discontent in
reference to plague measures, but much more than this there can be
no doubt that the recent unfortunately anti-Mohomedan attitude of
English political parties and Ehglish public speakers has produced
a great feeling of resentment. Those hostile to us are not slow
to take advantage of this, and I should hail with delight any freedom
from European political entanglement which would enable us once more
2
to enlist the Indian Mohamedans cordially on our side.1*
1 See Elgin to Fowler, 21 March, 29 May, 9 June, 19 June and 
31 July 1894, E.P., vol. 12.
2 E.KX.Ollivant to J. Piele (Member Indian Council) (Pr) , 3 November
1897; Enc. Hamilton to Elgin, 21 January 1898 ^ ""appendix_7,
E.P., vol. 16.
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There were, on the other hand, influential officials like
MacDonnell who pointed out that the successive British Governments
had been so far showing partiality towards the Muslims, especially
in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. This had, he believed,
necessarily alienated the larger section, that is, the Hindus whom
he considered more loyal. He informed that until now the Muslims
dominated in the subordinate executive and police services. For
example, out of 240 Tehsildars, 140 were Muslims and there were
2,570 Muslim police officers against 2,120 Hindu, though the
population ratio was 7 to 1 in favour of Hindus. He therefore
proposed to win the support of the Hindus by altering the ratio
in course of time to 5 to 3 in favour of the Hindus for these jobs.*
It is doubtful to say as to how far this and other suggestions were
given practical effect, but this sort of exhibition of personal
likes and dislikes by the officials must have perpetuated the rift
between the two communities. However, Elgin maintained an outward
2calm and did not express any preference for one to the other.
But he felt constrained to explain to Hamilton that the Muslims 
distrusted the clever Hindus and he did not apprehend any danger
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 August 1897 appendixE.P., vol. 71*
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 16 September 18971 ibid., vol. 15«
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on that account.*
Elgin personally was not motivated by the desire of driving 
a wedge between the two communities and did not take any special 
steps which could further aggravate the Hindu-Muslim differences.
But the fear of a possible unity between the Hindus and Muslims was 
always a source of great uneasiness to certain British administrators.
Elgin was also fundamentally at variance with Hamilton in 
dealing with the growing politically conscious and 'discontented* 
elements in the feociety. Elgin realised that Indian nationalism 
was bound to develop with the passing of time and British rule in 
India would "never be free from anxiety". He frankly recognised 
that the danger in the present and the future was obvious in the 
movement that 'they can no more stop than Canute could restrain the
2
waves, the progress of education and the acquisition of knowledge."
The Indians considered the English as alien and there was truth in 
what T.J.C. Plowden, the British Resident to the Court of the Nizam of
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 30 December 1897 ^ [~appendix_7, ibid.
C.J. Lyall, the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces expressed 
this point in detail. "At present 1 believe that Indian 1 Mus&lmans - 
that is, the thinking and educated portion of them - are generally 
loyal, because they clearly realise that their safety, in 
presence of the vast Hindu majority, and of the immense growth 
of the Hindus during last century in power, wealth, education, 
and influence, is bound up with the existence of British rule."
Lyall to Elgin, 17 July 1897 ^ a p p e n d i x ibid., vol. 71*
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 27 July 1897» ^"appendix_7, ibid., vol. 15.
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Hyderabad stated, nI have been too long in India to have illusions
1
to the real feelings of the Natives towards us11. But there was
no such move to supplant the British Government. Nor was the
Congress ready to usurp the reins of the Government. But of late
discontentment and dissatisfaction with the British rule had grown.
To some extent it was due to the spirit of the times and to the
exceptionally hard time through which the people had passed in
the years 1896 and 1897*
Elgin's diagnosis was essentially moderate and realistic.
He fully recognised that it was difficult to concede the same amount
of liberty of action in a country under a foreign rule but he
equally realised the danger in annihilating wall right of free
2
speech11 • Total restriction could exacerbate the political situation 
rather than ease it. He desired to divert the growing political 
consciousness in India into constitutional channels and not to turn
3
it into open hostility against British rule by trying to suppress it. 
Secondly, he emphasised that it would be dangerous to 
exaggerate the potentiality of the discontented elements. Talking 
of the Congress, which was a wred rag”, to the Secretary of State 
and many officials, he said that the Congress *not infrequently 
trespasses on the border land of what is permissible and I dare say
1 T.J.C. Plowden to Elgin, 28 July 1898, ibid., vol. 73*
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 10 February 1898, ^""appendixJ7, E.P., vol. 16.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 30 December 1897» ^""appendixJ7, ibid., vol. 15-
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 21 April 1897) ibid.
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contains within its ranks men who would go much further if they
dared, 1 doubt whether any responsible man would even propose to
1
prohibit the congress,w Earlier he had written "Remember I do
not myself admit that these men are disloyal. Some of them are
discontented men, and discontent may of course verge on disloyalty,
but I do not believe that a man like Mr Mehta wishes to overthrow
2
the British Government.11 It was a fact that the Congress merely
agitated nto improve the system of administration and not to abolish 
3
it." It was in the context of the circumstances that the Viceroy 
desired to bring that element into the open. This attitude of 
Elgin is fully reflected in the stand he took in dealing with the 
question of Legislative Councils for the Punjab and Burma and bears 
a sound testimony to his administrative farsightedness.
In 1892 the Punjab and Burma were the two provinces which were 
not given the Legislative Councils. For the reason that both were 
border states and both needed a strong and powerful executive.
Actually the retiring Lieutenant Governor Sir J.B. Lyall had conceded 
the desirability of having a Legislative Council in the Punjab but
4
the question was left to the discretion of the new Lieutenant Governor.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 27 July 18971 ^~appendix__7, ibid.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 25 August 1896, ibid., vol. 14.
3 B.M. Malabari, The Indian Problem, Bombay 1894, p. 12.
4 See Jndi&i Govt. (Home) to Punjab Govt., 28 March 1896, India, Public
Proc., vol. 4959, No. 1711 August 1896*
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The new Lieutenant Governor, Fitzpatrick, vehemently opposed
1
and the matter was allowed to he dropped. But when the question
of raising the status of Burma from a Chief Commissionership to a
Lieutenant Governorship was moixtEd, Elgin took the opportunity of
2suggesting a Council for Burma as well as the Punjab. Fitzpatrick 
opposed the move again and emphasized the uniqueness of the Punjab 
in being a border state, containing a turbulent people and rival
3
religious sects which at all costs needed a strong executive.
To Elgin,Fitzpatrick's objections appeared rather flimsy. Commenting
on his Note, Elgin said that if his objections were taken into
account there would be no legislative Council in any province. In
his usual diplomatic way, Elgin decided to take advantage of
Fitzpatrick's retirement and approached the Secretary of State for
making uan. ' appointment of a new Lieutenant Governor who necessarily
4
would not stick to his predecessor's opinion. Such a person Elgin 
found in Mackworth Young. But Elgin's executive council was still 
opposed to his idea and he asked Hamilton to give him his positive
1 Punjab Govt, to Indian Govt. (Home), 31 October 1892; ibid.,
No. 175-
2 See S.S. to Indian Govt., Desp. No. 1 (Pub), 9 January 1896,
India Public Proc., vol. 49591 1896, No. 170, August
1896.
3 Note by Denis Fitzpatrick, 10 April 1896, Para 14. India Public 
Proc., vol. 49591 No. 174, August 1896.
Burma Government had agreed to accept the Legislative Council. 
Burma Govt, to Indian Govt. (Home), 14 April 1896, Para 2, ibid., 
No. 176.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 16 June 1896, E.P., vol. 14.
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1
support. When the matter was finally put before the Executive
Council, the majority agreed with Fitzpatrick and opined **it
would be impolitic at present to establish a Legislative Council
in the Punjab.w Surprisingly a Legislative Council was approved
for Burma by 5 to 2 and rejected for the Punjab by 5 to 2, Elgin
2
and Voodburn dissenting. Elgin's Minute is very revealing and
significant and needs to be quoted at length, for it mirroxshis
basic approach to the political problems of the period. He wrote:
I affirm that to oppose the institution of Provincial 
Councils on the ground of the possibility of a recrude­
scence of sedition And disloyalty is to misunderstand the 
whole situation. No one can absolutely deny that hidden 
dangers may exist, or that the smouldering embers may some 
day be fanned into a flame. But if so, it will not be the 
open discussions of a Council, but one of the mysterious 
agencies, which the 'voiceless millions' of India kn6w both 
how to use and how to conceal from our most careful 
scrutiny, that will once more imperil the existence of 
the Indian Empire •••• How best to cope with the great 
silent, indefinite and implacable danger is a problem that 
has yet to be solved. Of one thing I am confident, and 
that is, that it will not be overcome by stifling criticism, 
but rather by inviting free discussion, whenever and 
whereever we can, and by throwing open to the light of day 
and being prepared to justify every act of our admini-- 
stration and of the officers who carry out our orders.
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 21 July 1896? ibid.
2 Indian Govt., to S.S. L.No. 64 (Pub), 25 August 1896. India 
Public Proc., vol. 4959? No. 177? August 1896. See also Proc. 
No. 178-182.
3 Elgin's Minute, 24 August 1896, Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, 25 
August 1896, MSS.Eur. D 509/2.
See also Voodburn's Minute, 15 August l896,^hc. to Hamilton, 
25 August 1896.
See also Voodburn to Elgin, 23 August 1896, E.P., vol. 69*
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Elgin refuted the charge of those who said that the Act of 1892 
was a Concession to political agitation" and urged Hamilton to 
extend the constitution of 1892 to the Punjab as well. In September
the matter was referred to the Judicial and Public Committee of the
Secretary of State's Council. There was a strong pro-Fitzpatrick 
element in the Council. Arthur Godley suggested a compromise
that a Council might be created not on the basis of 1892 Constitution
2 3but on the 1861 Act. Hamilton agreed. The majority of the
Councillors approved except A.C. Lyall who favoured extending the
41892 Act to the Punjab. Vith the best of intentions, Elgin did
not entirely succeed, but he gained his point substantially. In
December 1896 the Legislative Councils were granted to both Burma 
5
and the Punjab; though there were many who protested and agitated 
against restricting the scope of the new change to the 1861 Act.^
7
It was a matter of regret that no elective element was introduced.
1 Ibid.
2 A. Godley Note, 25 September 1896, J. & P. Papers, 1619/96, vol.429*
3 Hamilton's Note, 6 October 1896, ibid.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 30 October 1896, E.P*, vol. 14.
4 A.C* Lyall, Note, 14 October 1896, ibid. See also J. and P.
Minute, 21 October 1896, ibid.
See also India Council Minute Book, vol. 77*
5 S.S. to Indian Govt. Desp. No. 116 (Pub), 3 December 1896, Paras 3-51 
India Public Proc., vol. 5*80, No. 351 February 1897*
6 Memorial, Indian Association (Lahore), India. Public Proc., ibid*
No. 14. See also Report of the Indian National Congress, 1898, Res.xxi.
7 The Legislative Council in Punjab came into existence with 9 
nominated members. The first council consisted of 4 European 
officials, one non-official European and 4 non-official Indians.
India Public Proc., vol. 5*81, No. 415, October 1897*
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This analysis of the two different approaches, impulses and 
reflexions of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy is very 
revealing. First, we find that Hamilton's wit and judgement were 
obscured by his imperialist myopia and prejudice. Elgin, in 
contrast to him, appeared liberal and more pragmatic, especially 
because he had to deal with a dominant Secretary of State, 
intellectually shrewd, constitutionally strong and politically 
Conservative. The tension between the two accounted for a compromise 
in the context with the basic policies to be followed towards India.
They were to be more cautious than liberal, more watchful than 
suspicious. This was the main significance. Secondly, it also 
explodes the myth that Elgin was unduly subservient to either Whitehall 
or the Indian bureaucracy. Nor did he lose his grip over the admini­
stration. He refused to take a panicky view of the situation - 
a fact which Hamilton was constrained to admit. He wrote to Elgin, 
"whilst I differ from you as to the nature of weapons to be employed,
it is most satisfactory to find that you hold such strong and non-
1
alarmist views as to the general condition of India.w
On the main issue concerning sedition, Elgin agreed in principle 
to strengthen the existing law. But the nature of the change and 
the extent to which it would be strengthened were left to the deliberate 
and careful attention of the Indian Government.
In connection with the Poona riots the Bombay Government arrested
1 Hamilton to Elgin, 12 August 1897 ^ ”appendix_/, E.P., vol. 15*
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some people under Section 124A of the Indian Penal code for making
seditious utterances, the most notable among them being B.G. Tilak,
who was arrested on 27 July 1897* This trial, which ended in
conviction, had the distinction of passing through three stages.
There was a trial in the High Court, then the application for leave
to appeal to the Privy Council and finally the application before
the Privy Council itself.
The charge against Tilak was that he made some provocative and
irresponsible statements intended to cause disaffection. Tilak had
written in the Kesari of 4 May 1897» that the Bombay Government
should not have entrusted the execution of objectionable plague orders
to a "suspicious, sullen and tyrannical officer like Randn. On 12
June 1897 he addressed a Shivaji memorial meeting in which he justified
the murder of Afzal Khan and reminded his audience that everything was
permissible to attain national ends. He said, "do not circumscribe
2
your vision like a frog in a well; get out of the penal code.11
Vriting a week later in the same paper Tilak said, Mto speak the truth,
none can help thinking that this is surely not the proper time for
3
celebrating the jubilee, at least not in India.11 These statements
1 Bombay Govt, to S.S., L.No. 52 (Jud), 29 July 1897* Para 4, J. P. 
Papers 1657/97* vol. 454.
2 The Kesari, 15 June 1897•
3 Ibid., 22 June 1897-
were considered incendiary enough and he was brought to trial
on 8 September 1897* A jury of 6 Europeans found him guilty
against 3* two Hindus and one Parsi, and Tilak was convicted for
18 months.1 An appeal against the conviction and for leave to
appeal to Privy Council was rejected by the full bench of the High
2Court on 24 September 1897* This decision was finally upheld by
3
the Privy Council.
The significance of the trial was immense. Tilak at once
became a national hero. The Bengalee of 25 September appeared with
black borders. In the Amraoti Congress that year, S.N. Banerjee said,
"For Mr. Tilak my heart is fhll of sympathy, my feelings go forth to
4
him in his prison house. A nation is in tears.” Actually Tilak 
and many more were convinced that there was nothing seditious in what 
he had said or written and that he had no hand in the crime of 24 June.
1 Telegram, Bombay Govt, to Indian Govt., 14 September 1897*
India Public Proc., vol. 5413* No. 345* May 1898.
See for details, India Public Proc., vol. 5413* Nos. 356-9* May 
1898.
See also J.P. Papers 2254 and 2255/97* vol. 461.
See Report of the ' Tilak Trial, Times of India, 10 September - 
18 September 1897*J
See Full and Authentic Report of Trial of B.G. Tilak: edited 
by S.S. Sethur and K.G. Deshpande.
2 See for details, India Public Proc., vol. 5413* No. 362, May 1898. 
Also J.P. Papers 2291/97* vol. 462.
3 For details, India Public Proc., vol. 5413* Nos. 377-60, May 1898.
4 B.P. Sitaramyaya, The History of the Indian National Congress, 
1885-1935, P. 37.
5 T$ V. Parvate, Bal Grangadhar Tilak, Ahmedabad, 1958, P* 505*
311
Sandhurst, the Governor of Bombay did not find Tilak's speech
particularly seditious - nI have read a full translation of the
1
Shivaji speech, but I can see nothing in it.M On the other hand
it gave the Government some satisfaction that Section 124A. was found
workable. The Government was obviously pleased with Justice
Strachey's interpretation of Section 124A, defining disaffection
as simply an nabsence of affection. It means hatred, enmity, dislike,
hostility, contempt and every form of ill-will to the Government.ff
He went on to add that, nthe amount of intensity of the disaffection
is absolutely immaterial, except perhaps in dealing with the question
of punishment: if a man excites or attempts to excite feeliings of
2
disaffection, great or small, he is guilty under the section.n
Three other sedition trials were held in which two convictions
3
were upheld and one was discharged after tendering an apology.
1 Sandhurst to Elgin, 12 July 1897 / appendix_7, E.P*, vol. 71*
2 W.R. Donogh, The History and Law of Sedition, Calcutta, 1907, p. 47- 
See for the detailed summing up by Justice Strachey, India Public 
Proc., vol. 54131 No. 359, May 1898.
See also J.P. 2576/97, vol. 468.
The summing up of the Judge earned the following remarks from 
the Secretary of State: wThe Judge was judicial, judicious, and 
temperate and strong.11 Hamilton to Elgin, 16 September 1897, 
^~appendix_7, E.P., vol. 15*
3 See for details, Imperatrix vs Ramchandra Naryan (editor'
of Pratod) and Krishanji Dhandev (Publisher)• India Public
Proc., vol. 5413, No. 352, May 1898.
Imperatrix vs Shankarvish va nath Kelkar (Printer Poona Vaibhav)
and Sakharam Gopal Parandikar (Publisher), ibid., No. 366.
Imperatrix vs Kashinath Vaman tele (editor Madvritha),
No. 374.
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In spite of the fact that three out of four sedition 
trials had succeeded and the adequacy of Section 124A had been 
proved, the Government decided to change some sections of the Indian 
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code to make generally the 
judicial machinery flexible to deal with sedition effectively.
After the trial of Tilak, Elgin wrote to Sandhurst, MThough it is 
satisfactory to have got a verdict against Tilak, it was only by 
a majority, and the result of the subsequent trial shows how the 
change of sides of one member of the jury might have prevented 
Tilak's conviction. It cannot be pleasant for either you or me, 
personally to be responsible for the proposals to set aside juries 
in these cases, but it is exceedingly difficult to see how we can 
avoid it.w^
The amendment of the sedition laws was discussed in the
Executive Council meeting on 3 October and it was decided that the
2
changes should be of a non-executive and general nature. The
Indian Government also did not attempt to redefine Section 124A of
3
the Indian Penal Code. Three sections of the Criminal Procedure 
Code and two sections of the Indian Penal Code were recommended for 
amendment by the Indian Government.
1 Elgin to Sandhurst, 20 September 1897* /"appendix 7« E.P. ,_yol. 71- 
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 30 September 1897» ^appendix_/, ibid., 
vol. 13-
2 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., (Pr), 4 October 1897» 
ibid., vol. 20.
3 Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 68 (Pub), 14 October 18971 Paras 2-5- 
India; Public Proc., vol. 5413» No. 334, May 1898.
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First, they enlisted for amendment Section 107 of
the Criminal Procedure Code and proposed to empower the Magistracy
to demand security to keep the peace from a person who was likely
to do any such wrongful act, not only as might probably occasion
a breach of the peace, which was the existing law, but also as
might probably disturb the public tranquillity.* Secondly, the
Government suggested that a new clause be added to Section 109 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, which would provide a summary method
for stopping the dissemination of seditious or defamatory matter,
written or spoken in cases which were not of sufficient importance
to make it desirable to institute prosecutions under the Indian 
2
Penal Code. Thirdly, they recommended the addition to column 8
of the Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code in relating to the
offences under Section 124A, Indian Penal Code, of the words
^Presidency Magistrates or Magistrate of the First Class*1 - after
the words court of session. This amendment would enable trials
under 124A, Indian Penal Code, to be held by a Presidency Magistrate
3
and Magistrate First Class.
The two changes proposed in the Indian Penal Code related to 
Section 505 and 499. Section 505 pertained to false statement with 
intent to cause mutiny or commit offence against the public peace.
1 Ibid., Para 6.
2 Ibid., Para 7*
3 Ibid., Para 8.
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The Government proposed to reword the explanation so as to leave
1
the burden of proving it on the defence. The accused under the 
changed clause would be liable to conviction in spite of his 
intentions or actual effect, if he could not prove that the statement 
he made was false. Second amendment of the Indian Penal Code 
concerned Section 499 which related to the offence of defamation.
The majority of the councillors favoured to add to the earlier 
explanation that it would be an offence to make imputation against one
class or community of persons. The purpose of this addition was
2
to restrict the embittennent between one sect and the other.
Woodbum supported by Elgin opposed this change because it could
suggest to various sects or make it more easy for sects to bring
charges of defamation against each other aid could further inflame
the class animosity. He pointed out that already under Section 107
and 109 of the Penal Code executive possessed the exact authority,
3
it seemed to need. With these recommendations, Elgin asked
4
Hamilton to give their proposals a fair trial.
Elgin also invited the opinions of the local Governments on the
1 Ibid., Para 10.
2 Para 9. This change was strongly favoured by E.&K. Ollivant
and Sandhurst. See Sandhurst to Elgin, 4 October 18971 £ appendix_7, 
E.P., vol. 71»
3 Woodbum to Elgin, 3 October 18971 /"append ix_7, E.P., vol. 71«
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 13 October 18971 /~appendix_7* E*p*» vol. 15*
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nature and extent of the changes proposed in the despatch to
the Secretary of State* All local Governments agreed that there
was no need for reviving the Vernacular Press Act, or changing
the wording of Section 124A, except the Government of Madras who
wanted to amend it to make it clear to a layman.1 Similarly most
of the governments accepted the principle of amendment but Lyall,
Stevens and MacDonnell felt that the wordings of some of the
2
changes must be more sober. It was Cotton, the Chief Commissioner
of Assam who totally rejected the need for any change. He wrote:
WI trust I may not be deemed to have exceeded my duties if 1 venture
to offer you my most respectful warning against the trend of
legislation it is proposed to undertake. It will certainly be
received with tremendous opposition in India, and I anticipate that
the embitterment of racial feelings which is continually growing
3
will be augmented. ** Besides Cotton, all approved of the changes 
in Sections 107 and 109 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Regarding 
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, all local heads except Havelock
1 Havelock to Elgin, 15 November 1897, and P. Papers 218^/97? 
vol. 459*
See also Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., (Pr), 2 December 1897i
^appendix_7, E.P., vol. 20.
2 Lyall to Elgin, 19 November 1897* J* and P. Papers 2184/97* vol.459* 
Stevens to Elgin, 4 November 1897* /[~appendix_y, E.P., vol. 71»
Also Stevens to Elgin, 16 November 1897* ibid.
MacDonnell to Elgin, 9 November 1897* ibid.
3 Cotton to Elgin, 13 November 1897 /[""append ix_7, Ji>id.
See also Cotton's Minute, 12 November 1897* and P. Papers 
2184/97, vol. 45$.
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1
and Young supported John Voodburn. Section 505 of the same
code was opposed only by £otton and Stevens who wanted that the
burden of proving falsity should lie on the prosecution.^
After receiving their opinions Elgin was inclined to further
soften down the wordings of certain clauses. He emphasised that
there was a need for minimising the opposition, particularly by
redrafting the wordings of Section 505 and completely dropping
Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code. His inclination was
to alter the new Section 505, by omitting the word ’false* which
was objected to and make the explanation an exception. This he
considered would be a distinct improvement, the effect of which
would be that the prosecution could bring up against a man any
statement, true or false, but the accused by proving its truth could
escape. There would thus be shifting of the onusof proof, though
the practical effect in working would be exactly the same under
3
both forms of section.
Elgin rightly feared that there would be bitter criticism at 
the hands of the public of the provision giving all powers to the 
District Magistrates, the Presidency Magistrates and Magistrates
1 Havelock to Elgin, 15 November 1897, op. cit.
Mackworth Young to Elgin, 30 November. 1897, J* and P. Papers, 
2184/97, vol. 459.
2 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., (Pr), 2 December 1897, ^~appendix_7, 
E.P., vol. 20.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 24 November 1897, appendixJ7* ibid. , vol. 15*
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First Class to try sedition cases and deprive the jury of the right
to do so. He summed up his personal views by stating that nto
be charged with introducing legislation restricting the right of
free speech and free criticism and trial by jury is so unpalatable
that nothing short of a feeling that it is a positive duty would
1
induce me to support what is now proposed,*1
While Elgin was trying to further minimise the effect of the
new changes, Hamilton was planning to further enhance its scope
and extend the nature of the changes proposed. The recommendations
of the Indian Government were at once presented to Wilson, the legal
expert at the India Office, He opined in favour of the Indian
Government and approved their suggestion not to redraft Section 124A
of the Indian Penal Code. He also hinted that the Magistrates
2
should not be given such wide powers. Arthur Godley did not 
approve ofthe above opinion and forcefully suggested that Section 124A 
must be amended and the powers of the Magistrates need not be
3 4curtailed. Hamilton dittoed Godley. But the Judicial and 
Public Committee did not agree to amend Section 124A. However, it 
agreed to the amendment of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and 
also accepted the Secretary of State's suggestion to modify Section
1 Ibid.
2 Wilson's Memorandum, 9 November 18971 J» and P- Papers 2184/971 
vol. 459*
3 Godley's Memorandum, 16 November 18971 ibid.
4 Hamilton's Memorandum, 16 November 1897,ibid.
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505 which would make even a true statement which was nlikely to
1
cause offence11 punishable. Godley again sent a memorandum to
Hamilton repeating his earlier views, in spite of the fact that
the Privy Council had upheld the decision of John Strachey on
19 November. He also stated that he had obtained the concurrence
2of Wilson to the draft of his instructions. On 27 November,Hamilton
gave his decision to reward Section 124A. In line of the new
amendment, he agreed to drop his proposal to change Section 499 of
3
the Indian Penal Code. On 4 December 1897, in accordance with
the wishes of the Secretary of State, the Legal Committee approved
his decision. In their minute the Legal Committee wrote, nIt
appears to us however open to question whether, after the recent
favourable decision of the Privy Council, it is desirable to make any
amendment of the section.n Yet they hastened to add: nBut as we
understand that the Secretary of State considers the time opportune
for a restatement of that law, we think it advisable to take 
4
advantage.” On 7 December, Hamilton telegraphed his decision. In 
addition to the changes suggested in Section 505i He proposed to add 
the following new words to the Section 124A: "hatred, contempt or
1 Judicial and Public Committee Minute, 24 November 1897, ibid.
2 Godley1s Memorandum to Hamilton, 24 November 1897? ibid.
3 Hamilton*s Minute, 27 November 1897, ibid.
4 Legal Committee Minute, 4 December 1897? J* and P. Papers,
2184/97, vol. 459*
31S
disaffection, towards the Queen or Government or promote or
attempt to promote feelings of ill will between different classes
1
of the Queen's subjects. 11 He also urged Elgin to push through
both amendments in the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure
2
Code together and quickly.
Elgin accepted Hamilton's modifications, but refused to
combine both bills together for want of proper deliberation and
3
for reasons of political tactics. He wrote, "It appeared to
me that to make one Bill of these proposals would have the inevitable
result of concentrating all attention on this Bill, and its
attaining unenviable notoriety as the Press Legislation cf Lord
4
Elgin's Government. 11 After having secured the major point,
Hamilton was prepared to leave to the Indian Government the discretion
5
in the method of introduction.
The question arises as to why . Elgin agreedto change 
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code? A simple answer to this query
1 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy (Pr), 7 December 1897? ^fappendix_7,
E.P., vol. 20.
See also S.S. to Indian Govt., Desp. No. 44A (Jud), 6 December 
18971 India Public Proc., vol. 54131 No. 340, May 1898.
2 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy (Pr), 9 December 1897» / appendix 
E.P., vol. 20.
See also Hamilton to Elgin, 10 and 16 December 18971 ibid., vol. 15- 
? (Pr),
3 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S. ,/li December 1897» ^"appendix^ , 
ibid., vol. 20.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 16 December 1897,^"appendix_7, E.P., vol. 15.
5 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, (Pr), 13 December 18971 ^"appendix 
ibid., vol. 20.
is rather difficult. It could perhaps be best rationalised 
that in considering to agree to the concession he was striking 
a compromise with the Secretary of State. However, he attempted 
to minimise the impact of such a change.
Elgin informed Hamilton that all his proposals were adopted 
and on 21 December 1897 two separate Bills were introduced in the 
Legislative Council. One to amend the Indian Penal Code and the 
other, the Criminal Procedure Code.
The changes in the Indian Penal Code were first discussed and
1
were bitterly assailed by the non-official members of the Council.
2
Officials like Cotton protested against them. The Burma Government
also doubted the necessity of widening the scope of 124A and Section
505. The Governments of Bengal and the Central Provinces felt
h
constrained to object to the new changes. There was a good deal 
of criticism outside the official and Council chamber - all declaring 
that the new changes were uncalled for, restrictive and punitive.
1 See Proc. of the Council of the Governor-General in India, 1897? 
vol. 3 6, pp.
See also Elgin to Hamilton, 30 December 1897» ^£~appendix_/,
E.P., vol. 15-
See also Bishamber Nath's Note, (Member Legislative Council),
25 December 1897» J* and P. Papers l4l/98> attached to J. and 
P. 529/98, vol. 474.
2 Assam Govt., to Indian Govt., 31 December 18971 Para 2, J. 
and P. Papers 195/98 attached to 529/98, ibid.
3 Bengal Govt, to Indian Govt., 18 January 1898, Para 9-H» 
ibid.
Central Provinces Govt, to Indian Govt., 10 January 1898,
Para 3 and 7? J. and P. Papers 233/98 attached to 529/98, 
vol. 474.
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But Chalmers actually denied that any change in 124A was really
contemplated. The Government was merely introducing a few words
1
to make the clause more understandable. But this was not true.
Actually by choosing to change the explanations of 124A, the
Government had the intention of arming itself with substantial
executive powers. So strong was the opposition that Elgin had to
2
re:-:examine the situation. He telegraphed to Hamilton privately 
that the Select Committee on the Penal Code had proposed certain 
amendments and urged him to agree to it. The Committee believed that 
some degree of ill will wasjinseparable from criticism, however
1 Proc. of the Governor General Council in India, 18975 vol. 
xxxvii, pp. 379-81.
2 See Naoroji's statement, The Times, 29 December 1897-
See H.C. Dutt's letter to the Editor of Englishman, 4 January 
1898.
See The Capital, 5 January 1898, E.P., vol. 80, ^""newspaper 
cuttings/.
See Indian Association to Indian Govt.,21 January 1898, J. and 
P. Papers, 292/9 8, attached to 529/98, vol. 474.
See European and Anglo-Indian Defence Association to Indian 
Govt., 23 January 1898, J.P. 292/9 8, attached to 529/98, vol. 
474.
See British-India Association to Govt, of Bengal, 21 June 1898, 
ibid.
See note by Advocate General, Madras, 8 January 1898, ibid.
See President, British India Association to Indian Govt.,
28 January 1898, J.P. 358/98, attached to 529/98, vol. 474.
See Bombay Presidency Association to Indian Govt., 26 January
1898, ibid.
See Report of the Indian National Congress, 1897, Res. xiii.
See Poona Sawajanik Sabha.’ to Indian Govt., 2 January 1898,
J. and P. Papers 419, attached to 529/98, vol. 474.
See Bengal National Chamber to Bengal Government, 3 February 
1898, J. and P. Papers 475, attached to 529/98, vol. 474.
See Public Memorial from the citizens of Calcutta, 17 February 
1898, J. and P. Papers, 533, attached to 529/98, vol. 474.
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legitimate, and could be compatible with genuine loyalty. Accordingly
the committee suggested to drop the words "or promotes or attempts
to promote feelings of enmity or ill-will between different classes
of Her Majesty’s subjects'1 from the text of the clause which
were originally recommended by the Secretary of State in Council.
They also proposed to drop the word, rtill will1* from the
explanation and defined disaffection to include "disloyalty and
1
all feelings of enmity". They also added another explanation
stating that "comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative
or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting
to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an
2
offence under this section."
A similar suggestion to tone down the element of extra­
harshness in the Section 505 vas also recommended. The committee 
forcefully pointed out that it was too much under the conditions 
of modem journalism to require persons publishing statements to 
prove its actual truth. Its proposed new explanation read: "an 
offence within the meaning of this section when the person making, 
publishing or circulating any such statement, rumour, or report has 
reasonable grounds for believing that such statement, rumour or
report is true, and makes, publishes or circulates it without such
%intent as aforesaid.11^  The Secretary of State chose to accept the
1 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S. (Pr), 26 January 1898, ^/~appendix_7,
E.P., vol. 21.
2 W.R. Donaph, The History and Law of Sedition, p. 71-
3 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S. (Pr), 26 January 1898, op. cit.
1
recommendations. These changes were finally passed by the
2
Select Committee on the Bill to amend the Indian Penal Code. On
18 February the Bill was approved by the Legislative Council.
As a matter of fact, all these changes now approved of were
originally proposed by Elgin and Chalmers on 16 December 1897* But
Westland and Trevor, the members of the Executive Council, had
opposed it and it was then decided that if the pressure mounted
the concession could be given to render soft appearance to the 
3
public opinion.
The changes in the Bill to amend the Criminal Procedure Code
were also hotly contested andconcession had to be made before
they were enacted on 18 March 1898. The most important change
actually pertained to the summary method of stopping sedition and
its dissemination by giving powers to the Chief Presidency Magistrates
and the Magistrates First Class to try the cases and also allowing
them to take a security from the persons suspected of any such 
4
activities. The new alteration was criticised by almost all 
the Europeans and the Indians who submitted their criticism to
1 Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy (Pr), 27 January l898,^”appendix_7,
E.P., vol. 21.
2 See Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend 
Penal Code, Enc. Elgin to Hamilton, 3 February 1898, MSS.Eur.
D. 509/ix. See also P. Ananda Charlu's dissenting Note, 3*
January 1898. He questioned the very need of any change in 
Indian Penal Code, J.P. 529/98, vol. 474.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 16 December 1897» ^ appendix_7, E.P., vol. 15-
4 This amendment became subsequently Section 108 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code.
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the Government. The European and Anglo-Indian Defence Association
asked that either the amendment be cancelled or the Magistrates
should have a definite proof of a person's guilt before taking a 
1
security. H.T. Princep, formerly the Judge of the Calcutta High
Court and now the additional Member of the Viceroy's Council,
also voiced his concern on the issue and wrote, "I am sorry that it
has been settled to propose to give such power to magistrates
both by lowering the jurisdiction in cases under Section 124A, Penal
Code, and in security cases of this class. In neither case, in
my humble opinion, was it essential to enforcing the law, and I also
think that it certainly is not worth the agitation that it will
2
provoke in which Europeans will join the natives.”
Actually the main motive of the European agitation was that
they did not approve of being equated with the "native" press. The
Pioneer openly advocated to confine the restrictions to the "Vernacular
papers" and often eulogised Lytton that his arrangements were
"distinctly more convincing than those of Lord Elgin and Lord 
3
Chalmers". The European critics were most interested in confining 
the jurisdiction of 124A to the Presidency and the District Magistrates
1 Secy, of the Association to Indian Govt., 10 February 1898,
India Leg*.:. Proc., vol. 5480, Appendix A31.
2 H.T. Princep to H.B. Smith, 15 December 1897» ^"appendix 
E.P., vol. 71.
3 The Pioneer, 28 January 1898.
who were Europeans. They feared that in case of reducing the
jurisdiction to Magistrates, there could be the possibility of
1
a European being tried by a "native11. The motive behind their
agitation was primarily racial. Sir C. Paul, the Advocate General
2of Bengal, was openly carrying on propaganda in the Calcutta Bar.
The most fervent support of this idea came from G. Evans, a
member of the Legislative Council, and Mackenzie. The latter
3
even threatened to move an amendment to that effect. Elgin did
not like this tendency of introducing any element of race 
4
distinction.
The Indian Press and the public were equally critical. They 
resented the abolition of the trial by jury. They wanted some 
safeguards and demanded the provision for review of cases by the 
High Court. In most cases they did not trust the young Magistrates.
Rivaz, the new Home Member, and Chalmers were also now convinced 
that some changes were required. Similarly Elgin felt that the 
stringency of the law should be relaxed as feu: as it could be done
1 Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., (Pr) 4 February 1898, ^"appendix^,
E.P., vol. 21.
2 Westland to Elgin, 7 February 1898, / appendix^, ibid.
3 See Elgin to Hamilton, 10 February 1898, ^ appendix_7, ibid., 
vol. 16. To Mackenzie's attitude, Elgin had taken strong 
exception and wrote curtly to him that any of his hostile moves 
would be "intolerable". Elgin to Mackenzie, 12 February 1898,
^ ? l ? P e h ibid., vol. 72. See also Elgin to Hamilton, 17 February 
1898, append ixJ7j ibid., vol. 16. This brought a prompt apology _
from the Lt. Governor. Mackenzie to Elgin, 12 February 1898 ^ appendix 
ibid., vol. 72.
4 Elgin to MacDonnell, 6 February 1898, E.P., vol. 72.
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1
safely. Ultimately the Government made many changes. The
Magistrates were now allowed to have sureties of good behaviour
from the publisher and did not insist on securities. Secondly,
all orders issued under Section 108 were subjected to review of 
2
the High Court. These recommendations were accepted by the 
Secretary of State and by March both the Indian Penal Code and 
the Criminal Procedure Code stood amended.
There is no doubt that but for the active opposition they 
aroused and the ready conciliation and moderation shown by Elgin, 
the sedition laws would havebeen very restrictive.
One important fact emerged. Political offenders could now 
be tried by the Presidency, the District and the First Class 
Magistrateswithout recourse to the jury. This meant wider and 
greater powers for the Government. By omitting the clause * which 
he knows to be false' from Section 5059 it made impossible for the 
newspapers to publish any news regarding the action or intention 
of the Government.
During all this period of political difficulty, the Government 
did not ignore the presence of plague. The Government measures
1 Elgin to Hamilton, 24 February 1898, ^appendix_7, ibid., vol. 16.
2 Report of the Select Committee on the Bill to amend the Penal 
Code, Para 24, Appendix A49, India Leg. Proc., vol. 5^79»
continued with almost unabated zeal. During the summer months
there was a marked decline in the plague cases and fewerpLague
1
deaths were reported. The decline in the outbreak of plague
gave the impression to the Government that plague had been contained
due to the implementation of strong measures. But by the beginning of
monsoon and the coming of winter the plague recrudesced with great
virulence.. Some thought that the large scale outbreak was again
due to the relaxation of rules after the riots and other political
disturbances. A cry was raised for more effective arrangements,
which meant the revival of land quarantines and corpse inspection.
Sandhurst and Elgin were not disposed to take steps in that 
2direction. But by December and January plague reached its peak
1 See Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 12 (Sanitary), 31 March 1897» 
Para 2, L.N. 14 (San), 28 April, Para 3i L.No. 15 (San), 12 
May 1897i Para 3i Rev.L.I*, vol. 19*
See also Campbell (he became the Chairman of the Bombay Plague 
Committee on 1 July 1897 after the exit of Gatacre) Report, p. 1.
2 Sandhurst to Hamilton, 29 August 1897» One. Sandhurst to Elgin, 
29 August 18971 E.P., vol. 72.
Elgin doubted if corpse inspection would not be very unpopular 
with the lfomeh.„ He pointed out that even in most advanced
countries people had to heed their social and religious customs.
He gave the example of Lady Rosebery, a Jew; when she died 
her body was not touched when funeral ceremony began. He 
added, MIf in England among a highly educated section of 
society, feeling of the kind is so strong, it would be worse
than folly for us to neglect or ignore its existence here*”
Elgin to Hamilton, 30 December 1897» E.P., vol. 15.
and more cases were reported than ever before. Hamilton again
2
feared the loss of trade. In December 1897 rules were once
3
again issued for compulsory segregation and in January military
search parties were employed to evacuate the sick in various
4
parts of the Bombay Presidency. In addition, the Bombay Government
5
\oluntarily resorted to land quarantine.
On 3 February 1898 the Government of India issued a fresh
resolution and tightened the plague rules. The segregation of the
sick with the aid of search parties was its main measure; but
the Government still refused to agree to any drastic measure like
£
corpse inspection. But as it was, the situation was already 
explosive. In March 1898 it was rumoured that the Government in 
Bombay was instituting corpse inspection. This was the proverbial
1 See Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 27 (San), 9 December 1897»
Rev. L.I., vol. 19; L. No. 1 (San), 6 January 1898, Rev.L.I., 
vol. 21.
2 Hamilton to Elgin, 21 January 1898, E.P., vol. 16.
3 Campbell Report, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
4 Report of the Indian Plague Commission, op. cit., Para 3 6.
3 Elgin to Hamilton, 27 January 1898, E.P., vol. 16.
6 Etac. Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 4 (San), 3 February 1898, 
Rev.L.I., vol. 21.
See also Telegram, S.S. to Viceroy, 15 February 1898, Political 
and Secret Letters from India, 1898, vol. 100.
See also Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 24 February 1898, P.S.L.I., 
vol. 100.
Also Elgin to Hamilton, 24 February 1898 ^ ""appendix_7, E.P., 
vol. 16.
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last straw which broke the camel*s back. Already in Bombay all
British search parties were in use for plague purposes and land
quarantine, though officially prohibited was being regularly
practised in Bombay.1 On 9 March 1898 very fierce riots broke
out in Bombay. The disturbance was caused due to the attempted
removal of a Muslim female {lague patient to the hospital. There
was complete ’hartal* of the Bombay dock workers and cartmen which
2
continued with varying success from 9 March to 16 March 1898.
This spontaneous outbreak forced the Government to reconsider
3
its policy. On 15 March 1898 the Bombay Government announced 
the withdrawal of the military search parties. House visitation
4
was restricted to voluntary groups composed of the local population. 
MacDonnell and Macworth Young also sounded the note of caution and
1 Telegram, Gov. Bombay to S.S., 13 March 1898, P.S.L.I., vol. 102.
2 Telegram, Gov. Bombay to S.S. (Pr) , 9 March 1898. MSS.Eur.
D. 508/1.
Conf. Telegram, Gov. Bombay to S.S., 11 March 1898, P.S.L.I., 
vol. 102.
Also Telegram, Gov. Bombay to S.S., 16 March 1898, ibid.
Also Telegram, Viceroy to S.S., 10 and 12 March, 1898,
E.P., vol. 21.
Also Sandhurst to Elgin, 3 April 1898, ibid., vol. 72.
3 There were many riots in various other parts of India. The riots
broke out in Nasik on 27 January 1897; in Sharanpur, 30 March;
Jullundhar 24 April; Hoshiarpur, 28 April; Calcutta May 1898. 
Besides there were minor riots in Delhi. See Indian Govt, to
S.S., L.No. 19 (San), Conf. 25 August 1898, Rev.L.I., vol. 21.
4 Campbell Report, pp. 23-27.
See also Indian Govt, to S.S., No. 7 (San), 14 April 1893,
Para 3i Rev.L.I., vol. 21.
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both urged that the responsibility of the plague administration
should and must be given to the Indians and the local people.$ By
now the medical and administrative authorities were convinced
that plague did not recede on account of stringent measures but
increased and decreased in the winter and summer months respectively.
Hamilton was also brought around and was finally convinced that
3
extra-hard rules did not necessarily bring good results. local
Governments were given maximum discretion to apply rules according
to the need and circumstances of the situation. Segregation and
4
compulsory evacuation were completely given up in large towns.
These new propositions were fully supported by John Woodbum, till
5
recently Home-Member and now the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal;
1 MacDonnell to Elgin, 29 April 1898, E.P., vol. 72. _t 
Macworth Young to Elgin, 13 April 1898, ^""&PPendix_/, ibid.
See also MacDonnell to Elgin, 5 May 1898, ibid.
See also Elgin to MacDonnell,11 April 1898, ibid.
2 Elgin to Hamilton, 11 April 1898, ibid., vol. 16.
3 See Hamilton to Elgin, 1 April 1898 /"appendix 7i 7 April
appendixjf \ 6 May 1898 /  appendix_/ and 17 June
1898, ibid.
4 Elgin to Hamilton, 28 April, 26 May, 16 June,
14 July I8 9 8, E.P., vol. 16.
5 Sir John Woodbum, A Biographical Sketch by His Daughter,
London, undated, p. 23.
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Rivaz the new Home Member; Hewett, the Home Secretary, and
Surgeon-General Harvey, the Director of the Indian Medical Service.
In a way the Bombay Government reacted most effectively. The
special plague Committee was abolished and the Municipality was
1
again brought into the picture. The importance of this was
that public co-operation which could always be the most effective
weapon in an extremely conservative society, was fully put to use.
The confirmation of its utility could be seen in the fact that
Curzon followed it up.
In our attempt to evaluate the plague policy of the Indian
Government, we find many symptoms of muddle and confusion. It was
probably due to the fact that it had to work under two limitations.
Firstly, the plague policy was not yet evolved and the lessons
were learnt the hard way. Secondly, the confusion was worse confounded
on account of the unnecessary and persistent interference of the
outsiders. It was due to outside influences and imperial considerations
that the pilgrims for the Haj were stopped which consequently irritated
the feelings of the people. Even the Venice Sanitary Convention of
1897 did not prohibit the departure of the pilgrims from the infected
2
areas, if proper precautions were taken. In so doing the Government
1 Sandhurst to Elgin, 11 May I898 2f"aPPendix_7, E.P., vol. 72.
See also Telegram, Govt. Bombay to S,S., 3 May I8 9 8, 11 May,
16 May I898. MSS.Eur. D. 508/1.
See also Resolution Bombay Govt. 27 May 1898, Enc. No. 9i Indian 
Govt, to S.S., L.No. 12, 16 June 1898, Rev.L.I., vol. 21.
2 Report of the Indian Plague Commission, op. cit., Para 696.
went beyond the requirements of the convention. In addition, the
Government was ill advised to institute very stringent measures.
The excessive use of the search parties created social and political
hardships. Their high-handed attitude neither mitigated plague
nor appeased the people. Sandhurst himself said that wholesale
searching did not show results which were not out balanced"by
disadvantages and hardships, especially those caused by indiscreet
or corrupt subordinates. The result was that the entire population
1
was being set against the measures." It was therefore not so
surprising that the plague Commissioners did not favour compulsory
2
segregation or evacuation in their findings. Fortunately, due to
the guarded opposition of Elgin, more unpopular measures of doubtful
utility like corpse inspection were avoided. It was equally tragic 
that the Bombay Government was wrongly advised to wrest powers from 
the municipality. The only effective way to deal with epidemics 
of the type in the given circumstances was to solicit the maximum 
cooperation from the public. And that is what ultimately happened.
It was only after two years of consistent and patient endeavours 
on the part of Elgin that a plague policy worth the name was evolved
which laid stress on the isolation of the sick, disinfection of the
1 Telegram, Governor Bombay to S.S., 17 March 1898, P.S.L.I., 
vol. 102/1898.
See also India under Lord Elgin, Quarterly Review, op. cit., 
p. 328.
2 See Report of the Indian Commission, op. cit., Paras 5 8 1,
627 and 637-
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affected areas and finally in preference to coercion, the
compliance of the regulations through persuasion. It was this
1
policy which won the approval of the Plague Commissioners. The
lessons were learnt by Elgin by 1898 and the probable benefit
of this experience was reaped by Curzon.
The year 1896-7 was a year of great misfortunes. But India
was not overwhelmed by "disruptive forces1*, as depicted by 
2
The Times. Nor did the year inaugurate **a repressive regime
3
unparalleled in the annals of India11, as asserted by The Bengalee.
Both these views were journalistic exaggerations.
The most important feature of the period was Elgin's ability 
to face the crisis and keep his head cool. It goes to his credit 
to steer the ship of the state through the rocks without either 
grounding it or wrecking it. The situation might have easily gone 
out of control but for the foresight shown by Elgin. He not only 
contained the external forces but maintained a united administrative 
front. Though his policies were by no means liberal, they were 
decidedly motivated by deliberate caution.
1 See the Preliminary Report of the Plague Commission, Enc. Nos. 
28-32; Indian Govt, to S.S., L.No. 6 (San), 9 February 18991 
Rev.L.I., vol. 24.
See also Report of the Indian Plague Commission, op. cit. , 
Paras 727 and 731*
2 19 July 1897.
3 31 July 1897*
CONCLUSION
Lord Curzon arrived in Bombay on 30 December 1898 and Lord 
Elgin left Calcutta for London on 6 January 1899* Thus ended a 
momentous Viceroyalty.
At the end of Elgin's tenure there was hardly any forum of 
Indian public opinion which praised him. To some extent the reason 
for this attitude was obvious and possibly justified, because a 
new and uncertain currency system marked the beginning of the 
administration; controversial cotton and excise duties and un­
precedented natural calamities made it a target for criticism; change 
of sedition laws earned it still greater unpopularity. The Indian 
press, in fact censured Elgin for not paying due regard to the wishes 
of the governed.
The Indu Prakash wrote: "Whatever allowance may be made for 
the serious difficulties Lord Elgin had to contend against, the
fact is undeniable that his administration has been not only barren
1
of any good results, but positively productive of harm." The
Amrit Bazar Patricks deplored a Viceroyalty which excited "discontent"
and abated "repression" and thereby demolished the reputation, the
2
British statesmen built in India for justice and generosity. Some
1 26 December 1898, Bomb. N.N.R., 1899* See also Kesari,
27 December 1898, ibid.
2 3 November 1898, Selection from the Indian Newspapers, Thagi 
and Dakaiti Department, P.S.L.I., vol. 110.
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others complained that a "thorough going liberal11 had been converted
1
into a "narrow minded Anglo-Indian". Another Bombay weekly
4
described Elgin's rule as "pernicious and mischievous in the extreme".'
Another newspaper recorded that "Lord Elgin in India has been a
type of the very worst Anglo-Indian" and people would rejoice at 
3
his retirement. The same opinion was dittoed by the Bengalee some
time later. It described the period "where^Ln their ^ "the people's_7
4
sufferings knew no bounds." "Lord Elgin's administration was", wrote 
the Hitavadi, "from beginning to an end, marked by error, want of 
intelligence and light mindedness.
Many of the above comments lack a correct perspective because 
they were made in the heat of the moment. Elgin's administration, in 
fact, was not so barren of results nor was Elgin personally a 
reactionary. On the main issue of finance and currency Elgin showed 
a good deal of personal interest. He fully realised the gravity of a
1 Akhbar-i-Am, 19 October 1898, ibid.
See also Indian Spectator, Gujrati, Champion, 23 October 1898$ 
Sudharak, 24 October; Indu Prakash, 24 October; Kesari, 25 
October 1898, Bomb. N.N.R., 1898.
2 Indu Prakash, 25 October 1898, ibid.
3 Prabhat, 9 April 1898, ibid.
4 7 JanUary 1899*
5 6 January 1899» Bengal N.N.R. 1899* See also Bangavasi,
6 January 1899» ibid.
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unnatural monetary standard and tried his best to establish gold 
standard in the country. He was equally alive to the monetary 
needs of the community. In order to meet the demands of the public 
and the famine he released the monetary reserves from the currency 
balances. Elgin remained alive to the problem of currency and tried 
his best to terminate the transitory stage as early as possible.
By 1898 the fluctuations in the exchange rate stopped, the Government 
treasury was enriched and by the time Elgin left, the Government 
showed a surplus, but in the process the Elgin's administration had 
to act as a shock absorber to the new changes that had taken place 
in 1893.
The cotton duty controversy was indeed another important event. 
Elgin was personally criticised very much by the Indian public and 
press for showing his inability to protect the interest of Indian 
textile industry. But the decision to do so - in spite of Elgin's 
role - was made under various pressures, influences, and motives 
that seemed to be at work. It was no doubt, an unjust decision to 
impose duty on Indian cloth when there was no question of any 
competition between India and Manchester made goods. Its significance 
is further enhanced when one realises that it was dictated by a 
liberal Government.
Some of Elgin's most notable achievements in the field of railway 
expansion were obscured on account of other unfavourable developments. 
He was the first person to appreciate the value of feeder railways 
to develop hitherto underdeveloped areas and utilized for its
3 3 7
construction the locally raised capital. The Viceroyalty witnessed 
the maximum amount of railway growth that ever took place in 
span of five years. Besides, great experiments were made with 
the system of mixed economy (private sector and public sector) in 
the public utility services of India. Elgin was personally 
responsible for completely organising the railway establishment and 
introduced financial and administrative planning in India. His 
activities in connection with the Indian railways were most out­
standing example of his sound administrative ability.
His performance in the most difficult time of India’s famine 
was commendable. His non-alarmist and definite views on famine 
proved fruitful. His food policy though based on the old principle 
of free trade was used in the best possible way in the given 
circumstances.
Finally, Elgin's association with the sedition changes and the 
plague rules futrther told upon him, although his role effectively 
softened the more stringent measures. Elgin in fact, showed due 
regard to the wishes of the public and as a result many changes were 
introduced in the sedition laws before they were finally enacted.
Had he been of the same opinion as Hamilton, who could have stopped 
the re-imposition of the Vernacular Press Act? To Elgin must be 
given due credit for containing racial antipathies which were largely 
overstated by the Anglo-Indian press and the Secretary of State.
The main point of importance which emerged out of this stirring 
period was that the British attitude towards India which had been
_  33fc
taking shape for some time hardened* It finally announced that 
it was most difficultto reconcile liberalism with autocracy. Justice 
was all right in the abstract. It was upheld as long as vital 
British political and economic interests did not clash with those 
of India. For example, on the currency question, it clashed with 
the British, and the Indian Government had to follow the dictates 
and interests of the British Government.
y
Most important change levelled against Elgin was that he allowed
himself to be guided either by the 'mandate* of the Secretary of
State or by the advice of the members of his Executive Council. nThe
retiring Viceroy11, wrote the Tribune, tfproved an apt pupil in their
£  bureaucracyJ  hands.1'1 Showing thorough disappointment at Elgin's
personal ability, the Phonta asserted that he should not have
entered upon his duties unless he was resolved to do his best and
instead should not have acted as a "puppet or entrusted the keeping
2
of his conscience to others." Maintaining the same beat, the
Paisa Akhbar stated: "Weakness in a Viceroy of India is a sin and
weakness has been the most prominent characteristic of Lord Elgin's 
3
administration." Nor did the India of London, a Congress journal, 
spare Elgin. Though it credited Elgin with "excellent intentions"
1 1 November 1898, Selections from the Indian Newspapers, Thagi 
and Dakaiti Department, P.S.L.I., vol. 110.
See also Indian Mirror, 2 November 1898, ibid.
2 26 October 1898, ibid.
3 26 October 1898, ibid.
and popular sympathies, it added, "perhaps after the experience
of his Government seme Indians may prefer a Viceroy who, though
his views may be far less in harmony with those of the people of
the country, has yet sufficient strength of will to make him the
1
ruler and not the puppet of the high officials at Simla." This
stigma Elgin continued to have much after his death. The Dictionary
of National Biography wrote,"His personal influence on affairs was
weakened by a retiring disposition and a self-distrust, from which
there sprang a subservience to Whitehall that has perhaps no
2parallel in Viceregal records.”
Was Elgin really a "puppet" in the hands of his officials?
This charge is absolutely unfounded. A recent witer quotes Curzon
3
to prove that Elgin's period was the "apotheosis of bureaucracy"•
He further asserts that officals acted as they pleased and goes on
to cite a case of a certain executive councillor who openly defied
the Viceroy and it was only with the help of Cabinet that he could
4
ultimately control the councillor. Dr Gopal has used this citation
1 28 October 1898, ibid.
R.C. Dutt in an article written for the Indian Mirror considered 
that Curzon "would be a better change after that of Lord Elgin." 
Quoted in^.N. Gupta, Life and Works of Romesh Chandra Dutta,
P. 239.
2 D.N.B., 1912-1921, p. 72.
3 S. Gopal, British Policy in India, I858-I9 0 5, p. 180.
4 Ibid., p. 181.
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completely out of context. The real issue pertained to the
question of the imposition of excise duty on Indian cloth and yarn
to match that of Manchester goods. Both Pritchard, the then
Public Vorks Member and Miller, the then legal Member of the
Viceroyaf's Council were recalicitrant and threatened to vote
against the Government measure in the Legislative Council. Elgin,
as a matter of fact, faithfully forwarded their views to the
Secretary of State and in doing so he exhibited their strong feelings
against the course. Nowhere did Elgin demand from Fowler that
any action be taken against them. Actually the significance of
that assertion is completely the other way round. It revealed that
the British Government had taken a strong stand in spite of the
fact that many in the Indian Government, including Elgin, sympathised
with the Indian cause and had proceeded to give sound judgment. It
is rather befitting to relate that Elgin's attitude towards his
colleagues vis-a-vis the stand of the Secretary of State, was
admirable and statesman like. Fowler had acted in an indiscreet
and thoroughly dictati^nafr way. It lay to Elgin's credit in not
reopening the wound or add salt to it. He politely warned both
Pritchard and Miller of the strong feelings of the Home Government
and did not allow the matter to be stretched too far. A little
outburst from the Viceroy too, could, in all probability have led
to their resignation which in turn would have proved damaging to the
1
reputation of the Indian Government. Furthermore, it is hardly
1 See Elgin to Miller, 7 November 1894; Elgin to Pritchard, 28 
28 December 1894, E.P., vol. 6 5.
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appropriate to prove a point or pass a judgment on someone by merely
quoting the opinion of a person who mostly looked unkindly towards
any one's ability. Dr Gopal himself subsequently testifies to the
1
fact that Curzon had no ability to judge men.
Elgin in his own right was dominating and assertive but rarely 
outspoken and arrogant. When the Bengal Government opposed the 
Central Government, Elgin was sufficiently assertive and saw to it 
that the local Government did not do anything contrary to the 
decided policy. Of course he did not catch Mackenzie, the Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal by ear or punch him on the nose but in his usual 
discreet, diplomatic and forthright way got him around. Similarly 
when Westland and Trevor, two members of the Executive Council were 
more inclined to Hamilton's remedy of the "political ill" of the 
time, he squarely brought them to his side so that the Secretary of 
State would not get the opportunity of forcing the hands of the 
Government. It was a rare tribute to Elgin's administrative ability 
to maintain complete unanimity when many of his senior officials 
preferred a harder hand to strike against the Indians.
It was a special attribute of Elgin to get the workd done by 
his subordinates and yet not to give the impression of any undue 
dominance. Another example of his subtle way pertained to the issue 
of the Legislative Council for the Punjab. On this question Elgin
1 British Policies in India, p. 250.
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had strong feelings. So did Fitzpatrick, the Lieutenant Governor 
of the Punjab for the opposite reason. Elgin avoided a headlong 
collision and after the retirement of Fitzpatrick, he found it 
congenial to impose the condition on the new Lieutenant Governor 
Mackworth Young as the price of promotion. He did not have any 
unpleasant affair as Curzon had with Young on the issue of the 
creation of a separate Province on the North Western Frontier.
Surely Elgin consulted his colleagues on almost all issues, but 
consultation did not mean either weakness or subservience. After 
discussion on important issues Elgin usually proceeded on his own to 
recommend, execute or reject policies. The execution of famine 
policy, particularly food policy is a pointer in that direction. As 
regards railways, Elgin more than anyone else was responsible for 
whatever happened during this period. Actually his colleagues 
faithfully followed him and the India Office toed his line. Similarly 
in dealing with plague, he showed robust commonsense and the policy 
which finally came to be followed represented moat of his personal 
views. On technical matters like the currency question, he depended 
upon the experts though there too he took keen personal interest.
There was certainly nothing wrong in having adopted this attitude.
It is a keynote of any sound administrator to interfere as little 
as possible in the matters where one's personal knowledge is either 
deficient or lacks comprehension. Yet another distinctive feature 
of Elgin was that he believed in giving due credit to one who deserved 
most and often lauded him publicly. In a letter to Sandhurst in
.345
connection with his plague activities Elgin wrote: HI am a
great believer in Palman qui meruite ferat. You have fought this
fight £ against plague^, and I believe you are about to emerge
triumphant, and 1 should like your name to stand alone in connection 
1
with it.H Much of the adverse criticism against him resulted
either from attaching too much importance to one single issue or
in mistaking his unassuming nature for weakness or from a lack of
understanding of his administrative policies in their totality.
If on one hand, the Indian press assailed Elgin bitterly;
on the other, the Anglo-Indian and English Press in contrast praised
him immensely. The Times of India called him a tfstatesman of
2
unpretentious but solid attributes11. The Pioneer described his
3
all round operations as nhighly systematised11. The Times wrote:
11 It is but common justice to say that LORD EXGIN has more than
justified the wisdom of Mr GLADSTONE'S selection. The difficulties
with which he has had to contend have been rarely equalled, even
4
in annals of India. He has manfully confronted them all.n These 
observations were not necessarily impartial either.
1 Elgin to Sandhurst, 18 March 1897» E.P., vol. 70.
2 17 October 1898.
3 21 October 1898.
4 17 October 1898.
See also The Times, 3 January 1899•
The fact of the matter is that Elgin's administration was a 
period of problems - some old and some new. He hardly had any 
time to initiate reforms, except in the field of railways. Neither 
in the field of economics nor in that of politics Elgin displayed 
new or invigorating ideas. The economic aimcf his policy was based 
on the principles of free trade and private enterprise. Even during 
the famine of 1897*8118 aim remained the main guiding feature. The 
political aim of his policy was to draw the discontented and educated 
element out into the open and offer more responsible outlets. Yet 
in the implementation of this policy the Government did just the 
opposite. In most part the response of the Government was not active 
enough or liberal enough to keep pace with the growing political 
consciousness amongst the Indians. In the practical field of 
administration, Elgin boldly tackled the problems. He left for 
Curzon a rich exchequer, an effective famine administration and at 
last, a sound plague policy. In this way he prepared the ground 
for Curzonvs more ambitious plans. In a way Elgin's period is a 
fitting prelude to the Curzonian period of feforms.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Unpublished Sources 
I. Private Papers
A. Elgin Papers
i Correspondence of Lord Elgin relating to the Indian 
phase of his career. India Office Library (I.O.L.), 
(MSS.EUr.F.84).
Vol. 1 
Vols. 2-11 
Vols. 12-16
Correspondence with the Queen.
Letters from the Secretary of State (MSS.).
Letters to and from the Secretary of State (PR.).
Vols. 17-21 Telegrams from and to the Secretary of State (PR.).
Vol. 22 Correspondence with Mr Richmond Richie, 1895-93.
Vols. 23-28 Letters from persons in England and elsewhere (MSS.).
Vols. 29-330* Correspondence with persons in Ehgland and elsewhere (PR.)
Vols. 34-63 Letters from persons in India (MSS.).
Vols. 64-73 Correspondence with persons in India (PR.).
Vols. 74-80 Newspaper cuttings and personal accounts 1893-
February 1899-
Vol. 81 Frontier policy: Extracts from the Times 1897-98.
Vol. 88 Speeches of the Earl of Elgin (PR.) 1894-99-
Vols. 89-124 Private Secretary's correspondence.
Vol. 123 Miscellaneous papers.
(e) Poona Riots, September *94, Telegrams.
(f) Confidential, financial papers.
(g) The Viceroy's note on Chitral affairs (MSS.) 15 
June, '95-
(h) Legislative Council for the Punjab Correspondence 
Sir D. Fitzpatrick and Lord Lansdowne.
(i) Confidential - Legislative Department Correspondence 
about Mr Harvey James. Kept in Confidential Drawer.
(j) The Amir's book on Jehad.
(k) Confidential. M. Hopkin's plague prophylactic. 
Correspondence with Lord Sandhurst.
(l) Confidential Correspondence with Bombay. The Natus, 
Tilak, Plague.
(m) Unprinted Letters. Secretary of State to Viceroy, 
and Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1897-
(n) Unprinted affaires. Correspondence with Mr Plowden.
Bundle of miscellaneous papers containing the following
items:
(a) Minute by Lord Elgin on the Imperial Service Troops 
(MSS.).
(b) Minute by Lord Elgin on Railways (M5S.)•
(c) Minute by J. Westland on Railways dated 16 February 
1895-
(i) Minute recorded by His Excellency the Viceroy on 
the idea of having a Local Council in the Punjab.
24 August 1896.
(ii) Minute by J. Woodbum. 15 August 1896.
(iii) Minute recorded by the Honourable Mr. Trevor.
21 July 1896.
(ix) Letter to Ardagh from W.M. Bi$sek (MSS.) and note 
by the Director General of Railways on the terms 
offered in Government of Indian resolution No. 924 
R.C., dated 15 September 18931 with a view to 
encourage the construction of feeder railways by 
private enterprise.
» • - . - -i- 0
(xvii) The Chitral Proclamation and the alleged "breach 
of faith".
34■»* ** ^
Vol. 135 Bundles a-t containing Railway papers.
Vol. 136 Letters from Sir Arthur Godley (later Lord Kilbracken).
Vol. 137 Unbound Letters, miscellaneous, 1893-98* Mainly from
Lord Lansdowne and his private secret sir ies.
Vol. 138 Unprinted letters to and from the Viceroy 1894-98.
Vol. 139 Letters concerning the Curzon-Kitchener dispute on
army administration.
Vol. 141 Box of newspaper cuttings relating to Chitral, famine,
finance, Toprrah force, etc.
Family Papers.
Various letters and papers of Lord Elgin in the possession of the 
family. Most of these letters throw valuable light on his character 
and earlier life.
B. Other Private Papers.
Bruce, Lady E., Diary 1894-96, I.O.L. ^~Reel No. 430J ,
The Curzon Collection. I.O.L. MSS.EUR. F.lll.
Vols. 138-68 Correspondence with Secretary of State, Lord
Salisbury, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lansdowne, Sir Arthur
Godley, etc.; (P^R.) 1899-
Vol. 240 Spare copies of minutes on various subjects by Curzon.
1899-1905.
Vol. 268 Press cuttings about Curzon while Viceroy, 1899-1905-
Gladstone Papers.
The British Museum, ADD.MSS. 44229, 44287, 44290, 44496-8, 44502-3, 
44515, 44517, and 44789.
348
The Hamilton Collection.
I.O.L. MSS.EUR. C. 125-126, and 
MSS.EUR. D. 508-510
Vols. 1-3 Private Correspondence, India, Hamilton to Elgin 1895-98.
(c.125-126)
Vols. 1-12 Private Correspondence, India, Elgin to Hamilton 2 July
(D.508-510) 1895-5 January 1899.
Kilbracken Collection (Arthur Godley)
I.O.L. MSS.EUR. F.102.
Vol. 1 Copies of letters written by Sir Arthur Godley 1883-99*
Vol. 5 Letters from the Secretary of State, Sir H. Fowler
1894-95.
Vol. 6 Letters from Lord George Hamilton 1895-1903*
Vols. 12-16 Letters from Lord Elgin 1894-99*
Vol. 29 Letters from Mr Babington Smith 1894-98
Lansdowne Papers.
I.O.L. MSS.EUR.D. 558.
Vols. 1-10 Confidential letters and telegrams to and from 
persons in India.
Confidential letters and telegrams to and from 
persons in England, vols. i-v.
Confidential to and from Secretary of State, vols. i-v.
Confidential letters from H.M. Queen Etapress to Viceroy, 
vol. 1 , telegrams.
Confidential telegrams to and from Secretary of State, 
vols. i-iv.
3IS
The speeches of the Marquis of Lansdowne, vols. i-ii.
Notes and Minutes of the Marquis of Lansdowne, 
January 1889-January 1894.
Ripon Papers.
The British Museum, Add.MSS. 43515-6, and 43526.
The Lee-Wamer Collection and Press Cuttings.
I.O.L., MSS. EUR. F.92.
The Wolverhampton Collection (Sir H.H. Fowler).
I.O.L., MSS. EUR. C.145.
O U ito U . Recovdli w -U * -  
Bengal Native Newspaper Reports 1893-99
Bills of Exchange drawn on India (Correspondence and Statistics),
1893-1902.
Bombay Native Newspaper Reports, 1893-99*
Finance Departmental Papers India Office
1893 vols. 1194, 1216, 1225-6 , 1229, 1233-4, 1239-40, 1244
1894 vols. 1256, 1265, 1271, 1281-2 , 1284, 1295, 1302, 1307, 1309-10
1895 vols. 1366, 1370, 1372, 1376
1896 vols. 1380, 1382-4
1897 vols. 1386, 1388-90
1898 vols. 1393-4
1899 vols. 1399
Financial Despatches to India (original drafts) 1892-99* vols. 34-41. 
Financial Despatches to India (copies) 1892-99* vols. 39-46.
Financial letters received from India
1892 vols. 173
1893 vol. 176
1894 vol. 179
1895 vol. 182
1896 vol. 185
350
1897 vol. 188
1898 vol. 191
1899 vol. 194
Financial Enclosures received from India 1892-99* vols. 174-5, 177-8, 
180-1, 183-4, 186-8, 189-90, 192-3, 195-6.
Indian Council Minutes (dissents by the Members of the Council) 
original vol. 5 
copy vol. 2
India Finance and Commerce Proceedings
1892 vols. 4174-5
1893 vols. 4392-5
1894 vols. 4604-7
1895 vols. 4807-10
1896 vols. 5025-7 , 5029
1897 vols. 5257-6OA
1898 vols. 5484-88
India Home (Judicial) Proceedings
1896 vols. 4969-72
1897 vols. 5194-5
1898 vols. 5428-30
India Home (Municipal) Proceedings
1897 vol. 5186
1898 vol. 5419
1899 vol. 5646
India Home (Public) Proceedings
1893 vols. 4341-2
1894 vols. 4550-1
1895 vols. 4747-8
1896 vols. 4958-9
1897 vols. 5180-1
1898 vols. 5413-4
1899 vols. 5638-40
India Legislative Proceedings
1897 vols. 5253-5
1898 vols. 5479-82
India Loans. Miscellaneous Papers 1857-1898 (not listed at the 
India Office Library_7
India Sanitary Proceedings
1897 vols. 5188-91
1898 vols. 5421-5
1899 vols. 5648-52
India Separate Revenue (Finance and Commerce) Proceedings
1894 vol. 4608
1895 vol. 4811
1896 vols. 5030-1
1897 vols. 5261-2
India Statistic and Commerce (Finance and Commerce) Proceedings
1894 vol. 4606
1895 vol. 4809
1896 vol. 5028
1897 vol. 5260
1898 vol. 5487
Judicial and Public Departmental Papers India Office
1894 vols. 367-8, 372, 380-2, 384, 386
1895 vols. 389-90, 395, 397, 404, 409
1896 vols. 420, 422, 429
1897 vols. 440, 449-56, 459, 461-2, 465-66, 468
1898 vols. 474, 479, 486-7
Madras Native Newspaper Reports 1893-99
Military and Marine letters received from India
1893-1898 vols. 69-74
Minutes of Council of Secretary of State
1894-98 vols. 72-81
North-Western Provinces and Oudh Native Newspaper Reports 1893-99
Political and Secret letters and Enclosures received from India 
1897 and 1898 vols. 91-110
Public Despatches to India
1894-98 vols. 14-19
Public and General letters received from India
1894-98 vols. 19 to 25
352
Public Works Departmental Papers India Office
1893 vols. 375, 396
1894 vols. 402-4, 407, 411-16, 419-27
1895 vols. 432, 434, 442-4, 446-8, 451
1896 vols. 455, 458-61, 463, 466, 471, 475
1897 vols. 480, 487-9, 492-3, 498, 500
1898 vols. 502-3, 518-19, 522
1899 vols. 541, 544-5
Public Works, Despatches to India 
1892-99 vols. 13-20
Public Works letters received from India
1892-95 vol. 29
1895-1901 vol. 30
Punjab Native Newspaper Reports
Railway Despatches to India 
1892-99\ols. 12-19
Railway and Telegraph letters received from India 
1892-1899 vols. 34-41
Revenue and Agriculture (Famine) Proceedings
1896 vol. 4982
1897 vols. 5203-5209 
1897 vols. 5438-5441
Revenue Statistics and Commerce Departmental Papers. India Office 
1894 vols. 324, 359, 393
Revenue and Statistic Despatches to India (copies)
1892-9 vols. 13-20
Revenue letters received from India 
1892-1900 vols. 13 to 25
Summary of various Departments of Lord Lansdowne
Summary of the various Departments of Lord Elgin
3 5 3
Published Sources
1 Pariiament ary Papers
Vol. Year No.
80 1877 /"C.I87OJ
62 1880 /c. 2 5 9 1 7
62 1880 Z"c*2735_7
65 1893 /~C.7060.11/
60 1894 Z“c .7453_7
73 1895 /"c .7845_7
73 1895 / ”C.202_7
73 1895 /"c .7602_7
62 1896 /"c .8136_7
62 1896 /c.8259J
63 1897 / c .8386_7
63 1897 /"c.851l7
63 1897 / c . 88oo_ 7
64 1897 / “c .8302_7
64 1897 / c .8388_7
64 1897 /c.8504_7
Description
Statement of Trade of British 
India for five years,
1871-72 to 1875-76,
Report of the Indian Famine 
Commission - Part I,
Part II relating to measures of 
Famine Protection and Prevention,
Appendices to Report of the Indian 
currency committee, 1893*
Administrative Report on the 
Railways in India for 1893-94,
Administrative Report on the 
Railways in India for 1894-95*
Papers regarding Cotton Import Duties,
Indian Tariff Act and Cotton Duties.
Administrative Report on the 
Railways in India 1895-96.
Papers relating to Cotton and 
Excise Duties,
Papers Relating t>o Plague
Papers Relating to Plague
Papers Relating to Plague
Papers Regarding Famine Relief
Papers Regarding Famine Relief
Papers Regarding Famine Relief
354
Vol. Year No.
65 1897
65 1897 r * % j
65 1897 £ C.8297_7
65 1897 /~C.8338_7
65 1897 £ c .  8518_7
62 1898 / " c.8860_7
62 1898 / c .  8737.7
62 1898 Z~C.8739_7
62 1898 / c .8812_7
62 1898 £ c .  8823_7
63 1898 /" c .8713_7
63 1898 /~C .87l4_7
63 1898 £ c .  88717
63 1898 / “c.88oo_7
64 1898 Z"c .8733_7
64 1898 /~C.8921_7
Description
Papers relating to Railways to 
encourage Private agencies.
Statement of Moral and Material 
Progress in India 1895-96
Trade Review of British India
1895-96
Trade Tables of British India 
1891-92 to 1895-96.
Administrative Report on Railways 
in India 1896-97
Papers regarding the Famine Relief 
Operations in India.
Papers regarding the Famine Relief 
Operations in India.
Papers regarding the Famine Relief 
Operations in India.
Papers regarding the Famine Relief 
Operations in India.
Papers regarding the Famine Relief 
Operations in India.
Papers regarding Military Operations 
undertaken on North Western Frontiers.
Papers regarding Military Operations 
undertaken on North Western Frontiers.
Papers relating to Amendment in 
the Law relating to Sedition.
Papers relating to Outbreak of 
Plague in India.
Tables relating to Trade of British 
India 1892-3 to 1896-97.
Administrative Report of the Railways 
in India 1897-98.
3 5 5
Vol. Year No.
31 1899 2fc.9178j7
31 1899 Z~C.9390_7
33 1899 / “c.9258_7
66 Part 1 1899 Z~21:l 7
66 1899 /"c.9120J
66 1899 /c.9369_7
30 1900 Z~Cd. 139J
31 1900 /~Cd. 140_7
32 1900 /~Cd. I4l_7
72 1902 / “Cd. 810_7
70 1902 /"Cd. 876_7
47 1903 /"cd. 1713J 7
66 1904 / “cd. 1851 J
75 1908 /~Cd. 41117
10 1921 / “Cmd. 1512_7
Description
Report of the Indian Famine Commission 
1898.
Report of the Committee appointed 
to inquire into the Indian Currency.
Appendix to the Report by Indian 
Famine Commission, 1898, vol. vii.
Statement of Moral and Material 
Progress in India 1897-98.
Review and Tables relating to 
the trade of British India for five 
years 1893-94 to 1897-98.
Administrative Report on Railways 
1898-99.
Report from Commission on Plague - 
Minutes of evidences.
Report from Commission on Plague - 
Minutes of evidences.
Report from Commission on Plague - 
Minutes of evidences.
Report of the Indian Plague Commission 
with Summary.
Report of the Indian Famine 
Commission 1901.
Report on the Administration and 
Working of Indian Railways ^ Thomas 
Robertson Report_7»
Report of the Indian Agriculture 
Commission 1901-3.
Report of the Committee on Indian 
Railway Finance and Administration
/J.L. Mackay Committee_7-
Railway Committee Report ^ Acworth
Parliamentary Debates 1894-99.
Proceedings of the Council of Governor General in India 1893-99*
Annual Financial Statements of the Government of India 1892-1899*
Monthly Records of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 1893-99*
Report on the Immigration into Assam and Cachar, 1891-1900.
Report of the Brussels International Monetary Conference 1892.
Report of the Indian Currency Committee 1893*
Papers relating to Currency Question, Simla, 1893*
Reports of Railway Administration 1893-99*
Report of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce 1893=99*
Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1893-99*
Report of the Indian National Congress l893-99o\
Report on the Outbreak of Bubonic Plague in Bombay, 1896-97 (by 
P.C.H. Snow Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay).
Report of Bubonic Plague in Bombay by W.F. Gatacre, Chairman 
Plague Committee, 1896-97*
Report of the Bombay Plague Committee on the Plague in Bombay 
1897-98.
Report of Indian Famine Charitable Relief Fund 1897.
The Plague in India vols. i-iv (Nathan, R.) 1898.
Report of the Royal Commission on the Expenditure of India 
vols. i-iv 1900.
Report on Rise of Prices and Wages (K.L. Datta) 1914.
Report of Indian Industrial Commission 1916-18.
Report of the Committee appointed to investigate Revolutionary 
conspiracies in India 1918.
Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms 1918.
3 5 7
Statistical Abstract of British India 1891-2 to 1903-4.
Statistical Abstract United Kingdom 1891-2 to 1903-4.
Newspapers
Bengalee 
Englishman 
Pioneer 
Times of India 
The Times
Articles, Pamphlets and Tracts
Ahluwalia, M.M. , Press and India's Struggle for Freedom 1858-1909, 
Journal of Indian History vol. xxxviii part iii, I960.
Atkinson, Fred. The Indian Currency Question (Allahabad 1894).
Atkinson, F.J. 'Average Income of India 1875-1695* Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, June 1902.
Atkinson, F.J. 'Silver Prices in India' Journal of Royal Statistical 
Society, 1894 and 1897*
Baden Powel 'Proposed Law Regarding Alienation of Agricultural 
Land in the Punjab', Asiatic Review, 1900.
Banerjea, S.N. The Trumpet Voice of India London, 1909-
Barbour, D. The Anglo-Indian and the Rupee Bombay, 1892.
Barbour, D. The Currency Question from an Indian point of view 
London 1894.
Beales, H.L. 'The Great Depression in Industry and Trade', The 
Economic History Review, vol. 1, No. 5» 1934.
BeU, Horace. 'Recent Railway Policy in India' Journal of the Society 
of Arts vol. xlvi, 1899-
Bell, H. 'Railways and Famine', Journal of the Society of Arts, 
vol. xli, 1901.
Bhalchandra Krishna (Sir). Overcrowding in Bombay Bombay, 1904.
Blang, M. 'Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry 
During the nineteenth century', Economic History Review , I96O-6I.
35S
Bose, A.M. Backward or Forward London, 1899*
Chand Lai. An Essay on the Decline of Native Industries: its causes, 
evils and cure, Lahore, 1897*
Charlu, A.P. Six-fold need of Indian Politics, Madras, 1895*
«■ Charlu, A.P. On Indian Politics Madras, 1899*
Cole, W.A. 'The Measurement of Economic Growth', The Economic History 
Review 195®*
Coppock, D.J. British Industrial Growth during Great Depression 
(1873-9®)• & pessimistic view, The Economic History Review 
vol. xvii, 1964.
Cotton, H«J*5* The Problems of India Lonon4,1905*
Cotton, H«J«S« Indiai A Policy and a Prospect, London, undated.
Cunningham, Sir H.S. 'Indian Famines' East India Association vol. 28
1897*
Dar, P.T. Bishan Naraya<tt. Signs of the Times Lucknow, 1895*
Danveiy, Juland. 'The Progress of Railways and Trade in India',
Journal of the Society of Arts vol. xxxvii, 1889*
Deane, P. 'Contemporary Estimates of the National Income', (First 
half, second half of the Nineteenth Century) Economic History 
Review April 1956, April 1957*
Dunn, C.L. The Economic Value of the Prevention of Disease 
Indian Journal of Economics, January 1924.
Elliot, C.A. 'Recent Famines in India and Reports of the Second 
Famine Commission' Asiatic Quarterly Review vol. 8, 1899*
Elliot, C.A. 'On Measures Taken by the Government for the Prevention 
of Famine'. Journal of the Society of Arts vol. 45, 1897*
Forrest, G.W. Sir. 'The Famine in India' London, 1897-
Fowler, William. Indian Currency; An Essay London, 1899*
Foxwell, H.S. A criticism of Lord Farrer on the Monetary Standard 
(Reprinted from The National Revenue for January 1895)? London.
3 5 S
Gallaghar, J. and Robinson, R. 'The Imperialism of Free Trade',
The Economic History Review vol. vi, 1953*
a
Ghose, S.C. Indian Railway Finance Calcutta, 1912. .. \ ^
Gn ^ jtv.yL . '"lUt f c r - c o t V - T  f T f r *. NtVyU-t.^ Vt- *'*l_
Gupta, H.L. The Economic Impact of West on Indian Industries 
Journal of Indian History vol. xxxviii, April i960.
Handasy, Geo. de Die. International Bullion Money London, 1894.
Hamety, P. 'The Indian Cotton Duties Controversy 1894-6'
English Historical Review vol. 77, October 1962.
Harnety, P.'Nationalism and Imperialism' (The Viceroyalty of Curzon) 
Journal of Indian History, vol. xli, Par 11, August 1963*
Holdemess, T.W. 'Indian Famine of 1899* Journal of the Society of Arts 
vol. 5 0, 1902.
Hope, Theodore, C. 'The Rationale of the Railways in India' Journal 
of the Society of Arts, vol. xxxviii, 1890.
The Indian. Services and the depreciation of the Rupee London. 1893*
Howard, H.F. 'India and the Gold Standard* London, 1911*
Jamieson, George. The Silver Question, Injury to British Trade and 
Manufacture London, 1895*
Kellas, J.G. 'The Liberal Party in Scotland 1876-1895', Scottish 
Historical Review, vol. xliv, April 1965*
Khan, Ajmal. 'Plague' Delhi, undated.r- ' ~
Lai, Ranchore. Letters on currency questions Ahemadabad, 1895*
Lely, Sir F.S.P. 'Political Side of Famines in India' Journal of 
the Society of Arts vol. 55, 1907*
Liston, W.G. 'The Plague, Millray Lecture, 1924 British Medical 
Journal 1924 vol. 1.
Macdonagh, 0. 'The Anti-Imperial ism of Free Trade* The Economic 
History Review, vol. xiv, 1961-2.
Macleod, H.D. Indian Currency London, 1898.
Malaba3&, B.M. The Indian Problem Bombay, 1894.
3 6  (
Malabari, Behranji. India in 1897 Bombay, 1898.
Marriott, Edward Frere. The Indian Currency Onestion London, 1899 •
Moore, R.J. 'Imperialism and Free Trade Policy in India*
1853-4 The Economic History Review vol. xviii, 1964.
Musson, A.E. 'The Great Depression in Britain 1873-1896*,
The Journal of Economic History vol. xix, June 1959*
Musson, A.E. 'British Industrial Growth 1875-96: a Balanced View*
The Economic History Review vol. xvii, 1964.
Naoroji, Dadabhai. Speech on Financial Relations between U.K. 
and India London, undated.
Naoroji, Dadabhai. Statements to Indian Currency Committee 1898 
London, 1898.
Norman, John Henry. The Currency Problem. tfIs it False Political 
Economy11 London, 1895 •
Northbrook, E. North Western Frontier of India London, 1898.
Paish, George.'Great Britain's Capital Investments in other Lands' 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society vol. lxxii, Part 111,
1909.
Paish, George. 'Great Britain's Capital Investments in Individual
Colonial and Foreign Countries* Journal of Royal Statistical Society 
vol. lxxiv, Part 11, January, 1911.
Parry, J.V. 'The Coming of Railways of India and their Prospects' 
Journal of the Society of Arts vol. 43 9 1895•
Phipson, Major Cecil B. India's Difficulties: Some ways out of them:
Indian Poverty and Indian Famines London, 1903•
'India under Lord Elgin' Quarterly Review vol. 1891 1899*
'Indian Famine and their Remedies' Quarterly Review vol. 1951 1902.
Rees, 'Fighting Famines in India' Nineteenth Century March, 1897*
Samarath, V.M. 'Famines in India* Calcutta Review , 1902.
Sawtell, A. India and the Fiscal Problem Lahore, 1903*
Sethur, Deshpandf. Sethur, S.S. and Deshpandl, K.G. ^""edited_7 
A Full and Authentic Report of the Trial of Bal Ganjadhar Tilak 
Bombay, 1897*
361
Thorbum, S.S. ’Agireola Redivivus' Asiatic Qaarterly Review 1901.
Vacha, D.E. Indian Railway Finance Madras, 1912,
Wacha, D.E. Indian Military Expenditure Madras, 1911.
Vacha, D.E, Indian Currency Commission Bombay, 1913*
Vadia, J.A. The Artificial currency and the commerce of India 
Bombay, 1902.
Wallace, R. ’Lecture on Famines in India1 Edinburgh, 1900.
Walton, J.’Railway Extension in India and its Relation to the 
Trade of India and the United Kingdom’ Journal of the Society 
of Arts vol. 42, 1894.
Wedderbum, Naoroji, Bannerjee, Hume. A Call to Arms.
Wedderbum. ’Agricultural Banks for India’ Asiatic Review, 1898.
Wilson, Charles. 'The Entrepreneur in the Industrial Review in 
Britain' History June, 1957-
Other Works
Acworth, W.M. and Stephenson, W.T. , The Elements of Railway Economics 
London, 1924.
Adarkar, B.P. The Indian Tariff Problem, Allahabad, 1936.
Adarkar, B.P. The Indian Monetary Policy Allahabad, 1939-
^  Ahmed Sufia Some Aspects of the History of the Muslim Community in 
Bengal, 1884-1912 unpublished, Ph.D.Thesis, London, i960.
Ambedkar, B.R. The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India 
London, 1925.
Ambedkar, B.R. The problem of the Rupee London, 1923*
Anstey, Vera. Economic Development of India London, 1952.Ed.
Anstey, Vera. The Trade of Indian Ocean London, 1929-
362
Ashley, P. Modern Tariff History London, 1904.
Ashworth, William. A Short History of the International Economy 
1850-1950 London, 1954.
^ Bagal, J.C. History of Indian Association 1876-1951 Calcutta, 1953.
Balkrishna. Commercial Relation between India and England London,
1924.
Balkrishna , R. Studies in Indian Economic Problems London, 1959* 
Banerjea, P. A History of Indian Taxation London, 1930.
Banerjea, P.N. Fiscal Policy in India London, 1922.
Banerjea, S.N. Speeches vol. i-v Calcutta, 1894, 1896.
Banerjea, S.N. A Nation in Making Calcutta, 1925.
Banerjea, S.N. Speeches and Writing Madras, undated.
Barax\, Paul. Political Economy of Growth Indian Edition, New Delhi,
1957.
Barbour, David. The Theory of Bimetallism London, 1885*
^ Bams, M. The Indian Press London, 1940.
Beames, J. Memoirs of a Bengal Civilian London, 1961.
Bell, Horace. Railway Policy in India, London, 1894.
Bharucha, K.B. A History of the Cotton-Mill Industry in Western 
A^dla, vwLhl
Bharucha, S.B. Speeches on Indian Economics Bombay, undated.
Bhatia, B.M. Famines in India Bombay, 1963.
Blunt, Sir Edward The Indian Civil Service London, 1931*
Bonner, Edna. The Economic Policy of Government of India, 1898-1905, 
Unpublished M.A. Thesis, London, 1955.
Bowley, A.L. Wages in England in the Nineteenth Century London, 1900.
Buchanan, D.H. The Development of Capitalist Enterprise in India 
New York, 1934.
3 6 3
Buckle, G.E. The Letters of Queen Victoria (Edited) vol. II and 
III, London, 1931* 1932.
Calvert, H. The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab London, 1922.
Cambridge History of India vol. vi, 1932.
Campbell, George. Memoirs of my Indian Career 2 vols.
London, 1893•
Chablani, C.L. Indian Currency, Banking and Exchange London, 1932.
Chambers, J.D. The Workshop of the World (British Economic History 
from 1820 to 1880), London, 196l»
Chand, Gyan. Indian Teeming Millions 1939-
 ^Chandra, Bipan. Economic Policies of Indian National Leadership 
1880-1905* unpublished, Ph.D. Thesis, Delhi, 1963*
Chandravarkar, N.G. Speeches and Writings Bombay, 1911-
Char lu, A.♦Speeches in the Supreme Council, 1896-8f Madras, 1903•
Chatterton, A. Industrial Evolution in India Madras, 1912.
Chaudhri, R. Evolution of Indian Industry , nvi
Chesney, Sir George. Indian Polity London, 1904.
x Chintaraani, C.Y. Indian Politics since Mutiny Allahabad, 1937*
 ^ Chirol, Valentine. Indian Unrest London, 1910.
Choksey, R.D. Economic life in Bombay 1818-1939 Bombay, 1963*
Clapham, Sir John. Great Britain and Free Trade Cambridge, 1909*
Clapham, J.H. Economic Development of France and Germany Cambridge, 1921.
Clapham, Sir John. An Economic History of Modem Britain vol. I,
London, Cambridge, 1930.
Cole, G.D.H. Introduction to Economic History 1750“1952 London, 1953*
(The) Constitutional Year Book London, 1893-99•
Cotton, H.J.S. Nev India or India in Transition 2nd. London, 1904.
3 6 4
Cotton, H.J.S. Indian and Home Memories London, 1911- 
Coupland, R. India a Restatement Oxford, 1945-
Court, W.H.B. A Concise Economic History of Modem Britain ^ t
Court, W.H.B. British Economic History 1870-1914 Commentary and 
Documents London, 1965-
Coyajee, J-C- The Indian Currency System 1835-1926 Madras, 1930.
Coyajee, J-C. The Indian Fiscal Problem Calcutta, 1924.
^Cross (Lord). A Political History 1868-1900 Privately Printed, 1903-
Crawford, A. Our Troubles in Poona and the Deccan London, 1897-
Cumming, John. Modern India Oxford, 1932.
Cumming, J. (Ed.) Political India 1832-1932: A Cooperative survey 
of a century Oxford, 1932.
Currie, Major.-Gen. Fetidal. Belov the Surface London, 1900.
Curzon, G.N.British Government in India: The story of the Viceroy 
and the Govt, houses London, 1925-
Curzon, Speeches (vol. i-iv) Calcutta, 1904.
Dadachanji, B.E. History of Indian Currency and Exchange Bombay, 1928. 
Darling, M. Rusticus Loquitm London, 1930-
Darling, M.L. Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt London, 1932.
Dantwala, M.L. A Hundred Years of Indian Cotton Bombay, 1948.
Das, A.K. , Banerjee, H.N. The Impact of Tea Industry in the life 
of the tribals of West Bengal Calcutta, 1964.
Das, M.N. India Under Morley and Minto London, 1964.
Davies, C.C. The Problems of the North Western Frontier 1890-1908 
Cambridge, 1932.
Desai, A.R. Social Background of Indian Nationalism Bombay, 1954-
Dey, H.L. Indian Tariff Problem London, 1933-
Digby, William. Prosperous British India London, 1901.
Donogh, W. R. The History and Lav of Sedition Calcutta, 1917-
Dutt, R.C. The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age 
London, 1904.
Dutt, R.C. Famines in India London, 1900.
Dutt, R.P. India Today London, 1949-
Dutt, R.P. Britain's Crisis of British Etopire London, 1949- 
Dutt, S.C. Conflicting tendencies in Indian Economic Thought. 
Elgin, Earl, Speeches Calcutta, 1899-
Ensor, R.E.K. Oxford History of England 1870-1914 Oxford, 1936.
Forrest, G.W. The Administration of Lansdovne Calcutta, 1894.
Fovler, E.H. The Life of Lord Wolverhampton London, 1912.
Fraser, A.H.L. Among Indian Rajahs and Ryots London, 19H-
Fraser, L. India Under Curzon and After London, 1911-
Fuller, B. (Sir). Some Personal Experience London, 1930.
Furnivall, J.S. Colonial Policy and Practice Cambridge, 1948.
Gadgi£, D.R. The Industrial Evolution of India Madras, 1933 (ed.).
Gandhi, M.P. The Indian Cotton Textile Industry Calcutta, 1930.
Garth, Richard. Fev plain truths about India London, 1888-
Ghose, H.P. The Nevspaper in India Calcutta,1952.
Ghose, H.P. Press and Press lavs in India Calcutta, 1930-
Ghosh, P.C. The Development of Indian National Congress 1892-1909 
Calcutta, i960.
''Ghosh, Sujata, The British Indian Association CoJiu^*, u Vv
/
Ghose, S.C. Organisation of Railvays Calcutta, 1927.
Ghose, S.C. A Paper on Railvay Economics Calcutta, 1924.
Ghosh, S.C. Lectures on Indian Railvay Economy Calcutta, 1923-
3 6 6
Gokhale, G.K. Speeches 2nd Edition, Madras, 1916.
^Gopal, R. Indian Muslims: A Political History 1859-1947 London, 1959*
Gopal, R. Lokamanya Tilak Bombay, 1956.
^Gopal, S. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon 1880-1884 London, 1953*
Gopal, S. The British Policy in India 1858-1905 Cambridge, 1965-
Gopala Krishnan, P.K. Development of Economic ideas in India, 
1880-1950, New Delhi, 1959.
Griffith, P. The British Impact on India London, 1952.
Gronzel, J. Economic Protectionism Washington, 1916.
Gujral, L.M. Internal Administration of Lord Lytton Unpublished, 
Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1958.
Gupta, J.N. Life end Works of Romesh Chandra Dutt London, 1911.
Halevy, E. A History of the Engli^i People in 1895-1905 vol. Jfr-IV, 
London, 1929.
Hamilton, C.J. Trade Relations between England and India London,
1919.
Hamilton, George (Lord). Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections 
1889-1906, London, 1922.
Hanham, H.J. Elections and Party Management; Politics in the time 
of Disraeli and Gladstone London, 1959*
Hansen, Alvin. Guide to Keynes New York, 1953*
Harris, L. British Policy on the North-Western Frontier, Unpublished, 
Ph.D. Thesis, London, I960.
Hayland, John, S. G.K. Ghokhale Calcutta, 1933*
Hennessy, James Pope. Lord Crewe London, 1955*
Hobson, J.A. Imperialism; A Study London, 1954 (Ed.).
Hoffhiann, W. British Industry 1700-1950.
Holderaess, Sir T.W. People and Problems of India London, 1911.
Illbert,C« The Government of India H I 1-
Imlah, A.H. Economic Elements in the Pax Britanica Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1958.
Imperial Gazetteer of India vols. iii and iv, Oxford, 1907-
Imperial Gazetteer of India (Provincial Series).
Indian National Builders (in three parts) Madras, undated.
Indian National Congress, containing full text of all Presidential 
Addresses, Reprint of all the Congress Resolutions Madras, undated.
Iyer, G.S. Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India 
Madras, 1903.
Iyer, K.V. Indian Railway London, 1924.
Iyer, Ragjlwan. The Glass Curtain between Asia and Europe London, 1965* 
Jain, L.C. Monetary Problems of India London, 1933*
James, R.R. Rosebery London, 1963*
Jathar, G.B. aid Beri, S.G. Indian Economics vol. I, 7th Edition 
(Revised) Madras, 1942.
Jathar, G.B. and Beri, S.G. Indian Economics vol. II, Ninth Edition 
Madras, 1952.
Jenk, L.H. The Migration of British Capital to 1875 New York, 1927*
Joshi, G.V. Writings and Speeches Poona, 1912.
Kale and Ghokhale, G. Ecohomic Reforms Poona, 1916.
Kale, V.G. The Study of Indian Economics Poona, 1917*
Karandikar, S.L. Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak: The Hercules and 
Prometheus of Modem India Poona, 1957*
Karve, D.G. Poverty and Population of India London, 1936.
Keene, H.G. The Great Anarchy or Darkness before Dawn London, 1901.
Kemmerer, E.W. Money London, 1934.
Keynes, J.M. Indian Currency and Finance London, 1924.
Kitson, Clark, G. The Making of the Victorian Ehgland London, 1962.
Knowles, L.C.A. The Economic Development of the British Overseas 
Empire London, 1928.
Kuznets, S. and others. Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan 
Durham, 1955•
Loveday, Alexander. The History and Economics of Indian Famine 
London, 1914.
Lees-Smith, H.B. India and Tariff Problem London, 1909*
Lilley, W.S. India and its Problems London, 1902.
Limaye, P.M. The History of the Deccan Education Society: 1880-1935 
Poona, 1935*
Lipsett, H.C. Lord Curzon in India, 1898-1903 London, 1903*
Lovett, Verney. A History of Indian Nationalist Movement London, 1920.
Low, S. and Sanders, L.C. The Political History of England 1837-1901 
London, 1907*
Lyall, Alfred. The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava 
vol. I and II, London, 1905*
Malhotra, D.K. History and Problems of Indian Currency 1835-1939 
Lahore, 1939*
Malaviya, M.M. Speeches Madras, undated.
Marx and Ehgels, F. On Colonialism, Moscow,undated.
Masani, R.P. Dadabhai Naoroji: The Grand old man of India London, 1939.
Masani, R.P. Britain in India London, i960.
Mclane, J.R. The Development of Nationalist Ideas and Tactics and 
Policies of the Governments of India; 1897-1905 unpublished,
Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1961.
McMinn, C.W. Famine Truths, half Truths London, 1902.
Mehta, S.D. The Cotton Mills of India, 1854-1954 Bombay, 1954.
Merewether, F.H.S. Tour Through the Famine Districts of India 
London, 1897*
Misra, B.B. The Indian Middle Class London, 1961.
363
Moon, P.N. Imperialism and World Politics New York, 1927*
Morrison, T. The Economic Transition in India London, 1928.
Morison, J.L. The Eighth Earl of Elgin, London, 1928.
Morley, John. Life of W.E. Gladstone vol. Ill (188O-I898) London,
1903.
Moulton, E.C. Lord Northbrookfs Indian Administration, 1872-76 
unpublished, Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1964.
Murdoch, John. Famine, Facts and Fallacies London, undated.
Naoroji, D. Poverty and the UnBritish Rule in India London, 1901.
Nash, V. The Great Famine London, 1900.
Natarajanj. History of Indian Journalism. b-eJLu* . IQST*.
Natfian, G.A. Indian Politics Madras, 1898.
Newton Lord. Lansdowne London, 1929*
Nicholson, J.S. Principles of Political Economy London, 1906.
O'Donnell, C.J. The Failure of Lord Curzon: A Study in Imperialism.
An open letter to the Earl of Rosebery London, 1903.
Published under the pseudonym of 'Twenty-eight years in India*•
O'Malley, L.S.S. The Indian Civil Service London, 1931*
O'Malley, L.S. Modern India and the West London, 1941.
Panikar, K.M. Asia and the Western Dominance London, 1953*
Parris, H.W. Government and the Railways London, 1965*
Pearse, A.S. The Cotton Industry of India London, 1930*
Phillips, C.H. Evolution of India and Pakistan. Select Documents fa* 
London, 1962.
Philips, C.H. India London, 1949.
Pillai, P.P. Economic Conditions in India London, 1925*
3 7 0
Ponniah, J.S. Principles of Public Finance Madras, 1930.
Pradhan, G.P. and Bhazat, A.K. Lokmanya Tilak Bombay, 1938.
Prasad, Amba. Indian Railways: History in Public Utility
Administration London, I960.
Prasad, B. The Effects of improved transport upon the distribution 
of industry and population with special reference to India 
unpublished, M.A. Thesis, London, 1934,
Purshotam Das, Thakurdas. Evolution of the Cotton Trade of Bombay 
Bombay, 1947*
Rai, La j pat. Lala La j pat Rai: The Man in his vord Madras, 1907-
Ramanujam, T.V. The Function of State Railways in Indian National 
Economy Madras, 1944.
Ranade, M.C. Essay on Indian Economics Bombay, I898.
Ranchodas, R. and Thakorc, D.K. The Indian Penal Code 3rd 
Edition Bombay, 1905*
Rau, S. (K). The Crisis in India Madras, 1918.
Ray, P. Development in Indian Foreign Trade London, 1934.
Ray, P.O. Indian Famines: Their causes and Remedies Calcutta, 1901.
Redford, A. Manchester merchants and Foreign Trade vol. ii, 
Manchester, 1936.
Reed, Sir S. and Cadell, P.P. India; The New Phase London, 1928.
Rees, J.D. The Real India London, 1908.
Rees, Sir J.D. Modern India London, 1910.
Robinson, R. , Gallaghar, J., Denny, A. Africa and the Victorians 
London, 1961.
Roll, Eric. History of Economic Thought New York, 1946.
Rostow, W.W. , Gayer and Schwartz, The Growth and Fluctuations of 
the British Economy 1790-1830, Oxford, 1933*
Rostow, W.W. The British Economy in the 19th Century Oxford, 1948.
371
Roy, N.C. Indian Civil Service London, 1935*
Rushforth, F.V. The India Exchange Problem London, 1921.
SaklatVala, S.D. History of the Mill Owners* Association Bombay 
Bombay, 1931*
Sanyal, N. Development of Indian Railway Calcutta, 1930.
Sastry, N.S.R. The Statistical Study of Indian Industrial 
Development Bombay, undated.
Saul, S.B. Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1914 London, 1965.
Seal, A. The Emergence of India Nationalism 1885-1915 unpublished, 
Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge, 1962.
Seeley, Sir John. The Expansion of England London, 1883.
*
Shah, K.T. Sixty Years of Indian Finance Bombay, 1921.
Shah, K.T. Trade, Tariff and Transport in India London, 1923*
Shah, K.T. Federal Finance in India Bombay, 1929.
Shah and Khambatta. Wealth and Taxable Capacity in India London, 1924.
Shah, N.J. History of Indian Tariffs Bombay, 1924.
Shirras, G. Findley. Indian Finance and Banking London, 1919-
Singh, H.L. Problems and Policies of the British in India Bombay, 1963
Singh, S.N. Secretary of State and his Council 1859-1919 Delhi, 1962.
Sinha, N.C. Studies In Indo-British Economy Hundred Years Ago 
Calcutta, 1946.
Sitaramaya, B.P. History of Indian National Congress 1885-1935 
Madras, 1935•
Source Materials for a History of the freedom movement in India 
vol. 2, Bombay, 1957*
Spear, P. India: A Modern History Michigan, 1961.
Strachey, John. The End of Bnpire London, 1959-
Strachey, Sir John. India and its Administrative Progress London, 1911
372
Tahmankar, D.V. Lokamanya Tilak London, 1946,
Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 
London, 1959*
Thomas, P.J. The Growth of Federal Finance in India 1833-1939/ toVi
Thomson, S.J. The Silent India London, 1913»
Thompson and Garrett, The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in 
India London, 1934.
Thorbum, His Majesty*s Greatest Subject, L \ V » 7A
Thomer, D. Investment in Empire Philadelphia, 1950.
Towsend, M. Asia and Europe London, 1901,
Tripathi, R.D. Railways in Modern India, Bombay, 1941.
Tyson, G.W. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry 1853-1953 
Calcutta, 1953*
Vakil, C.N. Tariff Policy in India Bombay, 1937*
Vakil, C.N. Economic outlook in Federal India Delhi, 1933*
Vakil, C.N. Financial Developments in Modem India 1860-1924
Bombay, 1925- !
Vakil, C.N. and Munshi, M.C. Industrial Policy of India Bombay,
1934.
Vakil, C.N. and Munshi, M.C. Industrial Policy of India, with special 
reference to custom tariff Calcutta, 1934.
Vakil, C.N. and Muranjan, S.K. Currency and Prices in India 
Bombay, 1927-
Wacha, Dinshaw. Shells from the sands of Bombay Bombay, 1920.
Wacha, Dinshaw. Speeches and Writings Madras, undated.
Wadia, P.A. and Merchant, K.T. Our Economic Problem Bombay, 1946 (ed.).
Walrondyy The Life of Earl of Elgin London, 1872.
373
Wedderbum. Speeches and Writings Madras, 1918.
West, A. Private Diaries of Sir Algernon West London, 1922. 
Wolpert, S.A. Tilak and Gokhale California, 1962.
Woodbum, Sir John by his daughter London, undated.

Ky%
> o*3oo
po
I
4
i
r
CO
1
0
4 *
£
H
J *
* r  
A r
h o  
v;
OJ
* Z
»u —•
\-Z
« 4:
^U.
! >
7 O
-i
- ho* k
<yi r/ (f Lu
Vi>
F
£
